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Abstract 
 
 
For the last seventy years the United States of America has been the dominant 
political, economic, military, and cultural influence in the world. Under President 
Obama, this position is being challenged. In politics, academia, and popular media, 
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Introduction 
 
The United States is once again debating its decline. Books with alarming sounding 
titles like After America: Get Ready for Armageddon, Drift, or That Used to Be Us 
regularly feature at the top of the New York Times best sellers lists.1 In leading 
American media and expert publications, from the Washington Post to the National 
Interest, the United States under Barack Obama appears ‘shrunken,’ its foreign 
policy one of ‘weakness’ and ‘retreat’.2 Op-ed columnists, foreign policy experts, 
and pundits warn of China’s territorial claims in the Asia-Pacific, Russian incursions 
into Ukraine, and the multiple crises in the Middle East as dangerous signs that 
American leadership in the world is waning.3 
 
The rest of the world takes notice as well. The headline featuring on the cover of the 
British Economist on March 3, 2014 worriedly asked: “What would America fight 
                                            
1
 Gideon Rachmann, “American Nightmare,” Financial Times, March 16, 2012, accessed June 1, 2014, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/941a0132-6d37-11e1-ab1a-00144feab49a.html#axzz39PtVqDti; Rachel Maddow, 
Drift (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), [New York Times best seller, no. 1, May 06, 2012]; Mark Steyn, After 
America: Get Ready for Armageddon (Washington DC: Regnery, 2011), [New York Times best seller, no. 4, 
August 28, 2011]; Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, That Used To Be Us: How America Fell 
Behind in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011),  
[New York Times best seller, no. 2, October 2, 2011]. 
2
 Frank Bruni, “America the Shrunken,” New York Times, May 3, 2014, accessed June 2, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/opinion/sunday/bruni-america-the-shrunken.html?_r=0; Michael Gerson, 
“Obama’s foreign policy and the risks of retreat,” Washington Post, March 19, 2014, accessed June 2, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-gerson-obamas-foreign-policy-and-the-risks-of-
retreat/2013/03/18/526e9ad6-8ffa-11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239_story.html; Ian Bremmer, “The Tragic Decline of 
American Foreign Policy,” National Interest, April 16, 2014, accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tragic-decline-american-foreign-policy-10264; 
3
 See Michael Cohen, “America stands accused of retreat from its global duties. Nonsense,” Guardian, April 12, 
2014, accessed August 4, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/12/us-foreign-policy-
retreatism-obama-accused-weakness; The Editorial Board, “President Obama and the World,” New York Times, 
May 3, 2014, accessed August 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/opinion/sunday/president-obama-
and-the-world.html; the New York Times editorial board has commented how this criticism of Obama’s foreign 
policy is not limited to the Republican opposition, and conservative circles from Fox News to Charles 
Krauthammer, but includes critics from Democrats as well: “It is tempting to dismiss criticism from right-wing 
Republicans like Senator Ted Cruz, who knows little about foreign policy; from Senator John McCain, who 
knows quite a lot but advocates a military response to almost every crisis; and from former Bush officials. […] 
But there is also powerful criticism from Democrats, liberals and centrists, who fault Mr. Obama’s handling of 
Syria (some want airstrikes, some want more weapons for rebels) and Ukraine (many want weapons for the 
government). His critics are inconsistent in their philosophies and have failed to offer cogent alternatives to Mr. 
Obama’s policies. But the perception — of weakness, dithering, inaction, there are many names for it — has 
indisputably had a negative effect on Mr. Obama’s global standing;” ibid. 
 2 
for?” The foreign and security policy of the Obama administration was summed up 
by a damning verdict: “America is no longer as alarming to its foes, or reassuring to 
its friends.”4 In a similar vein, the English-language Japan Times stated that: “The 
American-led global economic and financial system is broken.” 5  The German 
international broadcaster Deutsche Welle speculated that Barack Obama might be: 
“(…) the first president forced to deal with the U.S.' downgrading from biggest 
superpower to co-player on the world stage.”6 
 
President Obama, it is said by critics, does not have a grand strategy to match 
Franklin D. Roosevelt or Harry S. Truman, who successfully led in similar times of 
geopolitical upheaval and existential threat to the national security of the United 
States.7 Obama in turn repeatedly stated that the United States remained the world’s 
‘indispensable nation’ today, and for the foreseeable future, declaring in the 2012 
State of the Union address that: “Anyone who tells you that America is in decline or 
that our influence has waned, doesn’t know what they are talking about.”8 Here, 
Obama directly referenced an article written by the neoconservative scholar Robert 
Kagan: Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline.9 In Kagan’s view, the 
                                            
4
 “The decline of deterrence,” Economist, May 3, 2014, p. 37. 
5
 Kevin Rafferty, “Where is the global leadership?” Japan Times, November 12, 2013, accessed August 4, 2014, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/11/12/commentary/world-commentary/where-is-the-global-
leadership/#.U9-WrhacIoE.  
6
 Frank Sieren, “Opinion: The world's superpower no more,” Deutsche Welle, July 15, 2014, accessed August 4, 
2014, http://www.dw.de/opinion-the-worlds-superpower-no-more/a-17788131.  
7
 Paul Bonicelli, “Five years is long enough to wait for an Obama grand strategy,” Foreign Policy, May 6, 2013, 
accessed, June 3, 2014, 
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/06/five_years_is_long_enough_to_wait_for_an_obama_grand_str
ategy; William C. Martel, “America’s Grand Strategy Disaster,” National Interest, June 9, 2014, accessed August 
4, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-grand-strategy-disaster-10627.  
8
 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address,” January 24, 2012, accessed August 
12, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address.  
9
 Robert Kagan, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline,” New Republic, January 11, 2012, 
accessed August 4, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-
declinism; before the State of the Union address Obama apparently directly mentioned Kagan’s article to a group 
of journalists, referencing individual points in the text, cf. Josh Rogin, “Obama embraces Romney advisor’s 
theory on ‘The Myth of American Decline’,” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2012, accessed August 4, 2014, 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/26/obama_embraces_romney_advisor_s_theory_on_the_myth_o
 
 3 
liberal world order that has advanced after World War 2, marked by democracy, 
economic prosperity and great power peace depends on America’s global hegemony 
and military supremacy.10 Far from being in decline, the United States has the chance 
to enjoy another two hundred years as the principle power and indispensable 
guarantor of a world order that ‘America made.’ Provided it is willing to continue to 
play the role of ‘liberal hegemon,’ and pursue a grand strategy of global primacy.11  
 
Yet, Kagan notwithstanding, America’s global leadership role is more contested than 
ever. While the presidency of George W. Bush was characterized by frequent debates 
over American empire, U.S. hegemony, and unilateralism, under President Obama 
the discussion appears to have shifted: the days of American unipolarity and ‘hyper-
power’ seem numbered, likely to be replaced by a ‘post-American world.’12 In 
popular media, expert discussions, and official discourses, from Foreign Policy 
magazine to the Center of a New American Security think tank (CNAS), and the 
National Intelligence Council of the United States (NIC), the future of the 
geopolitical order is expected to be defined by the end of American political, military 
                                                                                                                           
f_american_decline; Kagan would later follow up on his article, and the best selling book developed from it, The 
World America Made, to accuse the Obama administration of abandoning America’s global leadership role, and 
to invite instability and the unraveling of a liberal world order. According to Kagan, the negative effects of this 
retrenchment were already visible in Ukraine and Iraq, see Robert Kagan, “Superpowers don’t get to retire,” The 
New Republic, May 26, 2014, accessed June 2, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117859/allure-
normalcy-what-america-still-owes-world. 
10
 Robert Kagan, The World American Made (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012).  
11
 Ibid.  
12
 The term was made famous by the journalist and author in his bestselling book: Fareed Zakaria, The Post-
American World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008). 
 4 
and economic preeminence.13 This results in potentially far-reaching changes to the 
international system, and a redefinition of the role of the United States in the world.14  
Exactly these ‘tectonic shifts’ in the geopolitical landscape let Charles Kupchan 
propose that American grand strategy, the ‘fundamental tenets guiding the nation’s 
statecraft,’ should be reconsidered in the face of a fast changing international order.15 
According to Kupchan, Fareed Zakaria, Zbigniew Brzezinski and others, the United 
States should no longer seek an elusive and unattainable primacy, as promoted by 
Kagan and other neoconservatives, but pursue a grand strategy of cooperative 
engagement and joint global responsibilities.16  
 
In contrast to such liberal visions of engagement, calls for America to ‘come home’ 
are also gaining leverage in the United States. A much reported Pew research poll of 
December 2013 found that among Americans support for global engagement was at a 
historic low. 17  Prominent International Relations (IR) scholars, think tank 
researchers, and American politicians are proposing a grand strategy of ‘restraint’ 
                                            
13
 Cf., Elbridge Colby and Paul Lettow, “Have we hit peak America?,” Foreign Policy, July/August 2014, 
accessed August 5, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/03/have_we_hit_peak_america; 
National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington DC: National Intelligence 
Council, 2012); Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY. Preparing for War in the Robotic Age (Washington 
DC: Center for a New American Security, 2014).  
14
 Whether the result of this geopolitical transition will be a multipolar order, as suggested by Zakaria and others, 
in which the United States will exist as primus inter pares, maintaining a stable, international system in concert 
with others, or if the end of American hegemony will result in a descend into a volatile non-polarity, where no 
group of states or international organizations is responsible for global governance is intensely debated, see for 
example, Charles A. Kupchan, No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Gideon Rachmann, Zero-sum World: Power and Politics After the Crash 
(London: Atlantic Books, 2010); Ian Bremmer, Every Nation for Itself: What Happens When No One Leads the 
World (London: Penguin, 2012).  
15
 Charles A. Kupchan, “Grand Strategy: The Four Pillars of the Future,” Democracy Journal, no. 23, Winter 
2012, accessed August 4, 2014, http://www.democracyjournal.org/23/grand-strategy-the-four-pillars-of-the-
future.php?page=all.   
16
 See for example, Zakaria, The Post-American World, pp. 235-250; Kupchan, No-One’s World, pp. 202-205; 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision (New York: Basic Books, 2012).  
17
 “Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement Slips,” Pew Research Center, December 
3, 2013, accessed August 6, 2014, http://www.people-press.org/2013/12/03/public-sees-u-s-power-declining-as-
support-for-global-engagement-slips/; as the Pew Research Center reported: Currently, 52% say the United States 
“should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.” 
Just 38% disagree with the statement. This is the most lopsided balance in favor of the U.S. “minding its own 
business” in the nearly 50-year history of the measure; ibid; see also Paul Lewis, “Most Americans think U.S. 
should 'mind its own business' abroad, survey finds,” Guardian, December 3, 2013, accessed August 6, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/03/american-public-mind-its-own-business-survey.  
 5 
that would see the United States and its military less engaged in the world, not 
more.18 Decried by their critics as irresponsible ‘isolationists,’ these voices maintain 
that the United States is better served, and kept safe at far less cost, by a foreign and 
security policy of ‘non-interventionism,’ and ‘off-shore balancing.’19 Here, the failed 
interventions of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan serve as cautionary tale 
against illusions of American omnipotence, and the effectiveness of military power 
in world politics.  
 
These insights into the political, academic and media landscape reveal how current 
debates about America’s role in the world, its potential decline, and the significance 
of its global leadership are centered on issues of American grand strategy: what it is, 
what it should be, and if the President of the United States has in fact formulated 
such a geopolitical vision to guide the country into the future, and orient the national 
interest. Grand strategy has been described as the ‘highest form of statecraft.’20 A 
large segment of the foreign policy establishment in the United States, consisting of 
IR scholars, think tank experts, media pundits, diplomats, policymakers, and military 
professionals, sees grand strategy as an essential, intellectual prerequisite for the 
conduct of a successful foreign policy, and the production of national security.21 
                                            
18
 Barry R. Posen, Restraint. A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); 
Christopher A. Preble, The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less 
Prosperous, and Less Free (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Aaron Blake, “The Republican Party likes 
Rand Paul’s foreign policy — at least for now,” Washington Post, June 23, 2014, accessed August 6, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/06/23/how-big-is-the-rand-paul-foreign-policy-wing-of-
the-gop/.  
19
 Stephen M. Walt, “Offshore balancing: An idea whose time has come,” Foreign Policy, November 2, 2011, 
accessed August 4, 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/02/offshore_balancing_an_idea_whose_time_has_come; 
Christopher Layne, “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing,” National Interest, January 27, 2012, 
accessed August 6, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405; 
Daniel Larison, “Noninterventionism: A Primer,” American Conservative, June 11, 2014, accessed August 6, 
2014, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/noninterventionism-a-primer/.  
20
 Hal Brands, What good is Grand Strategy? (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 1.  
21
 See for example, Patrick Doherty, “A New U.S. Grand Strategy,” January 9, 2013, accessed August 6, 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/09/a_new_U.S._grand_strategy; Mr. Y, A National Strategic 
 
 6 
Without a grand strategy in turn, the United States is expected to risk its dominant 
place in the world, inviting national decline and the unraveling of the liberal world 
order ‘America made’ after World War II.22 As one author in this rationalist-
materialist discourse exemplary stated, without a grand strategy: “(…) the nation, its 
leaders, and people will experience a sense of drift and confusion.”23  
 
The lasting allure of grand strategy to its supporters is that it is supposed to clearly 
identify and prioritize external threats, allocate resources toward the pursuit of the 
national interest, and integrate a nation’s means of power into a coherent and 
consistent framework of thought and action. In this dominant materialist and 
positivist understanding, grand strategy exists as logical-rationalist calculation of 
means and ends, input and output. It is intrinsically linked to the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of neoliberalism and neoliberalism and their 
conceptualization of power, hegemony, security and world order, which dominate 
academic discourses of International Relations and the formal expertise on national 
security and geopolitics in the United States.24  
                                                                                                                           
Narrative (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011); Shawn Brimley and Michèle A. Flournoy, eds, 
Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy, (Washington DC: Center for a New American Security, 
2008); Richard Fontaine and Kirstin M. Lord, eds, America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration 
(Washington DC: Center for a New American Security, 2012); Daniel W. Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand 
Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011): pp. 57-67; “American Grand Strategy,” Diplomat, accessed August 6, 
2014, http://thediplomat.com/tag/american-grand-strategy/; “American Grand Strategy,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, November 5, 2013, accessed August 6, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/grand-strategy/american-grand-
strategy/p31797; Michael O’Hanlon, “How to Solve Obama's Grand Strategy Dilemma,” Brookings, May 23, 
2014, accessed August 6, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/05/23-obama-grand-strategy-
dilemma-ohanlon; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Does  
Obama have a grand strategy for his second term? If not, he could try one of these,” Washington Post, January 
18, 2013, accessed June 2, 2014,  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/does-obama-have-a-grand-strategy-for-his-second-term-if-not-he-
could-try-one-of-these/2013/01/18/ec78cede-5f27-11e2-a389-ee565c81c565_story.html 
22
 Cf., William C. Martel, “Why America Needs a Grand Strategy,” Diplomat, July 18, 2012, accessed July 28, 
20-14, http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/why-america-needs-a-grand-strategy/.   
23
 Martel, “America’s Grand Strategy Disaster.”  
24
 On this subject, see in particular, Steve Smith, “The discipline of international relations: still an American 
social science?,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2, no. 3 (2000): pp. 374–402; Ole 
Weaver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in 
International Relations,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): pp. 687-727; Steve Smith, “The United 
States and the Discipline of International Relations: ‘Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline’,” International 
 
 7 
To its critics, grand strategy represents an abstract, purely intellectual exercise for 
academic theorists and thinks tankers, without much practical use for policymaking, 
since the realities of world politics are too complex as to be subsumed under one 
coherent narrative.25 While frequently described as vital prerequisite for America’s 
continued success and necessary world leadership, the idealization of grand strategy, 
bordering on fetishization in certain academic and media circles, has occasionally 
met with mild ridicule. As the IR scholar Dan Drezner wryly remarked, every time a 
foreign policy expert devises a new grand strategy for the United States, in hopes of 
becoming the next George F. Kennan, ‘an angel gets its wings.’26 Again other critics, 
in particular realist IR scholars, do not question the premise of grand strategy per se, 
but see the United States pursue a dangerous and misguided strategic course of 
global hegemony and liberal imperialism that has overextended the country’s 
resources, and produced global instability rather than national security.27  
 
Prominent policy makers and practitioners of U.S. national security and foreign 
policy have likewise questioned the actual, practical value of grand strategy. After 
having read the biographies of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, President Bill 
Clinton reportedly rejected the notion that grand strategy was a useful concept 
                                                                                                                           
Studies Review 4, no. 2 (2002): pp. 67-85. This intellectual dominance becomes all the more apparent when 
studying the various syllabi of grand strategy courses currently taught at leading American universities, see for 
example “The Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy and Studies in Grand Strategy Graduate Seminar,” Yale 
University, accessed August 6, 2014, http://iss.yale.edu/grand-strategy-program; and “American Grand Strategy,” 
Duke University, accessed august 8, 2014, http://sites.duke.edu/agsp/.  
25
 Fareed Zakaria, “Stop searching for an Obama Doctrine,” Washington Post, July 6, 2011, accessed August 5, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/stop-searching-for-an-obama-
doctrine/2011/07/06/gIQAQMmI1H_story.html; in the words of Zakaria: “The doctrinal approach to foreign 
policy doesn’t make much sense anymore. […] In today’s multipolar, multilayered world, there is no central 
hinge upon which all American foreign policy rests. Policymaking looks more varied, and inconsistent, as regions 
require approaches that don’t necessarily apply elsewhere;” ibid. 
26
 Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy,” p. 61 
27
 See for example John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” National Interest, December 16, 2010, accessed 
October 24, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=1; Christopher Layne, 
“The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable,” The Atlantic, April 26, 2012, accessed 
October 24, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-
western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/; Posen, Restraint, pp. 24-69. 
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altogether. According to his former advisor Strobe Talbott: “Strategic coherence, he 
[Clinton] said, was largely imposed after the fact by scholars, memoirists and ‘the 
chattering classes’.”28 And in January 2014 President Obama told a reporter of the 
New Yorker that he did not need any new grand strategy: “I don’t really even need 
George Kennan right now (…).”29 What he rather needed, the President continued, 
were ‘the right partners.’30  
 
Obama’s and Drezner’s references to George F. Kennan illustrate how in the United 
States the Cold War period is predominantly seen as a time when the country 
pursued a coherent and consistent national grand strategy, -containment-, widely 
credited for winning the superpower confrontation with the Soviet Union, and 
securing an unprecedented American unipolarity in the international system. As one 
author has remarked: “This period was remarkable for the deep consensus in U.S. 
society and among our allies on the overall direction of our grand strategy.”31  
 
Today, in American politics, academia and popular media, the concept of grand 
strategy continues to dominate the geopolitical imagination. A growing number of 
research papers, op-ed articles, popular books, university programs, public speeches 
and policy documents on the subject testify to its lasting allure. Yet, under President 
Obama American grand strategy is perhaps more controversially discussed than ever, 
revealing a widening rift within the foreign policy establishment, and between elites 
                                            
28
 Quoted in Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 
2002), p. 113. 
29
 Quoted in David Remnick, “Going the Distance,” New Yorker, January 27, 2014, accessed August 4, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-2?currentPage=all.  
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Martel, “Why America Needs a Grand Strategy.” 
 9 
and the wider public about what America’s role in the world should be. The 
consensus of grand strategy has fractured. 
 
A critical research perspective of grand strategy 
 
Conventionally understood, an American grand strategy envisions how the United 
States should best use its various means of power, - military, economic, political – to 
achieve its desired ends: national security, economic prosperity, and a liberal 
international order of free trade, great power peace, and the rule of law.32 Studies 
following such a conceptualization are mainly interested in measuring grand strategy 
in terms of input and output, success and failure.  
 
Operating from a critical research perspective however, this thesis is concerned with 
the interlinkage of geopolitical identity, understood as a dominant representation of 
the role and position of the United States in world politics, and political practices in 
national security that reconstitute this identity. Hegemony, engagement and restraint 
in short are not just different, and essentially neutral tools for the application of 
American power in the world, but competing visions for ‘America.’33  
 
                                            
32
 For a range of definitions on grand strategy that follow this basic conceptualization, see for example Robert J. 
Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of 
Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Change in American 
Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Posen, Restraint; David S. McDonough, “Grand 
Strategy, Culture, and Strategic Choice: A Review,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 13, no. 4 (2011): 
pp. 1-33. 
33
 In staying with the mainstay of U.S. discourses it investigates, the thesis uses the terms ‘America’ and ‘United 
States’ interchangeably. While this is done for stylistic purposes, and to authentically reproduce the discourse, the 
author is aware that this reflects a geopolitical imagination that is in itself an expression of hegemony, which 
equalizes U.S. identity with ‘America,’ ignoring the other ‘Americans’ of Central and South America.   
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Beyond the idea of grand strategy as calculation of material means and ends, lies an 
ideational dimension of fundamental convictions of truth about the nature of 
international order, the usefulness of military power, and the character of a nation, its 
history and purpose. Hence, the thesis moves the realm of vision and imagination 
into the center of attention. It examines the geopolitical reality hegemony, 
engagement and restraint describe, the historic narratives they employ, the identity 
constructs they rely on, and the political implications of their competing visions for 
America’s role in the world. The study of grand strategy then is about the mindset 
that structures our thinking and orients political action.  
 
Reflected in visions of grand strategy are competing worldviews of neoconservatism, 
realism, libertarianism, and liberalism, as well as notions of nationalism, militarism 
and imperialism that reveal the fundamental political nature of the construction and 
operation of knowledge in world politics. Grand strategy then, usually understood as 
rationalist blueprint for the use of material power and the allocation of resources, is 
in fact an expression of conviction about how the world works, and what a country’s 
role in it should be. Grand strategy is a worldview. 
 
A key assumption brought forward by the conventional literature is that grand 
strategy, in order to function must provide a coherent and consistent vision to align 
means and ends.34 This assumes a reductionist logic that reduces the external 
complexity of international relations and geopolitics to a ‘big picture’ that prioritizes 
                                            
34
 Cf., Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 
21, no. 3 (1996/1997): pp. 5-53; Stephen D. Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment 
(Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005); Peter Feaver, “What is grand strategy and why do we need it?” 
Foreign Policy, April 8, 2009, accessed August 16, 2014, 
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it; Brands 
writes: “(…) a grand strategy is a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in 
the world, and how it should go about doing so.” Brands, p. 3;    
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threats, and provides a single-minded framework of reference to orient a 
government’s actions in national security and foreign policy.  
 
A critical research analysis of hegemony, engagement, and restraint is an 
investigation into the durability of geopolitical knowledge, and whether a trajectory 
of continuity or change can be established for the foreign and security policy of the 
Obama administration by looking at which American grand strategy has been 
dominant in providing the ‘big picture,’ and indeed if such a coherent and consistent 
vision of national security still exists in today’s America. Beyond that, a critical 
perspective also re-politicizes grand strategy by reframing it from a neutral, scientific 
process of examination of material conditions, to a process of reality production, 
infused with political agendas, ideological convictions, and meta-theoretical 
dispositions.  
 
The critical reconceptualization underling the research is that American grand 
strategy is manifest in a multitude of discourses, between popular culture, academic 
expertise, and political decision-making, which interlink representations of 
geopolitical identity, and practices of national security that confirm, but also contest 
a dominant worldview, resulting in competing geopolitical visions. If the established 
construct of geopolitical identity is contested by national security policies, this 
affects the political credibility of the dominant grand strategy discourse, which can 
no longer provide the narrative of national coherence and consistency it is supposed 
to perform.  
 
Under Obama, ‘American exceptionalism,’ ‘leading from behind,’ and ‘nation-
building at home’ all exist in a complex and uneasy compromise, simultaneously 
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confirming, reformulating, and contesting the established geopolitical identity of 
American leadership. In a puzzle to the conventional literature however, this does not 
actually signal the absence of grand strategy thinking so much as the presence of 
multiple grand strategies, which simultaneously inform national security policy. This 
in turn questions the significance of coherence and consistency, entailed in the 
conventional understanding of grand strategy.  
 
Research question 
 
The key issue then is not if the United States pursues the right or the wrong grand 
strategy, measurable in resources and outcomes, but how discourses of grand 
strategy structure the national debate on geopolitics and national security, and the 
political implications of this dominant discourse of identity construction. The 
question of grand strategy is a question of how ‘America’ thinks about itself, its role 
in the world, and how political actions confirm or contest this dominant self-
conception. Hence, the primary research questions the thesis tries to answer is:  
 
How did the Obama administration connect its national security policy to a 
geopolitical vision of America’s role and position in the world, and how did this 
reflect an American grand strategy? 
 
Research statement 
 
The aim of the research presented here is to make an original contribution to 
knowledge by examining the political significance of normative assumptions, 
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historic narratives, and geopolitical imaginations that are normally unspoken, or go 
unchecked, for the formulation of foreign and security policy. To paraphrase Rob 
Walker, the meaning of terms such as ‘security’, ‘strategy’, or ‘threat’ is mediated by 
complex cultural codes which strategic analysts are themselves only partly aware. 35 
A discursive understanding of grand strategy addresses these ‘blind spots’ missed by 
the positivist literature.  
 
To gain an understanding into the political implications of these ideational factors, 
the thoughts and actions that constitute a geopolitical vision of national security as a 
dominant worldview, is the interpretive value of discourses of grand strategy. This 
suggests that the central intellectual problem does not lie in what American grand 
strategy actually achieves, or is supposed to achieve in the minds of strategists, but 
rather in investigating how grand strategy functions as expression of a national 
construct of geopolitical identity that is interlinked with practices of national 
security.  
 
To its proponents, grand strategy is an interpretive device for the understanding of 
external reality and the orientation of political action. Yet, at the same time, their 
visions of grand strategy create the very reality they seek to explain through them. 
To uncover how discourses of American grand strategy produce and reproduce the 
reality of national security and geopolitics they are devised to analyze is the critical 
inversion undertaken by the thesis.  
 
 
                                            
35
 Cf., R.B.J. Walker “History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations,” in International Theory: 
Critical Investigations, ed. James Der Derian (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 330. 
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Theoretical background 
 
Operating from a Foucauldian understanding of power/knowledge in the construction 
of political and social reality, the thesis thereby integrates a critical, intertextual 
analysis of representations and practices of geopolitical identity and national security 
into a cross-discursive research design that moves beyond both the materialism and 
positivism of conventional research, and the textual bias of critical geopolitics.36 A 
critical perspective allows the thesis to analyze grand strategy primarily through the 
spatial and temporal constructs of geopolitical imagination that are expressed in 
various discourses, and that establish it as dominant knowledge. In the words of 
Michael Shapiro: 
A critical political perspective is […] one that questions the privileged forms 
of representation whose dominance has led to the unproblematic acceptance 
of subjects, objects, acts, and themes  through which the political world is 
constructed.37 
 
This locates the thesis theoretically and methodologically within a post-positivist 
research design that seeks an interpretive rather than an explanatory understanding of 
grand strategy. In its conceptualization of discourse, the thesis draws from literature 
in critical security studies, and in particular critical geopolitics. As explained by 
Gearóid Tuathail and John Agnew: 
Geopolitics […] should be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by 
which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as 
                                            
36
 On power/knowledge, see Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972-
1977. (New York: Pantheon, 1977); for its conceptualization in the study of International Relations, see 
especially Jenny Edkins, Poststructuralism & international relations: Bringing the political back in. (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 52-64. The key theoretical and methodological elements of critical geopolitics are 
presented in: Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds, Rethinking Geopolitics (New 
York: Routledge, 1998). For the problem of intertextuality and materiality in critical research and discourse 
analysis, see for example Tom Lundborg and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “New Materialisms, discourse analysis, 
and International Relations: a radical intertextual approach,” Review of International Studies (forthcoming 2015).  
37
 Michael J. Shapiro, “Textualizing Global Politics,” in International/Intertextual Relations, ed. James Der 
Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (New York: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 13. 
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to represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples, 
and dramas.38 
 
In a similar vein David Campbell has redefined foreign policy as practice of security 
that is engaged in the writing and rewriting of identity through discourse, separating 
the American ‘Self’ from the threatening ‘Other.’39 Grand strategy then should be 
understood as discursive practice that constructs the reality of national security and 
geopolitics by representing a spatialized American ‘Self’ against the non-American 
‘Other’ in the rest of the world through a series of interlinked texts, produced by 
influential voices and elites, operating in various networks of power/knowledge.40  
 
However, beyond a strict focus on representations and the rules under which these 
representations gain leverage, legitimacy, and power, the thesis also considers the 
practices that materialize grand strategy and that are interlinked with the formulation 
of geopolitical identity. Here, box office results and sales figures of best selling 
books provide measures for mapping prevalent grand strategy discourses, and their 
performance in American popular culture. In the realm of formal expertise, the thesis 
considers the impact factor and influence rankings of IR journals, and Washington 
think tanks to map the most significant voices that provide intellectual expertise on 
American grand strategy.  
 
Finally, in the discursive realms of U.S. defense planning and political decision-
making, the materialism of the Pentagon budget and American military intervention 
                                            
38
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American 
foreign policy,” Political Geography 11, no. 2 (1992): p. 192. 
39
 David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992, revised edition 1998). 
40
 On the of significance of intertextuality, and the performance of national security discourses, see in particular: 
Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 
55-73; Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), see also Jennifer Milliken, ”The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
Methods,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no.2 (1999): pp. 225-254. 
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is closely integrated with representations of geopolitical identity that again point to 
the wider, practical implication of discourse, beyond the writing and re-writing of 
identity to address the dimension of political action. American grand strategy then is 
not only about textually defining who the United States is and what threats it faces, 
but also about the actions and processes through which an American worldview 
operates and becomes reality, from the production of Hollywood films to the staffing 
of top positions in defense bureaucracies in Washington DC.  
 
Methodology 
 
The thesis argues that American grand strategy is an ideational concept that provides 
the United States with a dominant understanding of the national self within a world-
political context. This construction of geopolitical identity however cannot be the 
result of an isolated process of policy-decision making, or strategic defense planning 
if it is to successfully articulate the ‘national’ interest, and provide the ‘big picture’ 
for Americans to grasp. Hence, in order to map out the dominant discourse of grand 
strategy and its main contenders, the thesis will widen the scope of research beyond 
what is traditionally the content of grand strategy analysis, to include multiple sites 
of discursive production, from popular culture, to academic expertise and policy 
research, and political-practical decision-making. This offers a unique 
multidimensional, and carefully researched analysis into the mutual constitution of 
power and knowledge within and between discursive fields. This intertextual 
analysis explores in detail how dominant constructs of reality are built and rebuilt 
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through the interlinking of popular, formal, and practical discourses.41 The analytical 
conclusions of the thesis will thus be validated through a cross-discursive approach 
of intertextual analysis that combines six distinctive sites of discourse production, 
surveyed over a six-and-a-half year period between January 2009 and August 2014: 
The cinematic production of national security in top-grossing Hollywood movies; 
New York Times non-fiction best sellers on grand strategy and geopolitics; the 
formulation of grand strategy expertise in the top ranked American IR journal 
Foreign Affairs; the policy research on national security by seven of the most 
influential Washington think tanks; strategy and defense policy planning in the U.S. 
Department of Defense; and finally the formulation of a geopolitical vision of 
national security by President Barack Obama in official speeches, statements, and 
strategy documents.  
 
The individual discursive sites chosen for analysis are further detailed at the 
beginning of each individual chapter in terms of source selection, discursive 
performance and intertextual position. Methodologically, the selection of sources has 
been concerned in particular with the representation of geopolitical identity and the 
linkage of these identity constructs to practices of national security in the context of 
power/knowledge, and the intertextual connections between them. The materiality of 
sales figures and impact rankings have been used in particular as criteria for a 
mapping of dominant popular and formal discourses. In the realm of popular culture, 
                                            
41
 A description of popular, formal, and practical geopolitics as different sites of the production, distribution and 
consumption of geopolitical discourses is provided by Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, “Introduction: 
Rethinking Geopolitics,” in Rethinking Geopolitics, pp. 4-5; here practical geopolitics describes the discursive 
practices of ‘state leaders and foreign policy bureaucracies,’ formal geopolitics refers to the ‘strategic 
community’ and ‘intellectuals of statecraft,’ and popular geopolitics considers the ‘artifacts of transnational, 
popular culture,’ found in ‘mass-market magazines, novels, or movies,’ ibid., p. 4. The thesis will loosely follow 
this basic categorization in its analysis of American grand strategy, examined in the separate but interrelated 
discursive fields of popular culture, academic expertise and policy research, and defense planning and 
policymaking.  
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the thesis examines highest grossing films and non-fiction best sellers in particular 
due to the wide spectrum of popular discourse and intertextuality they reflect, while 
they both combine entertainment and politics in creating popular visions of 
America’s role in the world.   
 
Here, the established Pentagon-Hollywood liaison, dating as far back as World War 
2, works exemplary as discursive link that connects the sites of common sense 
knowledge and everyday experience and policy making. This extends to both the use 
of ideational constructs of identity and the practical aspect of cooperation. Hence, the 
thesis also considers how the Pentagon works with film productions in terms of 
equipment provided, going beyond only textual and representational issues. Non-
fiction best sellers have been chosen in particular since these works bridge the realm 
of entertainment with the discursive sites of journalism and popular media, academic 
expertise, or policy making. Hence, it is the fusion of the status of expert or 
practitioner together with the popularity of the texts examined that makes these 
artifacts such a valuable source for intertextual examination.  
 
The main consideration for selection has thus been popular-practical and popular-
formal discursive connectivity, where other works in critical security studies and 
critical geopolitics such as Stuart Croft’s Culture Crisis and America’s War on 
Terror or François Debrix’s Tabloid Geopolitics have featured a wider and deeper 
reading of culture and popularity. Croft for example has included TV shows, jokes, 
religion, billboard signs and many more aspects of American everyday experience in 
his reconstruction of the discursive intervention that led from 9/11 to the War on 
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Terror.42 Debrix on the other side has examined how the tabloid mediatization of 
fear, anxiety and insecurity has been the defining discursive feature in U.S. politics 
and foreign policy. 43 Yet, this thesis argues that it is less an all-encompassing 
cultural attitude or feature that dominates U.S. grand strategy discourse.  Rather, it 
seems that in the interconnected and mutually co-constituting reality producing 
discursive sites of popular culture, academic expertise and policy-making 
geopolitical visions about America’s role in the world are constantly competing with 
each other, but also within discursive sites in defining the ‘big picture.’  
 
As part of this cross-discursive and intertextual analysis, original research has also 
been undertaken by the author through a series of interviews in the United States. 
This field work has added a further critical dimension of data collection and 
interpretation to the intertextual analysis, interviewing individuals who as authors, 
experts and practitioners have been influential voices on American grand strategy 
under Obama, within and across discursive domains. 44   
 
On the one hand, interviews where chosen in particular to examine how particular 
‘experts’ in different discursive sites identified American grand strategy and how 
these views corresponded with their respective texts on the subject. With the experts 
that were successfully approached for an interview, interest was also on how, beyond 
                                            
42
 Cf., Croft, Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror, pp. 9-14.  
43
 François Debrix, Tabloid Terror. War, Culture and Geopolitics (Abingdon and New York: 2008, Routledge), 
pp. 1-18.   
44
 Among the people interviewed for the thesis are the best-selling author and IR scholar Andrew Bacevich, the 
former staff member of the National Security Council (NSC) and current executive vice president and director of 
studies of the Center of a New American Security (CNAS) think tank Shawn Brimley, the former special 
assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Col. ret. Mark ‘Puck’ Mykleby, and Col. Greg 
Schultz, chairman of the Department of Strategy and Policy at the National War College (NWC) of the United 
States, located at the National Defense University (NDU). Furthermore, the respective directors of foreign and 
security policy research at the Cato Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Brookings Institute, 
Christopher Preble, Thomas Donnelly, and Michael O’Hanlon have been interviewed for the thesis.  
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their own ideas for American grand strategy, they assessed the Obama White House 
and its geopolitical vision for America. These expert interviews thus serve as 
supplementary sources for data collection and analysis that accompany the primary 
discourse analysis undertaken by the thesis. They have offered some valuable 
additional insights in this context. In particular noteworthy here are Shawn Brimley’s 
comments and personal experience on the ‘rotating door’ connecting the White 
House, the Pentagon and think tanks, or Mark Mykleby’s and Greg Schultz’s 
elaboration on the military ‘thinking’ of grand strategy, and the many think tank 
experts that alluded to the Washington consensus of national security. 
 
The research design presented here thus provides a comprehensive and rich scope of 
content data to explore, and depict the confirmation and contestation of geopolitical 
identity, the interlinkage of identity and national security, and the discursive 
performance and political significance of American grand strategy under the Obama 
presidency. 
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Figure 1. Model of discourse analysis 
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Chapter outline 
 
In terms of the thesis structure, chapter one will first provide a detailed introduction 
into the concepts of grand strategy and geopolitics, and their conventional 
conceptualization in IR literature. This is juxtaposed with the main theoretical and 
methodological perspectives developed by the literature in critical security studies 
and critical geopolitics, which have provided the principle framework for the 
discourse analysis based research design. A special focus lies on a detailed 
exploration of the key critical concepts of power/knowledge, discourse, 
intertextuality, and identity the thesis has applied to the study of American grand 
strategy under the Obama presidency.  
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In chapters two and three, the thesis will focus on popular culture as site for the 
production of dominant geopolitical knowledge and conventional wisdom, 
examining Hollywood films that feature themes of national security (chapter 2), and 
popular non-fiction books on grand strategy and geopolitics, featured on the New 
York Times best sellers list (chapter 3). Here, the thesis focuses on the cultural 
construction of a geopolitical identity of American leadership, military supremacy 
and national exceptionalism, and how popular representations confirm or contest this 
construct of the American ‘Self’ in the context of national security and world 
politics.  
 
A critical textual analysis and deconstructive reading of popular representations and 
narratives located with Hollywood movies and New York Times bestsellers allows 
the thesis to create a basic categorization of U.S. grand strategy discourses from the 
‘ground up’.45 This approach to discourse analysis inverts the one undertaken for 
example by Lena Hansen.46 Rather than using popular culture to intertextually link 
up to representations of identity already established through the analysis of political 
and media discourses, the ‘everyday’ of popular culture serves as discursive location 
to map out and identify the key themes, representations and narratives of national 
security and geopolitics in the popular imagination.  
 
Together with the ‘national security cinema’ and its regular reproduction of a popular 
geopolitical imagination of American exceptionalism, heroism, and militarism in 
films such as Battleship and Act of Valor, works like Kagan’s The World America 
                                            
45
 Cf., Milliken, p. 234. 
46
 Cf., Hansen, pp. 59-64. 
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Made, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Strategic Vision, and Andrew Bacevich’s Washington 
Rules appear as exemplary voices that defend, reformulate, or negate a hegemonic 
identity of American leadership in basic grand strategy discourses of hegemony, 
engagement and restraint.  
 
From the mapping of basic grand strategy discourses in the popular realm, the 
analysis then continues through more formal modes of discourse. In chapters four 
and five the thesis will analyze the realm of academic debate and policy research that 
provides the dominant intellectual expertise on issues of grand strategy and national 
security within the American foreign policy establishment. Here, the thesis first 
engages in a comprehensive analysis of the grand strategy debate contained in the 
pages of Foreign Affairs (chapter 4), which represents a leading elite publication that 
bridges the presentation and debate of scholarly research and the policy oriented 
writing of experts and political practitioners. Chapter four also introduces the 
concept of ‘hybrid discourses’ of hegemonic engagement and hegemonic restraint, 
which reproduce the dominant representation of a geopolitical identity of American 
leadership, exceptionalism, and military supremacy, while articulating practices that 
partially reformulate, and negate this hegemonic role, such as the liberal concept of 
‘deep engagement,’ and realist concepts of ‘offshore balancing’.  
 
In chapter five, the thesis will investigate the grand strategy proposals by some of the 
leading think tanks operating in Washington DC, demonstrating how their nominally 
impartial, and independent research reveals a dominant, bipartisan 
neoconservative/liberal-internationalist consensus of hegemony that further 
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underlines the intertextual, and practical interconnection between, research expertise, 
professional knowledge, and policymaking.  
 
Finally, the analysis will investigate the center of political-practical discourses of 
grand strategy, national security and defense policy planning located with the U.S. 
Department of Defense (chapter 6) and President Barack Obama (chapter 7), who 
functions as supreme architect of grand strategy and main representative of U.S. 
national security and foreign policy. Here, the thesis will examine how constructs of 
geopolitical identity, and basic and hybrid discourses of grand strategy that have 
been established through the previous mapping of popular and formal discourses, are 
translated into political practices and the formulation of a strategic vision of national 
security, as for example in the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review, the 
Strategic Defense Guidance, or the President’s State of the Union addresses.  
 
From this critical analysis of American grand strategy, President Obama emerges as 
a political leader, who has connected its basic, discursive strands of hegemony, 
engagement and restraint into a multidimensional, and inherently conflicted 
geopolitical vision of national security. Under Obama there is an unresolved tension 
between the dominant, cross-discursive and intertextually constructed geopolitical 
vision of American leadership, where the ‘indispensable nation’ is a fixture of 
conventional wisdom, academic expertise, and political-practical reasoning, and a 
national security policy of engagement and restraint concerned with ‘burden sharing’ 
and ‘nation-building at home.’ So far, a grand strategy of ‘leading from behind’ has 
failed to resolve this tension, and could not forge a new consensus on America’s role 
in the world.  
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1. Reimagining grand strategy – From Clausewitz to critical geopolitics 
 
The basic idea of grand strategy is that it functions as a guideline for the national 
interest. It is supposed to provide an answer to the question about a country’s role in 
the world, and to dedicate a nation’s power and resources toward achieving the goals 
the strategy sets out.47 There is a substantial amount of literature in International 
Relations research built around this dominant understanding of grand strategy, and 
how it orients military power toward the goal of national security, predominantly in 
great power case studies and comparative analyses, largely based on realist/neorealist 
theoretical assumptions on structural anarchy and power distribution as explanation 
for grand strategy.48 Liberal institutionalism and social constructivism have provided 
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 See for example: Colin Dueck, “Realism, Culture and Grand Strategy: Explaining America’s Peculiar Path to 
World Power,” Security Studies 14, no. 2, (2005): pp. 195-231; Shawn Brimley and Michelle Flournoy state that: 
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should it rank them in importance. [...] How should states reconcile limited national resources with competing 
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and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 19. In contemporary International 
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while variations exist, most definitions stress the long-term planning of national security as the end, and military 
and economic power as the means of grand strategy. For further definitions of grand strategy and the equivalent 
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Naval Institute Press, 1973); and Robert J. Art, “A Defensible Defence: America’s Grand Strategy,” International 
Security 15, no. 4 (1991): pp. 5-53. 
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 Examples for neorealist perspectives on grand strategy include: John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); Art, A Grand Strategy for America; Robert J. Art 
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Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). Further 
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Imperial China, and the great powers in World War I and Word War II, cf., Edward Luttwak, The grand strategy 
of the Roman Empire from the first century AD to the third (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976); Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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alternative perspectives that have stressed the domestic impact on grand strategy by 
cultural, political and economic factors rather than the external pressure of the 
international system.49 Numerous neoclassical realist studies of grand strategy have 
lately attempted to fuse both perspectives by using domestically constituted cultural 
variables to fine-tune the analysis of grand strategy outcomes. 50  However, by 
committing to a positivist epistemology and ontology, the conventional IR literature 
on grand strategy has omitted issues of identity, narrative and discourse, which from 
a critical research perspective are essential components for understanding the 
construction of intellectual concepts such as ‘national security,’ and ‘geopolitics’ as 
political and social reality.  
 
Part I Grand strategy 
Strategy and grand strategy  
 
Charles Hill in his fascinating account of classical literature’s insight into 
International Relations writes: “Literature lives in the realm grand strategy requires, 
beyond rational calculation, in acts of the imagination.”51 In a similar vein, Lawrence 
Freedman, who produced a seminal work on the history of strategy as an intellectual 
                                                                                                                           
2009); Arthur Ferrill, Roman imperial grand strategy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991); Alastair Iain 
Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995); Samuel R. Williamson Jr., The politics of grand strategy: Britain and France prepare 
for war, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1969); Grand Strategy (Multiple Volumes): N. H. 
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 For a neoliberal reading of grand strategy, see: John G. Ikenberry, “American Grand Strategy in the Age of 
Terror,” Survival 43, no. 4 (2001): pp. 19-34. In constructivism an exemplary study has been: Johnston, Cultural 
Realism; see also, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds, The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993). 
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 Neoclassical realist analyses of grand strategy have been included: Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders; Layne, Peace 
of Illusions; Samuels, Securing Japan; and Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge.  
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 Charles Hill, Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order (New Haven, London: Yale University 
Press, 2010), p. 6. 
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concept, pointed to the central importance of communication and narratives in the 
operation of strategy. He defined strategy as: “(…) a story about power told in the 
future tense from the perspective of a leading character.”52 These interpretations of 
the concept of strategy demonstrate how a reconceptualization of grand strategy as 
product of discourse and formation of power/knowledge reflects a wider interest in 
the social sciences to open up debates about state behavior beyond the rigidities of 
positivism and rationalism, to include the realms of imagination, beliefs, and 
identities.53 
 
The original idea of grand strategy as a higher level of strategic planning goes back 
to the writings of British and American military thinkers and scholars of foreign 
relations, notably J.F.C. Fuller, Edward Mead Earle, and Basil Liddell Hart, and 
gained prominence in the 1940s and 1950s.54 Hart described the role of grand 
strategy as “(…) to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of 
nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined 
by fundamental policy.”55 While still mainly concerned with the Clausewitzian 
definition of strategy, and achieving victory in war, Hart had made an important step 
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 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A history (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 609. 
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 Carl von Clausewitz, one of the most profound thinkers about strategy and war likewise insisted that the proper 
understanding of strategy required the appreciation of human experience, creativity and intuition. Strategy for 
Clausewitz was never just a rational calculation of power and material capabilities, but about what goes on inside 
the mind, the ‘coup d’oeil,’ and how humans perceive their environment and react to it, cf. Carl von Clausewitz, 
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ultimate goal of strategy is therefore a political outcome, not just military victory on the battlefield; see ibid., pp. 
26-28. 
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 Brands, p. 2. 
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 Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp. 335-336. 
 28 
towards the refinement of grand strategy by including military and non-military 
sources of power.56 Grand strategy was more than the use of tactical engagements on 
the battlefield by politicians and generals; it was the use of national power in total 
and should take into account the broader national interest for peace after war. 
Ultimately, the understanding of grand strategy would move beyond the sole purpose 
of war. As Earle explained:  
The highest type of strategy – sometimes called grand strategy – is  that which 
so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is 
either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of 
victory.57  
 
Over time, grand strategy had come to define the planning and usage of a nation’s 
power for national security.58 Based on different ideal type scenarios of how a state 
can employ its power to achieve security in the international system, the respective 
IR literature provides a categorization of grand strategy, listing the various strategic 
choices available to the United States, which dominates as the research subject of 
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 According to Hart, grand strategy “(…) should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of 
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with the use of military power for countering existential threats, preserving the territorial integrity of the nation 
and guaranteeing the autonomy of action of political decision-makers by allowing them to operate free from 
outside coercion, cf. traditional definitions in Barry Buzan, Peoples, States, and Fear: The National Security 
Problem in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1983), pp. 16-17. As the thesis will elaborate in the 
subsequent chapters, in the discourse of American grand strategy, ‘national security’ is constructed around a more 
expansive geopolitical vision that includes for example, the maintenance of a liberal, international order under 
U.S. stewardship as vital security interest of the United States. As with ‘national security,’ ‘power’ in these grand 
strategy categorizations follows a traditional understanding as: “(…) the ability to effect the outcomes you want 
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attractiveness of values, ideas, and practices to influence events through persuasion and attraction, for example 
mediated through cultural diplomacy, international institutions or popular entertainment, on hard vs. soft power 
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power, Colin S. Gray, Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in 
the 21st Century (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011). 
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interest.59 These ideal type scenarios, evaluating various options of strategic choice 
available to rational actors, reveal the dominant materialist understanding of grand 
strategy in International Relations. The end (national security, peace, prosperity) 
stays consistent over time, it is how coercively, cooperatively or passively means of 
power (predominantly military force) are used towards this end that define grand 
strategy.  
 
Grand strategy in International Relations: Realists vs. the rest  
 
The contemporary and historical interest in grand strategy has traditionally been tied 
to states that were, or are considered great powers.60 This emphasis on power also 
explains the original dominance of realist and neorealist theories of international 
relations in the study of grand strategy. “Perhaps the most pervasive assumptions 
underlying contemporary strategy are those which are associated with the theory of 
political behavior known as ‘realism’,” as John Garnett has explained.61 
 
Following the basic conceptualization of neorealism, laid down by Kenneth Waltz, 
states are functionally identical actors, only differentiated by the distribution of 
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 Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman for example suggest three possible alternatives for American grand 
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 John Garnett, “Strategic Studies and its assumptions,” in Contemporary Strategy, ed. John Baylis et al. 
(London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 9. 
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power among them, sharing the ultimate goal to guarantee their survival. Operating 
under the structural anarchy of the international system they try to maximize their 
security by maintaining a favorable balance of power, which in a zero-sum game 
brings them into constant competition with each other.62 John Mearsheimer went 
beyond Waltz’s more defensive articulation of structural realism, stating that states 
seek to maximize their relative power at the expense of others.63 For offensive 
realism every great power ultimately pursues a grand strategy of regional hegemony; 
to become so powerful that it becomes unassailable by the remaining competitors in 
the international system.64 For realists, military power is the key determinant of 
grand strategy.65  
 
The neorealist model while highly influential has been widely criticized as too static 
and deterministic to allow for variation in grand strategy choices, and to be too 
inconsistent with developments after the end of the Cold War.66 Lately, the realist 
analysis of grand strategy has turned to neoclassical realism as an alternative that 
maintains a commitment to the centrality of material power and external pressure, 
while it includes an additional input of cultural influences and domestic politics.67 In 
this view, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism can serve as supplements to 
the basic neorealist assumptions underlying International Relations.68 To neoclassical 
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realists grand strategy is still fundamentally about power, security and survival and 
defined by means and ends, but within this context strategic choice is also influenced 
by economic and cultural variables that allow for different perceptions of and 
preferences for a particular grand strategy. “From a neoclassical realist perspective, 
cultural factors can help to specify and explain the final choices made by foreign 
policymakers.”69  
 
Colin Dueck employs neoclassical realism in his study of American grand strategy, 
demonstrating how classical liberal assumptions and a historical preference for 
limited liability in strategic affairs are two persistent features of strategic culture that 
help explain the strategic adjustment of the United States after the two World Wars 
and the end of the Cold War.70 The result, according to Dueck, is a grand strategy of 
liberal internationalist goals and limited means, resulting in a continuous gap of 
capabilities and commitments.71  
 
Christopher Layne arrives at quite the contrary result, when he states that the grand 
strategy of the United States has been marked by an on-going quest for extra-
regional hegemony, not constrained by a cultural inclination towards limited means, 
but rather following a domestically based ideological and economic logic of 
                                                                                                                           
“Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): pp. 144-172. Such a 
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expansionism, symbolized in the ‘Open Door’ policy towards China.72 The goal of 
American grand strategy is therefore: “(…) an international system, or ‘world order’, 
made up of states that are open and subscribe to the United States’ liberal values and 
institutions and that are open to U.S. economic penetration.” 73  These two 
diametrically opposed readings nonetheless agree in one key aspect: American grand 
strategy is not just the maintenance of a narrowly defined national security through 
military force, but the universalism of American liberalism and the global, 
geopolitical context of America’s power make its grand strategy a vision of world 
order, based on American cultural values and political and economic interests.   
 
While realism remains the main contender in IR for explaining grand strategy, 
international political economy, neoliberalism, and social constructivism have 
brought forward economic, institutional and cultural explanations that do not 
subscribe to the realist view of strategy. Kevin Narizny for example has produced an 
analysis of British and American strategic choices in the 19th and 20th century that 
interprets grand strategy as the product of the economic interests of influential 
domestic groups, with their position on grand strategy following from their 
involvement with the world economy.74  
 
Neoliberalism which, contrary to realism’s conflict-centric outlook, focuses on 
international cooperation as a result of political values, economic interdependence 
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and institutional order lets scholars like G. John Ikenberry emphasize the self-
binding, trust-building and stabilizing effects of American grand strategy in the Cold 
War and post-Cold War order.75 Grand strategy here is first and foremost understood 
as the Pax Britannica of the 19th and the Pax Americana of the 20th century, 
providing the common goods of open seas, free trade, international order and 
security. 76  The United States thus appears as the ‘liberal leviathan’ of the 
international order, hegemonic, but benevolent.77  
 
Where pessimistic neorealism and optimistic neoliberalism agree is that the material 
world exists independent from human interaction and that political decisions depend 
on cost-benefit analyses undertaken by rational actors, which makes grand strategy 
the product of structural constraints and rational choice.78 Constructivism challenges 
this view by arguing that our world is socially constructed and that norms, ideas, 
identities and culture have a profound impact on international relations and the 
behavior of states.79 As Alexander Wendt famously put it: “Anarchy is what states 
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make of it.”80 This perspective came to be increasingly popular in the study of grand 
strategy because it opened up a new ontological dimension concerning national 
security, as for example expressed by Richard Samuels: “(…) grand strategies serve 
as mirrors of national identity and communal longing; they are best built on a 
platform of ideas about a nation’s place in history and its people’s future.”81  
 
At the same time, mainstream constructivism still maintains a firm commitment to 
the positivist epistemology and independent/dependent variable empiricist model that 
many IR researchers, particular in the United States, deem essential for making valid 
statements on social reality and political outcomes. This allowed researchers to claim 
a ‘middle ground’ without having to resort to ‘some exotic (presumably Parisian) 
social theory,’ in the words of Peter Katzenstein.82  A comment aimed at the 
supposed lack of methodological rigor and explanatory value of critical and post-
structural research designs.83  
 
Maybe the most significant contribution to the study of grand strategy coming from 
conventional constructivism has been the development of ‘strategic culture’ as an 
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analytical tool.84 For Colin S. Gray, who is among the leading members of the ‘first 
generation’ of strategic culture scholars, strategic culture provides the context of 
ideas and behavior, constituting a particular national style in strategy.85 Grand 
strategy then appears still as equation of means and ends but strategic culture 
concedes that strategists don’t operate in a vacuum or a ‘black box,’ but are human 
beings that are socialized in a particular historical, geographical, social and political 
context. “Americans are what their interpretation of their history and their 
contemporary role has made them,” in the words of Gray.86 However, for the most 
part the strategic culture literature remains committed to a constructivist notion of 
social context that exists parallel, and independent from non-constructed elements, 
such as domestic and external constraints of behavior.87  
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position to the one taken by neo-classical realism, for example in the works of Dueck and Layne.  
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 Gray, Nuclear Strategy, p. 58. 
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reply to the Gray-Johnston debate on strategic culture,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): pp. 279-
284. The literature on strategic culture, while predominantly operating within a positivist epistemology, 
represents a significant evolution form the conventional understanding of grand strategy by moving beyond a 
positivist ontology that only considers material factors relevant to research. Gray for example stresses the 
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Considering the existing grand strategy literature then, a research perspective based 
on critical security studies and critical geopolitics provides a reconceptualization of 
the subject, beyond an exclusive material focus on military power and national 
security, and a positivist epistemology.88  
 
A critical security studies perspective of grand strategy: Power/knowledge, discourse 
and intertextuality 
 
Critical security studies is a research field that seeks to deepen and broaden the 
understanding of security, - conventionally understood as the absence of threat, - to 
include non-military dimensions of security and the political and social processes of 
securitization.89 Drawing from multiple disciplines in the humanities and the social 
                                                                                                                           
significance of context, as historical and geographical experience that influences strategic thinking and practice, a 
theme taken up by Oliver Lee who summarizes: “(…) a nation’s strategic culture as it exists in any given era […] 
results from the interaction of the nations’ perception of its geopolitical potential […] with the nation’s 
assessment of the international environment.” Oliver M. Lee, “The Geopolitics of America’s Strategic Culture,” 
Comparative Strategy 27, no. 3 (2008): p. 268. Here, the concept of strategic culture blends over into the 
intellectual realm of critical geopolitics and the idea of geopolitical culture and geopolitical identity as presented 
by Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, who define ‘geopolitical culture’ as comprised of the interlinked 
discursive fields of popular, formal, and practical geopolitics, cf., Ó Tuathail and Dalby, “Introduction,” in 
Rethinking Geopolitics, pp. 4-5. 
88
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generation’ of strategic culture researchers, cf., Edward Lock, “Refining strategic culture: return of the second 
generation,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 3 (2010): pp. 685-708; see also Iver B. Neumann and 
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and Conflict 40, no. 5 (2005): pp. 5-23. Klein draws from post-structuralism and post-Marxist critical theory, 
notably Gramsci, presenting strategic culture as expression of cultural hegemony, constituted through discourse: 
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occasions as worthy of military involvement.” Bradley S. Klein, “Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American 
Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics,” Review of International Studies 14 (1988): pp. 1-44. See also 
Bradley S. Klein, “The Textual Strategies of the Military: Have You Read Any Good Defense Manuals Lately?,” 
in International/Intertextual Relations, pp. 97-112. 
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 On the multiple perspectives, informed by critical theory and the Frankfurt School, post-structuralism and 
‘postmodernism’, that are collected under the label ‘critical security studies’, see Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, 
eds, Critical Reflections on Security and Change (Oxon, New York: Frank Cass, 2005); Columba Peoples and 
Nick Vaughan-Williams, Critical Security Studies: An Introduction (Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2010); Ken 
Booth, ed, Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Richard Wyn 
Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 1999). Keith Krause and 
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1997). Critical Security Studies (CSS) is a distinctive category within the field mainly informed by critical 
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 37 
sciences, a main concern is to examine deep-seated assumptions about security and 
the nature of conflict beyond the state-centrism and parochialism of traditional 
security studies and International Relations theory. Here, critical theory and post-
structuralism provide two distinctive, philosophically informed avenues of critical 
inquiry.90 While ‘critical security studies’ is a broad label that encompasses a 
multitude of analytical perspectives, research agendas, and methodologies, the thesis 
is mainly concerned with its post-structural strand. As such its understanding of 
critique follows Foucault in that:  
 (…) critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the 
 right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its 
 discourses of truth.91      
 
Post-structuralism shares critical theory’s skepticism towards Cartesian 
perspectivalism, rationalist epistemology and empiricist methodology, yet it does not 
explicitly pursue an overarching emancipatory agenda. Highly critical of any meta-
perspective, post-structural approaches in International Relations are mainly inspired 
by the writings of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, seeking: 
(…) to examine in detail how the world comes to be seen and thought of in 
particular ways at specific historical junctures and to study how particular 
social practices (…) work in terms of the relations of power and the ways of 
thinking that such practices produce or support.92  
                                                                                                                           
to contribute to the improvement of human conditions. It questions materialism, structuralism and determinism 
and centers on the meaning and conditions of human freedom. It is inspired by the philosophical tradition 
originating with Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, and builds in particular on the formulation of 
critical thinking by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer with significant subsequent contributions by Jürgen 
Habermas and Axel Honneth on the role of communication and recognition for emancipation, cf., Jones, Security, 
Strategy, and Critical Theory, pp. 47-48. Major proponents of critical theory in IR include Robert Cox and 
Andrew Linklater, see Robert Cox, “Social Forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations 
theory,” Millennium 10, no. 2 (1981): pp. 126-155; Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical 
Theory and International Relations (London: MacMillan, 1990). In the context of security studies emancipation 
addresses “those who are made insecure by the prevailing order”, Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 
p. 118.  
90
 In its Frankfurt School inspired strand CSS’s main goal is to ”provide deeper understandings of prevailing 
attitudes and behavior with a view to developing more promising ideas by which to overcome structural and 
contingent human wrongs.” Ken Booth, “Critical Explorations,” in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, 
ed. Booth, p. 16. 
91
 Michel Foucault, “What is Critique,” in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (Cambridge and London: 
MIT Press, 2007), p. 47. 
92
 Jenny Edkins, “Poststructuralism,” in International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century, ed, Martin 
Griffiths (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 88.  
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Post-structuralism therefore examines the discourses that constitute and reproduce 
the prevailing meaning of such influential concepts as ‘security’ and ‘strategy,’ at 
given times in society. As Peoples and Vaughan-Williams have commented in their 
analysis of Foucault:  
In a general sense, ‘discourse’ is the context within which regimes of truth 
come to be. (…) in Foucauldian terms, discourse is understood as series of 
practices, representations, and interpretations through which different 
regimes of truth […] are (re)produced.93     
 
Employing, among others, genealogy and deconstruction as main tools of analysis, a 
critical discourse perspective investigates how a dominant discourse ‘produces the 
social reality that it defines.’94 Foucault was centrally concerned with ‘the facilitating 
conditions of possibility for a particular set of power relations.’ 95 For Foucault, 
discourse is not limited to the textual, or linguistic definition of reality, but includes 
the practices, norms and rules under which a discursive formation becomes possible 
and attains regulative status. The formulation of knowledge then is embedded in, and 
constituted through power. As Foucault has remarked in Discipline and Punish: 
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 Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, p. 65. See also the treatment of Foucault and his use of discourse in Tony 
Crowley, The Politics of Discourse (London: Macmillan, 1989).  
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 Milliken, p. 242; see also Can E. Mutlu and Mark B. Salter, “The discursive turn,” in Research Methods in 
Critical Security Studies, ed. Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 113. 
Genealogy refers to an interpretive method inspired by the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche and further explored 
by Foucault, which examines how a particular form of knowledge has come to be understood as lasting and 
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American grand strategy discourse for example, the dominant interpretation of the outcome of the Cold War is 
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continuity of containment. This genealogy displaces other readings that stress the influence of the Helsinki 
process, civil rights movements in Eastern Europe, or arms control agreements in ending the American-Soviet 
confrontation. Deconstruction on the other hand is a method of textual analysis, mainly associated with the 
writings of Derrida, which shows how the reality building function of a discourse mainly relies on binary 
oppositions that can be reversed and displaced, substituting the ‘orthodoxy’ with an alternative ‘truth,’ cf., ibid. 
Milliken also speaks of the juxtapositional method, which is closely related to the deconstructive method, in that 
it points out how the ‘truth’ established by an official discourse is also built through the active omission of events 
and issues, cf., ibid. Finally, a focus on subjugated knowledge allows to further explore these alternative accounts 
of reality that deviate from the dominant discourses, cf., ibid. Deconstructing the American grand strategy 
discourse of hegemony reveals how it exemplary operates on a simple binary coding that juxtaposes American 
leadership and geopolitical volatility, and excludes alternative realities of international security. Hence, only the 
United States is able to safeguard the ‘global commons.’   
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 Mark B. Salter, “Introduction,” in Research Methods in Critical Security Studies, p. 5. 
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(…) power produces […] reality; it produces domains of objects, and rituals 
of truth. The individual and the knowledge gained of him belong to this 
production.96 
 
One of Foucault’s most important intellectual endeavors was his concern with this 
mutual interdependence of knowledge and power in establishing a dominant, 
legitimized formation of reality through discourse. He would characterize this nexus 
as power/knowledge, and often apply to the study of how individuals were politically 
and socially constituted through this process that defined the reality of madness, 
crime or sexual deviancy.97 
 
Drawing from Foucault, the thesis interprets American grand strategy as form of 
power/knowledge that establishes a dominant geopolitical identity of the United 
States and connects it to a conforming national security performance through a set of 
normative and practical factors. Grand strategy as particular geopolitical knowledge 
thus attains its relevant political, social, and cultural status through its intersection 
with power networks responsible for the formation of legitimized reality through 
common sense, formal expertise and political authority. Hollywood, Foreign Affairs, 
the Pentagon, and President Obama are thus all discursive producers centrally 
involved in the formulation of geopolitical identity, and the definition of national 
security.  
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 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1977), p. 194.  
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Foucault,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed September 17, 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/#4.3.  
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This also means that the thesis is not just concerned with a genealogical and 
deconstructive reading of representations of identity, but that it considers the 
practices through which these representations attain political, social and cultural 
meaning, and thus the material dimension with which they are interceded. Grand 
strategy is not only writing and speech, but also the process through which writing 
and speech become accepted as reality. Hence, the thesis interprets Foucault’s 
concept of power/knowledge, integrated into a cross-discursive, intertextual analysis 
as way to bridge the realms of identity and materiality through discourse.98  
 
In its use of discourse the thesis again is inspired by a post-structural understanding 
of the concept, mainly based on Foucault’s writings, such as The Archeology of 
Knowledge and The Will to Knowledge, and in particular prominent works in IR that 
have operationalized it for the study of security, such as Lene Hansen’s Security as 
Practice, Kurt Campbell’s Writing Security, and Stuart Croft’s Culture, Crisis and 
America’s War on Terror.99 Discourse then is the social process of producing reality 
through the use of language, and the rules under which this process operates.100 As 
Croft has defined the concept: 
Discourse defines the means by which language conveys meaning  through 
the production, distribution and reception of texts on a conscious and 
unconscious level.101  
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In terms of security, one of the main features of discourse is to define a common 
identity of the ‘Self,’ and to delineate it from the threatening ‘Other.’102 Understood 
as discourse, American grand strategy then positions the American ‘Self’ in a world 
political context, yet the construction of the ‘Other’ is not limited to the Manichean 
construct of the enemy, or rival, but it also includes such terms as ‘friends,’ ‘allies,’ 
and ‘partners,’ which although signifying a similarity to the United States, operate in 
a geopolitical context of otherness to the singularity of the United States. However, 
as applied by the thesis, discourse is not just limited to the writing and re-writing of 
identity, but it links identity and policy, representations and practices. The grand 
strategy vision of hegemony for example links a dominant identity construct of 
‘American leadership’ to a material reality of military supremacy, the forward basing 
of U.S. troops in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, and the ability for global power 
projection. As chapter six will demonstrate, superior military power is seen as the 
foundation of US hegemony, which in turn is the rational for maintaining this 
superiority. In the words of Lene Hansen: (…) foreign policy discourses articulate 
and intertwine material factors and ideas to such an extent that the two cannot be 
separated from one another.103  
 
While this mutual interlinking and co-constitution of identity and practice through 
discourse makes it impossible to determine causality, a critical discourse perspective 
nonetheless should seek to validate its interpretive findings through a clear, coherent, 
and comprehensive set of data analysis. In its critical analysis of American grand 
strategy, the thesis therefore emphasizes the intertextual dimension in the discursive 
production of reality, and how the interlinking of representations and practices 
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 Campbell, Writing Security.  
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functions across discursive domains, from popular culture to formal research, and 
political decision-making. As Hansen has pointed out: 
The ambition of discourse analysis is not only to understand official 
discourse, and the texts and representations, which have directly impacted it, 
but also to analyze how this discourse is present as legitimate in relation to 
the larger public and how it is reproduced or contested (…).104 
 
Discourses as ‘structures of signification’ construct social reality through the 
interconnectedness of signs and signifiers; individual texts acquire their meaning 
through their reference to other texts.105 When President Obama refers to America as 
the ‘indispensable nation’ this construct of geopolitical identity acquires its meaning 
through its connection to an established foreign policy discourse of American 
exceptionalism stressing the singularity, superiority and essentiality of the United 
States in the international system, a series of interconnected texts that can be traced 
back to at least Word War II.106 The use of the term then not only connects Obama to 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright and President Bill Clinton, who previously 
referred to America as the ‘indispensable nation,’ but to an entire genealogy of 
hegemony that has been dominant in describing America’s role in the world.  
 
However, in its discourse analysis of grand strategy the thesis goes beyond a more 
limited understanding of intertextuality in two important ways. First, it is not only 
concerned with tracing textual interconnections within a particular field of discourse, 
such as political rhetoric, but it is interested in how intertextual links from across 
discursive sites in establishing political, social and cultural reality. In order to 
successfully function as articulation of the ‘national interest’ a grand strategy cannot 
operate as an isolated product of expert knowledge, or political decision-making, but 
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it must be connected to the larger context of national identity, which it claims to 
articulate in the context of security and geopolitics. Hence, it is imperative to 
investigate grand strategy through an intertextual perspective that combines the 
realms of commons sense knowledge, formal expertise, practical reasoning, and 
political authority. The thesis thus investigates the intertextuality of discourses 
within and between popular culture, intellectual expertise, and policymaking in order 
to determine how the ‘big picture’ of grand strategy operates as a vision of 
geopolitical identity and national security, and which geopolitical vision can claim 
dominant status.  
 
Secondly, the method of intertextuality applied does not only extend to a strictly 
textual analysis, but also considers the realm of practice, and how geopolitical 
knowledge is constructed through an intertextual production of discourse. Here, 
visions of grand strategy are also established through an institutionalized cooperation 
between the realms of popular entertainment and defense, where the Pentagon is 
directly involved in the production of American motion pictures. Another example is 
the infusion of political decision making processes with expert advise and opinion, 
exhibited in the ‘rotating door’ that connects think tanks and government offices in 
Washington DC. As with the incorporation of power/knowledge, and the concern 
with the production of discourse, this wider understanding of intertextuality again 
bridges the divide between a primarily representational understanding of discourse 
that often dominates in the critical literature, and the materialism of positivist 
approaches.   
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Basic discourses of grand strategy: Hegemony, engagement and restraint 
 
In the following chapters the thesis will demonstrate that in the context of grand 
strategy there exist three main geopolitical visions about America’s role and position 
in the world that stand in competition to each other. This constitution and 
contestation of grand strategy occurs not in isolation, but in the interconnected 
realms of popular imagination, academic and policy research, and policy making that 
all form and reformulate American worldviews. These basic discourses can be 
analytically identified as hegemony, engagement, and restraint; a categorization 
based on their underlying representations of geopolitical identity and their linkage to 
different national security policies.107 It is important to note however that these 
discourses do not exist in a strict isolated separation from each other, but indeed have 
multiple intertextual connections between them, constituting various hybrid 
discourses of hegemonic engagement, or hegemonic restraint respectively. Before 
the thesis provides a detailed interpretation in the following chapters, these analytical 
perspectives will be summarized here to provide an initial overview of these 
interpretive devices.   
 
The first and dominant discourse of American grand strategy is identified as 
hegemony. This widely shared and entrenched geopolitical vision is anchored in the 
idea of global leadership of the United States as morally preferable and functionally 
essential. Frequently, such terms as ‘hegemony’, ‘primacy’, ‘indispensable nation,’ 
or ‘global leadership’ are used interchangeably to describe, both the dominant 
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position of the United States in world politics, -politically, militarily, and 
economically-, and America’s special responsibility to continuously maintain a 
liberal international order that was established ‘under U.S. stewardship’ after World 
War 2.108 A standard trope of this discourse in the context of national security is the 
necessity of the global military supremacy of the United States to deter potential 
aggressors, preserve regional stability, and guarantee world peace and access to the 
‘global commons.’109 Additionally, it can incorporate the special responsibility of the 
United States to undertake armed interventions in the face of human rights 
violations. 110  Oftentimes, visions of American ‘preponderance’ or ‘benevolent 
hegemony’ are associated with the ideological influence of neoconservative pundits 
and scholars such as William Kristol, Robert Kagan, or Charles Krauthammer.111 
Politically, the neoconservative influence was associated in particular with the 
George W. Bush administration and the famous ‘Bush doctrine’ for pre-emptive war, 
as articulated in the National Security Strategy of 2002.112  However, as the thesis 
will demonstrate the discourse of hegemony is not restricted to one particular 
ideology or presidential administration. In fact, the belief in the necessity and 
indispensability of U.S. power and global leadership unites neoconservatives and 
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liberal internationalists, policy makers and IR scholars, bestselling authors and 
Hollywood filmmakers.  
 
There is a difference however, in the way the hegemony discourse is accentuated 
politically. Neoconservative proponents of hegemony as primacy emphasize 
unilateral action, the pre-emptive use of military power against threats to national 
security, and the unrivalled global military supremacy of the United States.113 There 
is a strong identification with the moral superiority of the U.S., and the exceptional 
values of liberty, freedom and democracy, the country is supposed to represent. 
Rather than liberal internationalism, American exceptionalism is the foundational 
element of geopolitical identity.114 This discursive strand the thesis identifies as 
primacy, or unilateral hegemony. It is the geopolitical vision primarily articulated by 
neoconservatives and closely associated with the establishment of the Republican 
Party.  
 
The second significant strand of the hegemony discourse is in turn predominantly 
associated with the Democratic Party. Here, the emphasis lies on how the global 
leadership of the United States functions as part of a liberal institutionalist 
framework, with a preference for multilateral action and international cooperation. It 
is heavily influenced by liberal theories of International Relations and the Wilsonian 
tradition in American foreign policy.115 Nonetheless, it is assumed that is the United 
States, who has to lead in these cooperative arrangements, and act unilaterally if 
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necessary. A good example for this strand of the hegemony discourse was use of the 
term ‘indispensable nation’ in the 1990s by then Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright and President Bill Clinton to characterize the geopolitical role of the United 
States in the international system. 116  Although often clad in the rhetoric of 
‘engagement,’ this discourse actually represents a form of multilateral hegemony, or 
hegemonic engagement. Here, the leadership of United States is imagined through a 
cooperative framework of ‘burden-sharing’ and ‘responsible stakeholders,’ but with 
America firmly at the center of political, economic and military power.117     
 
Engagement is identified as the second basic grand strategy discourse. It is based on 
the idea that the United States should seek international cooperation with partners, 
allies and even potential rivals in order to successfully manage international affairs. 
Rather than the use of military power this discourse emphasizes, diplomatic 
solutions, economic interdependence, ‘soft power’ and the importance of 
international organizations and multilateral institutions.118 Closely connected with 
the engagement discourse under the Obama administration is the idea of relative 
American decline and the end of U.S. dominance in a ‘post-American world’.119  
 
While the United States is expected to remain the most powerful actor in the 
international system for the foreseeable future, it is represented as a ‘primus inter 
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pares’ rather than an unchecked global superpower.120 Subsequently, it becomes a 
necessity for the United States to engage with rising powers to maintain a liberal 
order that can no longer rely on the sole leadership of just one dominant actor. One 
prominent example for the engagement discourse was the G-2 scenario, envisioned 
by former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Here, a duopoly of 
the United States and China at the center of world politics would have jointly 
managed global economic and security matters.121 Instead of the singularity of 
American power and the ‘unipolar moment,’ global multipolarity and a globalized 
network of interconnected hubs dominate the geopolitical imagination in this 
discourse.  
 
Finally, the third basic discourse of grand strategy can be identified as the discourse 
of restraint. This geopolitical vision stands diametrically opposed to grand strategies 
of neoconservative primacy, global leadership and liberal interventionism. Instead of 
acting as the ‘policeman of the world,’ the United States is supposed to emphasize a 
domestic focus of ‘nation building at home.’122 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
characterized as waste of financial and military resources and dangerous folly, 
fuelled by geopolitical visions of American omnipotence and unmatched military 
supremacy.123 In this view, the overextension of American resources contributed to 
the fiscal instability of the United States and hastened American decline. Instead, the 
United States is supposed to decrease its global footprint, most importantly its global 
network of military bases and forwardly deployed American troops. The restraint 
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discourse calls for Americans to finally ‘come home’ from the Middle East, East 
Asia and Europe.124  
 
Closely associated with the realist school of IR, and such prominent scholars as John 
Mearsheimer or Stephen Walt, part of the restraint discourse is articulated as grand 
strategy of ‘offshore balancing.’125 While remaining a regional hegemon in North 
America, the United States is supposed to only use its military power when its vital 
security interests are concerned. Thus, the U.S. should only act if an actor threatens 
to likewise establish a regional hegemony as for example attempted by Nazi 
Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia in World War 2. Humanitarian intervention, or 
the individual defense of South Korea or Taiwan on the other hand should not be part 
of the national security design of the U.S. To its critics, restraint and offshore 
balancing represent a dangerous new from of ‘isolationism,’ a potentially 
catastrophic disengagement of the United States from the world.126  
 
From a critical perspective, offshore balancing actually represents another form of 
discursive intertextuality of geopolitical imagination, between regional hegemony 
and global retrenchment, identified in the thesis as hegemonic restraint. A more fully 
articulated discourse of restraint, as proposed for example by progressive think tanks, 
or critics on the Left of the political spectrum calls for the United States to 
concentrate exclusively on territorial self-defense, to reduce the political clout of the 
military-industrial complex, and to further prioritize domestic issues such as 
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healthcare, education and public infrastructure over an expansive foreign policy.127 
Politically, the restraint discourse finds support both among libertarians such as the 
conservative Tea party movement, and liberal critics of American imperialism and 
militarism.128  
 
Fig. 2 Discourses of American grand strategy 
Basic Discourses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hybrid Discourses  
 
Before the thesis further investigates the political significance of the competing 
geopolitical visions in American grand strategy discourses, it will now first provide 
an overview over the intellectual history and legacy of geopolitics, in order to 
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demonstrate how the spatialization of global order and national power has been 
conceptualized in the past, and how a critical reading of this theme can be a useful 
analytical tool for the understanding of grand strategy discourses. In order to better 
appreciate the political impact and intellectual depth of American grand strategy, we 
should include the perspective of geopolitics in our critical analysis. Geopolitics, 
positioned at the junction between geography and International Relations is the 
visualization of grand strategy on a world map of power and order. 
 
Part II Geopolitics 
Geopolitics - Past and Present  
 
The story of geopolitics could begin with a world map from 1910.129 The world the 
Cambridge modern history atlas depicts on this map is quite colorful. The empires of 
Europe, Imperial Japan and the United States of America have painted the globe, 
from the Red in the British Dominion of Canada to the Orange of German 
Cameroon, a Japanese Grey in Korea and the bright Green of the American 
Philippines. There are only a few white spots the imperial paintbrush has missed. At 
the same time, this world of far flung empires is connected by a spider web of black 
lines crisscrossing the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, indicating the main routes of 
trans-continental traffic, commerce and communication. Economic exchange, 
technological innovation and scientific advancement have reached an unprecedented 
height, connecting the world as never before.130 It was in this world of established 
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imperial rule and seemingly unbound progress that geopolitics emerged on the scene 
at the turn of the last century.  
Fig. 3 The World - Colonial Possessions and Commercial Highways 1910131 
 
The unknown direction this first globalization was headed in propelled scholars in 
Europe and the United States to rethink the relationship of space and power in world 
politics, looking for a grand strategy to guide their nations through what they 
believed was a perilous future ahead. Men like Halford Mackinder, Alfred Mahan or 
Karl Haushofer shared the belief that natural causes and material conditions, -
geographical location, size of population, or the possession of natural resources-, 
were paramount in determining a state’s development and its position in the world. 
Rooted in the philosophy of Descartes these intellectuals firmly believed in a 
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scientific rationalism that allowed them to analyze the external reality of the world 
and arrive at lasting and correct conclusions about the inner truth of nature. 
‘Cartesian perspectivalism’, ‘Imperialism’ and ‘Social Darwinism’ were the lenses 
though which their geopolitical gaze fell onto the world.132 This intellectual origin 
would define classical geopolitics and mark its ongoing attempt to establish a vision 
of the world through a particular representation of its spatial features, and to 
formulate a world order based on power and the control of space.  
 
Classical geopolitics from Mackinder to Haushofer: Heartland, sea power and 
Lebensraum  
 
On the evening of the 21st of January 1904, the British geographer Halford 
Mackinder (1861-1947) presented one of the most influential and enduring 
geopolitical concepts of all time. On this occasion, speaking before a rather modest 
audience, Mackinder presented to the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) a paper 
titled “The Geographical Pivot of History.”133 Mackinder explained that in the 20th 
century geography had to be concerned with the physical control of space and its 
meaning in history.134 From this outset Mackinder postulated his main argument: The 
steppe region of northern and central Eurasia was the ‘Heartland,’ the ‘pivot of 
history.’ Who controlled the Heartland, would be able to rule the world. 135 
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Mackinder’s Heartland theory modified in 1919 and again in 1943, would influence 
geopolitical thinkers, strategists, academics and politicians for generations to 
come.136 It still enjoys wide respect and appreciation today, notably in realist circles, 
where Mackinder is credited, among other things, with correctly predicting the 
geopolitical antagonism of the Cold War.137 Gerry Kearns on the other hand recently 
offered a critical reading of Mackinder and the geopolitics of imperialism that he 
advocated, and the strong parallels to contemporary imperial and geopolitical 
thought.138  
 
Mackinder’s geostrategic focus, a central dichotomy of sea and land power, was 
echoed by the American Rear Admiral, lecturer and author Alfred Thayer Mahan 
(1840-1914).139 His most prominent work, the seminal four volume The Influence of 
Sea Power upon History, published between 1890 and 1905 dealt with the role of 
natural and political conditions for the development of sea power, and described the 
rise of British naval supremacy and subsequent economic and political pre-eminence 
                                                                                                                           
world. The mobility of forces from the heartland that in the past had relied on horses, and that in the meantime 
had been surpassed by the commercial and military navies of the maritime powers of the West would transform 
through the advent of the transcontinental railway in Russia. This development would inevitably challenge the 
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in the world.140 While Anglo-American geopolitics was largely preoccupied with the 
meaning of maritime vs. continental space for influencing a nation’s power position, 
Geopolitik on the European continent would take on a different view, treating 
geography as physical determinant for the state’s very existence.141 Geopolitik, as 
biologization of political power and geographical space would reach its apex and 
greatest infamy under Professor Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), who sought to deliver 
a scientific foundation for German imperial expansionism.142 Central to Haushofer’s 
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thinking was a biological determinism that centered on the organic needs and living 
conditions of the German people, which he postulated was demanding the expansion 
of German living space.143 While Haushofer’s influence on the expansionist and 
racist foreign policy of Nazi-Germany was probably more abstract-theoretical than 
practical, he was credited in the United States with being the actual ‘brain’ behind 
Hitler. 144  Haushofer’s intellectual legacy was a lasting association of 
geopolitics/Geopolitik with imperialism, militarism, genocide and expansionism; at 
the same time it was his reflection in the United States that firmly established the 
term geopolitics in American discourse.145 As Adolf Stone, a former student of 
Haushofer wrote in the Journal of Geography in 1953: “(…) can we in the United 
States with our tremendous world responsibilities afford to disregard this ‘science of 
space’ of the man from Munich?”146  
 
Geopolitics makes a comeback  
 
Following World War II geopolitics, stigmatized through its association with Nazi-
Germany, was largely ignored in the United States. Nicholas J. Spykman (1893-
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argument for a multipolar system, cf., Hooker. 
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1943) had his last book The Geography of the Peace published posthumously in 
1943. In it he modified Mackinder’s Heartland theory into his own ‘Rimland’ theory, 
which required the United States to provide global stability by securing the Eurasian 
rimland regions through collaboration with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.147 
Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903-2002), like Spykman a geopolitical thinker and 
immigrant from Europe argued for the necessity of a firm U.S. commitment against 
the Soviet Union, actively supporting a grand strategy of containment.148 The fear of 
territorial domination of Western Europe and East Asia by the Soviet Union would 
provide a key argument for the military presence, long-term commitment and 
political alliances of America on both continents during the Cold War.149  
 
From the 1970s onwards, geopolitics in the U.S. would no longer be associated with 
biological determinism and ‘social Darwinism’ á la Haushofer and Ratzel, but rather 
understood along neorealist assumptions about systemic anarchy in the international 
system and the spatial dimension of the super power confrontation of the Cold 
War.150 Geopolitics was revived in particular due to the use of the term by Henry 
Kissinger as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Kissinger’s 
geopolitical vision consisted of an equilibrium between the United States, China and 
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the Soviet Union, similar to the European ‘concert of powers’ following the 
Congress of Vienna.151 
 
In the United States today, classical geopolitics continues to be in use as an 
analytical tool to visualize world maps of conflict, localizing spheres of influence, 
and marking danger zones in the international system.152 The existence of spaces of 
volatility, occupied by failed states and rouge regimes, terrorist camps and drug 
cartels or even online by cyber criminals is represented as serious threat to national 
security and international order that can require the United States to act, if necessary 
by force.153  
 
One prominent example for this argumentation can be found in the map Thomas P. 
M. Barnett drew for the U.S. Department of Defense in 2004, presenting a zone of 
stability, a ‘working core’ that encompassed North America, Europe and Japan and 
an ‘arch of instability’, a crescent of geopolitical volatility that stretched from 
Morocco to Indonesia.154 The Heartland had become the ‘Axis of Evil.’ Under 
President George W. Bush America’s geopolitical vision of liberal empire and global 
military supremacy, pre-emptively engaging ‘rouge states’ and transforming the 
political and social fabric of entire nations through ‘regime change’, would culminate 
in the Iraq War.155 The Iraq invasion and its aftermath demonstrated the inherent 
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danger in subjecting the entire world to one particular geopolitical vision of space 
and order. In Afghanistan and Iraq violently enforcing a simplistic Manichean 
worldview on a complex reality that did not conform to the categorization of 
classical geopolitics led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives; it produced an 
economic cost of $1.7 trillion that put an immense strain on the finances of the U.S. 
government; and it seriously undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
America’s global leadership role.156  
 
Fig. 4 ‘The Pentagon’s new map’157 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
theory, Darel E. Paul, “The Siren Song of Geopolitics: Towards a Gramscian Account of the Iraq War,” 
Millennium 36, no. 1 (2007): pp. 51-76. In the words of Edward Said:  
156
 Daniel Trotta, “Iraq war costs U.S. more than $2 trillion: study,” Reuters, March 14, 2013, accessed August 7, 
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-iraq-war-anniversary-idU.S.BRE92D0PG20130314. 
According to Reuters: “The U.S. war in Iraq has cost $1.7 trillion with an additional $490 billion in benefits owed 
to war veterans, expenses that could grow to more than $6 trillion over the next four decades counting interest, a 
study released on Thursday said. The war has killed at least 134,000 Iraqi civilians and may have contributed to 
the deaths of as many as four times that number, according to the Costs of War Project by the Watson Institute 
for International Studies at Brown University. When security forces, insurgents, journalists and humanitarian 
workers were included, the war's death toll rose to an estimated figure of 176,000 to 189,000, the study said;” 
ibid. 
157
 Mapping America's War on Terrorism: an aggressive new strategy (Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2010), accessed September 17, 2014, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_the_Pentagon's_War_on_Terrorism_strategy_2010.jpg.   
 60 
The critical turn 
 
Against the Machiavellian perspective of classical geopolitics, its self-proclaimed 
scientific rationalism, the dichotic categorization of the world into spheres of order 
and zones of threat, and the justification of imperialist and militarist policies, critical 
geopolitics emerged to provide an alternative outlook on the relationship between 
geography and world politics. Geopolitics would no longer be seen as scientific 
method based on the analysis of materiel conditions of physical reality, but 
understood as social construct of knowledge, critically examined for the origin, 
direction and effect of its discourses. One of the first to rethink the meaning of 
geopolitics and the relationship of geography and statehood was the French 
geographer Yves Lacoste, who published his La geographie, ça cert, d’abord, á faire 
la guerre (Geography is first and foremost about making war) in 1976.158 Published 
only two years later Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) went to demonstrate how the 
Middle East existed as geographical entity only in its relation to the imperial powers 
of Europe and how the ‘Orient’ had been actively constructed in European thought 
and action for centuries.159  
 
This began a shift in the academic evaluation of geopolitics in political geography 
and International Relations that would be labeled ‘critical geopolitics’. Inspired by 
authors like Lacoste and Said, and in particular from ideas of post-structuralism 
associated with the works of Derrida and Foucault, academics like John Agnew, 
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Simon Dalby, Klaus Dodds and Gearóid Ó Tuathail established a new way of 
thinking about the meaning of geography in world politics, emphasizing the 
historical and spatial contextuality and discursive practices of geopolitics.160 Space 
was not a material factor determining national power, but a subject of constant social 
interpretation, dependent on cultural factors. In following, this segment will 
concentrate on the outline of critical geopolitics provided by Ó Tuathail, as it 
presents the most comprehensive account of the field’s basic theoretical and 
methodological features. 
 
In line with critical security studies, critical geopolitics rejects the determinism and 
materialism of neorealism and structuralism and operates within a post-positivist 
ontological and epistemological framework, which also sets it apart from mainstream 
constructivism.161 Critical geopolitics is a fundamentally subjective perspective in 
the sense that it “recognizes that how people know, categorize and make sense of 
world politics is an interpretative cultural practice.”162 In critical geopolitics the 
geographic location of a state does not naturally result in a predisposition towards a 
particular course of action, as classical geopolitics would suggest, rather it influences 
the way people think about their state and the world around it.163 Critical geopolitics 
does not ignore the significance of material factors like geographic position, or even 
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deny their existence, but it examines the way these factors influence our thinking, 
how we perceive and interpret them and how we construct them in our view of the 
world. The material world in short does not exist independent from social 
construction. Central to the understanding of critical geopolitics as formulated by Ó 
Tuathail and others is again the notion of discourse and the understanding of power 
as power/knowledge following Foucault.164 For Foucault:  
(…) knowledge, once used to regulate the conduct of others, entails 
constraint, regulation and the disciplining of practice. Thus, there is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power 
relations.165  
 
Rather than defining power as the ability to make someone do something, power is 
the ability to define meaning and create knowledge through discourse.166 In The 
Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault defines discourse as a group of acts of 
formulation (sentences or propositions) constituted by a group of statements (the 
function that gives a group of sequences of signs an existence).167 As used by 
Foucault: 
(…) the term discourse can be defined as the group of statements that belong 
to a single system of formation; thus I shall be able to speak of clinical 
discourse, economic discourse, the discourse of natural history, psychiatric 
discourse.168  
 
In the words of Ó Tuathail and Agnew:  
Discourses are best conceptualized as sets of capabilities people have, as sets 
of socio-cultural resources used by people in the construction of meaning 
about their world and their activities. It is NOT simply speech or written 
statements but the rules by which verbal speech and written statements are 
made meaningful.169  
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To analyze geopolitics is to analyze geopolitical discourses, the use of texts and 
contexts that construct ‘world politics’.170 Geopolitics then can be studied through 
the labels of global space and maps of conflict, produced and re-produced to be 
accepted as dominant knowledge. This also opens and widens the understanding of 
geopolitics beyond state-centrism and the elite level of political decision-making.171 
Critical geopolitics does not deny the importance of political elites in world politics 
but stresses how these elites are embedded in a nation’s framework of reference, and 
how from this pool of common identity and shared experiences, geopolitical 
discourses are contextualized.  
In critically investigating the textuality of geopolitics, we are engaging not 
only geopolitical texts but also the historical, geographical, technological, and 
sociological contexts within which these texts arise and gain social meaning 
and persuasive force.172  
 
Ó Tuathail refers to this context as geopolitical culture, a culture of how a state 
conceptualizes its unique identity, role and position in the world.173 The place where 
the identities, visions and imaginations of geopolitics find expression is in discourse 
and as a state can have more than one geopolitical vision for itself, there are also a 
variety of geopolitical discourses that exist in society, including as resistance to 
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dominant narratives of world politics. Ó Tuathail distinguishes three different types 
of discourse in geopolitics:174 Formal geopolitics is expressed in geopolitical theories 
and visions produced by ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ in think tanks, universities, war 
colleges, the form most closely associated with traditional geopolitics.175 Practical 
geopolitics consists of narratives used by politicians and policy makers to conduct 
foreign and security policy, from declarations of war to diplomatic communiqués and 
public speeches.176 Popular geopolitics is the representation of world politics in 
popular culture, found in movies, magazines, books and other creative mediums.177  
 
The geopolitical discourse among academics, pundits, journalists, politicians, foreign 
policy advisors and the general public in its formal, practical and popular form serves 
to make sense of world politics and promises strategic insight into coming 
developments in international affairs. The ‘authorship’ of geopolitical discourse is 
essential; the way geopolitics is presented will depend heavily on who is telling the 
story. To quote Leslie Hepple, geopolitical texts are “(…) serving the interests of 
particular groups in society and helping to sustain and legitimate certain perspectives 
and interpretations.”178  
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American grand strategy as geopolitical discourse: Constructing the role and 
position of the United States in world politics 
 
In using a critical geopolitics perspective, the thesis is able to widen and deepen the 
understanding of American grand strategy from a conventional formulation of a 
national security agenda to a geopolitical discourse that seeks to define the country’s 
role and position in world politics. Within such a discourse, issues of national 
security and military power are bound up with concepts of world order and national 
identity, together forming the geopolitical vision of grand strategy. John Ruggie, 
although not specifically invoking geopolitics, refers indirectly to this geopolitical 
identity when he ties the strategies of engagement American leaders pursued in 1919, 
1945, and in the early Cold War years to a transformative vision of world order that 
appealed to the American public because it reflected the ‘principles of domestic 
order at play in America’s understanding of its own founding, in its own sense of 
political community.’179  
 
Andrew Bacevich in his critical history of American foreign policy links its 
dominating theme, a grand strategy of ‘openness’ to the economic and political 
liberalism at the core of the American project.180 The construction of a geopolitical 
identity with the distinct notion of spatial separation against an ‘Other,’ which is a 
source of threat and danger to national security is a key point critical geopolitics 
offers for an analysis of the formulation of grand strategy. To make the themes of 
geopolitics understood, simple dichotomies reduce the complexity of reality; the 
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world is explained in terms of collective identities, the language of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, 
‘friends and allies’ vs. ‘terrorists’ and ‘enemy combatants’ populates geopolitical 
narratives. 
 
Geopolitics provides an interpretation of space and world politics translated into 
words and images, from ‘Saving Private Ryan’ to President Bush landing on an 
aircraft carrier greeted by a banner pronouncing ‘Mission accomplished.’ These 
narratives have an affect, from mobilizing public support for war to providing 
engaging entertainment, because they spur the popular imagination and invoke a 
common identity.181 Even if we are not Americans, we are meant to identify with the 
United States, because in the script of geopolitics they play the part of hero, 
defending freedom and democracy against evil villains, from ‘Islamic terrorists’ to 
‘Russian Communists.’182 Dalby sees this identity ascribing and border drawing 
function as main feature of geopolitical discourse. In International Relations David 
Campbell subscribes to a similar view in his critical analysis of American foreign 
policy.183 “(…) the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of 
boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘self’ from an 
‘other’, a ‘domestic from a ‘foreign’.”184 Based on case study on the Committee on 
the Present Danger (CPD), Dalby shows how the texts of this group of 
neoconservative political analysts reflected a particular geopolitical interpretation of 
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the Cold War, which would later be influential in shaping the foreign policy of the 
Reagan administration.185  
 
The omnipresent threatening ‘Other’ is simultaneously used to explain the external, 
geopolitical reality of the Cold War and to declare other alternative formulations for 
the national security of the United States invalid.186 The national experience of time 
and space at the center of a geopolitical identity is thus juxtaposed with the 
experience of time and space of other nations. Such interpretations can stress both 
togetherness and friendship or distinction and enmity. 187 
 
A key category for a critical analysis of American grand strategy then is the concept 
of geopolitical identity.188 It is difficult to mark a clear distinction between ‘national’ 
and ‘geopolitical’ identity, yet the thesis argues that the former entails a broader 
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spectrum of representations of the nation as an ‘imagined community’, from national 
symbols like the Statue of Liberty, Rock’n Roll, or Baseball to central cultural and 
historical narratives, ranging from the Gettysburg Address to the myth of the 
American frontier and the Wild West. Geopolitical identity, while drawing from 
these sources, has a narrower outlook, specifically concerned with locating the ‘Self’ 
of the United States in a world political context, that is primarily vis-à-vis the 
‘Otherness’ of other nation states in the international system. It is in this context 
where representations like ‘indispensable nation,’ or ‘American exceptionalism’ 
dominate in delineating ‘America’ as a special and unique entity, unlike any other 
nation on earth.  
 
The ‘geographical imagination’ of nations, like ‘middle kingdom’, ‘indispensable 
nation,’ or ‘splendid isolation‘ are powerful images because they create a label for a 
distinctive national experience, separate from others and constant through history, 
that every new generation can relate to and accept as source of identity.189 John 
Agnew describes how in the case of the United States “(...) exceptionalist arguments 
offer much the same way of justification today as they did in the early 19th 
century.”190 For Geoffrey Sloan the ideas of Social Darwinism, the experience of an 
ever-expanding frontier and the ascent to superpower status after 1945 are the key 
elements that have influenced geopolitical thinking and the perceptions and actions 
of policy makers in the United States.191  
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In order to operate geopolitical identity as a useful concept within the framework of a 
discourse analysis it is vital to demonstrate, not just that identity exists, but how it 
matters. A point that Tuomas Forsberg stated in a similar fashion, when he declared 
that it is not enough to declare territory as socially constructed but that we must 
demonstrate: 
 (…) how the constructions have been established in particular contexts and 
how they change, and finding out in what way and why the constructions 
differ from the norm or other similar contexts rather than describe the 
constructions and assert that they matter.192  
 
The thesis conceptualizes American grand strategy as a geopolitical discourse, a 
vision of national security that reflects a particular worldview of identity, power, 
order and threat. This discourse is constructed from the dominant strands of 
geopolitical imagination existing in the United States. One of the main tasks in 
investigating the discursive performance of American grand strategy during the 
Obama presidency is thus to analyze if and how constructs of geopolitical identity — 
defined as the perception and interpretation of the national experience of America in 
a world political context —continue or change over time. 193  
  
Such an analysis must therefore include the study of historical narratives, the ‘mode 
of discourse’ used to represent reality, as Hayden White calls it, and how historic 
events are used in symbolic discourses to declare a certain reality ‘real’ and ‘true’.194 
James Der Derian has demonstrated this exemplarily in his decoding of the U.S. 
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National Security Strategy of 2002, which directly invoked the terror attacks of 9/11 
to construct a new American reality of a ‘war to rid the world of evil.’195 Stuart Croft 
has detailed how the historic event of 9/11 was discursively transformed into the 
‘war on terror,’ not as an isolated act of political decision-making, but as a boarder 
cultural process that established it as common sense and generally accepted 
knowledge.196  
 
This means that the story and history of American grand strategy is also a genealogy 
in the sense of Foucault, that it is constructed against marginalized knowledge, 
discontinuities and ruptures as “(…) the claim of a unitary body of theory which 
would filter, hierarchize, and order (…) in the name of some true knowledge and 
some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects.”197 In this regard 
there is also no inherent difference between history and fiction, since the 
construction of political and historical discourse also relies on achieving convincing 
storytelling.198 Ronald Reagan for example was reportedly quite disappointed, when 
he learned that the White House did not possess a ‘War Room,’ as featured in Dr. 
Strangelove. 199  This connection between fictional narratives and the political 
imagination of national security will be explored in particular in the following 
chapter, dealing with Hollywood films and popular geopolitics.   
 
Finally, the thesis has to consider the ‘imagined spaces’ of American grand strategy 
discourse, the spatialization of national security, which is expressed in such 
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constructs as ‘forward presence,’ ‘full spectrum dominance,’ or the ‘global 
commons.’ 200  Here, the grand strategy discourse localizes friendly spaces and 
spheres of influence of the United States, represented as ‘allies and partners,’ it 
demarcates threats, such as ‘rouge states,’ and it engages in projections of the global 
distribution of power and influence in the world, as for example in the Global Trends 
series by the National Intelligence Council of the United States. As Ó Tuathail has 
remarked: “All states are territorial and all foreign policy strategizing and practice is 
conditioned by territoriality, shaped by geographical location, and informed by 
certain geographical understandings about the world.”201 Jan Nijman refers in this 
context to the American spatialization of threat by prominent ‘intellectuals of 
statecraft’. 
American debates about superpower competition were overshadowed for 
decades by the belief among geostrategic thinkers, such as Gray or 
Brzezinski, that the Soviet Union held a superior geopolitical position in the 
Eurasian heartland.202  
 
Finally, beyond a national construction of identity, history and space, it should not be 
ignored that American grand strategy also reflects a product of Western political 
thought, philosophical traditions, and cultural attitudes that embeds it in a wider 
framework of geopolitical thinking as for example explored by John Agnew.203  
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In summary, a deeper and wider understanding of American grand strategy requires 
its analysis as geopolitical discourse, and how the temporal and spatial constructions 
of geopolitical identity interact with the formulation of national security policy in 
defining the role of the United States in world politics. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Critical security studies and critical geopolitics acknowledge the significance of 
human imagination and the impact of identity in constructing our political and social 
reality. This critical insight into the production of knowledge about the world and a 
state’s role and position in it allows the thesis to analyze American grand strategy 
through a wider lens than previously attempted. So far research on grand strategy in 
International Relations literature has predominantly focused on a positivist ontology 
and epistemology in addressing the subject. This has largely reduced the 
understanding of grand strategy to a neutral-scientific process, concerned with the 
allocation of material resources, the assessment of outcomes, and the matching of 
                                                                                                                           
also gave rise to objectifying the world to a ‘view from nowhere’, enabling a particular perspective to claim 
universal legitimacy and rational objectivity. Secondly, the spatialization of time. The global significance first of 
Europe and then the United States made their political, economic and social models and historic experience the 
standard of modernity, relegating the rest of the world to a state of backwardness, strikingly expressed in the 
terms First, Second or Third World. The West became the pacemaker of progress, the universal model of 
development to be emulated and imitated. Thirdly, the origin of the nation state in Europe made this particular 
form of political organization of territory and society the central actor of geopolitics. With it the notions of 
sovereignty, territoriality and the distinction of domestic vs. foreign affairs became prevalent in our 
understanding of how global space should be politically organized. Finally, the organization of space into 
territories controlled by states pursuing their security interests in constant competition against each other led to 
the dominance of a conflict-centered view of world politics. Hence the contest of great powers and the pursuit of 
hegemony dominated in geopolitics. Agnew sees these principles of geopolitical imagination as constant factors, 
at the same time he identifies three ‘Ages of Geopolitics’ in which these principles have been articulated in 
particular and distinctive ways, from the ‘civilizational geopolitics’ of European empire in the 18th and 19th 
century to the ‘naturalized geopolitics’ of the heartland and Lebensraum theories to the ‘ideological geopolitics’ 
of the Cold War, cf., Agnew, Geopolitics, pp. 85-114. Agnew only hints at what age of geopolitics could have 
followed the Cold War, but globalization and multipolarity seem to him  like powerful contenders for defining 
geopolitics at the beginning of the 21st century, cf., pp. 115-127 For Donald Snow economic matters “may 
become the [new] servant of geopolitics;” quoted in Kelly, p. 27. The Marxist tradition of critical geopolitics, less 
influenced by post-structuralism, is particularly concerned with the impact of economic globalization and the 
effects of American hegemony in ordering global space. See for example Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and 
Geoculture (Cambridge: University Press, 1991); David Harvey, Spaces of Capital (Edinburgh: University Press, 
2001).   
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means and ends, narrowly focused on the equation of military power and national 
security as the absence of threat.  
 
Here, the thesis has identified a gap in the literature, stemming from omitting issues 
of discourse and identity, which profoundly influence the definition of security and 
the making of strategy. Incorporating concepts of critical security studies, and in 
particular critical geopolitics allows the thesis to go beyond these limitations, and to 
examine how American grand strategy, which frequently employs representations of 
identity such as ‘indispensable nation,’ ‘American exceptionalism,’ or ‘command of 
the commons’ constitutes a dominant form of knowledge that articulates a 
geopolitical vision, an American worldview. Grand strategy then goes beyond the 
calculation of means and ends, the narrow definition of national security and the 
preeminence of military power, it articulates a worldview of American origin and 
objectifies global space to the projection of American perceptions of geopolitical 
identity and world politics. In looking at who is shaping the discourses, that is to say 
who is telling which story of grand strategy, the thesis attempts to provide a better 
understanding how a particular view of the world is fundamental in making this 
world.  
 
This opens the discussion of grand strategy to include processes of human perception 
and interpretation, which find expression in stories and images of space and power, 
order and threat. The geopolitical imagination that is expressed in popular, formal 
and practical discourses about the role of United States in the world, the threats it 
faces, and the international order it seeks has profound implications for the 
formulation of national security policy. Implications that are felt around the globe, 
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from the Iraq invasion to the Syria conflict, and that will have a profound impact on 
the future of world politics in the 21st century. For better or worse, we live in a world 
that has been shaped by American power and American ideas. Thus, we should pay 
close attention how under the Obama presidency, the course of the United States in 
the world has been debated, how America’s global leadership role has been 
confirmed and contested and by whom, and what this potentially means for the future 
of international relations in the years to come.  
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2. Filming hegemony - Popular geopolitics and the cinematic production of 
national security  
 
The Pentagon is a church. And the soldiers are the priests.1 – Oliver Stone 
 
Critically investigating grand strategy as geopolitical vision of America’s role in the 
world has maybe no better starting point than Hollywood. For more than a century 
the American film industry has perfected the making and re-making of America’s 
image for domestic and foreign audiences, making it a chronicler of the American 
experience, and a key producer of the popular, geopolitical imagination in the United 
States.  
 
As Virgine Mamadouh and Gertjan Dijkink have stated: “Only very powerful or 
hegemonic states can link geopolitical visions with an international power practice, 
changing world order.”2 However, while the overwhelming majority of International 
Relations literature has focused on the aspects of material capabilities and the 
distribution of power in analyzing American grand strategy practice, and its impact 
on the international system, little attention has been paid to representations, 
narratives and imaginations, the geopolitical vision, grand strategy constitutes.  
 
Approaching American grand strategy from a critical perspective, this chapter will 
look at the production and representation of dominant knowledge in relation to 
American power, geopolitical identity and national security in popular discourse and 
                                            
1
 Oliver Stone, interviewed for TV broadcast “Hollywood and the War Machine,” Al Jazeera, August 9, 2012, 
accessed August 12, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/2010/12/2010121681345363793.html. 
2
 Virgine Mamadouh and Gertjan Dijkink, “Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The 
Politics of Geopolitical Discourse,” Geopolitics 11, no. 3 (2006): pp. 349-366.    
 76 
how the popularization of these themes relates to key grand strategy discourses of 
America’s role world politics. Building on a growing literature in critical geopolitics 
and International Relations this widens the scope of what is traditionally considered 
to be the study of grand strategy, by looking at the production and representation of 
national security in popular culture, and specifically the realm of Hollywood film, as 
well as the formulation of American geopolitics in bestselling non-fiction books.  
 
This analytical approach follows from the theoretical conceptualization of grand 
strategy as geopolitical vision and the intertextuality of geopolitical knowledge.3 If a 
grand strategy discourse is to engage the geopolitical imagination of the nation and 
provide orientation for ‘what goes on in the world’, it cannot be the sole undertaking 
of isolated elite circles in politics and academia. The plausibility of elite 
representations of geopolitical identity also relies on their understanding in the 
population and their intertextual compatibility with popular knowledge.4  
 
This draws our attention to the role of popular culture in producing the ‘common 
sense’ of everyday experience.5 Popular culture provides key discursive sites within 
the wider cultural and societal context of geopolitics and national security, where 
deep-seated representations of geopolitical identity are formulated and permanently 
reconstituted.6 When they interrelate with practical discourses of grand strategy, 
popular representations can thus help to produce and sustain a legitimized, 
understood version of geopolitical reality, defining the role and place of the United 
                                            
3
 See Ó Tuathail and Dalby, “Introduction,” in Rethinking Geopolitics pp. 1-7.  
4
 Jutta Weldes, “Going Cultural: Star Trek, State Action, and Popular Culture.” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 28, no 1 (1999): pp. 117-134. 
5
 Ibid., p. 119. 
6
 See Hansen, p. 62.   
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States in the world. The close cooperation of the Pentagon and Hollywood is one 
striking example where popular representations and political-military practices 
intersect in this way. Through the production of film, images of national security, 
military power and the role of the Armed Forces are projected and promoted to a 
global audience for entertainment purposes, sustaining and reflecting in turn 
dominant grand strategy narratives employed by the U.S. defense establishment.  
 
Following the ‘cultural turn’ in international relations, the study of popular culture 
has revealed the numerous connections between the supposedly real world of 
politics, power, and security, and what is generally considered to lie outside the 
scope of appropriate IR research, the mundane world of our daily experiences, 
narratives, imagination, media reflections and the make-believe world of 
entertainment.7  
 
Treating popular culture as a legitimate subject of study for IR scholarship, this 
research employs a critical perspective that rejects a strict dichotomy between grand 
strategy as the sole realm of military power and political calculation, and film as the 
politically irrelevant world of entertainment and fiction. “Culture is political, and 
politics is cultural.”8 To examine the connection of film and grand strategy is to 
acknowledge the political significance of storytelling in creating a commonly shared 
truth. Both film and strategy then focus on the imagination of power as much as they 
                                            
7
 Stuart Croft has explored the role of popular culture in the narrative shift from 9/11 to the ‘War on Terror,’ cf. 
Croft, Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror; for the use of film in the critical analysis of International 
Relations theory and its foundational myths see Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory. Second Edition 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2007); Jutta Weldes has worked on the mutual interconnections of international relations and 
the fictional worlds of fantasy and science fiction, see for example Jutta Weldes, ed, To Seek Out New Worlds. 
Exploring Links between Science Fiction and World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Christina 
Rowley and Jutta Weldes, “The Evolution of International Security Studies and the Everyday: Suggestions from 
the Buffyverse,” SPAIS, University of Bristol, Working Paper No.11-12 
8
 Cynthia Weber, Imagining America at War (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 188. 
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rely on the power of images. This duality of power and image was remarkably 
illustrated when President George W. Bush landed on an aircraft carrier to announce 
the ending of major combat operations in Iraq; he seemed to deliberately invoke a 
Top Gun moment for the world to watch America’s might. The message was clear: 
Just like Tom Cruise in his F-14, the President had successfully defeated America’s 
enemies.  
 
Incorporating popular culture into a discourse analysis of grand strategy follows the 
reformulation of power and strategy in the context of critical security studies that has 
thought to use the insight of post-structuralism to challenge the dominant realist 
discourse.9 Jutta Weldes for example has explored how the multiple interconnections 
between real-life events, such as the Reagan-era SDI program, globalization, or the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and the imagined worlds of science fiction 
question the ‘great divide’ of high politics and popular culture.10  
 
Popular culture then is neither irrelevant nor dismissible, but one of the sites where 
power is produced and reproduced.11 However, popular culture cannot only sustain 
dominant definitions of world politics but also critique and question existing 
representations. Sometimes both confirmation and contestation can occur 
simultaneously. The 2004 Team America: World Police for example can be 
interpreted as a movie satire of gung-ho American jingoism, the War on Terror, 
                                            
9
 Michael Sheehan, International Security: An analytical Survey (Boulder: Lynne Rinner Publishers, 2005), pp. 
133-149. 
10
 Jutta Weldes, “Popular Culture, Science Fiction, and World Politics,” in: Jutta Weldes ed. 
 To Seek Out New Worlds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): pp. 1-27.  
11
 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Hollywood liberalism, Islamic terrorists, and the North-Korean nuclear threat all at 
the same time. As Weldes points out:  
Whether a particular popular cultural text supports or undermines existing 
relations of power, or both at once, examining such texts helps us to highlight 
the working of power.12  
 
The imagination of popular culture provides a background of meaning and 
understanding of geopolitics, foreign and security policy that audiences, critics and 
state officials alike connect with. “SDI becomes ‘Star Wars’ for its detractors, and 
then also for its defenders.”13  
 
The individual films selected for this chapter have been chosen according to three 
criteria. First, the analysis deals with films that were produced in the United States of 
America and released during the period of the presidency of Barack Obama covered 
by the thesis (January 2009 - August 2014). Second, the films selected, centrally 
involve a plot about a perceived threat to the national security of the United States 
and the actions undertaken to counter such a threat, focusing the analysis on the 
‘national security cinema’ during the Obama presidency and its representation of 
American geopolitical identity during that timeframe. Thirdly, all the films, have 
been selected from the 50 highest grossing films released in the United States in each 
year, suggesting a certain level of popularity and cultural presence for these pop 
cultural artifacts. The only exception, The Messenger has been chosen due to its 
production receiving direct support from the Pentagon. Here, the thesis attempts a 
critical analysis of how a dominant popular geopolitical imagination is being 
produced by combing a study of representational features with the materiality of box 
office results and budget figures. Hence, it is in particular the attempt to uncover a 
                                            
12
 Ibid., p. 7. 
13
 Ibid. 
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dominant, popular imagination of geopolitical identity and national security that 
motivates the research in this chapter. At the same time, the identification of such a 
dominant identity construct is then further examined and tested against the other 
discursive sites examined in the thesis, further elaborating if a ‘big picture’ of 
America’s role in the world has been constructed that fulfills the demands for a grand 
strategy of coherence and consistency. Thus, the thesis considers in particular 
commercially successful genres within the context of the national security cinema, 
such as science-fiction films, and not films that have largely failed to capture 
audience’s attention in bringing America to the big screen.  
 
The cinematic production of national security for entertainment purposes, realized in 
multi-million dollar films can be seen as a framework of reference for the popular 
imagination, one that illustrates the leverage of certain discursive formations over 
others in attaining ‘common sense’ status. The representations of geopolitical 
identity in the films surveyed in this thesis, testify to an enduring popularity of the 
themes of American heroism and global leadership, military superiority, and external 
threat endangering the existence of the United States. Counter-narratives to this basic 
Manichean narrative of American exceptionalism and militarism in popular movies 
also exist, for example when films feature threats to the United States emerging from 
out-of-control government surveillance efforts, rouge secret intelligence operations 
and military programs. However, predominantly these narrative constructs function 
as outliers and disruptors to the general notion of American exceptionalism, military 
prowess and the defensive nature of the United States.  
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The dominant, Manichean narrative of national security in Hollywood film then is 
closest to the geopolitical vision of American hegemony; a powerful and globally 
engaged United States is fighting Evil on behalf of the nation and the world. This 
questions the pervasiveness of existing alternative grand strategy narratives in formal 
and practical discourses, and their ability to touch on the popular geopolitical 
imagination through the medium of film. It seems that in Hollywood, hegemony dies 
hard. 
 
Critical geopolitics, film and popular narratives of grand strategy  
 
Among the majority of political commentators and International Relations literature, 
consensus is that American hegemony, or primacy was the defining feature of U.S. 
foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War period, especially pronounced 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.14 Subsequently, this narrative of American 
hegemony as powerful leader and global military force has been observed in 
numerous Hollywood films from Independence Day (1996) to Black Hawk Down 
(2001).15 Hollywood represents a global cultural icon and one of the United Sates’ 
most prevailing sources of ‘soft power,’ as well as an important factor in the 
American economy.16  According to the Guardian, in 2011 the American film 
                                            
14
 See Clark, pp. 23-28, Ikenberry, “American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror;” Christopher Layne, “The 
Waning of U.S. Hegemony – Myth or Reality? A Review Essay,” International Security 34, no. 1 (2009): pp. 
147-172; Efstathios T. Fakiolas and Tassos Fakiolas, “Pax Americana or Multilateralism? Reflecting on the 
United States’ Grand Strategic Vision of Hegemony in the Wake of the 11 September Attacks,” Mediterranean 
Quarterly 18, no. 4 (2007): pp. 53-86; Kristol and Kagan, pp. 18-32.     
15
 Timothy Garton Ash, “The new Rome is not the new Greece yet, but the U.S. must look to its laurels,” 
Guardian, June 29, 2012, accessed September 12, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/29/america-must-look-to-its-laurels. Simon 
Dalby, “Warrior geopolitics: Gladiator, Black Hawk Down and The Kingdom Of Heaven.” Political Geography 
27, no. 4 (2008): pp. 439-455. 
16
 Which does not mean of course that Hollywood cannot produce heavy resistance against what some perceive as 
cultural invasion and Americanization.  
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industry has earned $40.8bn domestically and $88.8bn worldwide.17 The global 
presence of American-made movies, DVDs, Blue-rays, soundtracks and 
merchandising is unrivalled. This impressive cultural machine, combining substantial 
capital investment, creative talent and technical sophistication has perfected a 
particular style of storytelling that has set a global standard for cinematic narrative.18  
 
A reliable genre that film producers regularly return to in the pursuit of profit is the 
cinematic representation of the American superpower, and how it counters existential 
threats to its national security. This makes Hollywood a filmic ‘chronicler of 
American empire,’ as the American journalist Chris Hedges puts it, its films 
celebrating the ‘virtue and power’ of the United States.19  The critical and multiple 
Academy Award winning filmmaker Oliver Stone sees Hollywood ‘selling the idea 
that America is militarily successful’ through films like Pearl Harbor (2000), or 
Black Hawk Down (2001).20 In projecting visions of American military power to 
audiences across the globe, Hollywood is a prime source for analyzing the popular 
geopolitical imagination, where certain actions of states and individuals are 
legitimized and naturalized in the context of national security.21  
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 Ben Child: “U.S. film industry set for four years of strong growth, predicts report,” Guardian, June 14, 2012, 
accessed August 8, 2014, http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2011/jun/14/us-film-industry-growth-forecast. 
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 See David Bordwell, The Way Hollywood tells it (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
2006). 
19
 Chris Hedges, interviewed for TV broadcast “Hollywood and the War Machine,” Al Jazeera, August 9, 2012, 
accessed August 12, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/2010/12/2010121681345363793.html. 
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 Oliver Stone, interviewed by Al Jazeera, ibid.  
21
 Mark J. Lacy, “War, Cinema, and Moral Anxiety,” Alternatives 28, no. 5 (2003): p. 614. Recently, there has 
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representations of national identity, global space and international power practices in film, the production of 
popular geopolitical discourse, the involvement of audiences in this discourse, and the contestation of dominant 
geopolitical narratives through cinematic aesthetics, see in particular, Marcus Power and Andrew Crampton, 
“Reel geopolitics: Cinemato-graphing Political Space.” Geopolitics 10, no. 2 (2005): pp. 193-203; Jason Dittmer, 
“American exceptionalism, visual effects, and the post-9/11 cinematic superhero boom,” Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 29, no. 1 (2011): pp. 114-130; Jason Dittmer and Klaus Dodds, “Popular 
Geopolitics Past and Future: Fandom, Identities and Audiences,” Geopolitics 13, no. 3 (2008): pp. 437-457; 
Michael Shapiro, Cinematic Geopolitics (Oxon: Routledge, 2009). 
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In their introduction to a special issue of Geopolitics dealing with cinema and 
geopolitics, Marcus Power and Andrew Crampton, talking about American military-
themed films released following 9/11, stress the popularity of these filmic narratives 
that confirmed a global military role of the United States in defense of national 
security. They argue that their success at the box office suggests the appeal of these 
films in times of cultural and political uncertainty, since they give the audience a 
clear vision of what goes on in the world.22 The cinema becomes a space where the 
ambiguity and complexity of world politics is replaced with certainty and 
simplicity.23 A function similar to the one grand strategy is supposed to perform.  
 
Hollywood films have dealt with the issues of national security, military power, 
American identity and war in numerous ways, predominantly in the genres of action-
thrillers and war films.24 Common to what Jean-Michel Valantin dubs the ‘national 
security cinema’ is the perception of threat as an existential danger to survival, 
security and order against which American power is mobilized; the narratives and 
visualizations of this theme then provide filmic representations of American grand 
strategy, from failed containment in Vietnam, to the reverberations of American 
primacy under George W. Bush. As Valantin notes:  
The history of relationships between the American state and strategy is also 
that of communication between Washington and Hollywood, which 
constantly transforms the application of American strategic practices into 
cinematic accounts.”25  
 
This communication however entails not only the intertextuality of representations of 
national security and grand strategy narratives but also the institutionalized 
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 Power and Crampton, pp. 193-194. 
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 Lacy, pp. 611-636. 
24
 See Klaus Dodds, “Hollywood and the Popular Geopolitics of the War on Terror,” Third World Quarterly 29, 
no.8 (2008): pp. 1624-1625.   
25
 Jean-Michel Valantin, Hollywood, the Pentagon and Washington (London: Anthem Press, 2005), p. xi.      
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cooperation between the Pentagon and Hollywood in the production of national 
security cinema and the military image of the United States.26  
 
Of course, it cannot be assumed that the popularity of these entertainment products is 
simply due to their particular geopolitical imagination, or indeed if such a 
geopolitical reading reaches the audience at all. The main purpose of a Hollywood 
film is to be enjoyed as entertainment and to make money. However, the thesis can 
note the respective conjunction of production value, geopolitical representation and 
box office success, and how these constellations change or continue over time. The 
continued involvement of the Pentagon in the production of Hollywood films for 
example suggest a conviction on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense that the 
predominantly positive image of the American military created in these films reaches 
the audience and is a worthwhile investment for public relations and recruitment.  
 
In a similar vein, the continued investment into certain geopolitical imaginations of 
American military power on film can be attributed to the conviction of movie 
producers that these films sell at the box office, justifying in turn further investment 
into similar products.27  The thesis thus explores how in the cinematic discourse of 
national security, certain representations coincide with certain levels of capital 
investment and revenue, suggesting their popularity and common sense appeal. The 
circular flow of box office success, generic film production and capital investment is 
an often overlooked element in the analysis of popular geopolitics and widens the 
                                            
26
 Cf., James Der Derian, Virtuous War (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001); David L. Robb, Operation Hollywood 
(New York: Prometheus Books, 2004); Valantin; Lawrence H. Suid, Guts & Glory. Revised an Expanded Edition 
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2002). 
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 This however does not suggest a Frankfurt School understanding of cultural production in the analysis of 
popular geopolitics, where an ideological message is employed to manipulate and exploit audiences by the forces 
of capital; see in this context also Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics & Identity (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2010), pp. 28-29. 
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scope beyond purely representational perspective to include aspects of cultural 
economy in the evaluation of how film reflects a Foucauldian nexus of 
power/knowledge.28  
 
Another issue in the analysis of popular geopolitics is the question of audience 
reception, which Dittmer and Dodds suggest can benefit from greater attention and 
rigor in research on how audiences derive meanings from geopolitical narratives and 
how audiences themselves participate in the creation of meaning.29 As Dittmer 
suggests in his analysis of audience responses to superhero movies on the Internet 
Movie Database, audiences primarily focus on aesthetic and artistic qualities in 
reviewing film, however themes such as military power or American exceptionalism 
are noticed and engaged with, albeit often in an indirect way.30  
 
While the question of audience responses is undoubtedly important, the research here 
is focused more on how Hollywood film creates a framework of reference for the 
popular geopolitical imagination of national security, and its connectivity to formal 
and practical discourses. As such it is interested more in patterns of production and 
representation, and what fictional material is offered to audiences, than the 
perception within audiences. As Ernest Giglio noted:  
Even though audiences may not be aware of it, the most visible and common 
manifestation of the Hollywood-Washington connection takes place on the 
big screen where, in a fraction of the five- to six-hundred films that 
Hollywood releases annually to theatres, films are shown that contain 
                                            
28
 Jason Dittmer has recently raised the issue of a greater attention to the role of cultural economy in the analysis 
of popular geopolitics; Dittmer, “American exceptionalism, visual effects, and the post-9/11 cinematic superhero 
boom”. 
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 Dittmer and Dodds, pp. 437-457. 
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 Dittmer, “American exceptionalism, visual effects, and the post-9/11 cinematic superhero boom,” pp. 124-126. 
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political messages or political themes that are ideological, propagandistic, 
historically misleading, or politically manipulative.31  
 
Whether the audience picks up on one particular narrative of national security then 
seems less relevant than the variety, or lack thereof, that is offered to the audience to 
interpret and engage with in the first place. As Klaus Dodds has noted, the majority 
of Hollywood films exploring geopolitical themes are action-thrillers, and as such 
shape the expectations of audiences and producers, concerning plotlines, narratives 
and outcomes.32 “The ending is invariably conservative (…).”33  
 
In this regard, Hollywood as an industry focused on reliable revenue and tried 
formulas of success, is a powerful voice for the defense of the status quo.34 As such, 
changes or continuities in the way Hollywood tells the story of national security are a 
powerful indicator for the way the American film industry perceives the status quo of 
American geopolitical identity in world politics.  
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 Ernest Giglio, Here’s looking at you: Hollywood, Film & Politics. Third Edition. (New York: Peterland, 2010), 
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Fig. 5 List of films surveyed:35  
                                            
35
 The numbers for box office revenue are taken from Box Office Mojo, accessed September 17, 2014, 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com; the numbers for estimated budgets and plot synopses are taken from the Internet 
Movie Database (IMDB), accessed September 17, 2014, http://www.imdb.com. 
36
 Avatar does not feature a direct threat to U.S. national security, but has been chosen due its enormous 
popularity and because it is a widely cited example for a cinematic critique of U.S. foreign and security policy, in 
particular the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a critique that was officially confirmed as intentional by the author 
and director James Cameron. “James Cameron: 'Avatar' Is Political But It's Not Un-American,” The Huffington 
Post, March 18, 2010, accessed October 12, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/14/james-cameron-
avatar-is-p_n_423068.html.   
Year Title 
 
U.S. Box Office / 
Production (est.) 
Ranking  Threat 
Scenario 
2009 Avatar36 $749,766,139 
$237,000,000 
1 Alien Invasion 
2009 Transformers: Revenge of 
the Fallen 
$402,111,870 
$200,00,000 
2  Alien Invasion  
2009 G.I. Joe:  
The Rise of Cobra  
$150,201,498 
$175,000,000 
18 Int. Terrorism / 
WMD Attack 
2009 Inglourious Basterds $120,540,719 
$70,000,000 
25 War / Foreign 
Enemy  
2009 
 
The Messenger $1,109,660 
$6,500,000 
196 War / Foreign 
Enemy 
2010 Iron Man 2 $312,433,331 
$200,000,000 
3 Domestic Crime 
/ Foreign 
Infiltration  
2010 Salt $118,311,368 
$110,000,000 
22 Foreign 
Infiltration 
2010 R.E.D. $90,380,162 
$58,000,000 
28 Rouge CIA 
operation 
2010 The A-Team $77,222,099 
$110,000,000 
44 Rouge CIA 
operation 
2010  Knight & Day $76,423,035 
$117,000,000 
45 Rouge CIA 
operation 
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2011 Transformers:  
Dark of the Moon 
$352,390,543 
$195,000,000 
2 Alien Invasion  
2011 Mission: Impossible - 
Ghost Protocol 
$209,397,903 
$145,000,000 
7 Int. Terrorism / 
WMD Attack  
2011 Captain America: The 
First Avenger 
$176,654,505 
$140,000,000 
12 War / WMD 
Attack 
2011 X-Men: First Class $146,408,305 
$160,000,000 
17 War / Foreign 
Infiltration 
2011 Battle: Los Angeles $83,552,429 
$70,000,000 
37 Alien Invasion 
2012 Marvel’s  
The Avengers 
$623,357,910 
$220,000,000 
1 Alien Invasion 
 
2012 The Dark Knight Rises $446,894,498 
$250,000,000 
2 Int. Terrorism / 
WMD Attack  
2012 The Bourne Legacy $112,870,105 
$125,000,000 
18 Rouge Military 
Operation 
2012 Act of Valor $70,012,847 
$12,000,000 
27 Int. Terrorism / 
WMD Attack 
2012 Battleship 
 
$65,233,400 
$209,000,000 
30 Alien Invasion 
2012 The Expendables 2 $85,028,192 
$92,000,00 
32 WMD 
Proliferation 
2013 Iron Man 3 $409,013,994 
$200,000,000 
2 Domestic Crime 
/ Int. Terrorism  
2013 Man of Steel $291,045,518 
$225,000,000 
5 Alien Invasion 
2013 G.I. Joe Retaliation $122,523,060 
$130,000,000 
25 Int. Terrorism / 
Foreign 
Infiltration 
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Heroism, militarization and the representation of the geopolitical identity of the 
United States on screen  
 
The issue of identity is maybe the one most comprehensively studied in the 
geopolitical analysis of Hollywood film. Joanne Sharp and Klaus Dodds for example 
have focused on the cinematic construction of gender, masculinity and patriotism, 
and how they write ‘America’s map of world order.’37 Closely related, yet distinctive 
from these phenomena is the theme of heroism and militarization that we regularly 
encounter in the construction of identity in national security films and how they 
divide the American Self from the threatening Other.38 In Iron Man 2 (2010) and 
Iron Man 3 (2013) for example it is the industrial and entrepreneur Tony Stark, who 
                                            
37
 Joanne P. Sharp, “Reel geographies of the new world order: patriotism, masculinity, and geopolitics in post 
Cold War American movies,” in Rethinking Geopolitics, pp. 152-170; Klaus Dodds, “Gender, Geopolitics, and 
Contemporary Representations of National Security.” Journal of Popular Film and Television 38, no. 1 (2010): 
pp. 21-33. 
38
 Marcus Power has demonstrated the link between visualization and militarization in the related subject of video 
games that allow the player to experience war from a first-person perspective and take on the role of hero, as he 
or she kills America’s enemies in an immersive 3-d environment, Marcus Power, “Digitized Virtuosity: Video 
War Games and Post-9/11 Cyber-Deterrence.” Security Dialouge 38, no. 2 (2007): pp. 271-288. As in the case of 
video games, films both entertain and legitimize military power and the geopolitical script of the United States as 
heroic defender of security.  
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thanks to his technological ingenuity is able to design and operate a weaponized 
high-tech armor, taking on the identity of Iron Man in the defense of America. Iron 
Man/Tony Stark represents a combination of military power, technological 
innovativeness and entrepreneurial spirit, displaying traits commonly associated with 
the United States, personified in the character of the superhero.39  
 
Fig. 6 Iron Man 2 (2010) 
 
Defending America together: U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. James ‘Rodey’ Rhodes (Don Cheadle) and Tony 
Stark/Iron Man (Robert Downey Jr.).40 
 
                                            
39
 Iron Man 2 opens with a senate hearing that questions the reliability of Iron Man to provide national security to 
the United States since as an individual he is operating outside the national command structure and the authority 
of the Pentagon. Remarkably, in the real world the Pentagon decided not to give official support to the Avengers 
movie, apparently because of the unclear status of the supranational S.H.I.E.L.D organization in relation to the 
national command structure of the United States. The Iron Man franchise on the other hand received official 
support from the Pentagon, since the U.S. Air Force features prominently in these movies. Tony Stark’s best 
friend is Lt. Col. James ‘Rhodey’ Rhodes, who in Iron Man 2 takes on the identity of ‘War Machine,’ supporting 
Iron Man in fighting the film’s main villain, the Russian scientist Ivan Vanko. 
40
 Retrieved December 19, 2014, from http://www.beyondhollywood.com/uploads/2009/04/new-iron-man-2-
6.jpg.    
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The American superhero, heroic American soldier, or valiant secret agent who 
defends the United States against the ultimate threat of foreign attack through force 
is a theme that has been repeated in numerous popular films since the advent of the 
Obama presidency, for example in Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen (2009), G.I. 
Joe: The Rise of Cobra (2009), Transformers: Dark Side of the Moon (2011), 
Mission Impossible: Ghost Protocol (2011), Expendables 2 (2012), Battleship 
(2012), Battle: Los Angeles (2012), The Dark Knight Rises (2012), Act of Valor 
(2012), Olympus Has Fallen (2013), Man of Steel (2013), and Jack Ryan: Shadow 
Recruit (2014) 
 
In all these examples we encounter what Der Derian has dubbed the ‘virtuous war’, 
the use of military power or violent force by the United States is morally 
unambiguous and righteous, surgically executed, successful and does neither produce 
collateral damage nor post-traumatic stress in the hero.41 America fights a good, 
clean fight in the combat of evil aliens and sinister terrorists. As Tom Pollard has 
noted, the glorification of American patriotism and militarism has not always been a 
staple feature of Hollywood film.  
When the popular mood of the country seemed to favor pacifism or 
isolationism, as during the years immediately preceding both World Wars, 
films tended either to avoid war altogether or to reflect a certain abhorrence 
of military conflict itself.42  
 
However, ever since the entry of the United States in World War 2 and the 
emergence of the country as a global superpower the ‘good war’ narrative and 
representations of military heroism have continuously been produced and 
                                            
41
 See Der Derian, Virtuous War. 
42
 Tom Pollard, “The Hollywood War Machine,” New Political Science 24, no.1 (2002): p. 121. 
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reproduced.43 Subsequent films in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, for example, such as 
First Blood (1982), or We Were Soldiers (2002), attempted to apply the ‘good war’ 
and ’hero’ narrative to Vietnam, and successfully reformulated the theme of 
America’s heroic geopolitical identity, from Top Gun (1986) to Independence Day 
(1996), and Behind Enemy Lines (2001).44 The mixed results and costly experience 
of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq seem to have done little to affect the popularity 
of this geopolitical image under President Obama. G.I. Joe: The Rise of Cobra 
(2009) and its sequel G.I. Joe: Retaliation (2013) are perfect examples that display 
this on-going conjunction of heroism and militarism in popular Hollywood film. 
Based on an American 1980s cartoon series, G.I. Joe features a fictional, American 
led, but formally international, secret organization of Special Forces soldiers, 
engaged in a global struggle against the evil Cobra organization, which seeks world 
                                            
43
 Examples for the continuity of the ‘good war narrative’ as constructed for World War II include for example, 
Bataan (1943), The Longest Day (1962), Saving Private Ryan (1998), and Red Tails (2012). In contrast to the 
overwhelmingly positive imagination of the Second World War, Vietnam, a conflict whose legitimacy, conduct 
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World War 2, while films about Vietnam itself took a much more critical stance toward American military power, 
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in Apocalypse Now (1979), and Platoon (1986), which focus on the traumatizing effect of the war on the 
American soldiers and the chaos, nihilism and madness of war itself. See Suid, especially pp. 42-64; pp. 352-369, 
and pp. 556-617. Anti-war films such as Apocalypse Now (1979), Platoon (1986) and Deer Hunter (1978) are 
among the most famous examples for films that are hailed for critically exploring the American involvement in 
the Vietnam War and its social and political implications, cf. Michael Anderegg, Inventing Vietnam: The War in 
Film and Television (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991). Others deny an ‘anti-war’ quality to these 
films, describing for example Apocalypse Now as violent spectacle that does not question the legitimacy of the 
Vietnam War and is based on the representation of the enemy as the unknown ‘Other,’ see Susan Hayward, 
Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 462. 
44
 See Geraóid Ó Tuathail, “The Frustrations of Geopolitics and the Pleasures of War: Behind Enemy Lines and 
American Geopolitical Culture,” Geopolitics 10, no. 2 (2005): pp. 356-377. During the 1980s films such as Top 
Gun (1986), the Rambo series (1982, 1985, 1988) or Red Dawn (1984) are widely cited as examples for a 
conservative resurgence in the United States under Ronald Reagan, emphasizing American military supremacy, 
patriotism and a renewed ideological determination in the Cold War confrontation against the Soviet Union, cf., 
Douglas Kellner, Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the Modern and the Post-
Modern (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 55-93. Lately, there have been various accounts of the fictional legacy 
of the Bush/Cheney administration, 9/11, the Global War on Terror and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in 
Hollywood, cf., Simon Dalby, “Warrior Geopolitics: Gladiator, Black Hawk Down and The Kingdom of 
Heaven,” Political Geography 27, no. 4 (2008): pp. 439-455; Dodds, “Hollywood and the Popular Geopolitics of 
the War on Terror;” Douglas Kellner, Cinema Wars: Hollywood Film and Politics in the Bush-Cheney Era  
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Cynthia Weber, Imagining America at War (Routledge: New York, 2007). 
Examples range from the 2001 production of Pearl Harbor (2001) and other ‘patriotic films’ following the terror 
attacks in New York and Washington, including Black Hawk Down (2001), We Were Soldiers (2002) and The 
Sum of All Fears (2002) to dark, pessimistic portraits of violence, nihilism and greed prevalent in American 
society in films such as There will be Blood (2008), No Country for Old Men (2008) or The Dark Night (2008), 
cf., Kellner, Cinema Wars, pp. 3-4; Weber, pp. 9-11; pp. 15-16. 
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domination. The motto of the original cartoon series captures the essence of this 
franchise: Every ‘Joe’ is ‘a real American hero’. 45 
 
Fig. 7 G.I. Joe: A Real American Hero (1985) 
 
The inspiration for the movies: The 1985 military cartoon and toy line.46  
 
This popular display of American military power, and the virtuous heroes which 
embody the values the country is supposed to represent is in fact a staple of formal 
and popular discourses of hegemony, where ‘American leadership’ in the world is 
fundamentally based on its military might and the purpose behind its use. As 
President Obama explained at West Point in 2014: “America must always lead on the 
                                            
45
 Some of G.I. Joe’s members, unlike the original all-American cartoon cast, hail from other countries, most 
likely to increase the global box office appeal of this very American military toy line turned movie fantasy; cf., 
Betsy Sharkey, “Movie Review 'G.I. Joe: The Rise of Cobra'”, Los Angeles Times, August 8, 2009, accessed 
August 8, 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/08/entertainment/et-gi-joe8. 
46
 Retrieved December 22, 2014, from http://i74.servimg.com/u/f74/16/81/92/05/008210.gif.  
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world stage. The military […] is and always will be the backbone of that 
leadership.”47 
 
Maybe most ostentatiously, the theme of heroism and military power comes in the 
form of American superheroes as defenders of national security. In Captain America: 
The First Avenger (2011) for example, the viewer encounters a fictional version of 
World War II, in which the United States is engaged in the development of a secret 
program, which can turn ordinary soldiers into super-powered individuals. The only 
soldier, who successfully undergoes this treatment, is Steve Rogers, who becomes 
the superhero Captain America, tasked to fight Nazis and the secret Hydra 
organization, led by the Nazi scientist Johann Schmidt, aka the Red Skull. In Captain 
America the United States fights a ‘good war’, virtually alone, against the very 
embodiment of Evil, and it is the heroic self-sacrifice of the soldier/hero Steve 
Rogers, who saves New York City from certain destruction by crashing the Red 
Skull’s WMD-armed bomber in the Arctic.  
 
Captain America quite literally embodies the military heroism of the United States as 
he is clad in a costume version of the Stars and Stripes. As Jason Dittmer has 
elaborated in his work on the Captain America comic books, significant to Captain 
America’s role in the process of popularizing geopolitical narratives is his ability to 
connect the individual experience of the hero to ‘political projects of American 
nationalism, international order, and foreign policy.’ 48  The Captain fights for 
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 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement 
Ceremony,” May 28, 2014, accessed August 12, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-west-point-academy-commencement-ceremony. 
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 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95, no. 3 (2005): p. 627. 
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America, but he also is America. American heroes like Iron Man, the G.I. Joes and 
Captain America are testament to the enduring myth of American exceptionalism in 
the geopolitical imagination of the United States, and the heroic individualism of its 
people. As the film critics A. O. Scott and Manohla Dargis have written: 
On one level the allure of comic book movies is obvious, because, among 
other attractions, they tap into deeply rooted national myths, including that of 
American Eden (Superman’s Smallville); the Western hero (who’s separate 
from the world and also its savior); and American exceptionalism (that this 
country is different from all others because of its mission to make ‘the world 
safe for democracy,’ as Woodrow Wilson and, I believe, Iron Man, both put 
it. 49  
 
The United States is an outstanding force for good in the world, and it produces 
outstanding individuals that embody its values, and who sometimes have to enforce 
them against ‘evildoers’ and ‘enemies of freedom’ as for example Robert Kagan, 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama would put it.50 As Caroline Kennedy has 
remarked: “Opposition to ‘Evil’ has marked American foreign policy for much of the 
twentieth and twenty-first century.51 
 
And time and again highly popular films confirm this worldview of American 
exceptionalism and Manichean simplicity when they show the virtues of American 
freedom, liberty, and independence under threat by enemies who wish to attack, 
suppress or destroy the United States. Furthermore, these enemies are oftentimes 
presented not only as enemies of the United States, but of freedom itself, and as 
menace to the survival of the entire planet. The evil Decepticons in the Transformers 
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 A. O. Scott and Manohla Dargis, “Super-Dreams of an Alternate World Order,” New York Times, June 27, 
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series, or the aliens in Battleship and Avengers all function as the ultimate despotic 
Other, against which the American geopolitical identity of freedom-loving heroism 
and world leadership is displayed.  
 
The same role of ultimate otherness has been fulfilled in the past by representations 
of Germans and Japanese in World War 2, Russians and Communists during the 
Cold War, or rouge states and Islamic terrorists before and after 9/11.52 In the 
enduring geopolitical script of Hollywood, the United States must use its formidable 
military power or extraordinary militarized superheroes in order to prevent invasion 
and preserve its freedom. An image invoked again in the 2012 top blockbuster 
Marvel’s The Avengers. In the film it is the combination of heroic individualism and 
military high-tech that saves the day for America and the world, when Iron Man uses 
a nuclear warhead to destroy the interstellar portal that allows the attacking aliens to 
invade New York City. The Avengers is a perfect example for the enduring 
popularity of cinematic narratives that weave together themes of exceptionalism, 
heroism and military power as force for good that tap deep into the mythical identity 
of ‘America’ as defender of freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
52
 See for example Pollard, “The Hollywood War Machine.” Sally Totman has written an extensive study on the 
construction of ‘rouge states’ in Hollywood cinema as the Other, replacing the Soviet Union in the role of the 
enemy following the end of the Cold War; cf., Sally Totman, How Hollywood Projects Foreign Policy (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
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Fig. 8 Marvel’s The Avengers (2012) 
 
The Avengers defend New York City (from left to right: Black Widow – Scarlett Johansson; Thor – 
Chris Hemsworth; Captain America – Chris Evans, Hawkeye – Jeremy Renner, Iron Man – Robert 
Donwy Jr., Hulk – Mark Ruffalo).53 
 
Hollywood, the Pentagon and the cinematic production of national security 
 
The popular narrative of the United States as defender of national and global security 
is centrally linked to the cinematic representation of American military power and 
superiority. The U.S. Department of Defense is actively involved in promoting and 
projecting this popular imagination of American geopolitical identity as the world’s 
leading superpower through its entertainment industry liaison. This longstanding 
cooperation between the Pentagon and Hollywood has been institutionalized through 
the Office of Public Relations and the Special Assistant for Entertainment Media of 
the Department of Defense, a position currently held by former U.S. Navy Colonel 
Phillip M. Strub. Individual liaison offices for the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army, the 
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 Retrieved December 19, 2014, from http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-
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U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force are located in Los Angeles. Their frequent 
involvement in contemporary film productions shows that the Department of 
Defense and the Armed Forces are not just a passive service provider to the film 
industry, but in fact have an active part in the process of filmmaking.54  Officially, 
the criteria the Armed Forces and the Pentagon apply to determine if they can 
provide support for a film are ‘accuracy’ and ‘realism.’ The portrayal on film is 
supposed to reflect a realistic image of the U.S. military and its role in defense of 
American national security.  
 
The actual support provided to film productions can include technical advice by 
active or former members of the Armed Forces, the lending of military hardware, 
such as tanks or helicopters, the provision of military personnel as extras, or shooting 
on location at military installations. This service can save a production substantial 
costs, but also allows the Pentagon great leverage in maintaining a positive image of 
the American military in the films it cooperates with.55 This relationship has been 
described by insiders as ‘mutual exploitation.’ 56  Hollywood obtains access to 
military hardware it would otherwise have to rent on the free market for substantially 
higher prices. The Pentagon in return reaps the public relations benefits from starring 
its technology and soldiers in big blockbusters where America’s military heroes save 
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 Cf., Robb. 
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 AP, “Pentagon provides for Hollywood,” U.S.A Today, May 29, 2001, accessed July 5, 2013, 
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the world.57 However, the role of the Pentagon goes beyond a mere supplier of 
technology and free rider on Hollywood’s PR machinery. It actively takes control of 
the popular image of national security that is being created in the films it cooperates 
with.  
 
In many past instances, the Pentagon has requested script changes to make a movie 
more ‘accurate’, which ultimately was a demand to show the military in a more 
favorable light.58 The conditions of ‘realism’ and ‘accuracy’ go far beyond the 
proper handling of weapons, or the following of military protocol in details such as 
proper saluting or accurate uniforms. A telling example for this is Thirteen Days 
(2000), a film by Kevin Costner about the Cuban Missile Crisis. As the author David 
Robb has reported, the Pentagon considered the portrayal of top ranking military 
figures, such as U.S. Air Force General Curtis Le May, to be too bellicose and 
warmongering, and denied support for the film. Despite the fact that the military 
position of LeMay and others could be proven to be historically accurate, due to 
secret tapes recorded by President Kennedy in the White House, the Pentagon 
refused to accept this historic ‘reality.’ Ultimately, ‘accuracy’ and ‘realism’ represent 
flexible categories of interpretation in which the Pentagon can apply its own 
definition of what constitutes a realistic portrayal of national security, and which 
version of reality it deems fit to support with expertise, manpower and equipment.  
 
This ultimately links the production of films and the cinematic practice of national 
security to the representation of identity as constructed by the Department of Defense 
and the hegemonic discourse of military power, geopolitics, and national security.  
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 Cf., Suid. 
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 Cf., Robb. 
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As the official statements of the various film liaison offices of the American military 
document, the goal of the Pentagon and the Armed Forces in the production of films 
is the projection of ‘authentic’ images.59 These are not simply for entertainment 
purposes; ‘authentic’ images are also meant to ‘educate’ audiences. As a U.S. Marine 
officer involved in the film business has argued, the majority of Americans today 
obtain their information about the U.S. military through entertainment products such 
as movies.60  
 
By watching Ironman 2 or Battleship, the audience is not only being entertained, it 
also is supposed to learn what the American military is and what it does. The 1986 
film Top Gun for example, which celebrated the daredevil exploits of U.S. Navy 
pilot Pete ‘Maverick’ Mitchel, played by Tom Cruise, saw the substantial 
involvement of the U.S. Navy. The film is credited for a subsequent, marked increase 
in recruitment figures for the Navy and Air Force.61 In fact, it has been the 
representation of the fictional entity of the S.H.I.E.L.D intelligence agency in the 
Avengers movie, as a formally ‘international’ body, outside the national chain of 
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accessed July 17, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-08-26/opinions/35271385_1_pentagon-brass-
military-budget-top-gun. 
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command that impeded the cooperation of the Pentagon with the production of this 
film. As Mr. Strub explained:  
We couldn’t reconcile the unreality of this international organization and our 
place in it. […] To whom did S.H.I.E.L.D. answer? Did we work for 
S.H.I.E.L.D.? We hit that roadblock and decided we couldn’t do anything 
with the film.62  
 
This was despite the fact that the Avengers featured a cast of predominantly 
American superheroes, defending the United States against alien invasion, and had 
Captain America as the team’s leader, who in the fictional Marvel universe is a 
product of the U.S. Army’s ‘super soldier’ program. The Pentagon however, defines 
the geopolitical identity of ‘American’ as one that is line with the national chain of 
military command and control within the national security state.  
 
While the production team of G.I. Joe: Rise of Cobra (2009) received permission to 
film at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California, according to 
Vincente C. Ogilvie, Deputy Director for Entertainment Media at the Pentagon, the 
Department of Defense could only provide limited support in part due to the fact that 
G.I. Joe was not ‘wholly American.’63 Even though, the film’s plot was changed 
after negative reaction from fans and U.S. service members, to make the military unit 
of Special Forces operatives predominantly American instead of an international 
team based in Belgium, it was still deemed too international. Furthermore, the lack of 
clarity about where the unit fit within the context of U.S. national security and the 
command authority of the President and the Department of Defense meant that it 
could not be considered a ‘realistic’ portrayal of U.S. military power.  
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In the Transformers franchise on the other hand, where it is clear that it is the 
American military that is defending national security ‘under U.S. command and 
control’ the support of the Pentagon even extended beyond what was originally 
asked for.64 Reportedly, Mr. Strub urged the filmmakers of Transformers: Revenge 
of the Fallen (2009) to also include the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps in the 
movie, in part so the Pentagon would have the opportunity to display even more of 
its weaponry and soldiers.65 In popular geopolitical discourse, the reality of giant 
alien robots can be accepted if it conforms to the hegemonic vision of U.S. global 
leadership and military power. An ‘international’ context however that sees the 
United States merely involved in a joint effort, and does not clearly represent the 
sovereign geopolitical identity of the United States as a nation-state and hegemonic 
superpower is too ‘unrealistic’ a projection of American national security.  
 
While ‘realism’ and ‘accuracy’ are officially stated as the decisive criteria that 
determine if a film can obtain support from the Pentagon, the realism of national 
security that the Pentagon seeks to promote and project on the big screen seems 
oftentimes far removed from the scenarios the American military is actually involved 
in, in real life. The Academy Award winning Hurt Locker (2009) for example, 
although hailed by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as ‘authentic’ and ‘very 
compelling’ did not enjoy official assistance.66  
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The actions of a traumatized, renegade bomb disposal specialist in Iraq, who 
becomes addicted to the violence and adrenalin of war, was deemed ‘unrealistic.’ A 
movie franchise about shape-shifting alien robots based on a 1980s kids cartoon was 
sufficiently ‘authentic’ to be awarded a plethora of military assistance. Unlike the 
Hurt Locker, Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen clearly promotes a global 
leadership role of the United States in defense of freedom and democracy, 
demonstrating the importance of military superiority and readiness against existential 
threats. It also constructs an unambiguous identity of American exceptionalism and 
soldierly heroism against the ultimate threatening Other, which seeks to dominate 
and destroy the United States and its allies. 
 
This Pentagon realism of national security and geopolitics is predominantly 
constructed in a virtual reality where the moral ambiguity, uncertainty of purpose 
and questionable outcomes that have accompanied the real life military interventions 
of the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 does not enter the popular imagination. 
Instead, we see the Pentagon support films in which Hollywood constructs an 
opponent whose evil otherness is the perfect enemy to fight and win against: the 
alien invader. 
 
The alien invasion theme reproduces a basic Manichean narrative of American 
innocence the Pentagon can support. Just as 9/11 was constructed as an attack out of 
the blue by ‘evildoers’ and ‘enemies of freedom,’ the alien invasion on screen comes 
over America as swift, sudden assault, taking an unprepared nation by surprise.67 
There is no backstory leading up to events, no ‘blowback’ of previous American 
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covert or military actions and no insight into the rational for invasion. Just like Nazis, 
Soviet Communists or Jihadists, the alien invader simply represents an enemy of 
freedom that America has to defeat in a basic struggle of good vs. evil, confirming 
the essential role of the United States as the ‘world’s preeminent power.’68 
 
According to the IMDB database between January 2009 and July 2014 a range of 
movies that feature the American military have obtained official support for their 
production through the Pentagon, including The Messenger (2009), Transformers: 
Revenge of the Fallen (2009), Iron Man 2 (2010), Transformers: Dark of the Moon 
(2011), Battle: Los Angeles (2011), Act of Valor (2012), Battleship (2012), Man of 
Steel (2013), G.I. Joe: Retaliation (2013), Olympus Has Fallen (2013), and White 
House Down (2013). Remarkably, the majority of these films do not depict the 
American military in real-world conflict but show American soldiers, sailors and 
Marines engaged in fighting giant robots and evil aliens in a series of films that 
largely subscribe to the science-fiction genre.  
 
No doubt, the predominantly male teenage audience of these special effects movies, 
with their fast cuts, action-centered plots, and multiple explosions and firefights, is 
one group the recruiters for the Armed Forces hope to inspire with a positive image 
of serving in America’s high-tech military. An illusion of realism, film promises the 
opportunity to experience the excitement of battle, the thrill of violence and 
destruction, and the spirit of camaraderie that the military embodies.69 
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of hyper-masculinity, again highlighting the gender perspective in the popular imagination of national security, 
see also Suid, pp. 6-11. 
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At the same time, these Pentagon-supported films reflect the dominant representation 
of military power, national security and its geopolitical contextualization in popular 
culture, located as they are at the juncture of Hollywood and Washington. In the 
majority of films the viewer encounters a technologically sophisticated, powerful and 
ultimately victorious United States that guarantees freedom and security across the 
globe, and at home.  
 
Through its involvement in the production of popular movies, the Pentagon can link 
a particular representation of military power and geopolitical identity that is usually 
limited to press statements, strategy papers and defense reviews to the practice of 
filmmaking. The medium of film can thus help to create a popular imagination of 
national security that is supportive of the policies and actions that the Department of 
Defense pursues, the self-image it wishes to project, and the grand strategy discourse 
it promotes. According to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel:  
The United States of America possesses the most lethal, strongest, most 
powerful military today in the history of the world. We will continue to have 
that kind of a military. We need that kind of a military to protect our 
interests.70  
 
Hollywood provides the cinematic narrative and visual spectacle in support of this 
rationale. Furthermore, the United States is always seen as acting in defense, its 
supreme military power only mobilized in response to external threat: the 
superpower as defender, liberator and protector. In addition, and unlike historic war 
films or even contemporary reflections of Iraq and Afghanistan, the entirely fictional 
scenario of an alien invasion allows the Pentagon to be involved in an even more 
sanitized version of warfare and military heroism, where post-traumatic stress, 
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civilian causalities, mutilation or friendly fire incidents are largely absent from the 
scenario of war fighting. Also, unlike the contested political reasons for going to war 
in Iraq or the doubtful final outcome of the Afghanistan mission, the moral cause for 
fighting in these films is unquestionable, and the outcome always a total victory.  
 
In the Transformers franchise for example the United States faces the threat of 
shape-shifting alien robots, the Decepticons, who want to exploit earth for its energy 
resources and technology to rule the universe. America is aided by a group of ‘good’ 
robot aliens, the Autobots. The second installment of the series, the 2009 
Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen is particularly interesting for the unprecedented 
support the U.S. Department of Defense has provided director Michel Bay in terms 
of military equipment and personnel.71 In Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen the 
American military deploys the entire range of its devastating firepower, representing 
all branches of the Armed Forces to win a decisive victory in the deserts of the 
Middle East.  This film display of American military superiority and network-centric 
warfare in defense of world order includes the use of satellites in outer space, 
Predator drones, and high-tech command centers. According to the Pentagon: 
(…) full-spectrum dominance means the ability of U.S. forces, operating 
alone or with allies, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across 
the range of military operations. 
 
Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen is full-spectrum dominance in action.72 At the 
same time Michael Bay’s Transformers films or Battle: Los Angeles with their 
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highly visceral, audio-visual effect bombardments and unapologetic relish in 
destruction seem like the military-entertainment-industry’s equivalent of ‘shock and 
awe,’ or what film critic A O Scott calls ‘symphonies of excess and redundancy, 
taking place in a universe full of fire and metal and purged of nuance’.73 There is no 
possibility for diplomacy, compromise or restraint, but only a Manichean 
confrontation of the forces of good versus the forces of evil. 
 
Fig. 9 Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen (2009) 
 
‘Full spectrum dominance’ in action. The U.S. military vs. the Decepticons in Transformers: Revenge 
of the Fallen.74  
 
 
In contrast to the high-tech desert warfare of Revenge of the Fallen the fighting in 
Transformers: Dark of the Moon and Battle: Los Angeles seems much more 
influenced by an asymmetrical conflict setting, showing the United States military 
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engaged in urban combat, employing essentially guerrilla tactics against superior 
enemy forces. Displaying America’s Armed Forces as the underdog seems odd, 
given the status of the United States as the world’s preeminent military power. 
However, these representations seem to reflect the costly and frustrating realities of 
asymmetrical warfare the U.S. military had to adapt to in the post-9/11 world. Here, 
counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism (CT) became the Pentagon’s new 
focus of war fighting, instead of conventional military confrontations with a potential 
peer competitor.75 In a remarkable reversion of roles though, the American soldiers 
act as insurgents, and the alien invader is the occupying force.  
 
This classic narrative of David vs. Goliath allows the audience to easily identify with 
the American ‘citizen-soldier,’ who defends the homeland with ingenuity and 
courage against the crushing superiority of the enemy’s war machine. At the same 
time, this cinematic imagination that the Pentagon promotes through the films it 
supports, conveniently avoids a critical engagement with the reality of American 
military power as occupying force in the post-9/11 environment. In the 2011 
Transformers: Dark of the Moon for example, the Decepticons launch an invasion of 
Chicago in their quest to subjugate Earth. In a costly final battle the Autobots and a 
small infantry unit of American soldiers manage to defeat the Decepticons once 
more. 
 
According to its website, the U.S. Air Force provided 50 Airmen from Headquarters 
Air Force Special Operations Command and the 1st Special Operations Wing for the 
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film as extras, together with an CV-22B Osprey plane and shoots on location at 
Hulbert Field, Florida and Edwards Air Force Base, California. According to Lt. Col. 
Francisco Hamm, the U.S. Air Force Entertainment Liaison Office Director of Public 
Affairs. "The franchise has been a great vehicle to showcase our aircraft, our Airmen 
and our mission capabilities, all within a canvass of joint operations."76 
 
Where the U.S. Air Force took the lead in Transformers: Dark of the Moon, the U.S. 
Marine Corps followed with its own invasion movie. Battle: Los Angeles is set in 
modern day Los Angeles, where a retiring Marine Staff Sergeant (Aaron Eckhardt) 
must go back into the line of duty to lead American troops during yet another global 
alien invasion. Here it is again the other, rather than the United States, who has the 
advantage of techno-power and operates sophisticated drones that control the skies 
and rain down death and destruction from above. The films centers on the 2nd 
Battalion 5th Marines and the production received substantial cooperation from the 
U.S. Marines Corps, including guidance, equipment, military training of actors and 
access to Camp Pendleton in California.77  
 
The purpose of the alien invasion is ultimately to serve as a backdrop for the display 
of the heroism and military power of the United States and the Marine Corps in 
particular. The website brandchannel.com quotes the film’s leading star Aaron 
Eckhardt who explained at the film’s premier: "This is a movie about Marines… 
kicking ass. When people see this movie, we want to make sure that they love the 
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Marines."78  Finally, in Battleship the defense of national security against invading 
aliens moves to the Pacific, and this time it is the United States Navy that is allowed 
to take the spotlight. Again the world is threatened by an alien invasion and again 
American military power is the planet’s last and best hope for survival.79 The film’s 
naval focus on a military exchange in the Pacific Ocean contrasts with the more 
ground combat and air power oriented films of the Transformers series and Battle: 
Los Angeles.  
 
Fig. 10 Battleship (2012) 
 
Protecting the ‘global commons’ on screen. The USS Missouri is facing off against the Alien invader 
in Battleship.80 
 
Departing from Iraq and Afghanistan inspired scenarios Battleship is particularly 
interesting in the context of the growing debate in the United States about checking a 
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rising China in the Pacific, and the Pentagon’s plans for an Air-Sea battle concept.81 
Battleship seems to bring the ‘Asian pivot’ to the big screen. The online defense and 
acquisition journal DoD Buzz quotes the Navy Chief of Information, Rear Admiral 
Denny Moynihan has explained:  
We can’t take everyone out to our ships, but we can work with Hollywood 
and bring the Navy to life on the big screen. Consequently, it’s in our best 
interest to engage and make sure that movies like Battleship accurately 
portray who we are and what we do as a Navy.82 
 
Although a science-fiction film, Battleship both asserts the geopolitical identity of 
the United States as a ‘Pacific power,’ and it underlines the key role of military 
power for maintaining national security and the defense of freedom.  
 
In contrast to the Pentagon supported science-fiction films the ‘realistic’ films, 
depicting the American military are limited to The Messenger, White House Down 
and Olympus Has Fallen, the latter two both depicting a terrorist takeover of the 
White House, and finally the Pentagon produced Act of Valor. A novel development, 
Act of Valor is a film about the elite Special Forces unit of the U.S. Navy, the SEALs 
(Sea Air Land teams) that was directly commissioned by the Navy's Special Warfare 
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Command and features real-life SEALs as the protagonists.83  The near all-action 
oriented film follows a group of SEALs as they track a global terrorist network, 
which seeks to set off a media frenzy and economic collapse within the United States 
by detonating a nuclear bomb. Act of Valor is popular reflection of the prominence of 
Special Forces and covert operations in combating terrorism under the Obama 
administration, as highlighted by the assassination of Osama bin Laden by the 
Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), also known as SEAL Team 6.84  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
83
 Rebecca Keegan, “'Act of Valor' must balance publicity, secrecy with Navy SEAL,” LA Times, February 12, 
2012, accessed August 21, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/12/entertainment/la-ca-act-of-valor-
20120212. 
84
 See also Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” New 
York Times, May 29, 2012, accessed August 10, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-
leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all. 
 113 
Fig. 11 Act of Valor (2012) 
 
The Hollywood-Pentagon liaison on a new level. UK Film poster for Act of Valor.85 
 
Only in one instance did the Pentagon lend support to a film that somewhat 
punctuated the narrative of American superior military power as victorious defender 
of freedom and security. The Messenger features Will Montgomery, a rebellious U.S. 
Army Staff Sergeant and declared war hero, who has returned home from Iraq. He is 
assigned to the Army’s Casualty Notification service and partnered with the 
recovering alcoholic, Captain Tony Stone to give notice to the families of fallen 
soldiers. The Messenger is quite a counter-point to the high-tech firework displays of 
military power in Transformers and Battleship. The film shows the wars of America 
coming back to the home front and the human cost attached to the role of global 
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superpower. Given the backdrop of the Iraq war, the Messenger can be seen as 
questioning both the defensive and victorious representations of military power and 
the meaning of military superiority altogether.  
 
Fig. 12 The Messenger (2009) 
 
Captain Tony Stone (Woody Harrelson) and Sergeant Will Montgomery (Ben Foster) on their way to 
notify the family of a fallen soldier.86  
 
However, in comparison with the other films supported by the Pentagon and given 
their respective production cost and box office successes, it seems that the image of 
the American military that film producers, the Department of Defense and the 
American public embrace most, is one of muscular military prowess in the defense of 
national security and global order, with the United Sates emerging victorious from a 
clear confrontation of good vs. evil.  
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This is even more striking when the Pentagon supported alien invasion films are 
compared against a more critical, cinematic reflection of military power. According 
to boxofficemojo.com, in 2011 Transformers: Dark of the Moon grossed $352.4 
million domestically and Battle Los Angeles made $83.5 million, while the Iraq War 
movie Green Zone (2010) grossed $35 million, the Oscar-winner Hurt Locker $17 
million and In the Valley of Elah (2007), which featured abuse of prisoners and post-
traumatic stress in soldiers, $6.7 million. Even the critically panned Battleship still 
managed to gross $65 million in 2012. Between a critical reflection of America’s 
military involvement in the Middle East, and a military fiction of defending the 
American homeland against evil aliens, the winner at the box office is clear. 
  
It is maybe the on-going commitment to a particular image of American military 
power that is the most significant contribution of mainstream Hollywood film in the 
popular discourse of national security and geopolitics. The military as the 
‘embodiment of the nation,’ its warriors united by ‘shared values and a common 
destiny’, which display the highest forms of valor and idealism in the confrontation 
against America’s enemies.87 Given the continued representation of the United 
States’ heroic identity and military superiority in Hollywood films under President 
Obama, it seems that the narrative of American hegemony maintains a dominant 
position in defining the geopolitical vision of the United States in the popular 
imagination. In the movies, at least the ones that sell best at the box office, America 
does not go home and it leads from the front, not from behind.  
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Counter-narratives in national security cinema 
 
The dominant cinematic narrative in the films surveyed so far establishes the United 
States as heroic, powerful and victorious defender of security and order. However 
there are prevailing counter-narratives to this theme in popular films, and not only in 
independent films, or economically negligible small budget productions such as The 
Messenger. In Avatar for example, one of the most successful films of all times, the 
Resources Development Administration (RDA) that invades the planet of Pandora to 
mine for natural resources and violently displaces the indigenous population can be 
read as an allegory for the United States as imperialist and militarist aggressor in the 
name of corporate profit.88 The film has been viewed as critique of American foreign 
policy, in particular directed against the vision of American primacy followed by the 
George W. Bush administration in its invasion of Iraq, and was even accused of 
being anti-American.89  
 
Another form of counter-narrative is the location of threat to the United States not 
externally but internally. In Iron Man 2 for example the threat to national security 
arises not only from a mad Russian scientist, but also domestically from corporate 
greed and the willingness of a corrupt CEO to use criminal practices in his pursuit of 
profit and status. A common element in representing internal threats to national 
security is through the negative depiction of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
arguably the best known of the several agencies the United States maintains for 
secret intelligence purposes. The theme of rogue agents for example, which are being 
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hunted down by the CIA, because of their knowledge of illegal government 
activities, has been featured in films such as Red (2010), and The Bourne Legacy 
(2012).90 In Hollywood, the CIA often represents a darker side of the American 
superpower. It is perhaps the aspect of American national security most frequently 
portrayed in a negative or at least critical fashion.91 
 
Plots that feature threats emerging from the military-industrial complex, or an out-of-
control intelligence establishment have provided the backdrop for a number of highly 
successful films, notably since the beginning of Obama’s second term in office. 
Here, the United States is not represented as heroic defender of national security; 
quite to the contrary, institutional secrecy and uncontrolled executive power are 
themselves shown as threats to civil liberties and individual freedom.  
 
In the commercially highly successful 2014 Captain America: The Winter Soldier for 
example Captain America doubts his role in the national security apparatus and is 
ultimately forced to fight his own side, the S.H.I.E.L.D. intelligence agency, which 
has been subverted from within, result of a widespread conspiracy, led by a State 
Department official. The surveillance and intelligence apparatus conceived to 
counter terrorists appears as direct danger to the American ideal of freedom Captain 
America embodies. As Steve Rogers explains, when confronted by S.H.I.E.L.D.’s 
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plans to establish a global, weaponized surveillance network: “You hold a gun to 
everyone on Earth and call it protection. This is not freedom. This is fear. ”92  
 
Fig.  13 Captain America: The Winter Soldier (2014) 
 
Captain America (Chris Evans) questions the methods of S.H.I.E.L.D. director Nick Fury (Samuel L. 
Jackson).93  
 
Captain America: The Winter Soldier provides a critical reflection of the Obama 
administration’s secret intelligence policy and global surveillance measures within 
the popular framework of a superhero movie. As the film review in the Washington 
Post stated:  
(…), “The Winter Soldier” uncannily taps into anxieties having to do not 
only with post-9/11 arguments about security and freedom, but also Obama-
era drone strikes and Snowden-era privacy.94 
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The 2013 White House Down is a particularly interesting entry in this group of 
movies. On the surface the film is a standard action thriller that pits a Capitol Hill 
police officer against a group of terrorists that have taken over the White House and 
want to take the President of the United States hostage. In fact, Olympus Has Fallen, 
released in the same year, virtually features an identical scenario of ‘Die Hard in the 
White House,’ albeit with North Koreans as the terrorist enemy. What makes White 
House Down noteworthy in comparison is its critical contextualization. As the 
reviewer for New Republic has remarked:  
(…) it manages to capture the zeitgeist: the movie is more concerned with 
civil liberties than foreign threats; the danger is the vaguely Tea Party-esque 
enemy within our own borders.95 
 
White House Down opens with President John Sawyer, played by Jamie Foxx, in the 
midst of negotiating a broad peace agreement with several countries in the Middle 
East, including Iran. As part of this agreement the United States has announced its 
willingness to withdraw all its troops from the region. In the film, the President 
specifically lays out a foreign policy vision of diplomacy and cooperation against a 
perpetual war scenario promoted by the ‘military-industrial complex,’ which is 
specifically referred to as such in the movie.  
 
This focus on cooperative engagement, even with declared ‘enemies’ of the United 
States seems like a direct, filmic allegory of President Obama’s attempts at 
engagement with Iran. In fact, the similarities between President Sawyer and 
President Obama were noted by several critics.96 The terrorist plot to take over the 
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White House is carried out by right-wing extremists and former Special Forces 
soldiers, and is ultimately orchestrated by the conservative Speaker of the House, and 
the military-industrial complex in an attempt to undermine President Sawyer’s peace 
efforts. Within the framework of a standard Hollywood action film White House 
Down provides a narrative that pits a geopolitical vision of diplomacy, compromise 
and restraint against a status quo of American primacy, military supremacy and 
forward presence. The film appears like a cinematic endorsement of President 
Obama’s verdict on the ‘War on Terror’ that: “(…) this war, like all wars, must 
end.”97  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
Republican, liberal action-fantasy, where Sawyer/Obama appears as the hero and the Speaker/John Boehner as 
the sinister villain, cf., David Franke, “‘White House Down’—What a Waste,” American Conservative, June 28, 
2014, accessed August 12, 2014, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/white-house-down-what-a-waste/.  
97
 Quoted in: “The End of the Perpetual War,” New York Times, May 23, 2013, accessed August 18, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/opinion/obama-vows-to-end-of-the-perpetual-
war.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
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Fig. 14 White House Down (2013) 
Battling the military-industrial complex: Capitol Hill cop John Cale (Channing Tatum) and President 
James Sawyer (Jamie Foxx).98  
 
Another interesting case that seems to cast doubt on the narrative of superior 
American power appears in The Dark Knight Rises (2012). In the film Gotham City, 
a fictional version of New York is subject to a massive terrorist attack. In The Dark 
Knight Rises the United States does not appear as the triumphant force for good, but 
as a profoundly troubled country, whose national security is easily disrupted, with its 
military power largely ineffectual. The institutions the American society charges to 
maintain law and order, and keep the country safe cannot be trusted, are corrupt or 
rendered useless. Only Batman, a masked vigilante that operates outside the law, and 
who utilizes methods from illegal wiretapping to interrogation techniques bordering 
on torture manages to finally free Gotham City after months under foreign 
domination.  
                                            
98
 Retrieved December 19, 2014, from http://madisonmovie.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/white-house-down.jpg.  
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The theme of the lone American hero is of course a staple of Hollywood action films 
and the national security cinema, a theme originally made prominent by Westerns, 
where it is due to the courage and determination of the individual, and not the weak, 
or non-existing institutions of the state to bring outlaws to justice. And with his 
superior technological arsenal of weapons and vehicles, martial arts skills, and body 
armor, Batman arguably represents another version of the militarized superhero, 
acting in defense of the nation. The Dark Knight Rises then reformulates but does not 
replace the Manichean narrative of good vs. evil.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Analyzing the narratives and representations of national security in popular 
Hollywood film productions during the Obama presidency, this chapter has revealed 
a considerable amount of continuity and cohesiveness in the way geopolitical 
identity is constructed in popular discourse. The analysis suggests that the heroic 
identity of the United States, and the use of its outstanding military power in defense 
against a multitude of existential threats to the nation and the world are hallmarks of 
the way national security is narrated. A Manichean narrative of good vs. evil anchors 
representations of geopolitical identity in cinematic projections of national security. 
This popular image of the United States as defender of freedom fighting against 
‘enemies of freedom’ and ‘evildoers’ is a powerful construct of identity that extends 
far beyond the realm of entertainment and is widely used, from President Obama to 
the Pentagon and prominent scholars like Robert Kagan.  
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Critically assessing discourses of U.S. national security through popular culture and 
cinematic narratives helps to reveal deep-seated constructs of identity and 
imagination, broadening and deepening a research perspective on grand strategy 
from a purely academic-political oriented discourse that limits its analysis to 
accounts of material power. At the same time, moving beyond a singular focus on 
representation and expanding a critical analysis of film to include processes of 
production and the practice of film making provides a better understanding how 
dominant discourses of national security and geopolitics are being created and 
maintained through the mutual exchange of the entertainment industry and the 
defense establishment.  
 
Taking the combination of box office success, production value and geopolitical 
representation, the great majority of popular Hollywood film formulates a dominant 
geopolitical vision of American hegemony, the United States as heroic power that 
takes the lead in defending America and the world against the threat of evil aliens 
and global terrorists. This hegemonic identity of American leadership and global 
military supremacy however is not merely an entertaining movie fantasy but 
represents a basic belief and normative assumption in the purpose of American 
power and the role of the United States. Hollywood merely delivers a sensationalized 
and dramatized version of the discourse of geopolitical hegemony produced by the 
elite network of the foreign policy establishment, where Captain America, and not 
the Messenger’s Captain Stone dominate the imagination of America’s role in the 
world.  
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In fact, with films like Battleship and Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen the U.S. 
Department of Defense is actively involved in promoting and projecting a popular 
imagination of military power and global leadership that corresponds with official 
statements of ‘full spectrum dominance’ and America as the ‘world’s preeminent 
power.’ This directly links the cinematic discourse of national security to the 
political formulation of grand strategy as geopolitical vision of hegemony, elevating 
the production of film beyond a creative process for entertainment purposes to a 
discourse of security and political act of considerable significance.  
 
The Pentagon-Hollywood liaison is centered on the constant reproduction of a 
particular construct of geopolitical knowledge that weaves together themes of 
American exceptionalism, militarism and heroism. This hegemonic vision is then 
offered to audiences as ‘authentic’ and ‘real’ depiction of world politics and 
American power. In particular, the defense against alien invaders to save the nation 
and the world is a theme that regularly represents the heroic identity of the United 
States, and the use of its outstanding military power in a way that confirms a global 
leadership role for the United States as dominant geopolitical knowledge. Battleship 
reveals a dominant worldview that unites film producers and military officials in 
their vision of what the American military represents and the purpose it serves.  
 
This geopolitical vision is meant to both entertain and educate, establishing global 
leadership, heroism and military supremacy as the hallmarks of American national 
security. As such, films like Transformers, Battle: Los Angeles and Battle: Los 
Angeles are military propaganda vehicles serving the interest of the Armed Forces 
for positive public relations and recruitment, but they also reveal a prevalent 
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conviction of truth that positions the United States and its military power as 
foundation and defender of a liberal world order of peace, democracy and prosperity 
that motivates IR scholarship and policy making.  
 
Film provides a popular framework of reference for the understanding of the role and 
place of the United States in world politics, and the strong presence of the 
geopolitical vision of American hegemony in popular film questions the ‘common 
sense’ status of alternative discourses of grand strategy, given their lack of cinematic 
presence. In Hollywood, diplomacy, compromise and restraint do not appear as 
regular features of American geopolitical identity or national security practice. The 
national security cinema creates a world that appears as a profoundly dangerous 
place, where America stands largely alone in defending the freedom and safety of its 
people against a multitude of existential threats from international terrorists to super 
villains and alien invaders.   
 
While Iron Man 2, Captain America: The Winter Soldier, or White House Down 
display threats to national security that emerge domestically, from the military-
industrial complex, or the national secret intelligence apparatus, these films do not 
question the fundamental Manichean narrative that represents the geopolitical 
identity of the United States as ‘good.’ Films like Avatar and White House Down 
however can be understood as critical reflections of American primacy within the 
framework of the action and science-fiction film that question the equation of 
military supremacy and national security. This demonstrates that, although usually a 
conservative voice in defense of the status quo, Hollywood is able to produce 
popular discourses that challenge conventional wisdom, provided the positive 
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geopolitical identity of the United States can be maintained, or redeemed as 
exceptional and heroic through the actions of the individual.  
 
Here, aberrations in the pursuit of national security are corrected, when the American 
secret agent, soldier, or superhero overcomes the corruption, subversion or 
institutional ineptitude that has allowed the United States to be endangered from 
within.99 As such, Captain America: The Winter Soldier both affirms the geopolitical 
identity of the United States and its heroic, military exceptionalism, and it questions 
the excess of secrecy and surveillance that has come to be associated with American 
primacy under the Obama presidency.  
 
This ambivalence about American power and hegemony the film expresses, reflects 
popular attitudes among Americans that are similarly split between a confirmation of 
American leadership and pride in the country’s superpower status, and doubt over 
the use of force, and reticence to be engaged abroad. While the heroic past of 
Captain America remains a fixture of popular imagination, his current purpose and 
future role are unclear. 
  
                                            
99
 This results in either averting the real threat to the United States, through foreign infiltration or global terrorism 
(Salt; Mission Impossible: Ghost Protocol), or in exposing the illegal activities of others and bring the corruption 
of elements of the national security apparatus to an end (Red, Knight and Day, A-Team, Bourne Legacy, Captain 
America: The Winter Soldier). 
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3. Competing visions for America – Popular grand strategy discourses on the 
New York Times best sellers list 
 
Anybody around here know how to write a telegram?1 – Thomas L. Freidman 
and Michael Mandelbaum 
 
The previous chapter explored the intertextual link of popular culture and American 
grand strategy through an analysis of the cinematic imagination of geopolitics and 
national security. This analysis demonstrated how the basic Manichean narrative of 
‘America saves the world,’ represents a dominant form of popular knowledge, a 
geopolitical vision of hegemony, continuously on display in thousands of American 
movie theaters. Now, the analysis will move beyond the more narrow focus on 
representations and production practices of the national security cinema to explore 
the wider scope of American grand strategy in popular geopolitical discourse.  
 
To this end, the following chapter provides an analysis of best selling non-fiction 
works gathered from the New York Times best sellers list in the period January 2009 
- July 2014 that have problematized the role and position of the United States in 
world politics under President Obama. The New York Times best sellers list is widely 
considered the preeminent account of best-selling books in the United States and as 
such obtains an outstanding location for the further mapping of popular discourse.2  
                                            
1
 Friedman and Mandelbaum, p. 15. 
2
 It is published weekly in The New York Times Book Review magazine, with the Sunday edition of The New York 
Times, and as a stand-alone publication. For the analysis the online account of the weekly “New York Times Best 
Sellers” list was used, in the category of non-fiction hardcover, with rankings from No. 1 to No. 35, starting on 4 
January 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/best-sellers-books/2009-01-04/hardcover-nonfiction/list.html, 
surveyed in monthly intervals until 6 July 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/best-sellers-books/2014-07-
06/hardcover-nonfiction/list.html. Rankings reflect sales reported by vendors offering a wide range of general 
interest titles. The sales venues for print books include independent book retailers; national, regional and local 
chains; online and multimedia entertainment retailers; supermarkets, university, gift and discount department 
stores; and newsstands. Sales of both print books and e-books are reported confidentially to the New York Times. 
The best sellers lists are prepared by the News Surveys and Election Analysis Department of the New York Times. 
Information taken from: “About the Best Sellers,” New York Times, accessed September 19, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/best-sellers-books/paperback-advice/list.html.  
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Focusing on popular non-fiction allows the thesis to investigate the discursive 
construction of grand strategy as a multidimensional phenomenon where 
entertainment, journalism, academia and political commentary intersect within 
popular culture. This moves somewhat beyond the distinction that critical geopolitics 
literature normally establishes between the boundaries of popular, formal and 
practical geopolitical discourses.3  
 
As Joanne Sharp has rightly noted the division between ‘international relations and 
the politics of everyday praxis’ should be scrutinized.4 However, the ‘everyday’ 
production of geopolitical knowledge also transcends a clear separation between 
political practice, formal analysis, and popular representation. The New York Times 
non-fiction best sellers combine popularity, profit-orientation and mass appeal with 
the formal authority of expert knowledge and engage in practical policy 
recommendations in their articulation of grand strategy. 
 
From a post-structural perspective there exists no distinctive hierarchy between 
discursive realms in the construction of reality and the legitimization of a generally 
accepted truth. As critical geopolitics has demonstrated, geopolitical knowledge is 
built from political, social and cultural resources.5 A process of imagination and 
articulation, grand strategy exists as a discourse that constructs geopolitical identity 
and links it to political practices of national security, which in turn reconfirms 
representations of identity. The designated purpose of grand strategy is to provide the 
‘big picture’, to guide the national interest, to be accepted as commonly shared 
                                            
3
 See for example in Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics; Ó Tuathail, The Geopolitics Reader. 
4
 Joanne Sharp, Condensing the Cold War: Reader’s Digest and American Identity (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 557. 
5
 Cf., Ó Tuathail and Dalby, eds, Rethinking Geopolitics.  
 129 
reality of world politics based on a clear understanding of what the United States is, 
what purpose it has in international affairs and how it pursues its interests.6 As John 
Agnew writes, referring to ideas of world politics: “If believed, […] and if in the 
hands of those powerful enough, they can become guides to action that make their 
own reality.”7 Hence, the stories, images and ideas that construct American grand 
strategy must be present in the popular imagination if they are meant to function as a 
national policy guideline or to remake the reality of geopolitics. 
 
The popular texts collected on the New York Times list provide a wide range of 
(neo)-liberal and (neo)-conservative, Democrat and Republican, more internationalist 
or isolationist inclined views of the United States that have all reached the status of 
national bestsellers and thus a certain degree of popularity and discursive 
prominence. In line with Hollywood’s cinematic accounts of heroism and military 
prowess, American hegemony or global leadership appears as central theme on the 
New York Times list. However, among the grand strategy narratives collected in these 
popular artifacts, which in fact blur the line between entertainment and academic 
research, popular and formal discourse, alternative accounts of the present and future 
state of American power and international influence are more numerous and varied.  
 
Accordingly, the authors of these books emerge from a wide range of backgrounds 
and professions, as former government officials, journalists, economists, pundits, 
geographers, radio talk show hosts, political scientists, and geopolitical analysts. 
Several of the authors included here enjoy a high media profile in the United States. 
                                            
6
 On the representation of the ‘national interest’ in the context of national identity and U.S. foreign policy, see 
Henry R. Nau, At Home Abroad (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 15-42. 
7
 John Agnew, “Know-Where: Geographies of Knowledge of World Politics,” International Political Sociology 
1, no. 2 (2007): p. 143. 
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Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Thomas L. Friedman is a regular op-ed contributor 
to the New York Times. Robert Kaplan is a best-selling author, and influential 
geopolitical analyst and journalist.  Rachel Maddow is a popular political show host 
for MSNBC, while Robert Kagan is a well-known pundit, and leading 
neoconservative scholar. Bill O’Reilly acts as figurehead for the conservative Fox 
News Channel.8  
 
The bestselling books analyzed here primarily feature works on geopolitics, 
American grand strategy, and U.S. foreign and security policy. However, it must be 
noted that even within the narrow confines of the New York Times list, on average 
books on geopolitical, economic, political, or related issues only represent a minority 
of the non-fiction works listed, the rest consisting of a wide array of celebrity 
memoirs, self-help guides, books on history, science, sports, comedy and the 
multitude of other topics that find interest among the readership of modern American 
society. While acknowledging this limitation however, the bestselling books that do 
problematize issues of geopolitics, or national security, provide valuable insight into 
the popular discourse about America’s role in the world, and how it is expected to 
change or continue over the coming years and decades. 
 
The individual books that have been selected for closer textual analysis have been 
chosen based upon their use of key representations of geopolitical identity (e.g. 
‘American exceptionalism’; ‘global leadership’), including historical narratives (e.g. 
‘victory’ in the Cold War), and their linking to practices of national security, defense 
                                            
8
 See in this context also in particular François Debrix’s work, who refers to Bill O’Reilly and Robert Kaplan in 
particular as representatives of ‘tabloid geopolitics,’ a cultural mode of discourse which infuses the concepts of 
world order and national security with the sensationalized media representations of terror, shock and fear in order 
to substantiate ideological predispositions and agendas, cf., Debrix, pp.  37-39; pp. 146-149. 
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and military power projection (e.g. ‘command of the commons’) in defining the role 
and position of the United States in world politics. The similarities and differences in 
the way these distinctive representations are used in popular discourse, allow the 
thesis to identify basic grand strategy discourses, and thus map the terrain in which 
the popular debate on U.S. grand strategy takes place. 9  
 
Hegemony between American leadership and American empire 
 
Several New York Times best sellers have formulated a grand strategy vision of 
American hegemony; a vision of global leadership of the United States based on the 
country’s military primacy, liberal, democratic identity, and economic 
preeminence. 10  These popular works cover a wide intellectual range from 
International Relations to economics and geopolitics. That Used To Be Us for 
example contextualizes American hegemony domestically and economically. The 
book by journalist Thomas L. Friedman and political scientist Michael Mandelbaum 
presents a renewed grand strategy vision of global leadership and preeminence as an 
answer to the ongoing economic problems of the United States. Contrasting this 
liberal vision of grand strategy and hegemony, George Friedman’s The Next 100 
Years and The Next Decade in turn approach American hegemony through the lens 
of classical geopolitics, neo-imperialism, and realpolitik, analyzing the geographic, 
                                            
9
 Cf. Hansen, p. 55-93. 
10
 Kagan, The World America Made [New York Times best seller, no. 29, March 04, 2012]; Friedman and 
Mandelbaum, 2011 [New York Times best seller, no. 2, October 2, 2011]; George Friedman, The Next 100 Years 
(New York, Doubleday, 2009), [New York Times best seller, no. 5, February 15, 2009]; George Friedman, The 
Next Decade (New York: Doubleday, 2011), [New York Times best seller, no. 3, February 13, 2011]; Robert D. 
Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography (New York: Random House, 2012), [New York Times best seller, no. 10, 
September 30, 2012]; Mitt Romney, No Apology (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2010), [NYT Best seller, no. 1, 
March 21, 2010]. 
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economic and military significance of Eurasia for maintaining the global primacy of 
the United States.  
 
Robert Kaplan likewise explores the link of geopolitics and grand strategy in The 
Revenge of Geography. Here, historical lessons from the Roman Empire are drawn 
up to argue for the transformation of American hegemony from global power 
projection into a North-American empire of global economic reach. No Apology, by 
Mitt Romney, the 2012 Republican presidential candidate, topped the New York 
Times best sellers list for the week of March 12, 2010. It explicitly linked a vision for 
American leadership in the world to the belief in American exceptionalism. Finally, 
The World America Made by the neoconservative political commentator Robert 
Kagan serves as an intertextual focal point that contains many of the basic 
representations and narratives that construct the grand strategy vision of American 
hegemony, both in popular, and in formal and practical discourse: the virtues of 
American exceptionalism, the dangerous volatility of any multipolar system, the 
avoidable character of American decline, and the desirability of America’s military 
and economic preeminence. 
 
The World America made opens with a reference to Frank Capra’s classic It’s a 
Wonderful Life (1946).11 Just like George Bailey in the film, the reader is invited to 
imagine a world without America as the preeminent power. It is not, Kagan suggests, 
a world we should wish for. The book builds its argument for continued global 
American leadership around one central narrative: The liberal world order that has 
                                            
11
 Kagan, Word America Made, p. 3. 
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emerged after World War 2 relies on American power and the worldview it 
supports.12 In the words of Kagan: 
The most important features of today’s world–the great spread of democracy, 
the prosperity, the prolonged great-power peace-have depended directly and 
indirectly on power and influence exercised by the United States.13 
 
According to this geopolitical narrative, were American power to decline, the liberal 
vision of an open, peaceful and democratic world, the United States supported, 
would loose ground to the visions of other powers with differing interests and 
beliefs.14 In No Apology, Mitt Romney follows this basic assessment of world 
politics. To him, the prospect of the United States becoming France, still great, but 
no longer leading, is simply ‘chilling.’15  
I reject the view that America must decline. I believe in American 
exceptionalism. I am convinced that we can act together to strengthen the 
nation, to preserve our global leadership, and to protect freedom where it 
exists and promote it where it does not.16 
 
The World America Made constructs the United States as the ‘benevolent empire’, 
which makes any change toward another configuration of power in the international 
system likely to have negative consequences, in a world less free, less democratic, 
and more violent.17 A sentimental 1940s Hollywood film about a man exploring a 
reality in which he never existed becomes a geopolitical metaphor for the future: 
only a world with the United States as its leading power is a ‘wonderful world order.’  
 
The geopolitical imagination that underlies the popular discourse of American 
hegemony is developed from a clear spatial and temporal, Manichean separation of 
                                            
12
 Ibid., p. 4.  
13
 Ibid., p. 8. 
14
 Cf., ibid., pp. 4-5. 
15
 Romney, p. 10. 
16
 Ibid., p. 30. 
17
 Cf. Robert Kagan, “The Benevolent Empire” Foreign Affairs 111, (1998): pp. 24-35; That Used To Be Us 
makes essentially the same argument about America’s benevolent hegemony, cf. Friedman and Mandelbaum, p. 
26. 
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positive and negative, a moral absolutism that does not allow room for variation, 
alternative, or change in international affairs. In its basic discursive framework, The 
World America made develops a key historical narrative of global political and 
economic progress since 1945, and directly links it to the geopolitical identity of the 
United States, represented as the ‘most powerful nation in the world’, ‘democracy’ 
and ‘the world’s leading free-market economy’.18 This makes the world we live in 
primarily an American achievement, rather than the result of universal historical 
processes.19   
 
Parallel to a historic narrative of imperial order and decline, Kagan’s strategic vision 
of American hegemony invokes the theoretical perspective of realism in that power 
is the key factor in International Relations. The possession of power is said to allow a 
country to shape ideas and establish norms of behavior.20 Through its intertextual 
connection to realism and imperialism, the discourse of American hegemony follows 
a central tradition of geopolitical thinking that characterizes the competition for 
power and the pursuit of primacy as ‘historical truth’ in its state-centered 
representation of world politics.21 
 
However, beyond a Western and European centered narrative of world history, and 
the structuralism of International Relations theories, the discourse of American 
hegemony is built around a particular representation of national geopolitical identity. 
The global leadership of the United States is presented as the direct consequence of 
                                            
18
 Kagan, World America Made, pp. 4-5. 
19
 “History shows that world orders, including our own, are transient. They rise and fall. Every international order 
in history has reflected the beliefs and interests of its strongest powers (…),” ibid., p. 5. 
20
 Cf. ibid., p. 8 
21
 Cf. Agnew, Geopolitics, pp. 67-84. 
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‘American exceptionalism.’22 It is the unique identity and power the United States 
possesses that explains the great success of the liberal order as Kagan sees it, not its 
inherent qualities and attractiveness: 
America’s unique geographical circumstances, its capitalist economic system, 
its democratic form of government, and its enormous military power have 
together shaped a particular kind of international order that would have 
looked very different had another nation with different characteristics wielded 
a similar amount of influence.23 
 
As Kagan notes, despite a history of violent expansionism and multiple military 
interventions abroad, the self-perception of Americans casts the United States as the 
‘Greta Garbo of nations,’ or the ‘reluctant sheriff,’ only engaging the world as a last 
resort to preserve the peace. The Other, against which the American sheriff must 
reluctantly draw his gun, appears as the ‘unsavory gangs’ that come riding into town: 
‘Japanese imperialists,’ ‘Nazis,’ ‘Soviet Communists,’ ‘Islamic jihadis.’ 24  This 
constructs the geopolitical identity of the United States as defender of peace and 
freedom by connecting it to a particular space and time of American myth, the Wild 
West. As explored in chapter two, this basic narrative in the hegemony discourse is 
frequently reproduced by Hollywood, where American soldiers and superheroes 
must defend Earth against evil aliens. Yet, as Kagan notes there seems to remain a 
disconnect between America’s self-perception, and the exercise of its power.  
                                            
22
 On American exceptionalism and its role in U.S. foreign policy, see especially Trevor B. McCrisken, American 
Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam (Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). “The term 
American exceptionalism describes the belief that the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role 
to play in human history; not only unique but also superior among nations;” McCrisken, p. 2. The idea of 
American exceptionalism draws from multiple historic genealogies, among these are: the colonial period and the 
cultural and religious heritage of Puritanism and Protestantism, the republican and democratic foundation of the 
United States and its inauguration in a deliberate political act through the Declaration of Independence, its 
relative geographic isolation, and the liberal tradition of entrepreneurism and capitalism, see also Seymour Martin 
Lipset, American exceptionalism: a double-edged sword (New York: Norton, 1996); Byron E. Shafer, Is America 
Different? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).    
23
 Kagan, World America Made, p. 9. To Kagan, this uniqueness extends to the ambivalent characteristics of 
American geopolitical identity, oscillating between individualism and universalism, activism and passivity, 
liberal creed and realpolitik, ibid., pp. 14-15;  
24
 Ibid., p. 10. 
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(…) one of the most powerful, influential, and expansive peoples in history 
still think of themselves as aloof, passive, self-contained, and generally 
inclined to minding their own business.25 
As Kagan notes: “Americans may be ‘imperialists’ in the eyes of many, but if so, 
they are reluctant, conscience-ridden, distracted, half-hearted imperialists.”26 In this 
view, America remains the liberal ‘empire by invitation.’27 A certain ambivalence in 
Americans’ perception of their role in the world seems indeed substantiated by recent 
opinion polls. These indicate that:   
Over the past decade, disillusionment with U.S. invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan have been coincident with the growing number of Americans 
who are reluctant to see the U.S. take an active role in solving international 
problems.28 
 
However, while Americans, when polled seem predominantly interested in sharing 
the responsibilities of global leadership with others, a large majority continues to 
believe that the United States is the ‘world’s leading military power’ and that it 
should remain so.29  
 
An unstable international system of multiple autocratic powers that fight over 
influence and territory represents the dangerous ‘Other’ to American leadership and 
unipolarity in the popular discourse of hegemony. This central dichotomy is the key 
                                            
25
 Ibid., p. 9. Kagan describes a ‘irresolvable tension between individualism and universalism’, rooted in the 
country’s founding ideology, ibid., p.12. Americans are described as “(…) suspicious about power, even their 
own, and this ambivalence is often paralyzing,” ibid. The geopolitical analyst George Friedman goes so far to 
describe the United States as ‘young and barbaric’, frequently emotionally overreacting, using its power fueled by 
idealism and without caution, then regretting involvement, cf., Friedman, The Next 100 Years, p. 48. Friedman 
concedes however that: “(…) for all their misgivings, most Americans have also developed a degree of 
satisfaction in their special role,” ibid. The ambivalence of America’s geopolitical identity is also constructed 
against the more overtly imperial identity of others, for example the British, represented by Kagan as holding a 
firm belief into their ‘vocation to rule’ during the British Empire, Kagan, World America Made, pp. 12-13. In 
juxtaposing imperial Britain against the geopolitically ambivalent United States, the latter appears, for all its 
flaws and failures, not like imperial powers of the past, but instead as a nation that regularly demonstrated an 
enlightened self-interest when it engaged the world, ibid., p. 61; see in this context also, Ferguson, Colossus, 
which characterizes this lacking imperial vocation in the American people as problematic.  
26
 Kagan, World America Made, p. 13.  
27
 See Lundestad. 
28
 “Americans: Disengaged, feeling less respected, but still see U.S. as world’s military superpower,” Pew 
Research Center, April 1, 2014, accessed August 7, 2014, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/04/01/americans-disengaged-feeling-less-respected-but-still-see-u-s-as-worlds-military-superpower/.  
29
 Ibid. 
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discursive feature that constructs a grand strategy of American hegemony as the sole 
viable option for world politics in the 21st century. As Agnew and Corbridge have 
pointed out, geopolitics represents a historical tradition of territorial thinking and 
‘power politics’ that is tied to the notion of hegemonic order as a necessary condition 
of world politics.30  
 
In his geopolitical forecasts George Friedman for example assesses future American 
grand strategy through the geospatial parameters that he sees as determining 
America’s power position and the course of international relations. Here, as in realist 
accounts, the global hegemony of the United States is primarily the result of its 
overwhelming military and economic power, most notably in its military control of 
the seas and maritime trade, and American grand strategy is motivated by the desire 
to maintain this position, and prevent any other power from achieving regional 
hegemony, focusing especially on Eurasia.31 American grand strategy appears as 
amalgam of Mackinder’s Heartland theory and Mahan’s emphasis on sea power.32 
The geopolitical analysis underlying American hegemony generally betrays an 
imperialist and Manichean worldview where the United States ranks first among the 
world’s enlightened democratic powers and non-Western powers are generally 
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 Cf., John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political 
Economy (Oxon: Routledge, 1995). In The World America Made, the geopolitical ambition of great powers for 
regional dominance is only kept in checked by the dominance of the United States. American decline would 
therefore mean a “return to something like the multipolar system of 19th century Europe, Kagan, World America 
Made, p. 85. 
31
 Friedman, The Next 100 Years, pp. 39-49. In realist terms this grand strategy is known as ‘selective 
engagement,’ cf., Art, A Grand Strategy for America.  
32
 According to Friedman, the goal of global hegemony is achieved in part through military interventions that 
block the aspirations of regional challengers to the position of the United States, such as Iraq, Serbia, or a 
potential ‘Islamic empire’ brought about by Al Qaeda, Friedman, The Next 100 Years, pp. 45-46.  
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viewed with suspicion. China and Russia in particular are singled out as potential 
threats, due to their authoritarian nature and territorial ambitions.33  
 
The arbitrary and pseudo-scientific nature of geopolitical analysis is well illustrated 
through Friedman’s assessment of the 2003 Iraq War. First a grand strategy move 
with negligible cost in manpower, it is later recast as expression of a narrow 
‘politico-military strategy’, that depleted resources and distracted from the true 
geostrategic interest and grand strategy of the United States: bringing order to its 
worldwide empire.34 “The strategic goal must be to prevent the emergence of any 
power that can challenge the United States in any given corner of the world.”35 
While Friedman openly advocates an American global imperial agenda, Robert 
Kaplan’s Revenge of Geography likewise seeks to orient U.S. grand strategy 
according to an imperial example: ancient Rome. Rather than perpetuating its 
established global hegemony, the United States should prepare itself for a ‘graceful 
retreat.’36 
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 See for example the treatment of China and Russia in Kagan, World America Made; Friedman, The Next 100 
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 Friedman, The Next 100 Years, pp. 3-7; p. 22. This imperial grand strategy requires, among other things, for the 
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and empire: logics of order in the American unipolar age,” Review of International Studies 30 (2004): pp. 609-
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 Wasting energies on securing an indefensible and ultimately destabilizing border is described by Kaplan as a 
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World Island (Eurasia and Africa).” Kaplan, Revenge of Geography, p. 344. According to Kaplan, a unified 
North-American empire, encompassing Canada, the United States, and Mexico, would serve as core of a 
‘Polynesian-cum-mestizo civilization: “America, in my vision, would become the globe’s preeminent duty-free 
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The driving force behind many of the debates surrounding the future of American 
grand strategy and the nation’s standing in the world is the worry about American 
decline. In the hegemony discourse, the prospect of decline is acknowledged, but the 
same time rebutted. In the World America Made, American decline is a choice, a 
matter of national will, not the consequence of shifting economic and geopolitical 
parameters, already notable in diminished international leverage.37 The ‘rise of the 
rest’ is “(…) either irrelevant to America’s strategic position or of benefit to it.”38  
 
Only China appears as potential challenger, provided: “(…) the Chinese translate 
enough of their growing economic strength into military strength.” 39  In the 
geopolitical imagination of hegemony, American decline would represent the 
transition from a positive unipolar to a negative multipolar world order. Having 
discounted external causes, such a transition is ultimately located in a possible 
transformation of American geopolitical identity at home that would no longer 
follow a vision of global leadership:  
 To many Americans, accepting decline may provide a welcome escape from 
the moral and material burdens that have weighed on them since World War 
II.”40  
 
As Kagan would reiterate in 2014: “Superpowers don’t get to retire.” With its 
triumphalism and pathos, The World America Made describes American grand 
                                                                                                                           
continue to use its immigration laws […] to further diversify attract an immigrant population that, as Huntington 
fears, is defined too much by Mexicans. In this vision, nationalism will be, perforce, diluted a bit, but not so 
much as to deprive America of its unique identity, or to undermine its military,” ibid., p. 339. 
37
 Kagan, World America Made, p. 105. The economic and military parameters of American power on which 
American hegemony is build, remain unchanged in this view. “In economic terms […] America’s position in the 
world has not changed,” ibid. To Kagan, the United States, parallel to the British Empire in 1870, is at the height 
of its economic and military power, cf., ibid., p. 107. In The World America Made, as in many other grand 
strategy texts, the main indicators for economic power are the national gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
United States, and its share of global GDP, as well as per capita GDP, for military power the main indicator is the 
size of the defense budget of the United States, cf., ibid., pp. 105-107. 
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 Ibid., p. 109. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., p. 133. 
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strategy as an issue that potentially decides the fate of the world. Here, the domestic 
challenges the United States faces to overcome its economic and social problems are 
seen as the greatest risk to its role as global hegemon: “As Thomas Friedman and 
others have asked, can Americans do what it needs to be done to compete effectively 
in the twenty-first century world?”41 This reference in The World America Made to 
Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum’s That Used To Be Us, illustrates how 
the popular discourse of American hegemony represents a remarkable mainstream 
consensus where neoconservative and neoliberal arguments for the American role in 
world politics significantly overlap.  
 
That Used To Be Us diagnoses severe problems and shortcomings prevailing in the 
United States, mainly in the areas of high school education, immigration policies, 
public infrastructure, government debt, and innovation and competitiveness in the 
global economy, perpetuated by a gridlocked, partisan political system that hinders 
the collective action necessary to overcome these issues.42 But the worrisome state of 
America is not just seen as domestic challenge, but threat to America’s global 
hegemony. In their firm belief in the necessity of the United States’ global leadership 
role, the neoliberal and neoconservative view of American grand strategy converge:  
A world shaped by a strong America–strong enough to provide political, 
economic, and moral leadership–will never be a perfect world, but it will be a 
better world than any alternative we can envision.43 
 
The issue of American grand strategy becomes directly entwined with the state of 
American politics and the American economy, and the need for deep and far 
reaching reform of both.  
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 Kagan, World America Made, pp. 130-131. 
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 Friedman and Mandelbaum, pp. 17-23.  
43
 Ibid., p. 351. 
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That Used To Be Us argues that the United States failed to adopt a compelling grand 
strategy after its victory in the Cold War, one as coherent and focused as 
containment, which is supposed to have successfully channeled the nation’s political, 
economic and military energy toward the confrontation against the Soviet Union as 
America’s geopolitical rival.44 Invoking George F. Kennan’s famous ‘long telegram’ 
from Moscow, Friedman and Mandelbaum, worriedly ask if anybody still knows 
how to write one.45  
 
Containment becomes the cipher for an idealized past of American hegemony and 
visionary strategic thinking.46 This narrative rests on the assumption that it was the 
United States, which ‘won’ the Cold War, due to its commitment, ingenuity and 
power, while the Soviet Union ‘lost,’ overwhelmed by American economic and 
military might.47 It was this competitive focus that supposedly kept the United States 
alert and innovative, and ultimately let it win the superpower race.48 According to 
Mitt Romney:  “George H.W. Bush and Ronald Reagan had pushed the Soviet Union 
to the wall and won.”49 However both liberal and neoconservative hegemonists 
believe that after the end of the Cold War, America allowed itself a ‘holiday from 
history’, as Charles Krauthammer put it.50  
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 Ibid., pp.13-17; the key historic narrative this argument is based on can be found for example in Gaddis, 
Strategies of Containment. 
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 Friedman and Mandelbaum, p. 15. 
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That American decline is even a possibility then, is the result of ignorance and 
complacency, and a missing grand strategy for a global competitive environment. 
American hegemony has to be underwritten by a concentrated and conscious effort to 
strengthen the American economy, so the power generated domestically can be 
projected globally. The world may have become flat, but it is still zero-sum.  
 
Engagement with the post-American world  
 
Two works on the New York Times best sellers list stand out for prominently arguing 
for a grand strategy vision of cooperative engagement, based on a narrative of 
geopolitical transition: The Post American World 2.0. by Fareed Zakaria and 
Strategic Vision, by Zbigniew Brzezinski.51 In his best selling The Post-American 
World, published in 2008, Zakaria, a popular political analyst and commentator on 
CNN, and former editor of Time and Newsweek, argued that the dynamic, economic 
growth of non-Western powers, especially India and China was redistributing 
economic power and political influence more evenly across the globe. This would 
result in a relative decline of the United States. In consequence, the United States 
would still be a leading power, but no longer hegemonic, and should adopt a grand 
strategy where it maintained excellent relations with everyone, rather than offset and 
balance emerging powers.52  
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 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World: Release 2.0 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011), [New York Times 
best seller, no. 27, July 03, 2011]; Strategic Vision [New York Times best seller, no. 10, February 12, 2012]. 
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 Zakaria, The Post-American World. 
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The updated and revised 2011 The Post American World 2.0., sees the 
aforementioned geopolitical trends fasten and gain momentum as result of the global 
financial crisis:  
I remain convinced that the United States can adapt and adjust to the new 
world I describe but the challenges have become greater and more complex 
(…). I also remain convinced that the geopolitical challenge of living in a 
world without a central, dominant power is one that will be felt everywhere 
and that too has been amply illustrated over the last few years.53 
 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, former security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, highly 
respected commentator on foreign affairs, and a prolific writer on American grand 
strategy and geopolitics shares Zakaria’s analysis of a multipolar future. 54  In 
Strategic Vision, Brzezinski argues that in response to the shift of economic and 
political influence from West to East, the United States should pursue a grand 
strategy of global cooperative engagement: building a core partnership around a 
renewed and ‘larger West’ that encompasses the United States and the European 
Union, plus Russia and Turkey, and simultaneously engaging China as relationship 
of single importance in dealing with the ‘new East’. 
 
A central element that separates the grand strategy discourse of engagement, from 
the previous discussed of American hegemony, is the issue of power polarity in the 
international system. Where Kagan, Friedman and others deny that American 
unipolarity is ending, and represent American decline mainly as domestic challenge, 
Zakaria and Brzezinski see a changing balance of power as an unavoidable fact of 
international relations and geopolitics. Where the former equals American decline 
with the end of unipolarity and the volatility and chaos that will follow, the latter 
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 Zakaria, The Post-American World: Release 2.0, p. xiii. 
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 Cf. Michiko Kakutani, “Surveying a Global Power Shift’, New York Times, January 30, 2012, C1.  
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does not necessarily associate multipolarity with the demise of the United States and 
the liberal world order.  
 
As Fareed Zakaria, who coined the term ‘post-American world’ insists, this story is 
not about American decline, but the ‘rise of everyone else.’55 Nonetheless, the shift 
of economic dynamism and growth away from the United States and Europe toward 
the rising economies of the ‘rest,’ most importantly China and Asia, is expected to 
alter the international system and affect the future conduct of American foreign and 
security policy.56  
 
Brzezinski concludes that: “Accordingly, the United States must seek to shape a 
broader geopolitical foundation for constructive cooperation in the global arena 
(…).”57 Where The World America Made exemplary constructs the grand strategy 
discourse of hegemony around a central historic narrative of unipolar stability and 
American indispensable leadership, Strategic Vision focuses on the transition and 
dispersion of global power in its argument for engagement.58 
 
Strategic Vision represents the United States as ‘focus of global attention.’59 As in 
the discourse of hegemony, American decline is a potential danger to the ability of 
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the United States to project its values globally. However, in addition to ‘negative 
domestic realities’, ‘internationally resented foreign initiatives’ also can undermine 
America’s ability to ‘influence events constructively’ and thus ‘delegitimize 
America’s historical role.’60 The challenge to American grand strategy then is not 
only to reform the country domestically in order to preserve its power, but also to 
‘reorient its drifting foreign policy.’61 A multipolar world needs an America that is at 
once: 
(…) economically vital, socially appealing, responsibly powerful, 
strategically deliberate, internationally respected, and historically enlightened 
in its global engagement with the new East. 62 
 
Brzezinski formulates his strategic vision of global cooperative engagement not only 
against what he sees as futile vision of unipolar hegemony and imperial dominance, 
but also explicitly against the dangers of American isolationism and global retreat.63 
In the geopolitical imagination of engagement the United States can no longer fill the 
role of global hegemon and sole superpower, but it also does not retreat back onto 
itself, instead it serves as leading global partner for governance.  
 
Where in the hegemony discourse, American exceptionalism seems to give the 
United Sates a clear mandate for global leadership and power projection, in 
Brzezinski’s vision of engagement, the allure of the American Dream works best if 
America successfully demonstrates its unique blend of ‘political idealism and 
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economic materialism’ at home, making it an attractive partner to the world.64 This is 
the geopolitical mantra of leadership through the ‘power of our example’, rather than 
the example of American power that is also represented in the text of the 2010 
National Security Strategy of the United States.65 As the thesis will demonstrate in 
the following chapters, this conviction that America must lead, but must not lead 
alone, is a central trope of the liberal strand of the American grand strategy discourse 
of hegemony that fuses a dominant representation of American leadership with 
arguments for cooperative engagement, resulting in a hybrid discourse of hegemonic 
engagement.  
 
In Strategic Vision, a cooperative vision of engagement appears as counter to a 
misguided, neoconservative vision of unipolarity and military power that was 
expressed in the Bush administration’s ‘War on Terror,’ which Brzezinski 
characterizes as the wrong grand strategy in the face of an evolving geopolitical 
landscape.66 In this context Brzezinski also refers to the impact of popular culture in 
shaping a dominant geopolitical imagination in the United States:  
American mass media-including Hollywood and TV dramas […] contributed 
to shaping a public mood in which fear and hatred were visually focused on 
actors with personally distinctive Arab features.67   
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At the same time Strategic Vision demonstrates a continuity of dominant geopolitical 
thinking, when Brzezinski criticizes a lack of geographical knowledge and education 
in the United States, just as Halford Mackinder bemoaned the lack of geographical 
understanding in England over a hundred years ago.  
 
Where the popular American grand strategy discourses of hegemony and 
engagement coincide, is on the issue of domestic reform: “Americans must 
understand that our strength abroad will depend increasingly on our ability to 
confront problems at home.”68 Comparing the neoliberal argument for hegemony in 
That Used To be Us with the elaboration of engagement in Strategic Vision reveals 
that both deem overcoming the country’s severe economic and social deficits the 
necessary condition for shaping America’s future global role and position, and 
avoiding American decline.69 Both also express the belief that a prudent American 
grand strategy has the ability to focus the country’s energies and motivation in a 
‘nationally focused response’ to avert the erosion of America’s influence in the 
world, just as the United States has successfully met major challenges in the past, 
from the Great Depression to the Cold War.70  
 
In both the hegemony and the engagement discourse, American decline would mean 
an end to ‘America’s continued capacity to play a major world role.’71 Unlike the 
hegemony discourse however, this domestic reform effort can only guarantee 
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continued American influence in a multipolar world, not perpetuate America’s 
unipolar moment.72 The choice America faces, lies between cooperative engagement 
and further relative decline, not between decline and hegemony as Kagan suggests:73  
America’s global standing in the decades ahead will depend on its successful 
implementation of purposeful efforts to overcome its drift towards a 
socioeconomic obsolescence and to shape a new and stable geopolitical 
equilibrium on the world’s most important continent by far, Eurasia.74 
 
From the concern with a continued centrality of the United States in world politics to 
worries about American decline, and the emphasis on grand strategy as vision for 
domestic renewal, the neoconservative discourse of unipolar primacy and the liberal 
discourse of cooperative engagement share many common themes, which reveal the 
strong intertextual links existing in the popular geopolitical imagination of grand 
strategy.  
 
What separates the representation of multipolarity in the engagement discourse is 
that such a scenario is not seen as inherently volatile, but as manageable though 
concentrated efforts of global governance. Since unipolarity is not considered a 
viable option, a grand strategy of cooperative engagement is to secure a safe and 
secure multipolar world order with the United States firmly in its center. 75 
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Brzezinski’s Eurasian grand strategy envisions a ‘larger West’ that expands the 
institutional ties of political, economic and security cooperation between the United 
States and Europe to Russia and Turkey.76 A strategic focus on the ‘new East’ 
represents the second half of this geopolitical vision of engagement. Here, the United 
States is supposed to maintain a significant presence through existing and expanding 
alliances in East and South East Asia, and at the same time fashion a substantial 
political and economic partnership with China. As outlined in chapter seven, the 
‘pivot to Asia’ the Obama administration announced in 2011/2012 reflects a 
geopolitical conceptualization of America as a ‘Pacific power’ that matches the basic 
analysis Brzezinski outlines in Strategic Vision.77 Whatever the outcome of the 
American-Chinese relationship, rather than imperial dominance and military power 
projection, Brzezinski and Zakaria both advocate a careful management approach 
where the United States brokers mutual understanding and goodwill of all great 
powers and regional partners involved in Asia, and the international system at 
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large.78 To Zakaria this new role of the United States as ‘honest broker’ rather than 
traditional ‘superpower’ would primarily involve ‘consultation, cooperation, and 
even compromise.’79  
 
Accordingly, the United States should avoid any ‘direct military involvement in 
conflicts between rival Asian powers’.80 Beyond the ethnocentric, Manichean and 
deterministic accounts of volatile multipolarity in the grand strategy discourse of 
hegemony, Strategic Vision also points to more specific differences in historical 
narratives and cultural experiences between West and East. It represents Asia as a 
geopolitical entity that is unified to varying degrees not only by sentiments of anti-
imperialism and the experience of Western domination, but also century long periods 
of inter-state peace. 81  Remarkably, it also emphasizes the potential impact of 
dominant geopolitical discourses that emerge in United States itself:  
China’s influential and rising role in world affairs is a reality to which 
Americans will have to adjust-instead of either demonizing it or engaging in 
thinly concealed wishful thinking about its failure.82  
 
Unlike the often triumphalist and exceptionalist language of the hegemony discourse, 
which treats the issue of grand strategy, world order and geopolitics almost 
exclusively as a matter of American agency and willpower, the discourse of 
engagement tacitly acknowledges that world politics in the 21st century is at least 
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partially outside American control, and will depend just as much on the thoughts and 
actions of others and how their geopolitical identities and historic narratives will 
shape their respective grand strategies. Strategic Vision and the Post-American 
World hence both outline a geopolitical vision for the United States that seeks 
cooperation and engagement with others, not imperial dominance, or a self-adulatory 
benevolent hegemony. 
 
America is coming home – The case for restraint 
 
While the basic discourse of engagement seeks to redefine America’s leadership role 
from a hegemonic hierarchy of subject-object relationships to a more level 
arrangement of cooperative partnerships, it fundamentally stays committed to the 
idea of a significant global role of the United States in world politics, and the 
country’s positive influence in international affairs. Based on a decidedly more 
critical assessment of American grand strategy and national security policy, the basic 
discourse of restraint in contrast seeks to further limit the use of American power 
abroad. Rather than engaging the world through extending global partnerships and 
multiple commitments, it wants the United States to focus on itself and its domestic 
renewal at home.  
 
Several books have popularized these views on the New York Times best sellers list: 
Washington Rules, by Andrew Bacevich presents American grand strategy as 
misguided imperial vision of global hegemony, perpetuated by a dangerous 
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American elite consensus in foreign and security policy.83 In her top best selling 
Drift Rachel Maddow, a popular political show host on the liberal inclined MSNBC 
network critically assesses the evolution of America’s military and national security 
apparatus, which she accuses of wasting financial resources and potentially 
endangering American liberties.84 Finally, The Untold History of the United States 
by the prominent filmmaker Oliver Stone and historian Peter Kuznick provides a 
critical counter-narrative to the dominant historical interpretation of American 
exceptionalism and the benevolent influence of the United States in world history.85 
 
The basic grand strategy discourse of restraint represents the geopolitical identity of 
the United States fundamentally different from the previously established basic 
discourses of hegemony and engagement. Rather than ‘American exceptionalism’ or 
the ‘American Dream’, negative features such as ‘imperialism’ and ‘militarism’ are 
constructed as central characteristics of the United States and its actions in world 
politics. As Stone and Kuznick point out such critical representations go directly 
against the mainstream consensus of geopolitical knowledge and historical narrative 
that prevails in the United States:  
That popular and somewhat mythic view, carefully filtered through the prism 
of American altruism, benevolence, magnanimity, exceptionalism, and 
devotion to liberty and justice, […] becomes part of the air that Americans 
breathe.86  
 
The central historic narrative of the restraint discourse casts the role the United 
States has played in the past in a far less favorable light. Episodes such as the CIA 
involvement in the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddeq and Chile’s 
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Salvador Allende, the Abu Ghraib prisoner scandal, or the civilian casualties in the 
bombing campaigns against North Vietnam are frequently ignored or represented as 
unfortunate but ultimately negligible aberrations in America’s overwhelmingly 
benign and positive record in international affairs.87 Stone and Kuznick instead 
reconstruct these episodes as regular and enduring features of American imperialism 
and the ‘darker side of U.S. history.’88  
 
The basic grand strategy discourse of restraint repudiates a Manichean and 
reductionist understanding of world history that continuously describes the United 
States as morally superior force that successfully vanquishes all enemies in its 
crusade for freedom. As the Washington Post review of Andrew Bacevich’s 
Washington Rules sums up this dominant understanding of the geopolitical identity 
of the United States: “Power and violence are cleansed by virtue: Because America 
is ‘good,’ her actions are always benign.”89  
 
Rather than the ideational foundation for a stable, liberal world order of peace, 
democracy and free trade, American exceptionalism appears as dangerous 
combination of national hubris, ideological self-delusion and missionary zeal that has 
exhausted the country’s resources, more often than not produced instability instead 
of security, has triggered multiple blowback, and engaged the country in activities 
that betrayed the moral righteousness the American cause of freedom was supposed 
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to represent. 90  As Stone and Kuznick write, ‘American exceptionalism’ as 
ideological foundation for an American grand strategy of primacy and imperial 
dominance was particularly influential under President George W. Bush and the 
neoconservative elements of his administration.  
Though the belief that the United States is fundamentally different from other 
nations […] was buried for many years in the ruins of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki and in the jungles of Vietnam, it has reemerged in recent years as a 
staple of right-wing revisionism.91 
 
While The Untold History of the United States links the myth of American 
exceptionalism in particular to the ideological convictions of neoconservatives and 
their hegemonic designs for ‘American empire’ and ‘military dominance,’ its 
influence is not confined to one particular political party or Presidential 
administration.92 President Obama is located within a continuity of American foreign 
and security policy, who, in following the dominant geopolitical discourse of 
American grand strategy, did not fundamentally reinvision the country’s role in the 
world, but merely changed the style of hegemony. 
His was a centrist approach to better managing the American Empire rather 
than advancing a positive role for the United States in a rapidly evolving 
world.93  
 
This assessment again points to the congruence between conservative and liberal 
discourses of American grand strategy that share fundamental assumptions about 
America’s necessary and beneficial leadership role in the world. Andrew Bacevich, a 
West Point graduate, Vietnam veteran and long-time critic of American foreign and 
security policy likewise supports the argument that American hegemony represents a 
joint vision of conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats about the 
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virtues of America’s global preeminence.94 In the eyes of Bacevich, this Washington 
consensus about America’s global leadership role is constructed around a central 
paradigm of military power. 
Call them the sacred trinity: an abiding conviction that the minimum 
essentials of international peace and order require the United States to 
maintain a global military presence, to configure its forces for global power 
projection, and to counter existing or anticipated threats by relying on a 
policy of global interventionism.95 
 
American exceptionalism, military dominance, imperialism and global hegemony 
represent the prevailing 'Other’ against which the discourse of restraint builds its 
own competing grand strategy vision of domestic renewal and self-limitation abroad. 
The popular texts of Romney, Kagan, Friedman and Mandelbaum and others 
celebrate American hegemony and hail containment as example for a golden age of 
American grand strategy vision during the Cold War, whose clarity and purpose are 
now desperately needed again for the geopolitical challenges of the 21st century. 
Inverting this argument, the critical discourse of restraint in The Untold History of 
the United States and Washington Rules clearly identifies an ongoing continuity of 
American grand strategy in the form of military primacy and global power 
projection, in place since World War 2, that should serve as a warning rather than an 
encouragement for America’s future role and position in world politics.96 In the 
words of Bacevich: “(…) adherence to that strategy has propelled the United States 
into a condition of perpetual war (…).”97  
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Here, from the Korean War onwards, the blend of militarism, imperialism and 
exceptionalism that marks American hegemony has repeatedly proven to be 
economically costly, wrought with political failure and undermined by overly 
ambitious goals.98 Again Obama appears as an establishment figure, who slightly 
modified, but did not change the prevailing hegemony consensus. According to 
Washington Rules, American grand strategy continues in its trajectory under the 
Obama administration, par some ‘cosmetic changes’, because hegemony, or ‘global 
leadership’ is an item of faith for both neoconservatives and liberals.99 “The national 
security consensus to which every president since 1945 has subscribed persists.”100  
 
Unlike the basic discourses of hegemony and restraint, which emphasize the benefits 
of American leadership, Washington Rules and Drift both stress the costs Americans 
have to pay for their country’s global role, not just in blood and treasure, but also in 
the distortion of the ideals of the republic by imperialism and militarism.101 In 
Washington Rules, the alternative to this costly and ultimately unsustainable path is 
for America to embrace a geopolitical vision of restraint, by creating a ‘city upon a 
hill,’ invoking the historic narrative of John Winthrop and the founding of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1630. America should seek to ‘exemplify’ and 
‘illuminate’ the world through its ‘self-mastery’ instead of trying to ‘compel’ and 
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‘enforce’ others.102 George Washington and John Quincy Adams are represented as 
proponents of an American grand strategy of prudent restraint and limitation that 
held valid until the late 19th century. This representation however at the same time 
glances over the aggressive expansionism that underlined the historical development 
of the continental United States in its westward march of ‘manifest destiny,’ 
including the violent expulsion of Native Americans; it also does not problematize 
the role of slavery in the ‘city upon a hill.’  
 
The case for restraint is essentially a call for America to finally ‘come home.’  
With resources currently devoted to rehabilitating Baghdad or Kabul freed 
up, the cause of rehabilitating Cleveland and Detroit might finally attract a 
following.103  
 
Maddow likewise refers to one of America’s ‘founding fathers’, Thomas Jefferson 
and his suspicion of standing armies, in building her argument against a spiraling 
military-industrial complex, metastasizing executive powers, and the explosion of 
financial resources invested by the United States in military and intelligence 
capabilities following 9/11.104  
 
The basic discourse of restraint builds its key historic narrative around a pre-
hegemonic representation of 19th century America, before the country ascended to 
world power status in the wake of the Spanish-American War, World War 1 and 
World War 2. The hegemony discourse in turn invokes the historic narrative of 
America’s victory over Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan as foundation for the 
lasting stability of the international system. Beyond a debate over the appropriate 
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national security policy, the argument over American grand strategy is also a fight 
over the correct interpretation of American history.    
 
While it does not subscribe to a vision of American decline, the basic discourse of 
restraint, as exemplary formulated by Bacevich, demands a clear repudiation of 
American hegemony, military primacy and a global ambition to remake the world in 
America’s image.105 The consequences of this strategic reorientation would be far 
reaching, as the Washington consensus of hegemony, and its surrounding political, 
military, intellectual, and socio-economic structure would be broken up.106 Following 
a grand strategy of restraint, the United States would ‘maintain only those forces 
required to accomplish the defense establishment’s core mission.’ It would therefore 
‘withdraw from the Persian Gulf and Central Asia,’ and never again undertake a ‘war 
of choice’ such as Iraq.107 
The proper aim of American statecraft, therefore, is not to redeem humankind 
or to prescribe some specific world order, nor to police the planet by force of 
arms. Its purpose is to permit Americans to avail themselves of the right of 
self-determination as they seek to create a ‘more perfect union’.108  
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This reorientation of American grand strategy targets first and foremost the 
definition of national security and the way Americans should think about war making 
and the role of the military in defense of the nation. The Messenger rather than 
Transformers 2 inspires the basic discourse of restraint and its underlying 
geopolitical imagination. Echoing Bacevich, Maddow argues that, beginning with the 
Vietnam War and furthered by the machinations of the Reagan administration, the 
national security policy of the United States has become a deeply flawed 
endeavor.109 Referring to the famous ‘Team B’ of neoconservative analysts that 
provided an alternative and highly exaggerated assessment of Soviet capabilities for 
the Pentagon in its justification for an American grand strategy vision of military 
primacy, she states: 
If all those Team B cranks in the hawks nest want to indulge in exhaustive 
paranoia, they can knock themselves out. […] Our military and weapons 
prowess is a fantastic and perfectly weighted hammer, but that doesn’t make 
every international problem a nail.110 
 
As detailed in chapter eight, this argument for a critical appraisal of the usefulness of 
military power in world politics would be repeated almost exactly in the same words 
by President Obama in his 2014 speech at the Military Academy of the United States 
in West Point, documenting the cross-discursive, intertextual links of the basic 
discourse of restraint between popular culture and policy making.111  
 
As described by Bacevich and Maddow an American grand strategy of restraint 
appears not only as best guide for steering the United States through world politics, 
but also as domestic necessity for reigning in an out-of-control leviathan of the 
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national security state. The United States should cut back and downsize its vast 
military and intelligence apparatus and end its national obsession with global 
leadership and American exceptionalism as guiding principle for international 
affairs. Instead of democratizing Iraq and Afghanistan the country should finally 
engage in ‘nation-building at home’. While this might provide ‘pretty cold comfort 
to Poles, Rwandans and Congolese’, the country whose democracy, prosperity and 
freedom American grand strategy should be concerned with above all others, is the 
United States of America.112 
 
Nationalism, populism, and American exceptionalism 
 
From the New York Times best sellers list a fourth, decidedly populist discursive 
strand concerning American grand strategy emerges. It originates from the ‘right-of-
center’ end of the conservative spectrum, most prominently found in nationally 
syndicated political talk show radio and conservative leaning media outlets such as 
Fox News, or the National Review magazine, where the ‘socialist’ policies of the 
Obama administration are endangering America’s exceptionalism and its supreme 
status as dominant global superpower.113 Its representations of geopolitical identity 
and formulation of national security policy does not qualify it as a basic grand 
strategy discourse per se. Rather, it appears as particular nationalist and chauvinist 
strand of the hegemony discourse that blends an ideological conviction in America’s 
greatness and uniqueness with a peculiar geopolitical vision of isolationist 
supremacy. As such it stands apart from the dominant bipartisan conservative-liberal 
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consensus of American leadership, as well as neoconservative ideas about 
benevolent American hegemony as foundation of a liberal, international order 
sustained by American power. 
 
Published in book form, several of these anti-Obama narratives have appeared on 
prominent places on the New York Times best sellers list, representing a popular 
critique of American grand strategy from the Right: After America by Mark Steyn 
describes the advent of American decline under Obama. Patrick J Buchanan’s 
Suicide of a Superpower focuses on the ‘endangered’ national identity of the United 
States due to multi-culturalism, while Michael Savage’s Trickle Down Tyranny 
describes the ‘socialist’ agenda of the Obama administration to remake the 
‘American Dream.’ Screwed by Dick Morris and Eileen McGann likewise argues 
that ‘globalism’ and ‘socialism’ are threatening America. Laura Ingham’s The 
Obama Diaries is written as satirical critique of the policies of the Obama 
Administration, while Bill O’Reilly’s, Pinheads and Patriots, explores the ‘shift’ in 
the United States occurring under President Obama. Finally Obama’s America by 
Dinesh D’Souza portrays President Obama’s ‘anti-Americanism’ and ‘radical anti-
colonialism’.114 The language in several of these texts is infused with national and 
racial stereotypes, generalizations, distortions, insults, and prejudice towards ethnic 
minorities, homosexuals, and the welfare state.115 President Obama in particular is a 
                                            
114
 Mark Steyn, After America (Washington DC: Regnery, 2011), [New York Times best seller, no. 4, August 
28], 2011; Patrick J. Buchanan, Suicide Of A Superpower  (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2011), [New York 
Times best seller, no. 4, November 06, 2011]; Michael Savage, Trickle Down Tyranny (New York: William 
Morrow, 2012), [New York Times best seller, no. 3, April 22, 2012]; Dick Morris and Eileen McGann, Screwed 
(New York: Broadside Books, 2012), [New York Times best seller, no. 3, May 27, 2012]; Laura Ingraham, The 
Obama Diaries (Chicago: Threshold Editions, 2010), [New York Times best seller, no. 01, August 01, 2010]; 
Bill O’Reilly, Pinheads and Patriots (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), [New York Times best seller, no. 2, 
October 03, 2010]; Dinesh D’Souza, Obama’s America (Washington DC: Regnery, 2012), [New York Times best 
seller, no. 5, September 02, 2012]. 
115
 For example: “(…) single women are the most reliable voters for Big Government, even as it turns them into 
junkies for the state pusher and ensures their kids will reach their adulthood pre-crippled.” Steyn, p. 230;  
 162 
target for attacks: “Like all leftist dictators, Obama is becoming a bloodthirsty 
monster.”116 In some cases the argument presented is bordering the territory of 
conspiracy theories, well illustrated by the title of the latest book of the former Fox 
News commentator and political analyst Dick Morris and his partner Eileen McGann: 
Here Come the Black Helicopters! The book seeks to uncover the ‘movement afoot 
to transfer American autonomy to the United Nations.’117 Here, the case for global 
governance appears as the sinister plot of cosmopolitan elites and international 
organizations to end American sovereignty.  
 
To various bestselling right-of-center authors decline represents an existential threat 
to American exceptionalism, both externally to the superpower status of the United 
States, and internally. After America, written by the political commentator and 
conservative critic Mark Steyn, which on its cover tellingly features a picture of 
Uncle Sam lying in the morgue, is a good illustration for the general line of argument 
in these publications:118 American decline is a reality, mainly due to mounting 
government debt, which is considered to be unsustainable and undermining 
American economic and military power. 119  In addition, American decline is 
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represented as historic break with a geopolitical continuity in which an Anglo-
Protestant culture was the superior driving force of world history. This shows 
obvious parallels with the central historic narrative of hegemony that The World 
America Made established. The geopolitical consequences of this transition are 
constructed as a global political and economic catastrophe: “(…) victims of 
American retreat were the many parts of the world that had benefited from an 
unusually benign hegemon.”120  
 
Multipolarity again represents a dangerous, volatile future that emerges from the 
absence of American power. However, unlike the representation of American decline 
in the basic discourses of hegemony and engagement, here it also appears as 
symptom of a deeper crisis, originating in misguided ideology and cultural 
decadence. Beyond matters of economics, politics and demographics, promiscuity, 
drug abuse, uncontrolled immigration, environmentalism, multiculturalism, the 
‘dictate’ of political correctness, and most of all the ‘snuffing out’ of individual 
responsibility by government entitlement programs and socialist ideology are seen as 
undermining American identity.121  
 
While abhorring a future without America as the world’s dominant power, this right-
wing discourse of American dominance and exceptionalism partially negates the 
neoliberal-neoconservative consensus on national security, American hegemony and 
the country’s leadership role in a liberal world order.122 Instead of representing 
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hegemony as necessary condition for globalization, where the consent of others 
legitimizes American leadership and power, globalization appears as a false idol, 
exhausting the country’s resources.123 “To its worshippers, globalization is some 
kind of mysterious metaphysical force that’s out there remaking our assumptions 
about the planet.”124  
 
Globalization is represented as an elitist project, designed for the interest of the 
global financial industry, international organizations, and government bureaucracies, 
which all follow a misguided vision of cosmopolitan universalism, or ‘globalism’.125 
Echoing this sentiment, the best selling Trickle Down Tyranny by conservative radio 
talk show host Michael Savage states: “Global government is nothing more than 
warmed-over Marxist-Leninist communism on a planetary scale.”126  
 
The populist discourse of America’s exceptionalist and isolationist supremacy 
constructs a grand strategy of ‘America first.’ Instead of wasting resources by 
following an internationalist vision of liberal world order, the United States should 
focus its energies to strengthen its economic and political system at home. In its 
support for small government, embrace of libertarian-conservative ideas of 
economics, and concern with conserving national resources, this vision of 
exceptionalist supremacy brings forward its own version of the restraint argument, 
not as progressive critique of American dominance and imperialism, but as 
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conservative charge against ‘big government’ and ‘un-American’ multilateralism.127 
On the other hand, there is general consensus that an alternative liberal grand 
strategy vision of cooperative engagement and multipolarity will only strengthen 
America’s enemies and leave the United States weaker and more endangered.128 “In 
a post-American world, the kind of world Barack Obama is committed to building, 
America will be surrounded on all sides by hostile forces (…).”129 
 
Against the otherness of globalization, socialism and multipolarity, American 
exceptionalism is represented as the true American self, the source of America’s 
strength and national greatness and the ideational foundation that should animate the 
country’s grand strategy. Accordingly, one of the main charges brought forward 
against President Obama by his conservative and right-wing critics, is that he does 
not believe in American exceptionalism and does not employ it as foundation for his 
geopolitical vision of U.S. foreign and security policy.  
 
As Bill O’Reilly, multiple bestselling author and host of the Fox News Channel’s top 
rated The O’Reilly Factor explains: “In addition, Barack Obama is an 
internationalist, which means he believes America does not have an ‘exceptional’ 
place in the world.”130 The Obama Diaries, which topped the New York Times non-
fiction best sellers list in August 2010, devoted its entire opening chapter to the issue 
of American exceptionalism and its endangered status under the Obama 
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administration.131 Written a as a satirical ‘insider’s account’ of the administration by 
the conservative political commentator and radio talk show host Laura Ingraham, the 
book states:  
His recitation of America’s purported sins creates an equivalency between the 
United States and nations that do not begin to approach our economic, 
military, or cultural strength. […] As described by the president, the United 
States seems like just another defective member of the League of Nations.132  
 
Obama’s approach to international relations and foreign policy is seen as deeply 
flawed, because it is not rooted in the belief in American exceptionalism, but 
supposedly motivated by a negative view of the international role the United States 
has played in the past. President Obama, who has frequently stressed international 
cooperation and multilateral approaches to global governance, and has seemingly 
distanced himself from the unilateralism associated with the previous Bush 
administration, is criticized for constantly ‘apologizing’ for America.133  
 
The idea of cooperative engagement with countries that are ‘weaker’ than the United 
States appears as violation of the values American exceptionalism is supposed to 
represent. In the Obama Diaries, beyond the role of the President, Hollywood 
liberals, such as James Cameron, Oliver Stone or Tom Hanks are singled out for 
undermining the belief in American exceptionalism and its historical foundations in 
films such as Avatar, or the Green Zone that cast the United States in a villainous 
role, and do not appropriately celebrate American heroism.134 This reference shows 
the significance Hollywood is attributed in shaping the general public’s perception of 
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 Ingraham, pp.  24-30. 
132
 Ibid., p. 13. 
133
 Ibid., 12; O’Reilly, p. 31.  
134
 Ibid., p. 20. Tom Hanks is criticized in partiuclar for remarks he made in context with the World War 2 TV 
series Pacific he produced together with Stephen Spielberg. Hanks described the Pacific campaign as one of 
‘racism and terror’ and pointed out the racism prevailing in the United States concerning the view of the Japense 
enemy; a critcal reflection and intervention against the ‘good war’ narrative, Ingraham clearly finds unacceptable, 
cf., ibid.   
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geopolitical identity and its central role in the popular discourse of national security, 
yet drawing from the analysis in the previous chapter it must be stated that far from 
undermining American exceptionalism, the majority of popular Hollywood movies 
seems in fact to support the image of military primacy and global leadership of the 
United States.135 
 
The argument that American grand strategy under President Obama is repudiating 
primacy, and essentially negating American exceptionalism, was further developed, 
and pursued in a more extreme fashion by the best selling Obama’s America, which 
was followed by a successful documentary film, both created by the conservative 
political commentator and author Dinesh D’Souza.136 Here, President Obama is 
accused of purposefully aiming to weaken the United States and fasten American 
decline due to his ideological roots in radical anti-colonialism, inherited from his 
Kenyan father.137 The post-American world appears as the intended result of one 
man’s hereditary ideological conviction and his subsequent quest to rectify the unfair 
distribution of wealth and power in the international system.138 
 
Fears that President Obama, due to his ‘exotic’ upbringing, multicultural 
background, and ideological disposition, is somehow ‘un-American,’ were 
                                            
135
 In this context see also the exploration of American exceptionalism in Hollywood film in Deborah Madsen, 
American Exceptionalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,1998), pp. 157-166. 
136
 The documentary 2016 Obama's America has grossed over $33.45 million in the United States, and was 
distributed in over 2.000 theaters. It is the second highest-grossing political documentary since 1982, topped only 
by Fahrenheit 9/11, cf., “Obama’s America,“ Box Office Mojo, accessed September 17, 2014 
http://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=2016obamasamerica.htm.  
137
 Ibid., p. 10. 
138
 In the words of D’Souza: “He subscribes to an ideology that says it is good for America to go down so that the 
rest of the world can come up. He wants Americans to be poorer so that Brazilians and Colombians can be richer. 
He thinks it would be beneficial to us and to the world for there to be many rich and powerful nations, with no 
single nation able to dominate or dictate terms to any other;” ibid., p. 258. 
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frequently raised on the American Right.139 The American President is seen as 
undermining or negating the exceptionalism of the United States, embracing 
America’s enemies, while simultaneously trying to make America more like others, 
especially socialist Europe, through the expansion of government programs, most 
notably the Affordable Healthcare Act, or ‘Obama care.’ As Steyn explains in his 
assessment of the 2009 State of the Union Address: 
The animating principles of the American idea were entirely absent from 
Obama’s vision—unless by American exceptionalism you mean an 
exceptional effort to harness an exceptionally big government in the cause of 
exceptionally massive spending.140 
 
In addition, the administration’s alleged weak stance in the Iranian nuclear crisis, its 
mismanagement of the Arab Spring, and the strained relationship with Israel are 
frequently singled out for conservative criticism.141 Beyond a mere dispute about 
politics, the foreign and security policy of President Obama and his team are 
scrutinized for being anti-American by its very design. A white, Anglo-Protestant 
identity is supposed to have been the cultural foundation for America’s greatness and 
global leadership.142 In this narrative, the election of President Obama has signaled a 
disruption to this original ‘American’ identity. As demonstrated in the geopolitical 
analysis of Kagan, Friedman and Kaplan, in popular grand strategy discourses 
preserving American identity at home and maintaining its status as dominant power 
in the world are intrinsically linked. 
 
 
 
                                            
139
 Cf. D’Souza; Savage; Steyn.  
140
 Steyn, p. 328. 
141
 Cf. Savage, pp. 302-350. 
142
 Cf. Buchanan; Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2004). 
 169 
Conclusion 
 
Employing the New York Times non-fiction best sellers list as discursive site for 
examining the popular geopolitical imagination of national security, and its 
production as generally accepted knowledge, the thesis has established three basic 
discourses of American grand strategy: hegemony, engagement and restraint. This 
basic categorization is developed from the distinctive use of identity constructs, 
historic narratives and policy recommendations in the relevant texts associated with 
each grand strategy discourse.  
 
Hegemony, engagement and restraint, while not representing completely independent 
entities that operate in isolation from each other, formulate geopolitical visions for 
the role of the United States in world politics that sufficiently sets them apart from 
each other. They prioritize different historic narratives, differ in their basic 
perception of the trajectory of power polarity in the international system and its 
implications, and they recommend fundamentally different designs in foreign and 
national security policy, defense matters and the projection of military power.  
 
Hegemony, engagement and restraint serve as labels to mark relevant distinctions 
between American grand strategy discourses, and how these articulate particular 
visions of geopolitical imagination. However, they are ultimately constructed as an 
analytical category in order to facilitate the investigation of American grand strategy, 
and the interlinking of geopolitical identity and national security under the Obama 
presidency. They cannot claim any objective materiality beyond an interpretive 
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construction. Frequently, there also exists considerable overlap and congruence 
between them. 
 
Both Brzezinski and Bacevich for example deemphasize the usefulness of military 
power in world politics and denounce an American grand strategy of unipolar 
primacy favored by neoconservatives. And, as expressed in The World America 
Made and The Post-American World, discourses of hegemony and engagement both 
share a fundamental assumption that American leadership, either as ‘benevolent 
hegemon’ or ‘honest broker’ is a necessary, beneficial and stabilizing influence in 
international affairs. The liberal critique of the national security apparatus by 
Maddow, Bacevich’s charge against the Washington consensus of hegemony, and 
the right-of-center polemics of After America also all share a concern with America’s 
fiscal situation, and its waste of economic resources to act as the ‘world’s 
policeman.’  
 
Finally, the analysis of popular geopolitical discourse in this chapter has further 
established that ‘American leadership’ represents a dominant identity construct in the 
popular geopolitical imagination. Neoconservative scholars, liberal political 
commentators and right-of-center populists alike employ the historic narrative of 
hegemonic stability. This suggests that any alternative formulation of American 
grand strategy primarily contends with a geopolitical vision of hegemony that is 
firmly culturally embedded. In the popular discourse of hegemony, supported by 
Kagan, Friedman, and Kaplan, ‘American exceptionalism’ for example is a staple 
feature in representing the geopolitical identity of the United States in comparison to 
other nations. In its more populist form, overtones of American nationalism, and 
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issues of racial and cultural superiority take center stage in defining America’s 
‘exceptional’ role in the world, and what the country must undertake to preserve its 
preeminence and uniqueness, both aboard and at home.  
 
Stone and Kuznick’s The Untold History of the United States and Bacevich’s 
Washington Rules document how the restraint discourse directly challenges this 
dominant historic narrative of American exceptionalism, and a bi-partisan 
conservative-liberal consensus of American leadership, military supremacy and 
global power projection. The best selling works of Brzezinski and Zakaria on the 
other hand seek to reframe the geopolitical identity of the United States from ‘sole 
superpower’ to central hub of the international system. Providing the most 
comprehensive formulation of an alternative grand strategy vision of cooperative 
engagement in a multipolar world, they directly contradict the neo-imperial and 
isolationist-supremacist fantasies of The Revenge of Geography, The Next 100 Years, 
or Trickle Down Tyranny. In any case, the deeply embedded, conventional narrative 
of American exceptionalism, superiority and preeminence appears as serious obstacle 
for any political reformulation of American grand strategy towards greater 
cooperative engagement, or more restraint in the global projection of military power. 
 
In Washington Rules Andrew Bacevich attributes the production and re-production 
of the dominant grand strategy discourse of hegemony and exceptionalism to 
‘Washington.’ An inter-locking set of institutions, combining the government, the 
military, mainstream media, weapons corporations, big banks, leading universities, 
national security think tanks, and select interest groups, which together form an elite 
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consensus on national security and geopolitics. 143 Although Bacevich does not make 
it explicit, from a critical perspective ‘Washington’ represents a dominant 
concentration of power/knowledge that defines grand strategy through dominant 
discourses of geopolitics and national security in elite power networks, from 
Hollywood to the New York Times, and the Pentagon to the Council of Foreign 
Relations, ranging from the popular to the formal and practical realm. Hence, it is in 
the realm of discourse where a critical analysis can attempt to validate Bacevich’s 
charge of an ongoing continuity of hegemony, or the conservative counter-argument 
that describes the foreign and security policy of President Obama not as continuation 
of American Empire, but as globalist antithesis to the idea of American 
exceptionalism and supremacy.  
 
  
                                            
143
 Bacevich, Washington Rules, p. 15; pp. 228-229. According to Bacevich, this network legitimizes and 
perpetuates American hegemony motivated by self-interest and institutional inertia: “The Washington rules 
deliver profit, power, and privilege to a long list of beneficiaries: elected and appointed officials, corporate 
executives and corporate lobbyists, admirals and generals, functionaries staffing the national security apparatus, 
media personalities, and policy intellectuals from universities and research organizations.” Ibid., p. 226.  
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4. The American grand strategy discourse in International Relations 
  
Most foreign policy experts are pushing for a new grand strategy (…). They are 
disposed toward big ideas and toward wedging all the pieces of a problem snugly 
together into one big, neat theory. They are not enamored of loose ends or 
unintended consequences, which call their expertise into question.1 – Leslie H. 
Gelb 
 
Do grand strategies matter? They definitely matter to strategists. These experts 
regularly bemoan a lack of strategic far-sightedness of politicians and the absence of 
a geopolitical vision in conducting foreign and security policy. The grand strategies 
they design are supposed to help steer the ‘ship of state’ and chart its course through 
the uncertain waters of world politics.2 If a country seems to lack a grand strategy, it 
is said to be unclear about its future course, the threats it faces, or the long-term 
interests it pursues.3 Hence, it is in the realm of expert knowledge and formal 
discourse where grand strategies are articulated in their purest intellectual from, 
formulated in elite circles for elite audiences, yet not encumbered by the daily 
pressures of policy-making, or the troubles of domestic politics.  
 
Previously, the thesis has explored the popular imagination of geopolitics and 
national security in Hollywood films and non-fiction bestsellers, and the political 
significance of these seemingly entertainment-oriented discursive domains. As 
demonstrated, visions of geopolitics and national security are regularly being 
popularized for the consumption of mass audiences, constituting an important site for 
the production of dominant knowledge in the realm of common sense experience. 
                                            
1
 Leslie H. Gelb, “Necessity, Choice, and Common Sense,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 3 (2009): p. 68. 
2
 Cf., Drezner, “Does Obama Have A Grand Strategy?,” p. 61.   
3
 Cf., Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy.” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): pp. 68-79. 
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From this critical analysis of popular culture, hegemony, engagement, and restraint 
were identified as three basic discourses of American grand strategy.  
 
Building upon these findings, this chapter continues the critical analysis of American 
grand strategy, and looks at how geopolitical visions of national security are 
constructed around the concept of expert knowledge that claims authority through its 
status as formal expertise.4 This connects methodologically to what Ó Tuathail 
described as the critical engagement of the intellectuals, institutions and texts that 
define geopolitical thought in formal geopolitics.5  
 
The particular form of knowledge under investigation here can be defined as the 
technical or scientific knowledge of experts and intellectuals, considered to be ‘true, 
objective and incontestable.’6 As such it can serve as the base for political decision-
making and may only be challenged and called into question by other experts, the 
knowledge itself located beyond political reproach due to its supposed scientific 
impartiality. 7  As Jenny Edkins writes, the role of the expert as a knowledge 
technician is to provide answers for decision makers, allowing them to close down 
the political debate. 8 Beyond merely offering a neutral, scientific-technological 
observation however, the experts investigated here actively seek to influence the 
political end themselves, to influence or change the grand strategy of the United 
                                            
4
 Cf. Ó Tuathail, “Understanding Critical Geopolitics,” pp. 110-113. Two of the contemporary ‘intellectuals of 
statecraft’ Ó Tuathail specifically mentions in this context, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski are featured 
as authors in Foreign Affairs and are analyzed in this chapter. 
5
 Ibid., p. 110.  
6
 Jenny Edkins, “Ethics and Practices of Engagement: Intellectuals as Experts.” International Relations 19, no. 1 
(2005): p. 66. 
7
 Ibid., p. 66; see also Edkins, Poststructuralism & international relations. 
8
 Ibid., p. 65. 
 175 
States, and the way the country pursues its national security.9 This locates the formal 
discourse of U.S. grand strategy at the nexus of political science and policy making. 
 
As Biersteker has pointed out, the reciprocal interrelationship of theory and practice 
in international relations and the sub-field of international security is manifold, from 
the use of theoretically informed framework concepts of world politics, consciously 
or unconsciously by political practitioners to the interpretation of international 
practices by IR scholars.10 In the context of formal grand strategy discourse, the 
theory-practice connection is largely centered on a dominant understanding of U.S. 
global leadership in world politics. This key representation of superior economic and 
military power and its political implications inform the geopolitical imagination of 
major policy makers as well as the majority of research expertise in mainstream IR 
scholarship. 
 
Looking to the realm of formal discourse and expert knowledge, the thesis aims to 
further map the construction of dominant knowledge, with the academic discipline of 
International Relations as a key site for the production of what is considered grand 
strategy expertise. The previous location of grand strategy in the respective IR 
literature served to mark the theoretical and methodological distinctiveness of the 
thesis from the established, conventional perspective of rationalist-positivist grand 
strategy research. The analysis of grand strategy and IR provided in this chapter now 
                                            
9
 In front of the background of the Iraq War Edward Said explained in the 2003 preface to his book Orientalism:  
“One specifically American contribution to the discourse of empire is the specialized jargon of policy experts. 
You don’t need Arabic or Persian or even French to pontificate about how the democracy domino effect is just 
what the Arab world needs. Combative and woefully ignorant policy experts whose world experience is limited to 
the Beltway grind out books on “terrorism” and liberalism, or about Islamic fundamentalism and American 
foreign policy, or about the end of history, all of it vying for attention and influence quite without regard for 
truthfulness or reflection or real knowledge. What matter is how efficient and resourceful it sounds, and who 
might go for it, as it were.” Said, Orientalism (preface 2003), p. xvi.  
10
 Thomas J. Biersteker, “Theory and Practice in International Security Studies,” Security Dialogue 41, no. 6 
(2010): pp. 599-608. 
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occurs within the context of a critical discourse analysis. The focus of interest lies 
especially on how formal expertise is intertextually connected to the realm of 
political practice in establishing and maintaining grand strategy as dominant 
geopolitical knowledge, and how this interconnection, its ‘complicity in the practices 
of statecraft’ did manifest during the Obama administration in the period observed.11  
As Edkins, Campbell and others have pointed out, from a critical perspective, the 
role of IR scholars as intellectuals does not only extend to their practical involvement 
in international politics, but must also consider the ethical dimension of their 
engagement with discourses of security. 12  From a critical point of view, the 
investigation of dominant sites of knowledge production, such as leading IR journals, 
and discursive producers, such as prominent grand strategy experts, must be self-
aware in the sense that by accepting the construct of leading status, the research at 
the same time reproduces a discursive dominance it aims to investigate.  
 
However, it does so in the attempt to uncover the ‘unacknowledged assumptions 
about an unproblematic reality’ that underlie the epistemological construction of 
these scientific knowledge formations.13 As Derrida wrote in Writing and Difference: 
“We cannot give up this metaphysical complicity without also giving up the critique 
we are directing against this complicity.”14  
 
                                            
11
 Richard Ashley, “The Achievements of Post-Structuralism,” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, 
ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 246.  
12
 Edkins, “Ethics and Practices of Engagement;” David Campbell, “Beyond Choice: The Onto-politics of 
Critique,” International Relations 19, no. 1 (2005): pp. 127-134; Larry N. George, “Pharmacotic War and the 
Ethical Dilemmas of Engagement,” International Relations 19, no. 1 (2005): pp. 115-125. 
13
 Cf., Campbell, “Beyond Choice,” p. 128. A view on alternative formulations of expert knowledge on grand 
strategy that fail to penetrate into the IR mainstream could also serve to further offset this dominance bias in the 
discourse analysis, however this lies outside of the scope of research presented here. In this context, see also 
Biersteker’s emphasis on paying attention to ‘scholars from the peripheries,’ Biersteker, p. 603.   
14
 Quoted in, Edkins, Poststructuralism & international relations, p. 74. 
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Methodologically, the analysis of formal discourse does not employ indexes of 
popularity, as with the analysis of highest grossing films and bestselling books, but 
considers the measure of influence and impact that is being assigned to academic 
research and expert knowledge. Both function as indicators for the discursive 
formation of dominant knowledge as they tie into respective domains of 
power/knowledge in popular and formal discourse.  
 
Here, the IR journal Foreign Affairs stands out as a publication that is consistently 
being regarded as world leading in its field, and as dominant voice in the intellectual 
debate on American grand strategy. This is expressed for example in statistical 
measures, such as the impact factor index of publisher Thompson Reuters, and the 
credentials awarded to the journal by prominent members of the U.S. foreign and 
security policy establishment.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
15
 Impact factors are statistical measures by which research journals are validated based on the number of 
citations of published articles. In a given year, the impact factor of a journal is the average number of citations 
received per paper published in that journal during the two preceding years. The impact factor is then used to 
compare different journals within an academic field, such as International Relations. According to Thomson 
Reuters, its Journal Citation Reports (JCR), which calculate the annual journal impact factors, are the world’s 
most influential resource for evaluating peer-reviewed publications; “Thomson Reuters Research Analytics 
Unveils 2013 Release of Its Journal Citation Reports,” Thompson Reuters, accessed September 17, 2014, 
http://thomsonreuters.com/press-releases/062013/2013-journal-citation-reports; Foreign Affairs regularly 
advertises its elite status with a quote from President Harry S. Truman: “Not all readers are leaders, but all leaders 
are readers.” 
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Fig. 15 Thompson Reuters Journal Citation Reports 2009-2013   
Top 10 International Relations journals ranked by impact factor  
 
 
 
Rank Journal Title Total 
Cites 
Impact 
Factor 
5-Year 
Impact 
Factor 
2009     
1 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 2075 3.243 5.303 
2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2598 3.155 2.869 
3 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 1529 2.468 2.677 
4 WORLD POLITICS 2134 2.114 2.815 
5 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 3465 2 4.4 
6 SPACE POLICY 241 1.707 1.454 
7 BIOSECURITY  BIOTERRORISM 250 1.644 1.519 
8 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 1363 1.625 2.459 
9 J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2410 1.507 3.015 
10 SECURITY DIALOGUE 390 1.49 1.807 
 
2010     
1  INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 3641 3.551 5.059 
2 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 1525 3.444 4.214 
3 WORLD POLITITICS 2011 2.889 3.903 
4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1775 2.557 2.263 
5 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 702 2.194 2.071 
6 MARINE POLICY 1524 2.053 1.961 
7 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2562 1.883 3.165 
8 INT. JOURNAL OF TRANS. JU.S.TICE 139 1.756 1.923 
9 SECURITY DIALOGUE 372 1.6 1.51 
10 INT. STUDIES QUARTERLY 1690 1.523 2.427 
 
2011         
1 WORLD POLITICS 2134 3.025 3.489 
2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 3441 2.98 4.377 
3 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 602 2.422 1.845 
4 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 1557 2.333 3.529 
5 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2426 2.237 2.922 
6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1645 2.034 2.103 
7 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 1522 1.98 2.152 
8 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM 284 1.939 1.504 
9 MARINE POLICY 1741 1.865 1.986 
10 INT. POLITICAL SOCIOLGY 140 1.381 1.663 
 
2012         
1 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 765 3 2.074 
2 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 1729 2.739 3.359 
3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 3968 2.49 4.643 
4 WORLD POLITICS 2159 2.308 3.716 
5 MARINE POLICY 2320 2.23 2.407 
6 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 1782 2.191 2.526 
7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1684 2.09 2.055 
8 NEW POLITICAL ECONONY 427 1.93 1.493 
9 INT. JOURNAL OF TRANS.JU.S.TICE 209 1.791 1.88 
10 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2620 1.701 2.885 
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2013         
1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1839 3.347 2.447 
2 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 1452 2.975 3.010 
3 MARITIME POLICY 3283 2.621 2.948 
4 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 3803 2.600 3.984 
5 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 1907 2.280 2.643 
6 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 506 2.043 1.672 
7 SECURITY DIALOGUE 521 1.952 2.007 
8 NEW POLITICAL ECONONY 450 1.656 1.766 
9 WORLD POLITICS 2252 1.650 3.274 
10 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM 334 1.618 1.532 
 
The impact factor appears as one the ‘instruments that form and accumulate 
knowledge,’ as Foucault described it, embedded in mechanisms of power/knowledge 
and its various networks.16 In short, the impact factor is used as a measure for 
identifying world leading research in IR, and as such it serves as an index for 
mapping the dominant discursive production of academic expertise in the United 
States in regard to American grand strategy and geopolitics. In 2013 for example 
Foreign Affairs had an impact factor of 3.347, ranking it as the most influential 
journal in the field of International Relations. In the four-year period between 2009 
and 2012 the journal was consistently ranked among the top ten IR journals. 
 
The style and structure of articles featured in Foreign Affairs normally follows a 
certain schematic, either treating current policy issues, or historical case studies, 
following a problem-solving approach, where causes are identified and conclusions 
drawn based on a rationalist and materialist analysis of world politics. Constructivist, 
or even critical approaches are rarely present in these discursive sites, and limit the 
possible range of theoretical and methodological perspectives offered, despite the 
self-proclaimed openness and neutrality. Its status as elite publication makes it a 
                                            
16
 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976 (London: 
Macmillan, 2003). p. 32. 
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prime site for investigating dominant definitions of American grand strategy, in the 
context of power/knowledge and the discursive construction of the ‘truth of IR’.17  
 
There exists a discursive cross-over at the highest level of strategy in the realm of 
formal expertise, between hegemony, engagement and restraint that confutes the 
reductionist logic of grand strategy as a unitary, strictly coherent means ends chain. 
Instead of clearly delineated grand strategy discourses that construct a coherent link 
between representations and practices, the majority of formal expertise on American 
grand strategy attempts to reconcile contradictory constructs of geopolitical identity 
and national security, between global leadership and superpower status on the one 
hand, and cooperative partnership and restraint on the other hand. This reflects the 
complexity and multidimensional nature of geopolitical thinking and the 
synchronicity of its various dominant representations that operate in constant 
competition with each other, a fact ignored by the mainstream of grand strategy 
expertise.  
 
Based on the critical analysis of formal discourse provided here, and especially the 
examination of intertextual links between formal expertise, popular imagination and 
political practice, this chapter will introduce a counter-perspective in regard to grand 
strategy thinking, through the concept of hybrid discourses that combine elements of 
at least two distinct basic discourses of grand strategy. Thus, the thesis will introduce 
the concepts of hegemonic engagement and hegemonic restraint as geopolitical 
                                            
17
 Cf. Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), p. 2. Methodologically, this 
chapter analyses articles appearing in the thirty-four issues of Foreign Affairs that were published between 
January/February 2009 and July/August 2014, in Vol. 88 - Vol. 93. The analysis is focused on articles centered 
on issues of U.S. national security, American grand strategy and geopolitics, comparable to the range of content 
featured by the books selected from the New York Times non-fiction bestsellers list, to investigate the co-
constitution of representations of identity and political practice in formal grand strategy discourse. 
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visions prevalent in the realm of academic research and intellectual debate. This also 
further evolves the discourse model of grand strategy that was developed from the 
previous two chapters and the analysis of popular imagination and common sense 
sites of knowledge production.  
 
U.S. grand strategy experts, IR theory and the impact of academic research on 
political practice 
 
As described in the review of research literature, the concept of grand strategy 
originated from a scholarly attempt to analyze the most appropriate use of state 
power towards the goal of national security. Within these parameters it remains a 
powerful intellectual concept and significant academic preoccupation in International 
Relations.18 At Yale University for example, the Bradly-Johnson Program, which 
secured a $17.5 million, fifteen-year endowment in 2006, aims to examine the theory 
and practice of grand strategy, defined as ‘the calculated relation of means to large 
ends.’19 The multitude of research books and journal articles on grand strategy, as 
well as various study programs on strategy, strategic planning and grand strategy, all 
usually with a positivist and rationalist focus of analysis, is testament to the strong 
and ongoing academic presence of grand strategy as specialist form of geopolitical 
expertise and its allure as ‘big picture’ thinking.  
                                            
18
 Study programs in Grand Strategy are currently run by several universities in the United States, notably Yale 
University, Duke University, the University of Texas, Columbia University, and Temple University.  
19
 Cf., “Studies in Grand Strategy.” The Bradly-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy, Spring 2010, January 16, 
2010 Update, Yale University; in the program, the rationalist study of historical and contemporary cases focuses 
on great powers, from the Roman Empire to the United States, and the established pantheon of strategic thinkers, 
ranging from Thucydides to Machiavelli, Clausewitz and the representatives of classical geopolitics like Henry 
Kissinger. The course ends with a crisis simulation exercise where students take on the role of leading national 
security officials, including the President; cf., Thomas Meaney and Stephen Wertheim, “Grand Flattery: The Yale 
Grand Strategy Seminar,” The Nation, May 28, 2012, accessed August 22, 2014, 
http://www.thenation.com/article/167807/grand-flattery-yale-grand-strategy-seminar#.  
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The intellectual outlook hover is at once conservative, reductionist and retrospective. 
As Meaney and Wertheim have observed:  
Yale’s grand strategists openly long for the intellectual certainties they 
associate with the cold war, when the Soviet threat made strategy seem 
indispensable.20  
 
John Lewis Gaddis, a leading conservative historian of the Cold War period, and 
together with Charles Hill and Paul Kennedy one of the teachers of the Yale program 
has explained:    
Grand strategy is endangered […] for in the absence of sufficiently grave 
threats to concentrate our minds, there are insufficient incentives to think in 
these terms.21 
 
Within academia, understood here as the mainstream of IR research in the United 
States, it is mainly a contest of neorealism and liberal institutionalism on the one 
hand, and within neorealism on the other hand that frames the theoretical debate on 
American grand strategy.22 This debate only produces a limited scope of new ideas 
about the American role in world politics, since it is largely confined to examining 
the global leadership of the United States, and how it can be materially sustained 
among shifting geopolitical parameters of military and economic power balances and 
existential threat scenarios. However, this limited positivist-rationalist discourse fails 
to actually fulfill its own promise of coherence and cohesiveness in the formulation 
of grand strategy.  
 
While hegemony, understood as neo-conservative vision of military supremacy and 
unilateral primacy has come under scrutiny with many foreign policy and security 
experts, the idea of global leadership of the United States remains pivotal to the 
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majority of geopolitical thinking in these expert circles. As a consequence, the focus 
of formal discourse has shifted from the ‘unipolar moment’ and the singularity of 
U.S. power to ‘burden sharing’ and cooperation, incorporating elements of 
multilateral engagement within the hegemony leitmotif. In a similar way, proponents 
of retrenchment seek to lower the costs and risks of the United States’ global posture, 
and especially to reduce its military footprint, while maintaining a vision of 
American leadership in the world, a form of hegemonic restraint, or ‘leading from 
behind.’23  
 
Some realists, like Stephen Brooks and Will Wohlforth, partially basing their 
argument in hegemonic stability theory, promote the global leadership of the United 
States as a necessary condition for the functioning of the liberal world order.24 They 
do not perceive America to be in decline or expect an end of structural unipolarity in 
the international system. As a consequence, they propose a grand strategy of 
hegemonic engagement, or what they refer to as ‘deep engagement,’ continuing an 
established trajectory of U.S. global leadership.25  
For more than sixty years, the United States has sought to advance its core 
interests in security, prosperity, and domestic liberty by pursuing three 
overlapping objectives: managing the external environment to reduce […] 
threats to U.S. national security; promoting a liberal economic order to 
expand the global economy […]; and creating, sustaining, and revising the 
global institutional order (…).26 
 
Their expertise on U.S. hegemony most clearly reflects the mainstream in grand 
strategy discourse and is the closest intertextual match of academic research and 
popular imagination, from Michael Bay’s Transformers to Mandelbaum’s and 
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Friedman’s That Used To Be Us. The authors’ advocacy of hegemonic engagement 
also reveals a discursive point of connection between neorealism and liberal 
institutionalism, as the co-authorship of Brooks and Wohlforth with John Ikenberry 
documents. Leading representatives of realism and liberal institutionalism together 
argue against retrenchment, urging America not to ‘come home.’27 At the same time, 
this outspoken belief in the virtue of America’s global leadership also forms a 
cornerstone in the political rhetoric of major officials in the Obama administration, 
as laid out in the pages of Foreign Affairs.  
  
Other prominent realists, such as John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, or Christopher 
Layne are in turn highly critical of America’s global primacy.28 They perceive it as a 
dangerous over-extension of American resources, wasted on policing the world, 
while the United States could be kept safe at far less cost to the American taxpayer 
and the U.S. military. Here, the idea of ‘imperial overstretch,’ developed by Paul 
Kennedy is a major concern in that American decline is the result of global 
aspirations that outstrip diminishing national capabilities and domestic resources.29 
As a consequence, an exclusive concentration on military supremacy and global 
hegemony could undermine the United States and weaken the domestic foundation 
of its power.30  
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Mearsheimer for example identifies ‘global hegemony’ or ‘global dominance’ as a 
misguided grand strategy that has been in place ever since the end of the Cold War, 
and that continues under President Obama, albeit with more liberal-institutionalist 
auspices.31 As Mearsheimer argues:   
The United States needs a new grand strategy. Global dominance is a 
prescription for endless trouble -- especially in its neoconservative variant. 
Unfortunately, the Obama administration is populated from top to bottom 
with liberal imperialists who remain committed to trying to govern the world, 
albeit with less emphasis on big-stick diplomacy and more emphasis on 
working with allies and international institutions.32 
 
Applied to the discursive meta-framework of U.S. grand strategy, Mearsheimer’s 
assessment of ‘neoconservatives’ and ‘liberal imperialists’ attests to the two 
discursive strands of hegemonic primacy and hegemonic engagement respectively.  
Their advocacy of an alternative ‘offshore balancing’ strategy places prominent 
realists like Mearsheimer, Walt and Layne firmly with the restraint discourse.  
 
However, unlike other prominent and even more outspoken critics of American 
primacy such as Andrew Bacevich, Tom Engelhardt, or Chalmers Johnson they do 
not envision a grand strategy of holistic disengagement, or demilitarization. Instead, 
they recommend a managed ‘retrenchment’ of the United States from Europe, Asia 
and the Middle East, while maintaining capable military forces ‘over the horizon.’ 
Macdonald and Parent provide a definition that illustrates how restraint as a realist 
concept is primarily concerned with the preservation of U.S. power, while it 
simultaneously adapts to a relative decline of America’s global position:  
We define ‘retrenchment’ as a policy of retracting grand strategic 
commitments in response to a decline in relative power. Abstractly, this 
means decreasing the overall costs of foreign policy by redistributing 
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resources away from peripheral commitments and toward core 
commitments.33 
 
In the realist view of retrenchment, U.S. military forces are there to act as deterrent, 
and in last consequence as an intervening force should another actor try to establish a 
regional hegemony. Realism’s focus on economic and especially military power as 
key determinant in international relations shapes the geopolitical imagination behind 
this grand strategy. Yet, their theory-based academic expertise also connects with the 
political–practical discourse in the United States. Arthur Krepinevich for example, 
president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) think tank 
envisions a grand strategy that brings ‘diminished resources’ in line with ‘realistic 
objectives.’ He proposes a reorientation of the Pentagon clearly along the lines of 
offshore balancing and retrenchment.34  
 
All the while, it is made clear by realists that strategic reorientation and retrenchment 
is not meant as American disengagement. Mearsheimer and Walt both specifically 
distinguish offshore balancing, from ‘isolationism,’ explaining that:    
Isolationists believe that there is no place outside of the Western Hemisphere 
to which it is worth deploying our troops. But offshore balancers believe 
there are three critical areas that no other hegemon should be allowed to 
dominate: Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia.35  
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Offshore balancing is not isolationism, however, because the United States 
would still be diplomatically engaged in many places and committed to 
intervening in key areas if and when the balance of power broke down.36 
 
The power-centric analysis and geopolitical imagination that assigns regions of 
primary strategic concern to the United Sates documents how offshore balancing in 
fact represents a hybrid discourse of hegemonic restraint. Here, the military posture 
of the United States is reduced, but the determination to maintain its political control 
over geopolitical key areas of the globe remains unchanged.  
 
While trying to avoid the isolationist label, a realist offshore balancing strategy 
contests the neoconservative vision of global primacy as well as liberal 
interventionist goals of humanitarian intervention.37 As such, the interventions of the 
United States in World War 1 and 2 are seen as justified use of U.S. military power, - 
having prevented a German hegemony in Europe and Japanese domination over 
Asia, - but not the civil wars in Libya or Syria. Instead of acting as the ‘world’s 
policeman,’ the United States is to simply prevent any other actor of matching its 
own status as regional hegemon. This purely power calculated grand strategy vision 
does negate any special moral or ethical responsibility for the United States to act on 
behalf of the international system, the United Nations or international law. It 
formulates a decidedly materialist, anti-idealist vision of America’s role in the world.  
The grand strategy visions of neoconservative primacy, or liberal-internationalist 
‘deep engagement,’ both draw heavily on the notion of America’s unique 
exceptionalist, liberal features to argue for its responsibility to lead. This lack of 
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idealism in the realist vision of offshore balancing might explain while it developed 
only limited political traction among Washington decision makers and pundits in in 
the past.38  
 
However, increasingly offshore balancing, or hegemonic restraint seems to have 
crossed over from an academic-centric discourse and point of debate among 
intellectuals to a wider sphere of popular and practical discussion. Walt for example 
points out how ideas of offshore balancing have informed a 2011 op-ed article by 
Thomas Friedman in the New York Times, supporting U.S. withdrawal from both 
Iraq and Afghanistan.39 As documented in the following chapter, members of the 
Republican party’s Tea Party wing and the libertarian Cato institute both promote 
visions of restraint that also reflect some of the realist arguments for offshore 
balancing. Finally, there also seems to be an intertextual connection to the 
Pentagon’s ‘Air-Sea Battle’ concept and the ‘pivot to Asia,’ which deemphasize 
ground combat and forward deployment in favor of more indirect forms of American 
power projection.40   
 
Where offshore balancing is rooted in realist power calculations and confrontational 
scenarios of great power competition, engagement can be traced to the IR theory of 
liberal institutionalism and the tradition of Wilsonian idealism. Here, the focus lies 
on the cooperative potential of the international system, due to commonly shared 
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norms and values and mutually beneficial institutional arrangements.41 Arguing from 
a liberal institutionalist perspective, John Ikenberry for example predicts that the 
liberal world order will endure even with a weakened United States.42 Here, the 
benefits of free trade, open sea-lanes, a rule-based system of international norms, 
institutions and organizations apply to all major and rising powers in the 
international system, and there is no competing ideology or alternative institutional 
design that could rival its prominence and advantages.43  
 
Ikenberry argues against primacy and the exclusive focus on unipolar stability theory 
underlying the hegemony discourse, and doubts the pessimist predictions form 
analysts such as Kagan or Kaplan for the negative effects of shifting power balances. 
In line with Zakaria, he stresses the rise of other states over the decline of the U.S., 
and emphasizes the opportunities of a post-American world. Thus, the United States 
should pursue a grand strategy of engagement, or ‘liberal order building’ that 
acknowledges shifting economic and political parameters in world politics, and seeks 
to maintain a cooperative management of the global institutional framework, while it 
simultaneously restores the standing of the U.S. as a global leader.44 Here, the U.S. 
would ‘renegotiate the bargains and institutions of the past decades but retain its 
position as hegemonic leader.45 This grand strategy vision of hegemonic engagement 
Ikenberry sees as guiding principle behind the Obama administration. 
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A more fundamental shift to a grand strategy vision of engagement that 
deemphasizes the leadership role of the U.S. would alternatively lead to a ‘post-
hegemonic,’ ‘post-American liberal order,’ where ‘the United States exercised less 
command and control of the rules an institutions.’46 Instead, global leadership would 
be exercised through universal institutions and global collective action, between 
institutions such as the UN, and groups like the G-20 that combine established and 
rising powers, such as the U.S., the EU, China and India.47 This falls more in line 
with similar recommendations for a geopolitical vision of partnership building from 
experts such as Brzezinski, Kissinger and Kupchan.48  
 
Engagement and its connection to liberal institutionalism is maybe the strongest 
intertextual link of IR theory-building and American grand strategy practice. The 
emphasis on engagement, cooperative multilateralism and the benefits of the liberal 
world order have long been hallmarks of the way the U.S. role in world politics is 
being described by Washington elites. 49  In fact, these themes have been 
reemphasized under the Obama administration.50  
 
However, this vision of engagement and cooperation is predominantly formulated 
from the assumption that the United States remains the indispensable leader in world 
affairs, rather than becoming just one of many network points in a multipolar system. 
Thus, it reflects a position of hegemonic engagement that actually reemphasizes the 
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standard representation of America’s dominant role in world politics at the center of 
the liberal, international order.  
 
The grand strategy debate in Foreign Affairs  
 
On its website, Foreign Affairs represents its leading expert status as the defining 
feature of its intellectual reputation, placing it in a central position for the analysis of 
formal grand strategy discourse in the context of power/knowledge: “Since its 
founding in 1922, Foreign Affairs has been the leading forum for serious discussion 
of American foreign policy and global affairs.”51 The journal is published by the 
Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), which describes its position as:   
(…) non-partisan, non-profit and nonpartisan membership organization 
dedicated to improving the understanding of U.S. foreign policy and 
international affairs through the free exchange of ideas.52  
 
For over 90 years, Foreign Affairs has generally been considered a prime expert 
publication on U.S. foreign policy, diplomatic relations and world politics. The 
Encyclopedia Britannica for example describes it as ‘one of the most prestigious 
periodicals of its kind in the world.’53 The journal does not only feature examples 
from academic research in IR, usually realist and liberal-institutionalist theory based 
expertise, but frequently represents the views and ideas of prominent political 
practitioners. Active and former Secretaries of State, Ambassadors, U.S. Senators 
and Generals are among those who regularly publish in this prestigious format of 
knowledge production and exchange.  
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Within the genealogy of American grand strategy, this publication also holds special 
significance to ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ due to its historical legacy. It was in the 
pages of Foreign Affairs, where the famous ‘Mr. X’ article was first published in 
1947, which would spell out a grand strategy of ‘containment’ against the Soviet 
Union.54 George F. Kennan, who was later revealed to be Mr. X, and had developed 
the article from his ‘Long Telegram,’ written as deputy chief of the U.S. mission in 
Moscow, is considered to be the embodiment of a grand strategist. His work is seen 
as the ideal example that any successful American grand strategy should aspire to be. 
As Michael Hirsh has remarked:  
The diplomatic world keeps pining away for the next George Kennan, 
someone who might sum up the country’s overall mission in a strategic 
concept as simple as containment.55 
 
In the words of Kennan’s biographer, John Lewis Gaddis, the idea of containment:  
(…) illuminated the path by which the international system found its way 
from the trajectory of self-destruction […] to one that had, by the end of the 
second half, removed the danger of great-power war, revived democracy and 
capitalism, and thereby enhanced the prospects for liberty beyond what they 
ever before had been.56   
 
Remarkably, Kennan himself later denounced the militarization of American Cold 
War policies under containment, and the over-simplification of U.S. foreign and 
security policy into one central slogan. At a meeting in the White House in 1994 he 
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apparently urged President Clinton to convey policy in a “thoughtful paragraph or 
more, rather than trying to come up with a bumper sticker.”57  
 
The almost mythical quality of the Mr. X. article and containment for the discourse 
of American grand strategy was remarkably reiterated when in 2009 a ‘Mr. Y’ article 
was published, titled “A new strategic narrative.” It was later revealed as the work of 
U.S. Navy Captain Wayne Porter and U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Mark "Puck" 
Mykleby, who invoked the image of Kennan to advocate a complete overhaul of 
strategic thinking in Washington. 58 The recantation of Kennan and the plea of Mr. Y 
however have done little to undermine the enthusiasm for grand strategy in academic 
circles in the United States, where under President Obama the adoration for Kennan 
and containment regularly usher in demands for a new ‘bumper sticker’ grand 
strategy. 
 
Rethinking hegemony: The geopolitical imagination of global leadership  
 
In Foreign Affairs, the dominant expert position on U.S. grand strategy by political 
scientists and practitioners reflects a strong bias towards a geopolitical vision of U.S. 
hegemony and global American leadership, based on the country’s superior 
economic and military power. Krepinevich for example directly relates the ‘global 
dominance’ of the United States to the country’s ‘overwhelming advantage in 
technology and resources,’ which gave the American military an unrivalled capacity 
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for global power projection.59 The blow to U.S.-style laissez-faire capitalism through 
the global financial crisis is therefore firstly understood as a weakening of American 
power in the world, most notably vis-à-vis China, which is predicted to gain in global 
importance. 60  In this neo-realist zero-sum perspective of world politics, the 
diminished ability of the United States to provide global leadership, due to domestic 
concerns, from public indebtedness to growing inequality and mounting healthcare 
costs, is directly correlated with a rise in threat levels, from a possible ‘reversal of 
globalization’, to the ‘disintegration of Pakistan.’61  
 
The German political commentator Josef Joffe in contrast doubts American decline 
and sees the United States as the essential ‘liberal empire’ necessary to underwrite 
global stability.62 This worldview, which equalizes U.S. hegemony, globalization and 
global security is deeply entrenched and widely shared. It informs a majority of the 
research and opinions in the widely cited Foreign Affairs articles, just as it underlies 
the premise of Hollywood blockbusters and the geopolitical analysis in major 
bestselling works, from The World America Made to the works by Friedman and 
Kaplan.63 This intertextuality between research articles and popular books, and 
especially in different outlets by the same prominent authors, demonstrates the 
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blurring line between popular imagination and formal expertise in the construction of 
grand strategy discourses. Popularity and scientific reputation seem to reinforce each 
other in forwarding the status of certain ‘experts’ and their expertise on grand 
strategy and geopolitics.  
 
Predominantly, this serves to further strengthen the hegemony consensus on U.S. 
grand strategy, which Posen defines as fundamental agreement over the ‘big picture’: 
“(…) the United States should dominate the world militarily, economically, and 
politically, […] a strategy of liberal hegemony.”64 On the other hand, the Foreign 
Affairs articles by Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of State Clinton, and other 
political and military officials, appearing in a major outlet of academic research and 
intellectual exchange, reveal the close intertextual link between formal expertise and 
the realm of policymaking. Here again, global leadership and military supremacy 
represent the centerpiece in the geopolitical imagination. In the words of then 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates: 
The United States is the strongest and greatest nation on earth (…). The 
power and global reach of its military have been an indispensable contributor 
to world peace and must remain so.65  
 
Hegemony is the lens through which these key officials of the Obama administration 
see the world and America’s role in it. At the same time, the attention given to the 
limits of American power, to ‘burden-sharing’ and ‘responsible stakeholders‘ also 
demonstrates that the grand strategy discourse in the Obama White House has not 
simply reproduced the geopolitical imagination of the ‘unipolar moment’ and the 
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‘indispensable nation,’ which featured so prominently under the Clinton and Bush 
administrations.   
 
In his 2010 Foreign Affairs article Robert Gates for example, referring to the new 
Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review, basically announced an end of large-scale 
ground operations and forced regime change as military tool of U.S. policy. The Iraq 
scenario had become a thing of the past. Instead the United States would focus on 
‘building partner capacity,’ to enable other countries to provide for their own 
security, in order to save American treasury expenditure and the necessity for boots 
on the ground.66 Providing this military assistance effectively and as part of a 
comprehensive approach was described as crucial tool to guarantee America’s 
‘global leadership’ and ‘U.S. security.’67  
 
Yet from an American point of view these security partnerships and alliances are 
perceived as being executed under United States’ stewardship, rather than in full 
partnership with the United States. Published in the very same journal where the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense laid out his vision for cooperative security management, 
George Packard for example described how Gates demanded the implementation of 
an agreement about the Futema Air Base on Okinawa, rather than agreeing to 
renegotiate it, when a new Japanese government under Prime Minister Hatoyama 
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came into office.68 This episode illustrated how in political practice, engagement 
functions within the context of hegemony rather than as an alternative to it.   
 
Echoing Gates, Hillary Clinton centered her 2010 Foreign Affairs article, where she 
argued for developing and strengthening the civilian power of the United States, on 
the problem of American leadership, and how to sustain it among a ‘crucible of 
challenges.’ 69 As she explained in 2010: “My big-picture commitment is to restore 
American leadership (…).”70 Clinton laid out a ‘smart power’ strategy, where 
development and diplomacy are strengthened and operate alongside defense as tools 
of American power and influence.71  
 
As Brooks and Wohlforth have argued, the ‘unipolar moment’ as a strategic 
guideline for the George W. Bush Administration fueled ‘illusions of omnipotence’ 
about the global supremacy of the United States and its ability to dictate the political 
outcomes of military interventions.72 This is largely blamed on the neoconservative 
influence on U.S. foreign and security policy at the time, associated with names such 
as Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and others, and their 
influence with key decision makers from President Bush to Vice-President Dick 
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Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 73  This ignores that the 
neoconservative agenda seems merely like a particularly military power focused and 
unilateral definition of the mainstream consensus on U.S. hegemony, or global 
leadership, which dominates in Washington DC. Only nuances separate Brooks, 
Wohlforth and Ikenberry from the neoconservative Kagan when they describe an 
alternative to American leadership as potentially catastrophic:  
Where American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be 
running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an 
engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.74 
 
From this neorealist-neoliberal perspective, ‘deep engagement,’ is an instrument for 
the better management of U.S. hegemony that ends the neoconservative squander of 
national resources and unnecessary wars of choice. It does not mean the advent of a 
post-American world, or a true multipolar international system. In the words of 
Melvy Leffler: 
The United States' quest for primacy, its desire to lead the world, its 
preference for an open door and free markets, its concern with military 
supremacy, its readiness to act unilaterally when deemed necessary, its 
eclectic merger of interests and values, its sense of indispensability all these 
remained, and remain, unchanged.75 
 
As such, neither the statements of Gates, nor those of Clinton, or Brooks, Ikenberry 
and Wohlforth did represent cooperative engagement as a true novel alternative to 
existing American grand strategy thinking, where leadership would be executed 
globally, in an equal, balanced partnership with others. It merely served as a tool to 
maintain the political, military and economic preeminence of the United States.  
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The renewal of institutional relationships that Brooks and Wohlforth advocated in 
Foreign Affairs represented a clear continuity of a hierarchical structure in the 
international system meant to favor the geopolitical position of the Untied Sates over 
all others. This is also revealed in the way the United States is supposed to convince 
others of the benefits of its leadership: “What constitutes a public good is not always 
straightforward, so the United States needs to persuade others that what it is 
supplying is important.”76  
 
Here again the provision of ‘global goods’ or access to the ‘global commons’ is 
represented as hallmark of American leadership, and one of the key services the 
liberal hegemon supposedly offers to the states of the world. However, if these 
services were objective truths, it seems unclear why the United States would have to 
‘persuade’ others of their value. It rather seems that the ‘global goods’ argument is a 
necessary trope within the U.S.-American context as justification for the global 
military presence and power projection capability of the United States, and thus is 
paramount to the geopolitical vision of hegemony.  
 
The idea that the global commons could be managed jointly, as for example the 
international response to the piracy problem off the coats of Somalia suggests, 
therefore does not enter the hegemony discourse. This absence of multipolarity 
mirrors its construction as the dangerous, volatile Other in Kagan’s unipolar 
argument for world order, or the neo-imperial fantasies of Kaplan and Friedman. In 
the discourse of hegemony, whether in its neoconservative, neorealist, or neoliberal 
version, the absence of ‘American leadership’ means geopolitical volatility and 
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increased security risks, chaos and war, not a possibility for increased cooperation 
and collective security.    
 
In addition, there remains a tendency within the Washington elite of foreign and 
security experts, to construct an ever-increasing plethora of existential threats to the 
United States, from failed states, to cyber warfare, global terrorism, rising powers, 
and regional instability.77 As Zenko and Cohen have argued in their constructivist 
analysis of the construction of threat in the discourse of U.S. national security and 
foreign policy, the hyping of threat guarantees the massive infrastructure of the 
military-industrial and intelligence complexes with their substantial political and 
economic embeddedness.78 The military-industrial-entertainment complex and the 
national security cinema function exemplary within this nexus of existential threat 
projections and Manichean narratives the discourse of hegemony employs. 
 
Engagement between leadership and partnership 
 
The existential necessity of threat discourses notwithstanding, the United States’ 
‘unipolar moment’ and an associated grand strategy of global primacy have come 
under scrutiny with many authors in Foreign Affairs, mostly due to the costly Iraq 
and Afghanistan experiences, and the mounting debt problem and economic 
difficulties of the United States perceived to persist at home. In response to these 
developments and the failure of neoconservative designs for regime change and 
regional transformation in the Middle East, alternative geopolitical visions were 
explored that sought to redefine America’s leadership role toward a more 
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cooperative position in managing international relations and sustaining a liberal 
world order.79  
 
In 2009, Krepinevich for example argued for a reorientation of the Pentagon’s 
military capabilities away from a focus on great power confrontation, towards 
counter-insurgency operations. At the same time he urged the United States ‘to 
attract capable and willing allies.’ 80  Zbigniew Brzezinski remains the most 
outspoken advocate of a liberal vision of cooperative multilateralism. In his 2009 
Foreign Affairs article he severely criticized the ‘unilateralism’ of the George W. 
Bush administration, and thus the vision of American unipolar primacy, and argued 
for a continued and even increased importance of the trans-Atlantic alliance.81 
Within the engagement discourse, the grand strategy of President Obama regularly 
appeared as direct contradiction of the unipolar vision of its predecessor.  
 
To Walter Russell Mead, a multilateral and liberal ‘Wilsonian’ vision informed the 
actions of the Obama administration, which he described as deliberate and calculated 
break with the unilateral and confrontational ‘Jacksonianism’ of President Bush.82 
Brzezinski and Kupchan both characterized the foreign policy of President Obama as 
reversal of Bush, as the former was supposedly guided by a grand strategy of 
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engagement. The ‘reset’ of relationships with Russia, the administration’s efforts for 
nuclear disarmament, the President’s Cairo speech to the Muslim world, and 
renewed negotiations with Iran and North-Korea all served as references to testify to 
this new approach of multilateral cooperation under Obama.83   
 
Here, engagement represents a geostrategic alternative to hegemony rather than an 
auxiliary element that functions to continue America’s global primacy. On China, 
Henry Kissinger, like Brzezinski considered a doyen of grand strategy thinking and 
American geopolitics, similarly envisioned a relationship based on cooperative 
partnership. Arguing from a decidedly realpolitik balance-of-power perspective, and 
as prominent former practitioner, who facilitated the original rapprochement between 
the United States and the People’s Republic, he warned against a confrontational 
grand strategy towards China that would try to replicate containment, based on 
American tendency to over-emphasize ideological differences with non-democratic 
actors.84 As such, he also criticized a hegemonic rhetoric in American politics, which 
defines China as ‘rising power’ with the need to ‘mature’ and behave ‘responsibly.’85  
Anne-Marie Slaughter, head of the U.S. State Department’s policy planning 
operation from 2009 until 2011, likewise envisioned the United States as a 
globalized networking power, concluding that:  
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In the twenty-first century, the United States' exceptional capacity for 
connection, rather than splendid isolation or hegemonic domination, will 
renew its power and restore its global purpose.”86  
 
Again, engagement appears as a distinctive alternative in defining the United States’ 
role in the world. In a similar vein, Joseph Nye Jr., who coined the term ‘soft power,’ 
demanded a new narrative to replace the ‘American century’ and ‘American 
primacy,’ arguing that the United States must develop a ‘smart power’ strategy, a 
term Secretary Clinton adopted for her civilian power concept, combining military 
and economic assets with the attractiveness of its culture and values in order to  
‘exercise power with others as much as power over others.’87 Finally, Leslie Gelb 
concluded that a U.S. foreign policy based in ‘common sense’ must acknowledge 
that:  
(…) mutual indispensability is the fundamental operating principle for power 
in the twenty-first century meaning that the United States is the indispensable 
leader but needs equally indispensable partners to succeed.”88  
 
However, as Gelb demonstrates, there remains an irresolvable contradictory tension 
in geopolitical representations between grand strategy discourses of hegemony and 
engagement, where the singularity of American leadership cannot be reconciled with 
a notion of equivalence towards other powers. While Gelb for example, seemingly 
endorses a vision of engagement as cooperative partnership, he is convinced that 
only the United States, ‘alone among nations can provide the leadership to solve the 
problems that will otherwise engulf the world.’89 Nye likewise sees his smart power 
strategy as a way to avoid American decline. Although he distinguishes between 
absolute American decline as ‘decay’, and relative decline, he does not seem to be 
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willing to accept a multipolar international system, or a post-American future where 
the United States is reduced to the status of primus inter pares.90  
 
American decline, ‘becoming just another great power’ in the words of Gelb, would 
mean that the identity of the United States of a global superpower would be lost. 
America would become ‘a nation barely worth fearing or following.’ 91  This 
representation of the United States as a country, which can only have a meaningful 
existence in world affairs as long as its superior power can elevate it above its allies 
and in its enemies alike, reveals the hegemonic imagination behind much of the 
engagement argument.  
 
Many experts have denounced the ‘unilateralism’, or ‘hubris’ of the Bush 
administration, and the neo-conservative ‘Vulcans,’ and their imperial delusions of 
American primacy.92 Yet it often seems that their idea of engagement only served to 
realize the established hegemony of the United States in a more cost-effective and 
cooperative fashion, not to fundamentally redefine America’s role in world politics.93 
The mantra of America’s global leadership remains sacrosanct and continues to 
dominate the geopolitical imagination in the majority of academic discourse.  
 
Even a modest American decline, as implied in the post-American scenario, was 
therefore deemed unacceptable by many prominent grand strategy experts. In their 
perception, decline and the future outcome of world politics remain almost 
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exclusively dependent on American agency and willpower. This dominant view of 
the United States as a uniquely capable superpower is intractably tied to the formal 
discourse of grand strategy in the United States. A geopolitical vision of hegemony 
represents a consensus shared by neoconservative, unilateral primacists and liberal, 
multilateral institutionalists.  
 
The result is a hybrid discourse of grand strategy as hegemonic engagement, where 
the United States remains the dominant superpower charged with global leadership, 
but where the unilateralism of the neoconservative vision of primacy is replaced with 
a method of multilateral cooperation. A more fundamental reformulation of 
American grand strategy towards a vision of cooperative engagement, as implied for 
example by Brzezinski or Slaughter would therefore have to readjust this dominant 
representation of the United States in world politics. Rather than emphasizing the 
role as ‘sole leader,’ a representation as ‘indispensable partner’ seems more in line 
with a geopolitical vision of engagement, if understood as leadership in partnership 
among equals within a network-based international system.  
 
Leading from behind – The American superpower under restraint 
 
Compared to the numerous proponents of hegemony and engagement, only a small 
minority of experts recommended a clear course of self-limitation and pure military 
self-defense as an inherently better way for the United States to pursue its national 
interests. Here, avoiding costly experiments in forced democracy export, cutting the 
defense budget, and doing away with the necessity for a global military presence of 
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permanent bases was not only seen as the economically sounder option but also the 
more sustainable path in security terms.94  
 
Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald for example have argued that a grand strategy of 
‘prudent retrenchment,’ could reduce the exposure of the United States to ‘potential 
flashpoints,’ encourage U.S. allies to provide more for common defense, and reduce 
enmity toward America. However, they conceded that such a course of action would 
run directly counter against the prevailing consensus on U.S. hegemony, where a 
maximum of global military power is equaled with a maximum of national security 
for the United States.95 Against this entrenched and institutionalized inertia, they saw 
presidential leadership as an essential motor for change.96  
 
This elite consensus however was strongly reconfirmed by the then Undersecretary 
of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy, who also co-founded the influential Centre 
for a New American Security think tank, and the former Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Plans Janine Davidson. Specifically formulated against a ‘misguided’ 
notion of retrenchment they advocated a policy of ‘forward deployment,’ citing the 
standard list of America’s key features of economic and military power and the 
country’s resulting special responsibility for global leadership.  
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The focus was again on the adjustment of U.S. hegemony, while simultaneously 
preserving its continuity among changing geopolitical parameters.97 Here, it is the 
deterrence of potential regional adversaries through the presence of U.S. troops in 
Asia, Europe and the Middle East that is essential for U.S. national security. It is 
noteworthy that the article’s detailed description of measures under the ‘pivot to 
Asia’ that President Obama announced in January 2012 did not mention any 
cooperative measures with China, although the geopolitical realignment of the 
United States to the Asia-Pacific was supposedly not meant to contain the People’s 
Republic.98  
 
In China however, it seems that these assurances were not given much credit, and the 
United States was in turn perceived as a revisionist power, motivated to halt, or at 
least delay China’s rise.99 As Nathan and Scobell pointed out: China has taken a 
special place in the American threat perception, seen as the only actor that could 
represent a credible challenge to U.S. hegemony by a competing great power.100  
 
This characterization of China as potentially expansionist and aggressive power that 
needed to be deterred and possibly contained also seems to drive the so called Air-
Sea battle concept by the Pentagon, which seeks to maintain the U.S. military’s 
supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region.101 The confrontational representation of China 
and the military response under the pivot indeed seem to be at odds with a vision of 
                                            
97
 Michèle Flournoy and Janine Davidson, “Obama’s New Global Posture,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): pp. 
54-63. 
98
 This list includes the U.S. security alliances with Japan and South-Korea, the deployment of U.S. Marines to 
Australia, the stationing of two littoral combat ships in Singapore, and increased military cooperation with 
Vietnam, Thailand, India, or the Philippines, ibid., p. 59. 
99
 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China Sees America,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5 (2012): pp. 32-
47; see also Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy (New York and London: 2011, Norton).  
100
 Ibid.  
101
 Cf., J. Randy Forbes, “America's Pacific Air-Sea Battle Vision,” The Diplomat, March 8, 2012, accessed 
November 20, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2012/03/americas-pacific-air-sea-battle-vision/. 
 208 
geopolitical partnership, as proposed for example by Kissinger or Brzezinski.102 
Indeed they run counter to it, as Ross suggested:  
(…) the administration has also reversed Washington’s longstanding policy 
of engagement with Beijing, turning instead to costly initiatives whose forces 
is disproportionate to the threat from China. 
 
Several authors in Foreign Affairs have subsequently struggled to reconcile a policy 
of cooperative engagement and military preeminence of the U.S. vis-à-vis China. 103  
 
As is the case with the Asian pivot, the emphasis by the defense experts Flournoy 
and Davidson on ‘burden sharing,’ global engagement and rebalancing ultimately 
served argumentatively to sustain the global military supremacy of the United States 
and its worldwide distribution of forces. As such, it is as a perfect example for the 
prevalence of U.S. hegemony in the political-practical discourse of grand strategy, 
especially in the Pentagon and its hostility toward a more radical reformulation of 
America’s role in world politics. A continuity that is well documented in the popular 
geopolitical imagination of military supremacy the Department of Defense sponsors 
through its Hollywood liaison.  
 
Directly contrary to the hopes of Parent and Macdonald to act for Obama as an agent 
of change, Flournoy and Davidson called on the U.S. President to largely maintain 
the status quo: “(…) the president must resist calls for retrenchment and continue to 
champion the United States’ unique and leadership role in the world.”104 Meanwhile, 
the meandering representation of China in the American geopolitical imagination, 
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between potential threat and possible partner demonstrated the frequent fluctuating 
between hegemony and engagement in the grand strategy discourse under Obama. 
On China, the United States remains ‘two-faced.’105 
 
The hegemony discourse is fundamentally tied to the imagination of the U.S. as a 
superpower and global leader facing multiple and serious dangers to its security. The 
grand strategy discourse of restraint relies in turn on a geopolitical representation of 
the world, where a smaller role of the United States, and especially less U.S. military 
power does not equal a rise in existential threat to the country. In the words of Zenko 
and Cohen: “In an era of relative peace and security, the U.S. military should not be 
the primary prism through which the country sees the world.”106 In fact, the restraint 
discourse argues that a more limited international role and military power would 
likely make the United States safer. Concluding his critical appraisal of the Asian 
pivot, Ross stated: “As China rises, a policy of restraint rather than alarmism, will 
best serve U.S. national security.”107 This argument for a less threat centered and 
military primacy focused grand strategy connects intertextually directly with the 
arguments popularized for example by Andre Bacevich or Rachel Maddow in their 
respective bestsellers that call for American restraint and strategic reorientation. 
 
Michael Mandelbaum’s critical review essay in Foreign Affairs of three books that 
all argue for less American commitment and military involvement in world affairs 
questioned this argument. He doubted that other governments would compensate the 
loss of American power. As a result of restraint Mandelbaum, a supporter of 
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American hegemony, argued that: “(…) the world is all too likely to become both 
more disorderly and less prosperous.108 While conceding that retrenchment and 
restraint would dominate American foreign and security policy in far greater detail 
than in the past, this was the result of economic realities that would diminish the 
material base of U.S. power projection capabilities: “The principal cause will be the 
fiscal condition of the United States.” 109 Restraint, in others words, was not due to a 
new geopolitical vision of prudence and caution that had taken root among the 
Washington elite, but because the American superpower had run out of money. 
 
Even the well-argued and detailed grand strategy program of Parent and Macdonald 
to align the economic and military resources of the United States with a perceived 
slow and relative decline remained committed to the central idea of U.S. leadership, 
and how to renew its legitimacy.110  Similar to the hegemonic engagement discourse, 
in much of the restraint discourse the key representation of geopolitical identity of 
the United States was the idea of America as leader. For Zemko and Cohen it serves 
as key feature in the geopolitical imagination of the United States: “American 
leadership must be commensurate with U.S. interests and nature of the challenges 
facing the country.”111  
 
Much of the restraint discourse tries to reconcile a reduction and reorientation of 
American power with an elevated role of the United States in world affairs. Thus, we 
encounter another hybrid discourse of hegemonic restraint; or what would become 
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known in the Libya intervention as ‘leading from behind.’112 However, as with the 
paring of hegemony and engagement, the reformulation of grand strategy practice 
without a more fundamental reassessment and reframing of American geopolitical 
identity seems to run counter to the dominant rationalist understanding of grand 
strategy. It did not holistically provide a coherent vision in a strategic context. 
Instead, it produced somewhat of a mismatch between the self-identification of the 
country and the political-strategic course of actions it was supposed to follow. 
 
This tension between contradictory geopolitical representations in the expert 
discourse of American grand strategy, between hegemony, engagement and restraint, 
unipolarity and decline, superpower status and post-American world, reveals that far 
from ideal type cases, there exist many hyphenated forms of grand strategy visions. 
Elements of two or even three distinctive basic discourses can enter the formulation 
of geopolitical imagination and political practice in parallel and contend with each 
other.  
 
Daniel Drezner developed a similar argumentation, when his 2011 article in Foreign 
Affairs characterized two grand strategies of the Obama administration: First, 
‘multilateral retrenchment,’ well articulated but unsuccessful, and then a more 
assertive ‘counter-punching,’ seen as poorly articulated but performing better.113 
Here, a prominent expert analysis on U.S. grand strategy indicated that ideas of 
engagement, restraint, and hegemony simultaneously influence geopolitical thinking 
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and strategic practice under President Obama. There is not one single dominant 
geopolitical vision: “The tone has been neither that of American triumphalism and 
exceptionalism nor one of American decline.”114 
 
As Drezner pointed out, the result can be that grand strategy seems ‘poorly 
articulated’ and does not meet the expectations for delivering a convincing rationale 
for the administration’s behavior.115 For Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon from the 
Washington based Brookings Institution, Obama in his first term, has not yet 
‘developed a clear strategy’ for the readjustment of America’s role in a changing 
global order.116 However, such assessments are based on the rationalist-positivist 
interpretation of grand strategy dominant in mainstream IR in the United States, 
which demands that simplicity and reductionist logic are imposed over the 
complexity of world politics through stringent narratives and coherent equations of 
means and ends. These self-declared acolytes of Kennan, fixated on the legacy of 
containment, are mostly unable to allow for complexity, nuance and 
multidimensionality in the analysis of grand strategy.   
 
Conclusion 
 
From an analysis of the debate in Foreign Affairs it is apparent that the expert 
discourse on American grand strategy under Obama has been dominated by a 
discussion of America’s global leadership, and the necessary conditions to sustain it 
among shifting geopolitical and domestic parameters. This corresponds with the 
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dominant position of U.S. hegemony in the common sense realm of cinematic 
imagination, where America’s military heroes have to save the world on a regular 
basis, as well as with the majority of bestselling books on national security and 
geopolitics that envisioned the United States as the indispensable center of world 
politics.  
 
From the analysis of expert discourse provided here, it seems that within the context 
of IR meta-theory the main competition for scientifically informing American grand 
strategy remains a contest of liberal-institutionalism versus neorealism, between 
engagement and offshore balancing, each seeking to reframe American hegemony 
for the future, not to replace it with an altogether different geopolitical vision. This 
intellectual exchange on the appropriate management of U.S. hegemony and world 
order continues an academic debate between realists and liberals that has dominated 
the field of International Relations and the political imagination of foreign affairs 
since its inception. And while engagement may have had a greater impact on 
political rhetoric so far, it seems that the realist argument for retrenchment has 
gained prominence.  
 
However, so far neither perspective appears to have been altogether dominant in 
shaping strategic thinking under the Obama administration, frustrating academic 
preferences for clear rationalist explanatory models and coherent arguments. The 
academic discourse has also largely failed to deliver a more holistic and 
comprehensive reformulation of American grand strategy that not only suggests 
political-practical course corrections, but a more fundamental and deep reaching 
reorientation of geopolitical identity of the United States as a whole. 
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As such, in largely staying with the status quo definition of America’s role in the 
world and the prevailing hegemony consensus, both realism and liberal 
institutionalism are in fact far closer to each other than their obvious differences in 
theoretical dispositions on strategic expertise would let the causal observer believe. 
Considering the majority of mainstream academic expertise, it seems that hegemony 
is still the only game in town.  
 
From a close textual analysis of expert discourse and its production of dominant 
knowledge in IR it becomes clear that the positivist-rationalist expectations for the 
formulation of grand strategy as coherent, consistent world view, aligning resources 
and goals in a logical chain of means and ends are not being fulfilled. By focusing on 
the function of discourse in producing the knowledge of grand strategy, and the key 
component of identity, this chapter has revealed that dominant visions of America’s 
role and position in the world, discussed at the center of IR expertise, have produced 
a mismatch between representations of identity and political practice, simultaneously 
operating with contradictory representations of leadership and partnership on the one 
hand, and leadership and restraint on the other hand.  
 
This has produced hybrid grand strategy discourses of hegemonic engagement, 
described as ‘deep engagement’ or ‘hegemonic liberal order’, and hegemonic 
restraint, or ‘offshore balancing.’ While still assuming America’s global leadership 
as key feature of world politics the practical recommendations for partnership 
building and burden sharing, or geopolitical retrenchment and military downsizing 
run counter to the hegemonic imagination of the United States as dominant economic 
and military superpower, American exceptionalism, and the special responsibility of 
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the United States for maintaining world order. At the same time, the continued 
reliance on this hegemonic representation of the United States stands in the way of a 
more fundamental geopolitical reorientation of the country, either as prominent node 
in a global network of equally responsible, cooperative partners, or a more limited, 
globally less exposed power that is focused on domestic renewal and military self-
defense.   
 
This production of mixed messages concerning U.S. grand strategy seems to animate 
the criticism of experts concerning the unclear geostrategic positioning of the Obama 
administration.  Their own formal expertise however, contributes to exactly this state 
of affairs. The contradictory impulses in U.S. grand strategy discourse do not signal 
the absence of strategic thinking under the Obama administration then. Instead, they 
reveal the existence of a fixed matrix of ideas, which operate in constant competition 
with each other in trying to shape the geopolitical imagination. It is this 
synchronicity and tension that marks contemporary U.S. grand strategy discourses. 
This follows from the logic of grand strategy as power/knowledge and the way 
power operates across and within discourses. As Foucault has remarked “(…) there 
can exist different and contradictory discourses within the same strategy (…).”117 
The formal discourse of U.S. grand strategy in IR remarkably demonstrates this 
fluidity and multiplicity of the geopolitical imagination during the Obama 
administration.  
  
                                            
117
 Quoted in Edkins, Poststructuralism & international relations, p. 54.  
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5. The Washington consensus: Think tanks, national security experts and 
American grand strategy in the public policy debate  
 
One striking feature of foreign policy discussions in the United States is the 
widespread assumption that this country is the ‘indispensable nation’ in the 
international system.1 – Ted Galen Carpenter 
 
America’s preferred role in the world, the pursuit of the national interest, and the 
appropriate use of U.S. power are the themes that animate the public policy debate 
on grand strategy. Here, think tanks form a ‘specialized community of security 
intellectuals’ that analyze, comment and recommend strategy, in order to ‘help 
policy makers see how the pieces fit together.’2 Their aim is to formulate a course 
that ’over several decades and multiple administrations’ can align means and ends, 
domestic and foreign policies, and global and regional issues, to bring about a world 
‘that is most conducive to American interests.’ 3  Unlike IR scholars with a 
predominantly academic interest in debate and intellectual exchange, their formal 
research and advice is decidedly policy oriented, motivated by the ambition to 
‘capture the political imagination’ of policy makers and the public.4 
 
In the previous chapter, the critical analysis of the expert debate in Foreign Affairs 
has revealed how the paradigm of American leadership constitutes the key element 
of geopolitical imagination within formal grand strategy discourse. The hegemonic 
identity of the United States represents a discursive fixture that supersedes the meta-
theoretical divide among neoliberal and neorealist IR scholars and overlays concepts 
                                            
1
 Ted Galen Carpenter, “Delusions of Indispensability.” The National Interest, no. 124 (March/April 2013): p. 47. 
2
 Ó Tuathail and Agnew, “Geopolitics and discourse”, p. 193; Richard Fontaine and Kirstin M. Lord, 
“Introduction: Debating America’s Future,” in America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration, p. 6. 
3
 Brimley and Flournoy, “Introduction,” in Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy, p. 6. 
4
 Cf., Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination: Think tanks and the policy process (New York: 
Psychology Press, 1996). Stone defines think tanks as epistemic communities, ‘made up of a network of 
specialists […] who share a common worldview and seek to translate their beliefs into public policies and 
programs;’ ibid., p. 3.   
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of restraint and engagement among policymakers and strategy experts, such as ‘deep 
engagement,’ or ‘offshore balancing.’ Thus, hegemony, as the dominant 
representation of a leading role of the United States in the international system, based 
on superior economic and military power becomes an institutionalized grand strategy 
discourse. It is co-produced as expert knowledge through the authoritative voice of 
academic research, and the reputation for excellence and influence, associated with a 
publication such as Foreign Affairs as an elite medium of intellectual exchange. 
 
This chapter will now build on this investigation of expert discourse, and analyze the 
work of several influential think tanks in the United States, thus further examining 
the formulation of grand strategy discourses as expert knowledge, and in particular 
how research expertise is applied to practical issues of national security and foreign 
policy. The think tank scene is a fixture of political life in Washington and central 
element in policy debates surrounding a wide range of topics from economics and 
health care to foreign policy and national security. The individual think tanks, set up 
as independent, non-profit organizations for political research, analysis and advice, 
offer professional expertise in a wide range of formats: They publish books, research 
papers, policy briefs, media articles and press releases, organize workshops, talks 
and conferences, provide policy experts for media enquiries or Congressional 
hearings, and engage in professional networking with government, businesses and 
political parties. Some think tanks are decidedly bi-partisan organizations, others 
pursue a clear ideological agenda. Their common goal however, is to influence 
policymakers, to inform the public debate, and to have an impact on the political 
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agenda setting in Washington.5 As James McGann put it in his study on think tanks 
and policy advice in the U.S., their primary function is to: “(…) help government 
understand and make informed choices about issues of domestic and international 
concern (…).”6 In this role they identify, articulate and promote policy issues, build 
networks, provide personnel and function as forums of intellectual exchange.  
 
Stuart Croft has remarked that think tanks are: “(…) repositories of self-defined 
knowledge, […] and that knowledge is framed by particular political and thereby 
discursive practices.”7  The majority of leading think tanks in Washington adheres to 
the central paradigm of American hegemony and the indispensability of a leading 
U.S. role in world politics in their research. This has considerable practical policy 
implications for the formulation of U.S. grand strategy and the question of continuity 
and change in the way the United States organizes its national security and foreign 
policy.8 This ‘Washington consensus’ of policy research and analysis further anchors 
and solidifies the geopolitical imagination of military preeminence and global 
leadership that the thesis has previously identified in the realm of popular 
imagination and formal expertise, and embeds it firmly at the heart of political 
discourse. 
 
                                            
5
 For an in-depth analysis of the role of think tanks and policy experts in American public policy, see in particular 
Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination and Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of 
Expertise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
6
 James G. McGann, Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the U.S. (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 
2005), p. 3. 
7
 Croft, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror, p. 235  
8
 See in this context also Michael J. Mazarr, “The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency,” The Washington 
Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2012): pp. 7-22. Mazarr refers to the ‘consensus of conventional wisdom’ on U.S. grand 
strategy as an impediment for envisioning and enacting change in policy; Carpenter likewise observes that ‘only a 
handful iconoclasts in the foreign-policy community’ would dare to question the ‘conventional wisdom’ that the 
United States is and must be the ‘indispensable nation’ in the international system, Carpenter, “Delusions of 
Indispensability”, p. 47. 
 219 
Critically investigating the intellectual output and research produced by this elite 
network that forms an integral part of the American foreign policy establishment 
reveals that the Washington think tank scene, for the most part, does not actually 
engage in an open-ended debate about American grand strategy, or a true exchange 
of ideas regarding what the role of the U.S. in the world should be. Despite the 
numerously stated self-descriptions as impartial, neutral, or bi-partisan, and the 
supposedly strict adherence to scientific rationality and pragmatism in formulating 
their policy advise, the expert discourse on grand strategy largely takes place within 
a black box of limited imagination and acceptable mainstream opinion.  
 
From the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute, to the bi-partisan think 
tanks of the Brookings Institution and the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, to the Center for a New American Security, and the progressive Center for 
American Progress, the necessity and desirability of American leadership in world 
affairs is not in question. Rather than discussing alternatives of grand strategy, there 
is a limited debate about the better management of U.S. hegemony. This becomes 
remarkably obvious, when the one true outlier to this consensus, the libertarian Cato 
Institute and its preference for a grand strategy of restraint and retrenchment, gets 
branded as ‘isolationist,’ and thus put outside the boundaries of acceptable policy 
discourse. Thus, the Washington think tank scene appears less as forum for the open 
exchange of ideas, and more like an element of the military-intellectual-complex that 
co-produces the geopolitical imagination of political leadership and military 
preeminence as expert knowledge; similar in the way the military-entertainment-
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industry liaison produces this vision as product of popular culture and common sense 
reference.9   
 
An important element of the political role of think tanks is the ‘rotating door’ 
principle. Part of the policy impact of think tanks stems form the fact that their 
individual experts have spent time as part of a presidential administration, offering 
valuable personal connections and practical experience, or will re-enter government 
at a later point, which allows them to transfer their knowledge and research expertise 
into their government functions. As Shawn Brimley, currently executive vice 
president and director of studies at the influential Centre for a New American 
Security, and former member of the National Security Council staff in the Obama 
White House has pointed out in an interview with the author: There is no single 
agency, or central, bureaucratic planning process politically responsible for grand 
strategy in Washington. Frequently however, individuals use their position in a think 
tank to develop ideas and engage in strategic thinking, and then try to translate their 
expertise into actual policies, when they hold government offices.10     
     
Methodologically, this chapter will concentrate on the work on foreign policy and 
national security of several high-ranking think tanks. These think tanks have been 
selected to provide the greatest possible range of political views on grand strategy. 
                                            
9
 In this context it is noteworthy that U.S. weapons manufacturers, such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, or 
Raytheon also count among the major donors of several influential think tanks investigated here, such as CNAS 
or CSIS, cf. Bryan Bender, “Many D.C. think tanks now players in partisan wars,” The Boston Globe, August 11, 
2013, accessed April 11, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/08/10/brain-trust-for-sale-the-
growing-footprint-washington-think-tank-industrial-complex/7ZifHfrLPlbz0bSeVOZHdI/story.html; Christopher 
A. Preble, “The Revolving Door, Think Tanks and the MIC,” The National Interest, December 29, 2010, 
accessed April 11, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-revolving-door-think-tanks-the-mic-
4646.   
10
 Shawn Brimley, interview by Georg Löfflmann, June 15, 2013.  
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At the same time, they are considered to have the greatest impact on public policy.11 
From the 2012 Global Go To Think Tanks Report and Policy Advise, six think tanks 
have been selected, each one is considered to be the top listed think tank in the 
respective category of conservative, libertarian, centrist and progressive, pertaining 
to their basic political orientation and ideological foundation.12  In the centrist 
category there is a further sub-division of center-right, centrist and center-left.  
 
Fig. 16 List of Think Tanks   
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) No. 7 Conservative 
Cato Institute No. 10 Libertarian 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) No. 4 Center-Right 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) No. 3 Centrist 
Brookings Institution No. 1 Center-Left 
Center for American Progress (CAP) No. 11 Progressive 
 
In addition, the Center for a New American Security has been selected for study in 
this chapter.13 CNAS has enjoyed a particular close connection to the Obama 
administration. Several leading members of this think tank have occupied high-
ranking policy positions for diplomacy and defense in the first Obama 
administration, and frequently media reports have remarked on CNAS’s influential 
position on policy making.14 
 
                                            
11
 The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the University of Pennsylvania ranks the top 55 
think tanks in the United States based on an annual global peer and expert survey of over 1950 scholars, 
policymakers, journalists, and regional and subject area experts. As the report states: “The Rankings’ primary 
objective is to recognize some of the world’s leading public policy think tanks and highlight the notable 
contributions these institutions are making to governments and civil societies worldwide.” James McGann, 2012 
Global Go To Think Tanks Report and Policy Advise (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2012), p. 11. 
12
 Cf., McGann, Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the U.S., p. 11-13; see also, Rich, pp. 18-20.   
13
 Although a relatively new think tank with just 30 employees, and only operating since 2007, it is considered 
one of the top ranking think tanks in the United States, specifically dealing with issues of national security (no. 
14). 
14
 See for example, Yochi J. Draezen, “Obama Dips Into Think Tank for Talent,” The Wall Street Journal, 
November 17, 2008, accessed February 6, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122688537606232319; 
Carlos Lozada, “Setting Priorities for the Afghan War,” The Washington Post, June 7, 2009, accessed February 5, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/05/AR2009060501967.html.  
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Together these think tanks, covering a wide range of political perspectives and 
ideological convictions have developed a significant body of work on U.S. national 
security and foreign policy, and continue to centrally inform and influence the 
political debate in Washington. In its analysis the thesis will concentrate on two 
policy issues in particular that were prominent in the expert debate about the future 
role of the United States in world politics: sequestration and the Asian pivot. These 
two issues were of special significance not only because they occupied a central 
place in the context of national security and foreign policy under President Obama, 
but also because they were consistently framed as fundamental long-term challenges 
to the global role of the United States and the definition of its overarching grand 
strategy for the 21st century.15 As the chapter will demonstrate, far from a clash of 
ideas about America’s role in the world, the majority of think tanks agree on a 
fundamental truth about the country’s indispensable leadership, perpetuating not 
challenging conventional wisdom, and co-producing it as expert knowledge and 
pragmatic policy advise.  
 
Examining the policy research and expertise of these leading think tanks further 
underlines the centrality of the geopolitical imagination of global leadership in the 
formal discourse of grand strategy that had already emerged from the pages of 
Foreign Affairs and the mainstream discourse of IR scholarship. At the same time its 
central position among policy experts corresponds with its dominant presence in 
popular culture and common sense knowledge, and further reveals how the 
                                            
15
 In a study on U.S. force structure in Asia for the Pentagon, the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) for example concluded that: “The repositioning of forces in the region has strategic consequences that will 
shape the trajectory of the next three decades.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S. Force Posture 
Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2012), p. 3. 
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intertextual production and co-constitution of geopolitical imagination establishes 
discourses of grand strategy as firmly entrenched worldview. 
 
Budget hawks versus defense hawks: Grand strategy under sequestration and the 
debate on the Right 
 
The American Enterprise Institute (AEI), founded in 1943, is a leading conservative 
think tank with close links to the Republican Party. AEI enjoyed special prominence 
under the George W. Bush administration, where several of its members occupied 
important positions.16 In 2003, commemorating the prominent neoconservative and 
AEI senior fellow Irving Kristol, President Bush commended the institute for having 
‘some of the finest minds in our nation.’ He added that: “You do such good work 
that my administration has borrowed 20 such minds."17 
 
This political and ideological proximity to the Republican Party continued under the 
Obama administration, manifest for example when AEI along with the Heritage 
Foundation co-hosted the Republican primary debate on national security on 22 
November 2011. Republican Representative and vice-presidential candidate of 2012, 
Paul Ryan called the think tank ‘one of the beachheads of the modern conservative 
movement.’18 AEI also continues to be an intellectual home for several prominent 
neoconservatives, such as Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, or Richard Perle, which 
were all signatories of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) that was 
                                            
16
 These include: John R. Bolton, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs 
(2001–2005) and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (2005–2006); Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense 
Policy Board Advisory Committee (2001–2003); Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense (2001–2005) and 
10th President of the World Bank (2005-2007), and John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General (2001-2003). 
17
 Quoted in Michael Flynn, “The War Hawks,” The Chicago Tribune, April 13, 2003, accessed January 21, 
2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-04-13/news/0304130427_1_iraq-william-kristol-benevolent-
hegemony. 
18
 American Enterprise Institute, Annual Report (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2012), 12. 
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closely associated with AEI and strongly advocated a grand strategy of American 
primacy.19  
 
Central to this geopolitical vision of ‘benevolent global hegemony’ and ‘strategic 
and ideological predominance’ is the emphasis of a unipolar world order, with the 
United States as its undisputed leader, outspoken support for large defense budgets to 
perpetuate America’s technological and military supremacy, a distrust of 
international organizations and multilateral institutions for infringing on American 
sovereignty, and a strong ideological conviction in the moral righteousness and 
superiority of American values of freedom, liberty and democracy. 20  This 
neoconservative vision of American primacy, and especially the strategic emphasis 
to act unilaterally and preemptively when U.S. national security seems threatened, 
would centrally inform the so-called ‘Bush-doctrine.’21 The experts of AEI, PNAC 
and other conservative think tanks were also major voices in promoting and in fact 
co-producing the political discourse of the global ‘war on terror’ in response to the 
events of 9/11.22 
 
Under the Obama presidency, AEI continued to promote a grand strategy of 
American primacy, including support for large defense budgets, unilateral 
assertiveness and military interventions for regime change. This was despite the 
heavy criticism the costly Iraq and Afghanistan experiences have produced on the 
political stage, in academic circles, and the media against this neo-imperial vision of 
                                            
19
 Cf., “Project for the New American Century,” IPS Right Web, accessed January 21, 2014, 
http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/project_for_the_new_american_century.  
20
 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “Statement of Principles,” Project for the New American Century, June 3, 
1997, accessed January 21, 2014, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070810113753/www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm. 
21
 Cf., Krauthammer, “The Bush Doctrine,” p. 42. 
22
 See Croft, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror, pp. 235-239.   
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American global power projection and unrestricted hegemony. From the texts of 
Brzezinski to Mearsheimer and Maddow, various reformulations of American grand 
strategy under the auspices of engagement and restraint have been published in 
popular and formal discourse, uniting former political practitioners, conservative IR 
scholars and liberal political commentators in their criticism of neoconservative 
geopolitics. They all stressed the limits of U.S. power over the geopolitical 
imagination of American exceptionalism and military-technological supremacy.  
 
Yet, as explained in the last chapter, for the most part this critical attitude towards 
American primacy did not result in abandoning the belief in the virtues of the global 
leadership of the United States, or lead to the replacement of hegemony with an 
alternate grand strategy imagination altogether. It is rather that the neoconservative 
vision of American primacy, as one particular unilateral and military power centric 
articulation of hegemony has fallen out of favor with most prominent discursive 
producers.  
 
Politically, this contestation of primacy is no longer limited to the liberal end of the 
spectrum. In fact, increasingly there seems to be a split on the American Right 
concerning the preferred role and position of the United States in world politics that 
manifests itself in diverging grand strategy discourses.23 The libertarian Tea Party 
movement, which gained prominence after 2009, is based on a strong ideological 
platform of limited government, tax cuts and fiscal austerity.24 This has come into 
                                            
23
 Cf., Charles Krauthammer, “How fractured is the GOP?,” The Washington Post, August 1, 2013, accessed 
January 21, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-how-fractured-is-the-
gop/2013/08/01/6fd6f816-fada-11e2-9bde-7ddaa186b751_story.html. Krauthammer speaks in this context of a 
conflict between ‘isolationist’ and ‘internationalist’ tendencies in the Republican Party. 
24
 See Ben McGrath, “The Movement,” The New Yorker, February 1, 2010, accessed February 6, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/02/01/100201fa_fact_mcgrath?currentPage=all; Anthony DiMaggio, 
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conflict with political demands of traditional conservatives for continued large-scale 
defense budgets of the kind that were introduced after 9/11. Here, the budget hawks 
of the Tea Party and the libertarian Cato Institute stand against the defense hawks of 
the Republican establishment and neoconservative think tanks such as AEI.  
 
In the context of grand strategy, this political confrontation manifested itself in 
competing visions of primacy and restraint, where conservative and libertarian think 
tanks have formulated fundamentally contrary policy recommendations for national 
security and American leadership in global affairs. Here, AEI maintained a very 
consistent and coherent link between its representation of the geopolitical identity of 
the United States as indispensable military superpower and its policy 
recommendations. For example, in 2012 AEI published a policy brief, arguing 
against mandatory budget cuts, to be implemented as a result of the Budget Control 
Act of 2011.25  
 
Known as ‘sequestration,’ these across-the-board cuts in projected federal 
discretionary spending would amount to $1.2 trillion over ten years, in the period of 
2013-2021, distributed evenly between defense and non-defense related 
expenditures.26 This would mean a cut of $487 billion from the defense budget for 
this period.27 In addition to cuts already implemented through the 2011 Budget 
Control Act, sequestration would ultimately result in cuts of almost $1 trillion to the 
projected U.S. defense budget.  
                                                                                                                           
The Rise of the Tea Party: Political Discontent and Corporate Media in the Age of Obama (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 2011).   
25
 American Enterprise Institute, Defense Spending 101 (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2012).  
26
 Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Impact of Automatic Budget Enforcement Procedures Specified in the 
Budget Control Act (Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2011).  
27
 U.S. Department of Defense, Overview – FY 2013 Defense Budget (Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2012). 
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These automatic cuts were ultimately put into effect after the failure of the 
Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction to find a compromise 
between Democrats and Republicans on fiscal spending reduction in late 2012, and 
are likely to remain in place for the coming years, occupying center stage in the 
political debate on national security and defense in Washington.28 According to AEI: 
“(…) U.S. spending on national defense has given our country a military 
preeminence that, in turn, has yielded enormous strategic returns.”29  
 
The policy issue of federal defense spending would be directly related to a grand 
strategy vision of American primacy and the ability to “(…) maintain a military 
capable of keeping the great powers of the world at peace.”30 AEI identifies a 
continuity of American hegemony ‘from the Cold War to the post-9/11 world’ and a 
rationale of maintaining a liberal world order that directly matches the identical 
correlation of U.S. military supremacy and world peace Kagan, Brooks and 
Wohlforth, and others have constructed in popular and formal grand strategy 
discourses. Kagan for example explains how: 
(…) the large gap in power between the United States and the other great 
powers tends to dampen natural competitive rivalries and deters attempts to 
establish regional hegemonies.31  
 
                                            
28
 Cf., Mackenzie Eaglen, “The sequester is here to stay - now the military needs to get to work,” Fox News, May 
8, 2013, accessed February 6, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/05/08/sequester-is-here-to-stay-now-
military-needs-to-get-to-work/. In December 2013, a bipartisan budget deal was struck by House Budget 
Committee Chairman Paul Ryan (R) and Senate Budget Committee Chairwoman Patty Murray (D) on ‘sequester 
relief,’ erasing  $63 billion in across-the-board spending cuts for the federal budget in 2014 and 2015 ($31.5 
billion for the Pentagon), cf. John T. Bennett, “Senate OKs Sequester-Relief Budget Plan,” Defense News, 
December 18, 2013, accessed February 6, 2014, 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131218/DEFREG02/312180031/Senate-OKs-Sequester-Relief-Budget-
Plan; however overall sequestration levels were kept in place, extended to 2023, cf., Congressional Budget 
Office, Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2013). 
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 American Enterprise Institute, Defense Spending 101, p. 5. These ‘strategic returns’ are detailed as: Protecting 
the security and prosperity of the United States and its allies; amplifying America’s diplomatic and economic 
leadership throughout the globe; preventing the outbreak of great-power wars that marked previous centuries; 
preserving the international order in the face of aggressive, illiberal threats. Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Kagan, World America Made, p. 51.  
 228 
For Brooks and Wohlforth, ‘the United States remains the sole superpower today’ 
and thus: “No other state has any claim to leadership commensurate with 
Washington’s.”32 This line of argumentation that establishes a causal link between 
the preeminence of U.S. military power and America’s global leadership role, and 
the existence of a liberal world order marked by peace, prosperity and freedom is a 
cross-discursive fixture of geopolitical imagination. It runs from The World America 
Made and That Used To Be Us through the majority of grand strategy articles in 
Foreign Affairs, and it finds its echoes in the cinematic displays of America’s 
military heroes saving the world, from Captain America to the Navy SEALs in Act of 
Valor.  
 
It also constitutes a conservative consensus on national security and geopolitics, as a 
joint paper by AEI, the Heritage Foundation and the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) 
documents, titled: Defending Defense: Defense Spending, the Super Committee and 
the Price of Greatness.33 Remarkably, the report closes with a quote from Winston 
Churchill: “The people of the United States cannot escape world responsibility.”34 
This invocation of the historical narrative of the American involvement in World 
War 2 as necessary, morally righteous and victorious directly underwrites the 
geopolitical imagination of primacy and the political case for continued and even 
increased defense expenditures. Any deviation from this grand strategy, even a 
modest reduction in America’s global military posture, such as sequestration implies, 
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 Brooks and Wohlforth, “Reshaping the World Order,” p. 55 and p. 58 
33
 The Foreign Policy Initiative, American Enterprise Institute, and The Heritage Foundation, Defending Defense: 
Defense Spending, the Super Committee and the Price of Greatness (Washington DC: Foreign Policy Initiative, 
American Enterprise Institute, and The Heritage Foundation, 2011). 
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 Ibid., p. 9. 
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is in turn cast in the negative light of isolationism and a dangerous and irresponsible 
disengagement of the United States from world affairs.  
 
The clear representation of China as potential threat that could undermine the 
stability in East Asia in AEI’s geopolitical risk analysis likewise follows this logic. 
Checking and deterring a rising China is a central argument for continued substantial 
investments in U.S. defense capabilities, including increased research and 
development (R&D) for future weapons systems, and the strengthening of the 
American military involvement in the Asia-Pacific.35  
 
Here, China is cast as potential successor to Imperial and Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union; a revisionist, authoritarian power that could seek to establish regional 
hegemony and upset the established international order promoted by Western liberal 
democracies. In fact, in the eyes of AEI scholars this geopolitical competition for 
political and economic influence and regional dominance has already begun: “We 
conclude that a struggle between the United States and China is underway for 
mastery of the Asia-Pacific region.”36 In Asia, the United States should subsequently 
increase and strengthen its military presence on all levels.37 Casting China as geo-
strategic rival of the U.S. has become integral to the conservative primacy discourse.  
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An alternative grand strategy of offshore balancing, as advocated by the rival 
libertarian Cato Institute and supported by many realist IR scholars, is directly 
discarded by AEI, because it would ‘undercut deterrence’ of potential adversaries 
and undermine the confidence of America’s alliance partners in the reliability of the 
United States to come to their defense.38  
 
However, this firm belief in global primacy and military supremacy as the minimum 
requirement to maintain world order and great power peace does no longer cover the 
entire spectrum of grand strategy discourses on the conservative side. Calls for a 
grand strategy of restraint and offshore balancing are no longer limited to the 
scholarly debate among IR experts, but have found prominent support among 
Republican politicians that are associated with the Tea Party movement, such as the 
Republican Senator Rand Paul.39 In February 2013, Paul gave a foreign policy 
speech at the Heritage Foundation in which he declared:  
(…) a more restrained foreign policy is the true conservative foreign policy, 
as it includes two basic tenets of true conservatism: respect for the 
constitution, and fiscal discipline.40 
 
Mead has commented in Foreign Affairs that foreign policy views in the Tea Party 
tend to be dominated by two strands of populist sentiment:41 The first is a unilateral 
Jacksonianism that combines a firm belief in the singularity of American 
exceptionalism with skepticism toward the continued role of the United States as sole 
guarantor of a liberal world order. As demonstrated in chapter four, this view has 
found multiple expressions in popular discourse in such bestsellers as After America, 
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Trickle Down Tyranny, or Screwed that describe this peculiar, populist version of 
exceptionalism. The second strand, Mead describes as Jeffersonian neo-isolationism 
that seeks to minimize the use of American military power abroad and focus on 
domestic issues, economic growth and fiscal prudence.  
 
This is the discourse of ‘non-interventionism’ as promoted by Senator Paul and 
others. Yet, despite their differences both strands are highly critical of ‘liberal 
internationalism’ and thus challenge the Washington consensus on global leadership 
and the use of U.S. military power in the service for global stability and security as 
the various conservative and liberal proponents of the hegemony discourse define 
it.42 Thus, the grand strategy discourse associated with the Tea Party stands in 
contrast to both the neoconservative advocates of ‘benevolent hegemony’ and 
unilateral primacy as well as liberal internationalists and their vision of ‘deep 
engagement’ and support for humanitarian interventions. The ongoing significance 
of this bi-partisan consensus was well illustrated in an op-ed article in the 
Washington Post in April 2013 in which the former senators Joe Liberman, a 
Democrat, and John Kyl, a Republican, stated:    
We must not wait for another catastrophe to persuade us of the continuing 
importance of American internationalism. Regardless of party or ideology, 
our leaders must forge a new consensus about the U.S. role in the world. That 
will require engaging with those who disagree to rebuild and reaffirm a 
bipartisan foreign policy consensus based on the lessons of history.43 
 
Here again, the historical narrative of the pivotal role of the United States in creating 
and maintaining a liberal world order is the key discursive argument. American 
hegemony means peace and stability, restraint equals isolationism and potentially 
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catastrophe. It is an argumentative line that runs from Munich to Pearl Harbor and 
9/11. The Washington consensus represents a deeply entrenched, politically powerful 
and emotive linking of restraint with isolationism that the Cato Institute in turn is 
determined to dissolve in the public policy debate.  
 
In fact, Cato devotes an entire website on the issue, explaining that: “(…) 
interventionists brand their opponents as isolationists to delegitimize them and to 
stifle debate.”44 As described in chapter five, a similar effort was made by Waltz, 
Mearsheimer and other prominent realists to differentiate offshore balancing from 
‘isolationism,’ in order to deflect attempts to delegitimize their contribution to the 
grand strategy discourse in IR. If ‘leadership’ represents an intertextual fixture and 
faithful mantra in American foreign and security policy discourse, then 
‘isolationism’ appears as its nemesis, the ultimate taboo to be avoided at all cost. In 
contrast to this establishment stand, Cato represents restraint as superior alternative 
to hegemony, declaring: 
The foreign policy of restraint is particularly appropriate in the modern era as 
threats to the United States have waned, and as the high costs and dubious 
benefits of a hyperactive, interventionist foreign policy are glaringly 
apparent. 45 
 
Political proponents of U.S. global leadership construct their discourse around the 
narrative of U.S. victory and lasting success in World War 2 and the Cold War. The 
libertarians at Cato draw their historical lessons for offshore balancing from more 
recent events: U.S. failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here, the immense drain on 
financial and military resources these interventions have meant for the United States, 
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and the failure to establish lasting democratic transformation and regional stability 
are seen as cautionary tale about the dangers of ‘imperial overstretch’ and the folly of 
over-committing America aboard.  
 
When it comes to individual policy issues, Cato accordingly translates restraint into 
concrete plans for changing rather than perpetuating the established national security 
design of the United States. On the Asian pivot, directly contrasting policy 
recommendations made by AEI, Cato explains:  
America ought to pivot home. […] American policymakers should work to 
lessen and ultimately remove the forward-deployed U.S. military presence in 
the region, helping establish more powerful national militaries in like-minded 
states. The new administration should encourage Asian nations to work to-
gether on security issues without the United States leading the way.46 
 
When it comes to sequestration, Cato likewise recommends a policy course that 
contradicts the primacy discourse, outlining cuts of more than $1.2 trillion over ten 
years. 47  These are presented not only as unproblematic, but indeed favorable. 
However, far from merely trimming the defense budget for fiscal reasons, Cato 
proposes a fundamental change in grand strategy that would maintain national 
security at far less cost to the American taxpayer:  
The United States confuses what it wants from its military, which is global 
primacy or hegemony, with what its needs, which is safety. […] We can 
defend ourselves with far more restrained military objectives, at far less cost 
(…).48 
 
This change to a grand strategy of restraint, self-defense and offshore balancing 
would entail a substantial downsizing of U.S. military capabilities on all levels.49  
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While such measures would be characterized as unacceptable and irresponsible risk 
to U.S. national security in context with U.S. hegemony, as AEI and others 
demonstrate, for Cato it presents the opportunity to reorient and refocus the role and 
position of the United States while ‘avoiding needless military conflict and 
protecting our prosperity.’  
 
Finally, it is not surprising that both AEI and Cato criticize the grand strategy of the 
Democratic Obama administration. Yet, they do so for different reasons. In the eyes 
of Thomas Donnelly, co-director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at 
AEI, and formerly a senior fellow at PNAC, the grand strategy of the Obama 
administration is one of ‘retrenchment and withdrawal’, both in the Middle East and 
Asia, where he characterizes the pivot as ‘thus far entirely rhetorical.’50 Interviewed 
for this thesis, he pointed out that far from confirming American primacy, he saw a 
mindset of offshore balancing taking hold among leading members of the 
administration.51  
 
For Christopher Preble on the other hand, director of foreign policy studies at the 
Cato Institute, Obama purses a grand strategy of ‘hegemony on the cheap.’ When 
interviewed, he identified Obama’s policy as neither committed to global primacy, 
nor changing to a truly alternative course of restraint and offshore balancing.52 For 
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Asia, this grand strategy in-between results in an attempt to simultaneously contain 
and engage China. A policy Cato succinctly refers to as ‘congagement’.53  
 
Rebalancing hegemony – The Asian pivot, the Obama Administration and the 
bipartisan consensus on American leadership 
 
While AEI and Cato stand politically and ideologically close to the oppositional 
Republican Party, the think tanks belonging to the centrist spectrum either carefully 
stress bipartisan neutrality, or are openly sympathetic to the Obama administration. 
Similar to the close relationship between AEI and the George W. Bush 
Administration, the left-of-center leaning Brookings Institution for example has had 
ties to both the Clinton and Obama administrations. Brookings is considered to be 
one of the most prestigious and influential think tanks in Washington. 54  The 
president of Brookings is Strobe Talbot, deputy secretary of state under President 
Clinton, while the former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and 
current National Security Advisor to President Obama, Susan Rice worked at 
Brookings as senior fellow in foreign policy from 2002 to 2009.55  However, 
Brookings also counts the leading neoconservative Robert Kagan among its senior 
fellows, underlining its bipartisan credentials.  
 
Brookings’ centrist position on grand strategy does not demonstrate the clear 
ideological conservative or libertarian preferences for all out primacy or restraint, but 
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rather projects a bipartisan mainstream vision of U.S. grand strategy, anchored on the 
well established imagination of America’s essential global leadership, its 
responsibility for a liberal international order and the central importance of engaging 
U.S. allies and partners around the world politically, economically and militarily.56 
Within this discourse of hegemonic engagement, there is a spectrum of policy 
recommendations on rebalancing to Asia, or cutting the defense budget, but in 
general these propositions do not intend to fundamentally alter the national security 
design of the United States.  
 
On sequestration Brookings occupies a middle ground. In early 2013 the think tank 
published a paper, where instead of accepting or opposing sequestration outright, it 
argued for modest defense cuts of $200 billion over ten years.57 Brookings connects 
with the basic hegemony discourse in its assessment that U.S. military power is a 
‘stabilizing element in the current global environment.’58 Here again the geopolitical 
imagination of policy research intersects with the representation of the United States 
in popular culture. Friedman and Mandelbaum for example explained how 
‘America’s navy safeguards the sea-lanes’ and its ‘military deployments […] 
underwrite security in Europe and East Asia.’59  
 
This role of global deterrence and intervention is linked by Brookings to the 
capability of America’s Armed Forces to carry out two major wars simultaneously.60 
Full sequestration however, Brookings assessed as ‘unwise’, ‘excessive and ill-
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advised,’ curtailing the capability of the United States for global power projection 
and armed intervention, limiting its armed forces to conduct only one major ground 
combat operation.61 This would result in ‘dramatic changes in America’s basic 
strategic approach to the world.’62 While the text mentioned the ability of partners 
and allies to provide for security, this happens largely through the lens of hegemonic 
engagement where the United States must be the primary anchor of such security 
alliances, as with Japan and South Korea, continuing the forward deployment of U.S. 
forces, as on the island of Okinawa, and only recommending a limited redeployment 
of military personnel to offshore installations elsewhere, for example to U.S. 
facilities on Guam or in California.63 
 
On the Asian pivot, Brookings concluded that Obama was striking a careful balance 
between ‘diplomatic engagement’ and ‘military offshore balancing’, one however 
that did not negate America’s leadership role or liberal responsibility as realists or 
the libertarians at Cato would have it:  
What is novel about Obama’s version of offshore balancing is its moral 
dimension, which centers on America’s exceptionalism—including its respect 
for human rights—rather than just its hegemony.64 
 
In Brookings’ assessment, the Asian pivot represents yet another hybrid form of 
grand strategy discourse that simultaneously incorporates elements of hegemony, 
engagement and restraint. This further contributes to the assessment of contradicting 
discourses and a multiplicity of geopolitical imagination under the Obama 
administration that the analysis of Foreign Affairs produced in the previous chapter. 
Further underlining this analysis is Michael O’Hanlon, director of research for 
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foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, who diagnosed a tension of geopolitical 
imagination in the way President Obama envisions the global role of the United 
States, when interviewed for this thesis:  
He wants to lead, but through coalitions and alliances more than Bush. He 
wants to correct for what he saw as the unilateralist impulses of the Bush 
administration, but he wants to do all this while limiting American 
engagement.65  
 
Another Brookings policy brief adds to this assessment by analyzing a change in 
Obama’s foreign policy during his first term: “Obama’s campaign platform of peace 
through diplomatic engagement and military restraint played off the post-Bush 
distaste for war.”66 While this focus on engagement and restraint has not been 
replaced: “(…) increasingly it has been balanced by overt and covert military action, 
coercive diplomacy, and a deepening of alliance commitments.”67  
 
Here, there is yet another articulation of the synchronicity of contradicting 
geopolitical ideas existing in American grand strategy discourse. It seems that under 
President Obama discourses of hegemony, engagement and restraint have 
simultaneously provided key representations of imagination about America’s 
preferred course in world politics, leading to fluctuating priorities and potentially 
contradicting policy outcomes that could not be subsumed under one central strategic 
narrative.  
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Further stressing this is Richard K. Betts, senior fellow for national security studies 
at the centrist Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Asked ‘what is Obama’s grand 
strategy’, as part of a Q&A segment on the think tank’s website, he responded: 
President Obama's foreign policy balances between contending views, some 
more liberal than the preceding Republican Bush administration, and some 
more conservative than the liberal wing of his own Democratic Party. […] 
Obama endorses multilateralism in security policy, but pursues unilateral 
initiatives where collaboration is impractical or undesirable (…).68 
 
This multiplicity has frequently lead to charges of Obama missing a grand strategy 
altogether.69 Indeed, as Betts argues: “(…) the Obama administration does not really 
have a grand strategy in the usual sense of the term, and that is not a bad thing.”70 
This assessment that Obama is largely doing the ‘right thing,’ but does not offer a 
clearly defined or spelled out strategic vision is mostly shared by the two other 
prominent centrist think tanks analyzed here, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 
 
According to its website, since its founding in 1962, CSIS ‘has been dedicated to 
finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in 
the world.’71 CSIS, categorized as right-of-center by the Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, was ranked the number one think tank in the world for security and 
international affairs by the University of Pennsylvania’s 2012 Global Go To Think 
Tanks Report.72  
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CSIS ultimately constructs a grand strategy discourse that puts greater emphasis on 
military power than the Brookings Institution. On the Asian pivot for example, CSIS 
concluded that ‘preeminence in the Western Pacific’ has allowed the U.S. military to 
occupy an advantageous position in the region.73 In response to the perceived 
challenge by China, in particular its development of military technologies that could 
potentially hinder U.S. access to and movement within the region, labeled ‘A2/AD,’ 
the United States should strengthen its position through a combination of diplomatic 
engagement, military rebalancing and increased alliance cooperation, again reflecting 
a view of multilateral hegemony.74 “(…) the overall trend should be toward more 
jointness, integration, collaboration, and presence across the region.”75 An alternative 
strategy of offshore balancing was in contrast characterized as ‘ahistorical and 
counterproductive.’ 76 Again, World War 2 and the failure of isolationism in the 
1930s provided the central lens through which the geopolitical posture of the United 
States is reviewed.  
 
In 2012, CSIS was asked by the Department of Defense to ‘commission an 
independent assessment of U.S. force posture in Asia’ in compliance with  
Section 346 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.77 This extensive report, 
directly addressed to then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta not only demonstrates 
the prominent role of external policy advise and research for the formulation of U.S. 
national security, but also represents an important document in American grand 
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strategy discourse, again reconfirming the significance of an established bipartisan 
Washington consensus on the global leadership role of the United States. CSIS 
concluded that:   
America sustained a remarkably consistent defense policy for fifty years of 
the Cold War because our national leaders at the outset established a durable 
consensus on national challenges and strategic objectives. We now need a 
comparable framework for the next thirty years in Asia.78 
 
Again, a historical narrative of U.S. dependent peace and stability would build the 
essential argument for America’s continued military preeminence and essential 
leadership role, as already encountered multiple times in formal and popular 
discourses of hegemony.79 Against this continuity, the discursive nuances between 
the left-of-center Brookings and the right-of-center CSIS are largely cosmetic in 
nature.  
 
How blurring the lines between the formally independent expertise of think tank 
research, and the practical discourse of policymaking can be, was also revealed, 
when an article in the Boston Globe reported in 2013 how a speech by Secretary of 
Defense Chuck Hagel at an Asian security summit in Singapore had been drafted by 
security experts of CSIS, rather than by his own Pentagon staff.80 Ernest Z. Bower, 
one of the CSIS experts identified as having been involved in preparing Hagel’s 
Singapore speech, later published an article on the CSIS website, titled “Engagement 
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in the Indo-Pacific: The Pentagon Leads by Example.” Here, Bower applauded the 
Secretary and the Pentagon for taking the lead in the administration’s Asia strategy, 
highlighting the very same speech he apparently helped to write:  
Hagel took engagement with ASEAN to a new level during his June speech 
at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore when he invited the ASEAN defense 
ministers to Hawaii in 2014 (…).81  
 
This episode further underlines how the dominant consensus on grand strategy is 
reinforced through the intertextual and intellectual exchange between policy circles 
and research experts, and how it operates through an elite network of active and 
former government officials, military officers, defense contractors, security experts 
and geopolitical thinkers concentrated in Washington DC. 
 
This prevalent mainstream consensus was somewhat modified however by another 
integral member of the foreign policy establishment, the centrist Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR). 82  CFR is a highly influential and prestigious institution in 
American public policy discourse, publishing the prominent Foreign Affairs journal 
and counting senior politicians, former Presidents, CIA directors, Secretaries of State 
and Defense, as well as high-profile bankers, lawyers, professors, and senior media 
figures among its members.83 Unlike other think tanks, CFR officially takes no 
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institutional positions on matters of policy, but aims to serve as an independent 
source for information and intellectual exchange.84  
 
Like CSIS and Brookings, CFR essentially promotes a bipartisan grand strategy 
vision of liberal hegemony, where the United States exercises its global leadership 
through a broad cooperative network of political, economic and military engagement 
in a rule-based international order.85 This cooperative vision of American grand 
strategy nonetheless clearly represents the United States at the center and on top of 
the international system. As Richard Hass, the current president of CFR has 
commented: 
(…) the United States stands first among unequals. American primacy is, in 
part, a consequence of innate advantages: political stability, healthy 
demographics and commitment to the rule of law.86  
 
At the same time, Haas connected U.S. ‘primacy’, and an increased diplomatic, 
economic and military engagement in Asia, with a new focus on restraint, ending 
‘wars of choice’ and ‘wholesale efforts to remake societies like the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 and the surge in Afghanistan in 2009.’ 87 Instead, the United States should 
focus on its domestic renewal, investing more in public education, improving its 
infrastructure and further reforming healthcare, following a doctrine of 
‘restoration.’88 He concluded:  
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This is not a recipe for isolationism. Rather, it is a new grand strategy for 
America that views national security as a function of both foreign and 
domestic policy.89 
 
Haas essentially spells out a geopolitical vision of simultaneous hegemonic 
engagement and restraint that President Obama and the country should pursue. This 
multidimensional course of action at the same time provokes charges of missing a 
clear-cut geopolitical vision in foreign policy and national security from conservative 
and libertarian think tanks, as well as from prominent academics, and even scholars 
associated with such centrist organizations as Brookings or CFR itself.  
 
The restraint argument ill fits with the established mainstream notion of global 
leadership and historic continuity that underwrites the Washington consensus on 
grand strategy. While in general the centrist think tanks assess the foreign and 
security policy of the Obama administration favorably, in particular stressing the 
correct decision of rebalancing towards Asia as geopolitical move of vital 
importance for securing America’s future, they struggle to reconcile its contradicting 
representations and conflicting policy priorities into one single coherent narrative or 
grand strategy label.90  
 
A new way forward? A progressive grand strategy of sustainable security 
 
The idea of restoring America’s standing in the world and its domestic power base 
unifies such diverse voices as the libertarian policy researchers at Cato and the 
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president of the centrist Council on Foreign Relations. In fact, the idea of 
Congressional sequestration was born out of fear about the fiscal sustainability of the 
United States and its future ability to conduct domestic and foreign policies. But 
arguments for sustainability and restoration do not necessarily result in political 
demands for greater restraint.  
 
On the progressive end of the political spectrum, the Center for American Progress 
(CAP) is one of the most prominent proponents for holistically reorienting policy on 
national security, yet it is also calling for an expansion of American engagement in 
the world. CAP was founded in 2003 by John Podesta, former chief of staff to 
President Clinton, with a liberal policy agenda to improve ‘the lives of Americans 
through progressive ideas and action.’ Politically, the think tank is clearly aligned 
with the Democratic Party.91  
 
Departing from the usual national security centric perspective of defense, existential 
threats and national interests, CAP contributes a genuine novel element to the policy 
discourse of grand strategy by stressing ‘sustainability’ as essential component of 
any overarching American security design.92 The ‘project for sustainable security’ at 
CAP aims to rethink national security by linking it to ‘human security’ and 
‘collective security,’ interconnecting diplomacy, defense and development in a 
collective grand strategy vision.93  
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Instead of focusing almost exclusively on American leadership and military power, 
the grand strategy discourse of sustainability stresses multilateral responsibility and 
international cooperation to jointly manage ‘global transnational threats. 94  This 
includes policy recommendations for increased development aid, an institutionalized 
government capacity for the promotion of global poverty reduction and economic 
growth, a strengthening of U.S. alliances, and the ‘reform and creation of strong 
international institutions.’95 Similar to the restraint argument made by Cato or CFR 
the narrative of ill-fated U.S. attempts in nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan 
serves as central argument for changing the established national security consensus. 
Rather than a reorientation and limitation towards restraint and offshore balancing 
however, CAP envisions a strengthening and expanding of the U.S. engagement in 
world politics, as part of a global network for crisis prevention, human development 
and conflict resolution.  
 
Within the sustainability discourse, the geopolitical identity of the United States 
continues to be represented through the paradigm of global leadership, the 
exclusivity and superiority of the United States and its material power however is 
stressed far less prominently than with the conservative or centrist think tanks. 
Instead, this progressive vision of grand strategy highlights global 
interconnectedness as central feature of geopolitics in the 21st century. Thus, the 
sustainably discourse promoted by CAP envisions maybe the most holistic policy 
change in American grand strategy perspective, next to Cato’s suggestions for 
offshore balancing and the end of American hegemony. 
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On national security, CAP translated this grand strategy vision of sustainability into 
policy recommendations for further cuts to the defense budget and military 
equipment.96 Where sequestration envisions cuts of $487 billion from originally 
projected federal spending, a 2012 report by CAP pointed out that, despite 
sequestration, in 2017: “(…) the Pentagon’s base budget will be larger than it is 
today and larger, in real terms, than it was on average during the Cold War.”97  
 
This was characterized as unfounded overinvestment in military resources and 
imbalance toward other political priorities: “We face no existential threats abroad at 
a time when we are long overdue for investment at home.”98 Similarly, on the Asian 
pivot, CAP countered conservative assessments of China as challenging U.S. 
hegemony, and emphasized diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation over 
the military dimension of the U.S. rebalancing to Asia. As John Podesta, the 
president of CAP remarked in a speech in Japan at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation: 
“The rise of one country need not come at the expense of another, and […] power 
does not need to be a zero-sum game.”99 
 
Sustainable security represents a direct repudiation of the realist understanding of 
international relations and neoconservative views of geopolitics. As such it negates 
unilateral primacy as well as calls for offshore balancing, a strategy strictly based on 
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a realist, materialist calculation of military and economic power balances and 
regional hegemony. Intertextually, this progressive policy discourse primarily 
connects with popular notions of engagement, as forwarded for example by 
Brzezinski and Zakaria that stress the cooperative vision of American grand strategy 
in a global, multipolar network system.  
 
As Brzezinski has written in context with Asia for example, the United States should 
be ‘cooperatively engaged in multilateral structures,’ and expand ‘global cooperation 
with China.’ 100 In terms of formal expertise, the most obvious link exists to IR 
research on collective and cooperative security and the theoretical assumptions of 
liberal institutionalism.101 A 2008 report by CAP on sustainable security stated for 
example:  
Offered up by academia and Washington’s think tanks, the concepts of ‘soft 
power,’ ‘integrated power,’ and ‘smart power’ bear in common the counsel 
that America must recalibrate its foreign policy to rely less on military power 
and more on other tools that can foster change and enhance our security.102 
 
A second, more surprising discursive connection links this liberal-progressive agenda 
for policy change to the center of American military power and grand strategy 
planning. Written in the Pentagon, but published by the liberal Woodrow Wilson 
Center, the ‘Mr. Y’ article provided an articulation of the sustainability argument that 
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was directly encouraged by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael 
Mullen.103  
 
As one of the co-authors, Mark ‘Puck’ Mykleby explained in an interview with the 
author, the attempt was to ‘think outside the box’ of the usually threat fixated 
discourse of national security in Washington, and to address several issues that were 
seen as vital concerns for the longtime prosperity of the country.104 The title of ‘Mr. 
Y’ in itself represents a trope of intertextuality in American grand strategy discourse 
in its obvious reference to the Mr. X article in Foreign Affairs, which was also 
alluded to in the popular That Used to Be Us. Here Friedman and Manelbaum 
bemoaned the fact that no one had written the U.S. a ‘long telegram’ after the end of 
the Cold war.105 To strategy experts and popular authors alike, Mr. X, Kennan and 
containment remain symbols for the ideal of American grand strategy; 
simultaneously they stand for their ongoing frustration that nothing comparable has 
been formulated since.  
 
In terms of practical policy impact, the sustainability discourse was in particular 
reflected in the Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review under Secretary 
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Clinton, a process that was officially endorsed by CAP.106 Clinton’s Director of 
Policy Planning, Anne-Marie Slaughter also wrote the preface for the Mr. Y article, 
further stressing the intertextual significance of the discourse of cooperative 
engagement and sustainability within the U.S. government.  As demonstrated in the 
previous analysis of Foreign Affairs, this increased discursive profile of diplomacy 
and development associated with Clinton, Gates and others appeared as deliberate 
political reversal of the unilateralist vision of U.S. foreign policy under President 
Bush.  
 
However, sustainability and cooperative security did not displace the central 
paradigm of military power and threat from the center of national security discourse, 
and engagement as grand strategy vision of global collective partnership did not 
supplant the key geopolitical imagination of American leadership and 
indispensability. In the end, as with offshore balancing and restraint, a vision of 
sustainable security remained too far outside the entrenched mainstream consensus 
on U.S. grand strategy as to be of greater political significance. This raises the 
question of the political influence of think tanks and how the external advice and 
research they offer to government translates into actual policy on national security 
and foreign policy.  
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From grand strategy research to policy making: The Centre for a New American 
Security (CNAS) and the Obama administration 
 
The Center for a New American Security has been highlighted as think tank with 
significant political impact under the Obama administration, due to several high-
ranking officials that transferred into government from this organization. These 
include the founders of CNAS, Michèle Flournoy, who served as under secretary of 
defense for policy, and Kurt Campbell, who as assistant secretary of state for East 
Asian and Pacific affairs is considered to be one of the leading voices behind the 
‘Asian pivot’ of strategically rebalancing the United States to the Asia-Pacific 
region.107  As the Washington Post has remarked: “When CNAS talks, people 
listen.”108 However, this closeness to the defense establishment and national security 
apparatus has also led to criticism concerning the independence of CNAS’s research. 
As the journalist Nathan Hodge has commented:  
Institutions like CNAS are also heavily funded by major weapons 
manufacturers and Pentagon contractors, creating potential conflicts of 
interest rarely disclosed in the media.109  
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The  stated mission of CNAS is to ‘develop strong, pragmatic and principled national 
security and defense policies that promote and protect American interests and 
values.’110 Officially, a nonpartisan, independent think tank, the organization has 
been described as ‘a haven for hawkish Democrats,’ and was particularly noted for 
its outspoken support for an expansive military strategy of counter-insurgency 
(COIN) in Afghanistan, supporting such military figures as General David Petraeaus 
and Stanley McChrystal against proponents of a more limited course of counter-
terrorism, as for example Vice-President Joe Biden.111  
 
Commenting on CNAS’s role in the Washington discourse on national security 
policy, Kelley Beaucar Vlahos wrote in The American Conservative: “COIN today is 
the realm of CNAS, as if Frederick Kagan and AEI had never existed.”112 This 
observation testifies to the intertextual crossover that connects Republicans and 
Democrats, conservative and centrist think tanks on issues of U.S. leadership and 
military supremacy, the Washington consensus on hegemony. They ‘all drank the 
Kool-Aid,’ in the words of Professor Bacevich.113 As the thesis has demonstrated so 
far however, this discursive network that promotes the geopolitical vision of 
American leadership also extends far beyond the Washington beltway to include 
Hollywood film studios, New York publishing houses, and Ivy League universities, 
where grand strategy discourses are being co-produced as dominant knowledge 
through popular bestsellers, top-grossing movies and high-impact research articles. 
                                            
110
 “Research,” Center for a New American Security, accessed February 5, 2014, http://www.cnas.org/research-
areas.  
111
 Cf., Lozada, “Setting Priorities for the Afghan War;” Bengali and Gold Tribune: “Policy ace Michele 
Flournoy could be first female Defense chief.” On the differing opinions on counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism strategies for Afghanistan in the Obama White House, see also Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars 
(London: Simon & Schuster, 2010). 
112
 Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, "One-Sided COIN," The American Conservative, August 1, 2009, accessed February 
4, 2014, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2009/aug/01/00038/. 
113
 Quoted in ibid. 
 253 
Unlike Cato, or partially CAP, CNAS does not challenge the established discourse 
on national security and grand strategy, but is one of its leading proponents. Relating 
the elevated political position CNAS seems to have occupied in the Obama 
administration to the institution’s views on national security and geopolitics, it 
becomes a further indicator how the dominant discourse in Washington tends to 
favor continuity over change, visions of leadership over ideas of restraint, and 
confidence in military power over reliance in diplomacy.  
 
On grand strategy, CNAS has formulated a vision of hegemonic engagement that 
focuses on improving the effectiveness of U.S. military power, but never questions 
its indispensability for maintaining a liberal world order. In 2008, before the 
presidential elections, CNAS published a report, titled Finding Our Way: Debating 
American Grand Strategy. 114  This text presented itself as repudiation of 
neoconservative primacy and preventive warfare and criticized the absence of a clear 
strategic vision in Washington. Brimley and Flournoy argued that it was indeed the 
absence of an American grand strategy under George W. Bush that had been 
reflected in the mismanagement of the Iraq War.115 A new grand strategy should 
therefore answer fundamental questions about ‘America’s core national interest’ and 
‘the purpose of American power’.116  
 
The report spells out four distinctive grand strategy alternatives: “Isolationism or 
restraint, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy.”117   
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Following the line of the conservative and centrist think tanks, ‘isolationism’ is 
linked to the discourse of offshore balancing and restraint, and the realist school of 
IR, referring to Layne and Posen in particular.118 Selective engagement is presented 
as ‘hybrid strategy’ that combines a ‘forward posture’ in security matters with 
general support for liberal goals of ‘free markets, human rights, and international 
openness.’ 119  Cooperative security is mainly characterized as vision of liberal 
institutionalism, naming Ikenberry as one of its main proponents.120 Finally, primacy 
and hegemony are used interchangeably to describe a grand strategy that seeks to 
perpetuate the ‘unipolar moment’ to ensure ‘continued global stability,’ as endorsed 
for example by Krauthammer, Mandelbaum, Kagan and AEI.121  
 
CNAS itself proposed a grand strategy of ‘sustainment’. This strategic ‘long-term 
vision’ essentially reproduced the dominant establishment discourse of liberal 
hegemony, where the United States, beyond defending its own homeland, promotes 
free trade, guarantees access to the ‘global commons’ of sea, air and cyberspace, 
maintains a global network of partnerships, alliances and forwardly deployed bases, 
and supports great power peace through its ability to militarily dominate potential 
rivals.122  
 
While CNAS warned against the dangers of overextension and exhaustion that result 
from a geopolitical vision of American primacy, it equally distanced itself against a 
view of restraint, offshore balancing or isolationism, where the United Sates defines 
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its national security simply along the lines of self-defense. When it comes to ideas of 
cooperative engagement, alliances and partnerships are seen as vital instrument of 
American power and influence in the world, but not as collective body of global 
governance, or concert of powers that could replace or supplant U.S. leadership. 
Central to the argument is the conviction that the United States has to lead, but that it 
cannot lead without support:  
No matter how powerful the United States is, it cannot effectively address 
these challenges alone. To safeguard our security and prosperity we must be 
able to inspire others to make common cause with us.123  
 
The centrality of American leadership was also the common thread running through 
the 2012 follow-up report named America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next 
Administration.124 Although the authors collected there again emphasized different 
aspects of national security policy, they all confirmed a hegemonic identity of the 
United States in world politics as guiding principle of American grand strategy.125  
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The central paradigm of leadership extends far beyond a neoconservative grand 
strategy of primacy, and shapes ideas from ‘selective engagement,’ to ‘network 
centrality,’ and ‘soft primacy.’ This largely reduces the character of these strategies 
to mere variations of hegemony, instead of comprehensive alternatives in 
understanding America’s role in the world. As CNAS itself has remarked:  
(…) there is little that is fundamentally new in a strategy emphasizing the 
very theme and currents that lie deep within American history and the 
bipartisan exercise of statecraft over man decades.126 
 
The mantra of American leadership is the central paradigm that orients American 
grand strategy discourse. As a result, none of the research conducted by CNAS or the 
authors collected by it, offer more than variations of the hegemony theme. 
Apparently, only a think tank that adheres to this paradigm can hope to have 
significant policy impact in Washington. It was in particular the reputation for 
pragmatism and technocratic expertise that build the national security credentials of 
CNAS and raised its profile under the Obama administration.127 This seems to 
correspond with many expert assessments of President Obama as pursuing an un-
ideological, pragmatic course in foreign affairs, where grand visions are eschewed in 
exchange for workable solutions.128 However, this alleged pragmatism nonetheless 
revolves around a geopolitical vision that represents an item of faith in America 
politics. 
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Conclusion 
 
The CNAS reports on grand strategy document in an exemplary fashion that in 
Washington DC, the political debate on America’s role in the world is an extremely 
limited intellectual exchange that revolves around a seemingly sacrosanct 
geopolitical imagination of American superiority, leadership and indispensability. It 
is the illusion of a debate on grand strategy, rather than an actual debate that takes 
place inside the Washington beltway. As Hodge has remarked, ‘the Beltway 
consensus’ is built through ‘the subtle reinforcement of conventional wisdom.’129  
 
This conventional wisdom frames the political grand strategy discourse and orients 
the policy recommendations of the most influential think tanks that form an integral 
part of the national security and foreign policy establishment. This also corresponds 
with the findings of the previous chapters in that hegemony represents an intertextual 
fixture of American identity construction in world politics that dominates the 
geopolitical imagination in both popular culture and formal expertise, projecting 
ideas and images of U.S. hegemony from Battleship to Foreign Affairs.  
 
It seems questionable, if fundamental change in American grand strategy is possible, 
when virtually all options discussed operate with the same understanding of the 
preferred U.S. role in world politics. Studying the think tank led policy research and 
advise exposes further how, beyond a neutral assessment of interests, means and 
ends, American grand strategy constitutes a world view, or weltanschauung, where 
fundamental elements are not derived from empirical, scientific analysis, but merely 
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imposed a priori as normative convictions of truth. This fundamental truth that the 
leading role of the United States in the world is essential for the preservation of 
world peace, the uninterrupted flow of free trade, and the functioning of a liberal, 
international order is largely build on a narrative of historic continuity that sets in 
with the American involvement in World War 2 and is projected into the foreseeable 
future. This image centrally underwrites the mainstream bipartisan consensus on 
U.S. grand strategy. 
 
The one true outlier to this Washington consensus on national security in public 
policy discourse is the libertarian Cato Institute that promotes a distinctive grand 
strategy alternative of restraint and offshore balancing. Politically, it is telling that 
this vision is only endorsed by the populist Tea Party movement; itself considered to 
exist at the fringes of political discourse on American foreign and security policy. 
From the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute, to the various centrist and 
bipartisan think tanks, to the progressive Center for American Progress: conventional 
wisdom holds that restraint equals isolationism. Such a grand strategy is then 
denounced as dangerous and morally reprehensible, discredited through America’s 
absenteeism from international affairs in the 1920s and 1930s and its catastrophic 
consequences for the world. Cato’s argument for restraint appears as something akin 
to heresy in its questioning of the wisdom of American indispensability.  
 
While the influential think tanks investigated here usually anchor their geopolitical 
imagination on the central paradigm of American leadership, the question how this 
leadership can be sustained and perpetuated into the future can still produce in part 
starkly different policy recommendations and analyses. These range from how 
 259 
assertively the United States should react to the rise of China, to the meaning of 
economic and domestic parameters for the future of American power in the 21st 
century.   
 
In this context, while not challenging the premise of American leadership altogether, 
the argument for sustainable security that has been brought forward by such diverse 
voices as the liberal Center for American Progress and the authors of the Mr. Y 
article, presents an important caveat on the exclusive focus on U.S. military 
preeminence and American exceptionalism. Here, the vision of cooperative 
engagement, sustainable development, economic recovery and domestic renewal in 
the United States acts as a widening and deepening of the prevailing discourse of 
national security, moving away from an almost exclusive focus on military power, 
defense matters and threat perceptions.  
 
This progressive view modifies the established mainstream consensus as represented 
by Brookings or CNAS, and challenges AEI’s neoconservative designs for American 
primacy, as well as Cato’s libertarian vision of restraint. So far however, it seems 
that the argument for sustainability has had its most significant policy impact in the 
form of sequestration. It does not seem to have resulted in a more holistic change in 
political attitudes toward American grand strategy.  
 
Looking at the various policy recommendations by the majority of Washington think 
tanks, the response to defense budget cuts seems to have been a tweaking and 
downsizing of America’s military supremacy, not a reorientation away from global 
preeminence. On the Asian pivot, there is a near unanimous endorsement of this 
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rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region by conservative, centrist and progressive think 
tanks that only differ in their assessment of how significant the military component 
of this shift has to be. Both sequestration and the Asian pivot also underline the 
fundamental importance of the subject of American military power for the political 
discourse of grand strategy, a complex that will be analyzed more closely in the 
following chapter.  
 
In their assessment of the Obama administration, most think tanks struggle to define 
a clearly formulated grand strategy vision that would fit a distinctive label. Given the 
apparent hybrid character of formal grand strategy discourses identified by the thesis, 
it seems dubious if such suggestions as ‘soft primacy,’ ‘network centrality,’ or 
‘restoration’ will claim the highly coveted title of the new ‘containment’ any time 
soon. The think tanks’ difficulty in identifying a clear grand strategy under Obama 
however, corresponds with their inability to present true alternatives for American 
grand strategy from their own research expertise. Cato, and partially CAP aside, they 
all offer variations of hegemony, not alternatives to established continuities and 
conventional narratives. Far from an open exchange of ideas, or probing of 
innovative approaches to world politics, the discourse of policy advice and research 
is for the most part a circle of constant repetition and self-reinforcing truisms. The 
limits of imagination are marked by the unthinkability of ‘isolationism.’ The 
conventional wisdom that represents American leadership, military supremacy and 
global power projection as unshakable pillars of U.S. national security policy 
remains unchallenged inside the Beltway.   
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6. Strategic Vision: National security, American defense policy and the 
geopolitics of military preeminence 
 
The United States is the strongest and greatest nation on earth (…). The 
power and global reach of its military have been an indispensable contributor 
to world peace and must remain so.1 – Robert M. Gates 
 
Applying critical insights about the mutual constitution of power/knowledge for the 
construction of political reality to the investigation of contemporary formulations of 
American grand strategy, the thesis has so far explored how discourses of popular 
imagination and formal expertise produce dominant geopolitical visions about 
America’s role in the world. This analysis has established a hegemonic imagination 
of global leadership as key representation of geopolitical identity that centrally 
informs grand strategy discourses, from highest grossing films and bestselling books 
in popular culture to high impact journal articles and the most influential of 
Washington think tanks in intellectual expert circles.  
 
Within this dominant worldview of national security and geopolitics, images, 
narratives and ideas about American indispensability and superiority provide a 
central lens of imagination and interpretation; it is for the most part a debate about 
how America should lead in the world, not if. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
would sum up this fundamental belief in his memoir, published in 2014: “We are the 
‘indispensable nation,’ and few international problems can be addressed successfully 
without our leadership.”2      
 
                                            
1
 Gates, “A Balanced Strategy”, p. 39. 
2
 Robert M. Gates, Duty (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), [New York Times best seller, February 2, 2014] p. 
591. 
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In order to further clarify how a discursive perspective of grand strategy can be used 
to better understand the formulation of U.S. security and foreign policy under the 
Obama administration, the focus of research will now move into the realm of 
practical reasoning and policy making to analyze how representations of geopolitical 
identity are linked to political decisions at the heart of what constitutes the national 
security apparatus of the United States. As Mamadouh and Dijkink have remarked, 
practical geopolitics is ‘the domain of policy making and geopolitical reasoning 
justifying concrete foreign policy actions.3 In terms of grand strategy, this draws the 
attention to political actions and policy decisions that have been framed as serving 
the long-term interest of the United States for national security.  
 
One of the key elements in the practical dimension of grand strategy discourse then 
is the significance of the concept of American military power for the formulation of 
U.S. national security policy. It is a generally accepted truth that the United States 
possesses outstanding military capabilities and an unmatched ability for global power 
projection. This global geopolitical reach for command and control of geographical 
(and cyber) space through military power, the ‘command of the commons’ Posen for 
example defines as the material foundation of U.S. hegemony.4 IR scholars, political 
commentators, media journalists, film producers and policymakers constantly 
                                            
3
 Mamadouh and Dijkink, “Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography,” p. 355. 
4
 Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony;” as Scheinmann and Cohen 
have observed, ‘securing the commons’ has become and intertextual fixture of national security dialogue in 
Washington: “One of the few points of agreement between President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy, 
the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the neoconservative Project for the New America’s Century’s 
‘‘Rebuilding American Defense’’ report, various NATO research papers, and numerous think tank publications is 
that they all emphasize the importance of ‘‘safeguarding the global commons.” Gabriel M. Scheinmann and 
Raphael S. Cohen, “The Myth of ‘‘Securing the Commons,’’ The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1 (2011): p. 115; 
there is also a strong intellectual link between the idea of U.S. control of the global commons, and classic 
geopolitical conceptualizations, such as Mackinder’s’ ‘Heartland,’ or Spykman’s ‘Rimland’ theory, cf. Abraham 
M. Denmark, “Managing the Global Commons,” The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 3 (2010): pp. 165-182; see 
also Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007, originally published in 1942 by Harcourt, Brace and Company). 
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represent American military might as a category that separates the United States 
from the rest of the world. It is perhaps the most obvious and visible expression of 
American primacy: a global icon of power and American exceptionalism that 
permeates popular culture, academic analysis and political discourse.  
 
Viewed from a critical perspective, the representations and practices of U.S. military 
power are critical to the political discourse of national security and the constitution 
of arguments for America’s global leadership. As such, the planning of defense 
policy and military strategy is a central element in the practical discourse of grand 
strategy. The way geopolitical representations are employed to legitimize and 
authorize political actions in matters of security and defense allow the thesis to 
explore how American leadership in world politics has been defined or redefined 
politically under the Obama administration, and how this articulation of military 
power corresponds or deviates with popular and formal discourse of grand strategy in 
regard to the categories of hegemony, engagement and restraint established so far. 
 
Thus, this chapter will explore the practical dimension of national security planning, 
defense policymaking, and military strategy on several levels. First, it will analyze 
the highest level of policy planning located at the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD), commonly referred to as the Pentagon. The DoD is a key discursive producer 
that regularly translates ideas of grand strategy and geopolitical codes into concrete 
policy outcomes. Ó Tuathail for example classified the 1995 National Military 
Strategy of the United States, published by the Joint Chiefs, as ‘geo-strategic 
doctrine’ that established ‘overseas presence’ and ‘power projection’ as key elements 
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of America’s strategic outlook of geopolitical primacy.5 In particular, high-level 
strategic documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review reports or the Defense 
Strategic Guidance are of interest here, together with related official statements and 
media appearances by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
(CJCS). Together they frame a significant part of the political, civilian-military 
leadership debate about America’s future role in international affairs in their roles as 
key advisors and assistants to the President, and top representatives of the defense 
establishment. Here, the Secretary of Defense is the ‘principal defense policy 
advisor’ to the President, while the JCS chairman acts as the administration’s ‘senior 
military advisor.’6 In investigating defense policy planning, the thesis will also 
consider in greater detail the impact of sequestration on defense and the U.S. 
military, and how this policy issue that is widely debated in Washington is affecting 
the discourse of military preeminence and U.S. hegemony that has been dominant in 
political, civilian and military expert circles since the end of the Cold War.  
 
Below the level of general defense policy, the analysis will consider the dimension of 
military strategy, doctrine, and operational planning, concerned with the practical 
preparation of the use of armed force by the United States, in particular the apparent 
shift from a strategic and operational focus on large-scale ground operations with a 
geographical emphasis on the Middle East and Central Asia, - the counter-insurgency 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan -, to a more air and naval oriented focus on the 
                                            
5
 Ó Tuathail, “Postmodern Geopolitics? The Modern Geopolitical Imagination and Beyond,” in Rethinking 
Geopolitics, p. 32.   
6
 “About the Department of Defense (DOD),” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed May 5, 2014,   
http://www.defense.gov/about/. Both are also mandatory members of the National Security Council that was 
established through the National Security Act of 1947. The role of the JCS chairman was further strengthened 
through the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which elevated his position compared to the individual service 
chiefs of the Air Force, Navy, Army and Marine Corps, in order to ‘present the president a prompt, single, unified 
military position’ on security and defense issues, see Harvey M. Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz, and Caitlin Talmadge, 
U.S. Defense Politics: The origins of security policy (New York and London: Routledge, 2009), p. 54. 
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Asia-Pacific region as part of the Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ to the region, and 
the operational concept of Air-Sea Battle. The geopolitical contextualization of 
America’s war fighting strategy will be investigated especially in relation to the 
expert debate about continued American primacy, greater cooperative engagement, 
or strategic restraint encountered in the previous chapters.  
 
Finally, the chapter will consider how the U.S. military establishes and adapts the 
thinking of grand strategy as dominant form of knowledge through its senior 
educational institutions, in particular at the United States National War College. Here 
grand strategy is taught to ‘groom’ future officers for leadership.7 The education of 
future leaders that are being prepared for the highest positions in the national security 
establishment, joint military command, and general staff functions is an important 
indicator how the geopolitical imagination about America’s role in the world is 
developed and perpetuated in one of the key institutions that is tasked with executing 
U.S. policy and protecting American interest abroad. The special emphasis of the 
military establishment on ‘leadership’ also serves to further explore this key element 
of American grand strategy discourse in the practical context of U.S. security and 
defense.  
 
As this chapter will demonstrate, the various elements of policy making, defense 
planning, military strategy development and professional senior education suggest a 
careful reframing of American hegemony in practical discourse that puts greater 
emphasis on cooperative engagement and restraint, while preserving the United 
                                            
7
 Cf., Ervin J. Rourke, “Military education for the new age,” in American Defense Policy, ed. Paul J. Bolt, 
Damon V. Coletta, and Collins G. Shackelford Jr. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2005): pp. 322-326.   
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States ability to act with superior military force where it is deemed politically 
necessary in the pursuit of vital national interests. The result is that while still the 
most visible denominator of global leadership, U.S. military preeminence is 
simultaneously being downsized and recalibrated toward more regional 
prioritization, increased collaboration, greater financial sustainability and less 
ambitious geopolitical goals in U.S. national security policy.    
 
U.S. defense policy planning and the geopolitical vision of American leadership in a 
multipolar system 
 
The U.S. Department of Defense has been described by Secretary Gates, who served 
at its head from 2006 until 2011, under both President Bush and Obama, as the 
‘largest, most complex organization on the planet.’8 Over 1.4 million men and 
women serve in the American military on active duty, in addition the Pentagon 
employs 718,000 civilian personnel, making it the ‘nation's largest employer.’9 
Another 1.1 million serve in the National Guard and Reserve forces. Under President 
Obama, the Department of Defense had an average annual budget in excess of $500 
billion, $700 billion if accounting for the supplementary budgets to finance the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, officially named ‘overseas contingency operations.’10 The 
DoD oversees American operations and military installations in the entire world and 
is the principal actor of the U.S. government charged with the execution of security 
and defense policy. After the President and the White House, the Pentagon is the 
                                            
8
 Gates, Duty, p. 577. 
9
 “About the Department of Defense (DOD),” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed, May 6, 2014, 
http://www.defense.gov/about/.  
10
 “Government Spending Chart,” U.S. Government Spending, accessed September 17, 2014,  
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/spending_chart_2004_2018U.S.r_09s1li111mcn_30f.  
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most important practitioner of U.S. grand strategy. One of the first significant 
strategic documents on defense to be released under the Obama administration was 
the Quadrennial Defense Review report (QDR), submitted on February 1, 2010.  
 
The QDR is a congressionally mandated report, requiring the examination of defense 
strategy and priorities every four years by the Department of Defense. The 2010 
QDR emphasized prioritizing America’s current conflicts, the engagements in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, marked by asymmetric conflicts, counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism, over planning for potential conflicts with ‘near peer’ rivals in classic 
scenarios of conventional war fighting.11 A second focus of the QDR was to 
reorganize the acquisition and management process at the Pentagon, to allow for 
greater accountability and efficiency in the allocation of financial resources. This 
was a first, timid step to reign in ballooning defense expenditures. A concern that 
would move more and more into the forefront of defense planning over Obama’s 
time in office. 
 
The 2010 QDR anticipates a geopolitical diffusion of political, economic and 
military power, in particular mentioning the rise of India and China in this context. In 
this increasingly multipolar international system, ‘the United States will remain the 
most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to 
sustain stability and peace.’12 Intertextually, the language of the QDR directly 
connects in its geopolitical assessment with the popular imagination of multipolarity 
                                            
11
 This resulted in the cancellation of several high-profile weapons programs primarily designed for such 
conventional conflicts as part of the FY 2010 budget, such as the F-22 air superiority fighter, or the Army’s 
Future Combat System, see Gates, Duty, pp. 311-322.  
12
 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Defense , 2010), p. iii. 
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in Zakaria’s Post-American World, or Brzezinski’s Strategic Vision, and the liberal-
internationalist analysis of ‘mutual indispensability’ and ‘network centrality’ by such 
authors as Slaughter, Nye and Gelb in Foreign Affairs. The assessment that a 
geopolitical diffusion of power and influence is occurring and that it is modifying the 
established hegemony of the United States and its global leadership role also seems 
to represent an intra-governmental consensus among U.S. defense planning and 
intelligence analysis.  
 
The National Intelligence Council (NIC), an internal government think tank located 
with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and drawing experts 
from government, academia, and the private sector, concluded in its 2008 report, 
titled Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World that a ‘global multipolar system is 
emerging with the rise of China, India, and others.’13 According to its mission 
statement, the NIC is supposed to provide ‘long-term strategic analysis’ to the 
intelligence community of the United States and the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI).14 The DNI in turn serves as ‘principal advisor’ to the President and the 
National Security Council on intelligence matters related to national security. 
Compared to the Pentagon, the NIC’s intelligence assessment is more candid in its 
view of a relative decline of U.S. economic and military power, and future 
                                            
13
 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington DC: National 
Intelligence Council, 2008), p. iv. Every four years the NIC publishes an update of its Global Trends series that 
identifies ‘key drivers and developments likely to shape world events a couple of decades into the future,’ cf., 
“Global Trends,” National Intelligence Council, accessed April 4, 2014, 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-what-we-do.  
14
 “Who we are,” National Intelligence Council, accessed April 4, 2014, 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-who-we-are. The NIC describes 
its role as: (…) bridge between the intelligence and policy communities, a source of deep substantive expertise on 
intelligence issues, and a facilitator of Intelligence Community collaboration and outreach, ibid. The ‘Intelligence 
Community’ (IC) of the United States encompasses a coalition of seventeen different (!) agencies and 
organizations that are charged with gathering and analyzing ‘intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations 
and national security activities,’ cf., “Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.dni.gov/index.php.  
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constraints of policy options. In general though, the defense policy planning process 
under Obama seems to have internalized the idea that the United States is facing the 
rise of a multipolar system.15 The text of the 2010 QDR subsequently moves away 
from the idea of a ‘unipolar moment,’ or the ‘Global War on Terror’ and embraces 
cooperative engagement as the way forward to secure American leadership in the 
world:16 
The United States must demonstrate steadfast engagement to address these 
global challenges and capitalize on emerging opportunities. We must display 
a continued willingness to commit substantial effort to strengthen and reform 
the international order and, in concert with our allies and partners abroad, 
engage in cooperative, purposeful action in the pursuit of common interests.17 
 
Again, this rhetorical shift from primacy to engagement represents a cross-discursive 
link between political practice and formal expertise, connecting the Pentagon 
planning process to the expertise of influential Washington think tanks, leading 
geopolitical experts and prominent IR scholars. As described in the previous 
chapters, the move to reframe and reformulate American grand strategy under 
Obama was already set up by the 2009 CNAS report edited by Brimley and 
Flournoy. Both would both be centrally involved in the formulation of the QDR, 
most importantly Flournoy, who as under secretary of defense for policy was directly 
responsible for the development of this policy document.18 After the publication of 
the QDR, the geopolitical vision outlined in this key text of practical discourse was 
flanked and reconfirmed by prominent Foreign Affairs articles by both Clinton and 
Gates, who stressed a new era of ‘building partner capacity’ and ‘smart power.’ 
                                            
15
 Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, p. 93. 
16
 In March 2009 the Department of Defense officially changed the name from ‘Global War on Terror’ to 
‘Overseas Contingency Operation’ (OCO) to designate its counter-terrorism activities, cf. Scott Wilson and Al 
Kamen, “’Global War on Terror’ is given a new name,” The Washington Post, March 25, 2009, accessed March 
14, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html.  
17
 Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010, p. 5. 
18
 Cf., Mark Thompson, “Michèle Flournoy Departs,” TIME, December 14, 2011, accessed, April 3, 2014, 
http://nation.time.com/2011/12/14/michele-flournoy-departs/.    
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Finally, Mead, Ikenberry and Brzezinski, all writing in Foreign Affairs, would hail 
the Obama administration for its vision of ‘engagement’ that seemingly repudiated 
the unilateralism of the Bush administration.19  
 
The ‘Bush doctrine’ had expressed a grand strategy vision of military primacy, an 
expansive agenda for global transformation, preemptive warfare, and an increased 
willingness to act unilaterally.20 In comparison with key strategic documents of the 
Bush presidency such as the National Security Strategy of 2002 and 2006 or the 
National Defense Strategy of 2008, the 2010 defense review under Obama developed 
a vision of hegemonic engagement that put greater emphasis on cooperative 
multilateralism to pursue U.S. interests for ‘security, prosperity, broad respect for 
universal values, and an international order that promotes cooperative action.’21 The 
previous 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review under Donald Rumsfeld had singled out 
the United Kingdom and Australia and their military support for the U.S.-led military 
intervention in Iraq as, ‘models for the breadth and depth of cooperation that the 
United States seeks to foster with other allies and partners around the world.’22  
 
The strategic focus had predominantly been on fighting a ‘long war’ under U.S. 
leadership, with America’s allies as welcome auxiliaries in this globe spanning 
conflict: “With its allies and partners, the United States must be prepared to wage 
                                            
19
 Ibid.  
20
 See for example the definition of the ‘Bush doctrine’ in, Gary L. Guertner, “European Views of Preemption in 
U.S. National Security Strategy,” The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection 5 (2007/2008), accessed March 
14, 2014, http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume5/august_2007/8_07_2.html.   
21
 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010, p. iv; where the Rumsfeld QDR of 2006 for 
example mentions ‘allies’ 57 times, the Gates QDR of 2010 nearly doubles this number, mentioning ‘allies’ 107 
times; ‘engagement’ on the other hand is not used to describe a strategic priority for defense planning and 
security cooperation under Rumsfeld, while it features prominently in this role in the 2010 QDR.  
22
 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2006), p. 7. 
 271 
this war in many locations simultaneously and for some years to come.”23 While both 
documents frequently mention ‘allies’ and ‘partners’ as cornerstone and necessary 
foundation of U.S. national security and defense, the Obama QDR of 2010 describes 
engagement in the context of a much broader geopolitical vision for global 
cooperation:  
The United States cannot sustain a stable international system alone. In an 
increasingly interdependent world, challenges to common interests are best 
addressed in concert with likeminded allies and partners who share 
responsibility for fostering peace and security.24 
 
In the words of the NIC:  
 (…) the multiplicity of influential actors and distrust of vast power  means 
less room for the U.S. to call the shots without the support of  strong 
partnerships.25  
 
At the same time, this shift towards greater cooperative engagement, compared to the 
Bush administration’s emphasis on a U.S.-led global agenda for the active promotion 
of freedom and democracy, and the fight against terrorist extremism, did not signal a 
departure from American preeminence in military matters:  
The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-
scale operations over extended distances. This unique position generates an 
obligation to be responsible stewards of the power and influence that history, 
determination, and circumstance have provided.26 
 
That greater engagement as element of the Obama defense policy was meant to 
reformulate American hegemony, not replace it was also well illustrated when 
Flournoy took a decisive stand against notions of restraint and retrenchment of U.S. 
military power and its global forward presence in the 2012 Foreign Affairs article 
she co-authored, titled “Obama’s New Global Posture.”27 Far from a radical change, 
                                            
23
 Ibid., p. 1. 
24
 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010, p. 57. 
25
 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, p. xi. 
26
 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010, p. v.  
27
 Flournoy and Davidson, “Obama’s New Global Posture.”  
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there was a strong continuity in defense policy and the way practical discourse 
framed the role of the United States and its military power in national security and 
world politics.  
 
The ‘stewardship of the international system’ the 2010 QDR identified as America’s 
ongoing and necessary role in the world for example, represents yet another 
metaphor for U.S. hegemony. In fact, the global ambition and reach of U.S. military 
power, as outlined in the 2010 QDR, directly linked the grand strategy visions of 
both Bush and Obama: The unique military capability for power projection remained 
the foundation of the global leadership role of the United States. As the Military 
Strategy of the United States, published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and meant to 
complement the 2010 QDR and achieve its military objectives through the 
instrument of the Armed Forces described it in 2011: 
Leadership is how we exercise the full spectrum of power to defend our 
national interests and advance international security and stability.28 
 
In terms of the hierarchy of grand strategy policy documents, and the practical 
formulation of the geopolitical identity of the United States, the Joint Chiefs refer to 
the National Security Strategy (NSS) issued by President Obama in 2010 as the 
highest level of U.S. security and defense planning that defined ‘our [America’s] 
enduring national interests.’ 29 Ultimately, the ends of American grand strategy under 
Obama, security, economic prosperity, a cooperative international order, and the 
promotion of universal values are all seen as advancing through continued American 
                                            
28
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2011), p. 1. 
29
 Ibid., 4. These are described as: “The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; A 
strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes 
opportunity and prosperity; Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and 
An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through 
stronger cooperation to meet global challenges;” ibid. 
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hegemony, of which military power is an essential component. The National Military 
Strategy of the United States perfectly folds into this political top-down chain of 
argumentation for U.S. hegemony in national security, defense policy and military 
strategy. Describing the NSS as having reaffirmed  ‘America’s commitment to 
retaining its global leadership role,’ it directly relates the global projection of 
American military power to the geopolitical vision of hegemony the NSS and the 
QDR set out:   
In pursuing these objectives, America’s Joint Force makes critical 
contributions to U.S. leadership and national security. […] This requires 
America’s Joint Force possesses the reach, resolve, and ability to project 
decisive military power.30 
 
The representations and practices of hegemonic military power, as documented in the 
Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Military Strategy of the United States 
reconfirm the geopolitical vision of hegemony in practical grand strategy discourse, 
at the same time the global leadership role of the Unites States provides the rationale 
for the continued existence and exercise of that power. The result is an argumentative 
tautology that reproduces itself in practical grand strategy discourse: Because of the 
superior military power it possesses, the United States is able to lead, because it is a 
indispensable leader in world affairs, the United States requires superior military 
power.  
 
This practical rationale however, is far from an isolated self-serving discourse 
produced by the top level of the military bureaucracy in the Pentagon. As the thesis 
has demonstrated, the equation of military preeminence, American hegemony and its 
stated positive effects for regional stability, democracy, and global prosperity is 
                                            
30
 Ibid., p. 5.  
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widely supported and contributed to by the formally independent expertise from 
Washington think tanks, from the neoconservative AEI, to the centrist Brookings, 
CSIS, or CNAS, which all argue to varying degrees for ‘preeminence’ of U.S. 
military power as stabilizing factor and deterrent of would be aggressors. In IR 
scholarship, one of the most prominent recent examples is the argument by Brooks, 
Wohlforth and Ikenberry for ‘deep engagement,’ brought forward in International 
Security, and later in Foreign Affairs, which states among other things that 
America’s ‘military dominance undergirds its economic leadership,’ and that the 
United States should not adopt a grand strategy of retrenchment and offshore 
balancing, for risking global instability.31  
 
In popular culture, the supremacy of the U.S. military and its historic achievements 
provided one of the key argument for Robert Kagan’s popular tractate on America as 
the George Bailey of the international system, the sole possible guarantor of the 
liberal world order, its military power essential to preserve world order, to ‘shape its 
norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system, and keep 
the peace.32 This vision of an American supremacy of power likewise underwrote the 
geopolitical bestsellers by Robert Kaplan or George Friedman and their neo-imperial 
fantasies of the U.S. president as ‘global emperor,’ or America’s  ‘voluntary 
Romanization.’33  
 
                                            
31
 Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America;” Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, “Lean 
Forward;” on this realist debate on U.S. grand strategy in IR, also see Craig Campbell, Benjamin H. Friedman, 
Brendan Rittenhouse Green, and Justin Logan, Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, 
“Correspondence. Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 
38, no. 2 (2013): pp. 181-199. 
32
 Kagan, The World America Made, p. 139. 
33
 Friedman, The Next Decade, p. 14; Kaplan, Revenge of Geography, pp. 342-344.   
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And of course with active support from the Pentagon the various cinematic accounts 
of the United States military heroically defending freedom and democracy against 
terrorists, alien invaders and super villains firmly embed the notion of military 
preeminence and U.S. leadership in the popular imagination. However, under the 
impression of sequestration this hegemonic, geopolitical identity of the United States 
would have to be reconciled with an increasing emphasis on restraint in security and 
defense matters. This would in turn further the tension between the political rhetoric 
and policy practice of American grand strategy discourse.  
 
Superpower under restraint: Sequestration and its impact on defense policy and the 
military planning of American grand strategy 
 
With the presentation of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) it became clear 
that greater restraint would enter the highest level of defense policy planning, and 
would in turn somewhat modify the definition of U.S. hegemony and its military 
power base. The DSG was released on January 5, 2012 under Obama’s second 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, who described it as ‘reflecting the President’s 
strategic direction to the department.’ The Defense Strategic Guidance officially 
adapted, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the standard measure for the 
global power projection capability of the United States, defined as the ability to fight 
two wars simultaneously. Instead the standard was reduced to the ability to fight one 
major war and act defensively against the aggressive aspirations of another actor in a 
second conflict.34 In addition, U.S. forces would ‘no longer be sized to conduct 
                                            
34
 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
(Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2012), p. 4. The former assistant secretary of defense in the 
Reagan administration, and senior fellow at the Center for American Progress Lawrence J. Korb and the 
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large-scale, prolonged stability operations.’35 The 2012 DSG in effect spelled out a 
grand strategy of ‘hegemony light.’ 
 
At the same time, it was announced that the United States, would in future prioritize 
its military capabilities in the ‘Asia-Pacific region.’36 This announcement was part of 
the ‘pivot to Asia’ the Obama administration declared in a concentrated effort in late 
2011 and early 2012. The pivot represented a key element of U.S. foreign and 
security policy discourse and was promoted by several prominent members of the 
Obama administration in a series of high profile public speeches, media articles, trips 
abroad, and policy announcements. These included the President himself, Secretary 
of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Panetta, and National Security Advisor 
Thomas Donilon.37 Militarily, one of the results of this strategic shift was that from 
2020 onwards the U.S. Navy would have 60% of its forces stationed in the Pacific, 
compared to a previous rough parity of forces between the Atlantic and the Pacific.38 
To offset the impression that the United States was withdrawing, or pivoting away 
                                                                                                                           
journalist Mark Thompson have pointed out that the ‘two war’ standard has always been a construct, as 
demonstrated for example by the inability of the American Armed Forces to simultaneously prioritize 
Afghanistan and Iraq, see Lawrence J. Korb, “The Right Cuts,” National Interest, January 25, 2012, accessed 
May, 7, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obamas-overblown-defense-reductions-6379; Mark 
Thompson, “The Two-MRC Strategy: Major Regional Contingencies, or Mythical Routine Canards?,” TIME, 
January 4, 2012, accessed, May 7, 2014, http://nation.time.com/2012/01/04/the-two-mrc-strategy-major-regional-
contingencies-or-mythical-routine-canards/; nonetheless the official abandonment of this established discursive 
trope of U.S. hegemony and global military preeminence in favor of a more limited imagination of the military 
role and geopolitical ambition of the United States remains a significant element in practical grand strategy 
discourse.    
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 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, p. 6.  
36
 Ibid., p. 2. 
37
 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, accessed March 11, 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century; Tom Donilon, “America is Back in 
the Pacific and will Uphold the Rules,” Financial Times, November 27, 2011, accessed March 11, 2014, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f3febac-1761-11e1-b00e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2vlVeZcC4;  
Barack Obama, “Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” November 17, 2011, accessed 
March 11, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-
parliament. 
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 Further military components of the ‘pivot’ include increased training exercises of the United States with ‘allies’ 
and ‘partners’, such as Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, as well as the 
stationing of U.S. Marines in Australia, cf., Leon Panetta, “Speech delivered at the Shangri-La Security 
Dialogue,” June 2, 2012, accessed April 07, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681. 
Secretary of Defense Panetta who described the United States as a ‘Pacific power,’ ended his speech in 
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from the Middle East and Europe, the ‘pivot’ was later renamed ‘rebalancing’ in 
official statements.39 This retrenchment however, seems already underway in parts, 
considering the removal of heavy U.S. combat troops from Germany, the limited 
U.S. involvement over Libya, or the absence of American military action in response 
to chemical weapons attacks in Syria.40 With the 2012 DSG the United States 
engaged in a geopolitical realignment, which prioritized one particular region, the 
Asia-Pacific, over others in the long-term orientation of national security policy. 
 
This strategic downsizing and rebalancing documented that under Obama defense 
policy would to some degree redefine the meaning of U.S. military preeminence and 
subsequently of America’s global hegemony in general. This was largely undertaken 
under the impression that the United States was facing a mounting debt crisis, and in 
context with increased political efforts to reign in federal spending, including on 
defense. In his opening remarks in the DSG document, titled Sustaining U.S. Global 
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense President Obama first focused on 
ending America’s conflicts after 9/11, the end of the War in Iraq, putting ‘al-Qa’ida 
on the path to defeat,’ and the transition in Afghanistan to Afghan responsibility.41 
Directly after, he referred to the Budget Control Act of 2011, and the need to reduce 
defense spending, in order to ‘renew our long-term economic strength.’42  
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 Cf., David Brewster, “'Asian pivot' is really an 'Asian re-balance',” The Interpreter, June 22, 2013, accessed 
April 07, 2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/06/22/asian-pivot-is-really-an-asian-
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 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, cover letter. 
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As an assessment by the Congressional Research Service stated, the strategy review 
leading up to the DSG was initiated by the President in April 2011, in order to 
identify $400 billion in additional savings in the defense budget as part of a broader 
effort to achieve $4 trillion in deficit reduction over 12 years.43 As Stuart Kaufman 
has commented, defense spending is the ‘material base’ for grand strategy. 44 
Changes to the size and trajectory of defense spending would affect the practical 
policy discourse on strategy and defense planning over the course of Obama’s first 
term and beyond.  
 
In the words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin E. Dempsey: “Cost 
has reemerged as an independent variable in the U.S. national security equation.”45 
From a critical perspective however, it is not primarily the correlation between 
money as material input and grand strategy as output that is relevant, but rather how 
the representation of cost and debt, affected the discourse of national security, and 
how it changed existing paradigms of grand strategy thinking, and established 
practices in defense policy.  
 
As Secretary Gates has noted in his memoirs, while in 2009, 2010 and 2011 defense 
budgets were largely unaffected by cuts, the 2012 budget was the first under 
President Obama to see a significant reduction in the growth of defense spending.46 
With the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the onset of sequestration in 2013 the 
                                            
43
 Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, In Brief: Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), p. 2. 
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Pentagon would ultimately face a reduction in previously planned defense spending 
levels of about $1 trillion over ten years compared to original estimates.47  
 
While even after these reductions the United States would maintain by far the largest 
single defense budget in the world, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance was a 
signifier that a new era of restraint would succeed the post-9/11 decade of ever 
increasing defense expenditures and ambitious military interventions. In fact, the 
DSG itself did not yet account for the possibility of sequestration, which senior 
officials in the Pentagon claimed would ‘break’ the new defense strategy.48 When it 
became clear that sequestration would in all likelihood become a political and fiscal 
reality, the Department of Defense would seek to further develop the strategic course 
of restraint the 2012 defense strategy had set out. A Strategic Choices and 
Management Review (SCMR) was conducted by the DoD in 2013 under the new 
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel that would further explore options fur cutting 
costs. The 2014 QDR was then designed to build upon and update the 2012 
guideline, and its vision of American leadership in an ‘age of austerity.’49 As part of 
the Pentagon budget proposal for 2015, Hagel announced further cuts to American 
Armed Forces, bringing the U.S. Army down to its ‘smallest number of troops since 
before the Second World War,’ as it was widely reported.50 This cautious and limited 
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reduction nonetheless produced a foreseeable and widespread outcry against 
President Obama’s ‘weakening’ of U.S. military power, his acceptance of 
incalculable risk in a dangerous world of ever growing threats, and the demise of 
America’s historic primacy in conservative circles of the foreign and security policy 
establishment.51   
 
The 2012 DSG also again put a strong emphasis on engagement, echoing the focus 
of the 2010 QDR. Calling repeatedly for continued efforts to work with allies, the 
document stressed that: “Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also 
remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership.”52 
In his cover letter to the Defense Strategic Guidance, President Obama referred to 
military operations in Libya to illustrate this vision of ‘burden-sharing.’53 As Obama 
also pointed out however, any fiscal constraint on U.S. military capabilities would 
not question the established geopolitical identity of the United States:  
(…) we will keep our Armed Forces the best-trained, best-led, best equipped 
fighting force in history. […] in a changing world that demands our 
leadership, the United States of America will remain the greatest force for 
freedom and security the world has ever known.54 
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and further cuts to the numbers of U.S. ships and airplanes, see Lawrence J. Korb, Max Hoffman, and Kate 
Blakeley, A User’s Guide to the Fiscal Year 2015 Defense Budget (Washington DC: Center for American 
Progress, 2014). Sequestration is ultimately opposed by the Pentagon and the Obama administration, and the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s budget planning process currently only has adapted to budget caps for the fiscal year 
2015. As Korb, Hoffman, and Blakeley argue, the department still hopes: “(…) if it can just weather this short-
term budgetary storm, it can avoid adjusting its long-term plans to reflect existing fiscal realities;” ibid, p. 1. 
51
 See for example, Dov Zakheim, “A budget strategy that courts disaster,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2012, 
accessed May 7, 2014, 
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/05/a_budget_strategy_that_courts_disaster; Arthur Herman, 
“America’s Disarmed Future,” National Review Online, January 6, 2012, accessed May 7, 2014,  
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/287320/america-s-disarmed-future-arthur-herman; Gary Schmitt and 
Tom Donnelly, “No Superpower Here,” Center for Defense Studies, January 9, 2012, accessed, May 7, 2014, 
http://www.defensestudies.org/cds/no-superpower-here/.  
52
 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, p. 3. 
53
 Ibid., cover letter. 
54
 Ibid. 
 281 
As with the greater emphasis on cooperative engagement compared to Bush, restraint 
would modify the articulation of U.S. grand strategy, but not replace the imagination 
of American leadership, global hegemony and military preeminence that lies at its 
center. The highest civilian and military representatives of the United States 
regularly frame U.S. military power as a force whose superiority is unparalleled in 
history, and whose necessity is beyond doubt in a world of ever increasing risks that 
is presented as beyond everything the United States has faced in the past. As 
Secretary Hagel recently stated during a Senate hearing about the future of defense 
spending:    
The United States of America possesses the most lethal, strongest, most 
powerful military today in the history of the world. We will continue to have 
that kind of a military. We need that kind of a military to protect our 
interests.55 
 
The Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, perfectly illustrated the 
inflationary use of the rhetoric of geopolitical volatility, existential threat and 
mounting risks abroad during another Senate hearing on U.S. intelligence: “I have 
not experienced a time when we have been beset by more crises and threats around 
the globe.”56 And General Dempsey informed the Senate Armed Service Committee: 
"I will personally attest to the fact that [the world is] more dangerous than it has ever 
been."57 As Micah Zenko succinctly summed up this statement:  
 Dempsey argues that we are not merely living in the most dangerous 
 moment since his birth in 1952, but since the earth was formed 4.54 
 billion years ago.58  
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Given the real possibility of a thermo-nuclear war with the Soviet Union for more 
than fifty years, the debacle of the Vietnam War with its millions of dead and 
wounded, or the experience of 9/11, to name but a few, this institutionalized, 
hyperbolic rhetoric of threat and fear seems not only out of place, but it can easily be 
identified as predominantly motivated by bureaucratic interests. The aim is to 
politically secure continued resources to fund a grand strategy of American 
hegemony, and the intelligence and military assets that come with it. This practical 
reasoning that is supposedly rooted in a careful appreciation of facts, and the rational 
analysis of international trends by seasoned experts and hardnosed strategists is then 
frequently reproduced and reconfirmed in formal and popular discourses, in think 
tank reports and research articles, in media commentaries and statements by 
congressional leaders, by popular book authors and movie producers, cementing it as 
a dominant world view and perception of geopolitical reality.  
 
Only rarely is there a critical reflection and investigation into these claims in the 
mainstream discourse of American grand strategy, as for example in the ‘Clear and 
Present Safety’ article in Foreign Affairs by Micah Zenko and Michael Cohen.59 As 
Robert Golan-Vilella has suggested, one of the results of this ‘threat inflation’ in 
geopolitical imagination might be that when polled on national security issues, 
American citizens tend to understate the actual dimension of the military power of 
the United States, and overstate perceived risks and threats, such as the belief that 
Iran is already in possession of nuclear weapons.60  
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The rhetoric of military preeminence and individual defense measures undertaken in 
context with the pivot testifies to the fact that the United States under Obama was 
determined to maintain a strong and growing military presence in a region that was 
defined as being of vital geostrategic importance for the future of U.S. political, 
economic and security interests. Still, the limited discursive shift in the framing of 
grand strategy within Obama’s first term from 2010 to 2012 testifies to a larger 
reorientation of the strategic focus of United States defense policy. While winning 
the ‘Long War’ against terrorism and extremism dominated the language of the 
Rumsfeld QDR in 2006, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were still at the 
forefront of the Gates QDR of 2010, the 2014 QDR, submitted by the new Secretary 
of Defense Chuck Hagel made it clear that ‘fiscal austerity’ had become the central 
focus of strategic planning at the Pentagon: 
(…) the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is principally focused on 
preparing for the future by rebalancing our defense efforts in a period of 
increasing fiscal constraint.61 
 
The high-level documents on defense policy and strategic planning submitted under 
President Obama suggest that the Obama administration continues to adhere to the 
central representation of American exceptionalism and global leadership, 
necessitated by a ever more volatile world of risks and threats. At the same time, the 
practice of defense policy is increasingly motivated by the concern for the 
sustainability of the United States fiscal situation, and subsequently engages in a 
careful restraining of defense expenditures and limited downsizing of military 
capabilities.  
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As a result, there is growing divide between grand strategy rhetoric and practice. As 
a 2012 CRS report remarked, the DSG would underscore ‘the unique global 
leadership role of the United States’, but not define the ‘scope or scale’ of this 
leadership.62 This incoherence in strategic defense planning, between continued 
hegemonic aspirations and increasingly limited means would be replicated on the 
level of operational military thinking, where the ‘pivot to Asia’ would prove to be 
more rhetorical than practical. 
 
From COIN to Air-Sea Battle: The geopolitics of military strategy 
 
In January 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta remarked that the United States 
saw itself ‘at a turning point after a decade of war.’63 A metaphor also frequently 
used by President Obama.64 A result of this turning point has been that the capability 
for global power projection, the military definition of U.S. hegemony is adapted and 
modified under the Obama presidency. The United States is ending its decade-long, 
large-scale combat operations in the Middle East and Central Asia and the 
experience of America engaging in militarily enforced regime change and counter-
insurgency is not likely to be repeated anytime soon. As Secretary Gates told an 
audience of Army cadets in a speech at the United States Military Academy at West 
Point in 2011:  
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In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to 
again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or 
Africa should ‘have his head examined (…)’65  
 
This rebalancing of defense policy would have both geopolitical and institutional 
implications. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, the principal instruments of 
land warfare, and thus the tools necessary for occupying foreign territory, are being 
downsized, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force are largely being maintained at current 
levels. This reflects a renewed geopolitical interest in the Asia-Pacific region that is 
largely perceived as a ‘naval theater,’ and which, under the ‘Unified Command Plan’ 
of the U.S. Department of Defense lies under the responsibility of the United States 
Pacific Command.66 The United States military is leaving behind ‘COIN’ and the 
Middle East, and is getting ready for ‘Air-Sea Battle’ (ASB) in the Pacific.  
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Fig. 17 The United States ‘Unified Command Plan’67  
 
COIN, or counter-insurgency as a military strategy to achieve victory in 
asymmetrical conflicts rose to prominence under a group of so-called ‘warrior 
scholars’ that sought to redefine America’s war fighting ability in the post-9/11 
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environment.68 One of the strategy’s key texts was the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine 
Corps field manual FM 3-24 of 2006, co-authored by U.S. Army General David 
Petraeus and U.S. Marine Corps General James F. Amos. COIN called for the 
military to concentrate not just on fighting and the elimination of enemies, but to 
follow a broader political, social and economic approach toward armed insurrection. 
The protection of civilian populations, the targeting of insurgency leaders, and 
support for a legitimate host-nation government were all counted as part of this 
comprehensive strategy. FM 3-24 stated that: “(…) COIN operations always demand 
considerable expenditures of time and resources.”69 COIN later became almost 
synonymous with U.S. military strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also with the 
immense financial burden and considerable military and civilian resources necessary 
to undertake operations that simultaneously were aimed at providing security, 
economic assistance, and development for local populations in conflict zones, in 
order to achieve a stable political environment.70  
 
Furthermore, it seems that neither in Iraq nor in Afghanistan counter-insurgency 
could produce the lasting stability the U.S. military claimed it would provide. Two 
names in particular were associated with COIN in Obama’s first term: The first is 
General David Petraeus, who served as U.S. commander in Iraq from 2007 to 2008 
and later as combatant commander of U.S. Central Command from 2008 to 2010, the 
military command in charge of all American forces in the Middle East and Central 
Asia. The second is General Stanley McChrystal, who served as U.S. commander in 
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Afghanistan from 2009 to 2010. Both defined counter-insurgency as only possible 
strategy for the United States to ‘win’ in Afghanistan, the conflict that would take 
center stage in national security policy during Obama’s first term.71 As Professor 
Bacevich has remarked in an interview with the author, both Petraeus and 
McChrystal have since been somewhat discredited, and it seems so has COIN as 
defining military strategy for the United States in the 21st century. 72  As the 
Washington Post wrote on March 4, 2014: 
In Washington, among policymakers, the Afghan war is increasingly 
discussed with exasperation, like a curse. It is the type of warfare the United 
States must avoid at all cost, President Obama argued during his State of the 
Union address.73 
 
The journalist Bob Woodward reported in 2010, in his New York Times bestselling 
book Obama’s Wars that President Obama and the White House felt frequently 
pressured by Petraeus, McChrystal and the military leadership to endorse a COIN 
strategy for Afghanistan, and to agree to a significant troop surge in the fall of 2009, 
which would ultimately result in the political decision for 30.000 additional 
American troops to be sent to the country.  
 
The conflict over COIN revealed an at times strenuous civil-military relationship in 
the first term of the Obama administration. COIN in Afghanistan seems to have been 
a largely military driven strategy that while politically supported by the President, 
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MacArthur for insubordination during the Korean War. On the strains in civilian-military relations over the 
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was never framed by Obama in terms of his central grand strategy vision for the 
United States.74 The ‘pivot to Asia’ the Obama administration announced in 2011 
and 2012 however, seems to represent a far more central element of President 
Obama’s vision about America’s long-term interest and future geopolitical 
trajectory.75 Obama emphasized this during his November 2011 address to the 
Australian Parliament in Canberra: 
As we consider the future of our armed forces, we've begun a review that will 
identify our most important strategic interests and guide our defense priorities 
and spending over the coming decade. […] As we end today’s wars, I have 
directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the 
Asia Pacific a top priority.76 
 
The abandonment of COIN and downsizing of the Army and the Marine Corps, and 
the discursive framing of the ‘pivot’ and the prioritization of the Navy and Air Force 
in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance seem to support this strategic rebalancing. 
As a consequence, and in line with the 2012 guidance, the Air-Sea Battle concept 
would increasingly became the focus of future military operational planning under 
President Obama.77 Air-Sea Battle first entered the policy discourse of grand strategy 
with the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2010 that stated:   
The Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle 
concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, 
including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial 
capabilities.78 
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 Cf., Jaffe, “U.S. model for a future war fans tensions with China and inside Pentagon.”  
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In August 2011, the Pentagon announced the establishment of an Air-Sea Battle 
Office to coordinate related policies in the department. Air-Sea Battle essentially 
envisions a potential challenge to U.S. hegemony in Asia, and to a lesser degree in 
the Middle East.79 It is assumed that the improvement and proliferation of advanced 
military technological capabilities, in particular conventional and nuclear 
submarines, satellites, long-range fighters, stealth, drones, and ballistic missile 
systems could endanger U.S. military installations and naval assets, and offset the 
traditional advantage conventional U.S. forces have enjoyed in the past.80 These 
‘A2/AD’ capabilities could prohibit American access to and movement within a 
region, and are in particular attributed to the growing military clout of China in 
Asia.81 As the Military Strategy of the United States explained in its segment on 
regional security in the Asia-Pacific: 
To safeguard U.S. and partner nation interests, we will be prepared to 
demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation’s 
actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and 
cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies.82 
 
Since the uninhibited projection of military power and command of the ‘global 
commons’ are viewed as the essential foundation of America’s leadership role and 
cornerstone of its security and defense strategy, ‘A2/AD’ is perceived as a potential 
threat to U.S. interests, and challenge to American grand strategy. In response, Air-
Sea Battle envisions the ‘ability to conduct operational maneuver from strategic 
distances—that is, the ability to project dominant military force across transoceanic 
ranges.’83 As the Center for Strategic and Budget Assessments (CSBA) has defined 
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‘Air-Sea Battle,’ it should help ‘set the conditions at the operational level to sustain a 
stable, favorable conventional military balance throughout the Western Pacific 
region.’84  
 
As the Washington Post has reported, one of the key figures behind Air-Sea Battle is 
the futurist Andrew Marshall who has developed the concept for over twenty years at 
the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA). 85 In essence, the ONA is the 
Pentagon’s equivalent to the NIC, an internal research and analysis organization, 
tasked with developing a long-term strategic outlook for U.S. national security and 
defense matters in support of political decision-making and operational planning. It 
enjoys wide admiration for its grand strategy proficiency among the defense policy 
establishment, and in particular the Washington think tank scene, where it is seen as 
much needed antithesis to the un-strategic, short-term crisis reaction mode associated 
with conventional politics in Washington.  
 
Subsequently, grand strategy and security experts reacted with anger and protest to 
rumors in 2013 that the organization might be closed due to budget cuts.86 As 
Thomas M. Skypek explained, writing in defense of the ONA in the National 
Interest, a leading American foreign affairs journal:  
Its contributions are significant and numerous: it positioned the United States 
for victory in the Cold War […]; foresaw the revolution of information 
warfare and […]; and highlighted the challenges that a rising, assertive China 
will pose.87 
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The development of Air-Sea Battle and the celebration of the ONA and its visionary 
abilities for strategic insight also document how, aside from the mantra of leadership, 
there exists something akin to a cult of grand strategy in Washington DC, where the 
elite discourse of national security and defense policy is fixated on the 
indispensability of strategy and the essential insight of the strategist in guiding the 
national interest over the long term.  
 
Marshall and the Office of Net Assessment apparently have established a wide 
network of supporters among the Department of Defense, think tanks, Congress and 
the defense industry for Air-Sea Battle.88 A key supporter for example is the Center 
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, who published its first reports on the 
subject of Air-Sea Battle in 2010.89  Andrew Krepinevich, the think tank’s president, 
who authored this first report for CSBA also strongly advocated this strategy in his 
articles for Foreign Affairs as described in chapter five.90  
 
The framing of Air-Sea Battle between policy makers, military officials and civilian 
experts as an operational concept of fundamental strategic importance for the long-
term security of the United States, in addition with popular reflections of naval 
warfare in the Pacific in the movie Battleship perfectly illustrate how geopolitical 
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visions of grand strategy are built and established as dominant knowledge and 
generally accepted truth through the intertextual links between practical, formal and 
popular discourses. In the relatively short time between 2010 and 2012 Air-Sea 
Battle emerged from the sidelines of military-operational thinking to a key feature of 
geopolitical imagination on U.S. national security in military strategy documents, 
think tank reports, journal articles, press statements, conference presentations, public 
speeches, and even a major Hollywood movie.  
 
At the same time though, as a military-operational element of grand strategy practice, 
Air-Sea Battle seems to combine efforts to maintain the regional hegemony the 
United States enjoys in military matters with elements of a realist offshore balancing 
approach. So far, the ‘pivot,’ or rebalancing did not result in a significant military 
buildup of the United States in Japan or South Korea, the traditional locations for the 
forward presence of the U.S. in the region, regularly identified as the foundation of 
its hegemonic position. Instead, the United States sent two Littoral Combat Ships 
(LCSs) to Singapore, and announced the deployment of 2.500 Marines to Darwin in 
Australia, ‘off-shore’ locations in the geopolitical logic of realist balance-of-power 
calculations as described by Walt, Mearsheimer, or Layne. This in turn gave rise to 
criticisms of the pivot as being merely ‘rhetoric’ from circles that envision a stronger 
American military presence in the region and that demand a decisive confirmation of 
American military primacy in Asia, as for example documented by AEI. As even 
General Dempsey has acknowledged, from a military point of view:  “For now, this 
shift in focus is more about thinking than it is doing.”91 
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Thus, the concept of Air-Sea Battle and its implementation under Obama seem to 
entail yet another articulation of the contradiction between geopolitical 
representations and security practices in dominant discourses of American grand 
strategy. One of the key problems for Air-Sea battle is that while American officials 
stress that the pivot is not designed to contain China, the military focus of this 
strategy is clearly on the perceived threat potential of the People’s Republic and its 
rising defense budgets. As a senior Navy official has remarked: 
We want to put enough uncertainty in the minds of Chinese military planners 
that they would not want to take us on. […] Air-Sea Battle is all about 
convincing the Chinese that we will win this competition.92 
 
However, characterizing Air-Sea Battle as a military containment strategy, and thus 
framing it exclusively in terms of maintaining American hegemony in the region 
would jeopardize efforts of the Obama administration to seek continued engagement 
and an improved cooperative relationship with China. As President Obama has 
remarked in February 2012: 
(…) I have always emphasized that we welcome China’s peaceful rise that 
we believe that a strong and prosperous China is one that can help to bring 
stability at prosperity to the region and to the world.  And we expect to be 
able to continue on the cooperative track that we’ve tried to establish over the 
last three years.93 
 
At the same time, the fiscal constraints on future U.S. defense spending and military 
planning are seen as potentially undermining the credibility of the pivot, both 
domestically and abroad, even more so with the full impact of sequestration yet 
having to materialize.94 Furthermore, it seems that the reticence of the United States 
to get involved militarily, first in Syria and over the Russian annexation of Crimea, 
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has in turn cast further doubt over the credibility of the pivot and American regional 
security guarantees among political elites in Asia.95 An impression President Obama 
deliberately tried to counter during an Asia trip in April 2014, that both underscored 
America’s established alliances, with visits to Japan and South Korea, and signaled 
the pivot’s emphasis on developing partnerships, highlighting through increased U.S. 
cooperation with the Philippines and Malaysia.96  
 
In the context of grand strategy the military aspect of the Asian pivot is caught in an 
unresolved tension between the ambition to maintain America’s regional hegemony, 
fiscal constraints that seem better suited to realist approach of offshore balancing, 
and the continued desire of the United States to develop China into a ‘responsible 
stakeholder’ for the cooperative management of security and economic affairs in the 
Asia-Pacific. Perhaps owning to this conundrum, in terms of military strategy, Air-
Sea Battle has so far had only limited operational impact.  
 
As explored in the previous chapter, this undecided nature of the pivot has been 
frequently observed among leading Washington think tanks and it contributes to the 
difficulties security experts seem to have in assigning a distinct label to the grand 
strategy of President Obama. However, if we consider the realm of professional 
military education of national security and grand strategy, it seems that in the U.S. 
military there is a much greater appreciation for the dynamic nature of strategic 
thinking and practice, and openness for the adaptability of strategic concepts of 
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American leadership than the more politicized debate in Washington DC is able to 
tolerate. 
 
‘Grooming for leadership’ - The U.S. military and the institutionalization of grand 
strategy thinking in senior military education  
 
Leadership is one of the most important qualities the United States military values in 
its members, and in particular its officers. It is also viewed as the key element for a 
successful implementation of grand strategy. As General Dempsey remarked in 
context with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance:  
The real test of this strategy is not in the choices we made, but in putting the 
choices to work. I am confident that we will pass this test for one simple 
reason—leadership.97 
 
‘Leadership’ as professional military skill and mark of personal character is being 
developed throughout the career of an officer in the U.S. military in several 
educational institutions. At the beginning stands officer cadet training, either at the 
individual service academies, most famous among them the United States Military 
Academy at West Point and the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, in 
reserve officer training courses (ROTC) at regular U.S. colleges and universities, or 
at the military’s officer candidate schools (OCS). These stand at the beginning of a 
lifelong system of professional military education (PME), where the development of 
military skills and knowledge is being developed in hierarchical stages of progress, 
designed so that upon successful completion American officers are able to take on 
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ever greater responsibilities for command, from the tactical to the operational, and 
finally the strategic level.98   
 
In the context of grand strategy discourse the most important of these institutions and 
programs are those that train future flag-rank and general staff officers for the 
highest military command positions, and other high-profile assignments in national 
security and defense policy. At this level, the senior education of military leadership 
at war colleges incorporates the teaching of grand strategy, IR theory and geopolitics, 
deemed essential professional knowledge for in turn maintaining the global 
leadership role of the United States.  
 
The syllabus for the course ‘Fundamentals of Statecraft,’ part of the National War 
College’s core curriculum illustrates this. Designed to introduce the objects and 
issues of the ‘highest level of strategic thought,’ it emphasizes the practice of grand 
strategy over abstract theory, and in particular singles out such classical thinkers and 
practitioners of war, military power and geopolitics as Niccolo Machiavelli, Carl von 
Clausewitz, and Henry Kissinger for study and critical examination about the 
‘assumptions that underpin strategists’ thinking.99 A CSIS report on professional 
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military education explicitly stresses the close link between the education of 
geopolitical and strategic knowledge and the practice of grand strategy:  
They [the officers of the U.S. military] represent the human capital that will 
sustain the global leadership of the United States and secure its role as the 
world’s sole remaining superpower into the twenty-first century.100  
 
Thus, the education for military leadership becomes entwined with the dominant 
discourse of grand strategy that establishes the military preeminence and global 
hegemony of the United States as geopolitical reality. One of the most important 
institutions for the teaching of grand strategy is the National Defense University 
(NDU), located in Washington DC, and its National War College (NWC). According 
to its website:  
The mission of the National War College is to educate future leaders of the 
Armed Forces, State Department, and other civilian agencies for high-level 
policy, command, and staff responsibilities by conducting a senior-level 
course of study in national security strategy.101    
 
As Colonel Greg Schultz, chairman of the Department of Strategy and Policy at the 
NWC, has explained when interviewed for this thesis, American grand strategy is 
defined by a continued national interest for the promotion of American leadership 
and a globally engaged United States.102 In preparing American officers to plan and 
operate America’s military in a strategic context, the military education of grand 
strategy is yet another site for the reproduction of the geopolitical identity of the 
United States, and the dominant worldview of power and order the military is 
supposed to defend. The senior service colleges, like the U.S. Army War College, the 
U.S. Naval War College, the U.S. Air War College, and the U.S. Marine Corps War 
College train selected officers (minimum 16-22 years of service) to groom for ‘future 
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leadership,’ focusing on the ‘macro-realm of national security strategy’ and teaching 
them ‘how to think as opposed to what to think.’103 A further element is the 
assignment of senior officers as students at graduate schools, or as fellows in think 
tanks, further stressing the intertextual and intellectual exchange between military 
thinking and civilian expertise, between formal and practical discourses in the 
formulation of grand strategy knowledge.   
 
Remarkably though, in the military education of strategy the U.S. military does not 
define strategy strictly as scientific knowledge, and purely rational-technological 
calculation of means and ends, like the majority of positivist IR literature. Instead it 
stresses the creative dimension of strategic thinking, the interplay of means, ends, 
and ways, and how ‘strategy is an art.’104 The U.S. Army War College Guide to 
National Security, published by the college’s Institute for Strategic Studies, for 
example explicitly relates the operation of grand strategy to the underlying 
geopolitical imagination of the country: 
At the grand strategic level, the ways and means to achieve U.S. core national 
interests are based on the national leadership’s strategic vision of America’s 
role in the world.105         
 
Furthermore, it relates the successful political formulation of grand strategy, and its 
discursive authority to its intertextual connectivity and recognition in the popular 
realm: 
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To be effective, each new administration has had to express a vision for the 
U.S. role in the world that does not outpace the experience of the American 
people, and thus lose the decisive authority or domestic consensus to 
implement the strategic vision. Is the vision, in other words, suitable and 
acceptable?106 
 
As the Mr. Y article has documented, there is a growing awareness in military circles 
that the political-military leadership faces the challenge to develop a new strategic 
narrative that resonates with the American public and that brings the imagination of 
American leadership in line with changing geopolitical dynamics. Here, the aim is a 
grand strategy focused on promoting sustainability and common security interests 
with other countries, rather than just a concentration on threats alone. It seems that in 
the professional military education of national security, there exists a similar shift 
toward greater cooperative engagement and approaches of ‘leading from behind,’ 
when it comes to the definition of American leadership. According to Col. Schultz, a 
majority of the military and civilian students at the NWC, who as part of their course 
assignments have to develop a grand strategy for the United States, favor a globally 
engaged United States and at the same time ‘strong collaborative relationships’ with 
other countries for the joint promotion of sustainable security.107  
 
In combination with the Defense Strategic Guidance and the latest National Defense 
Review it seem that the U.S. military, both at the top level and in its future leadership 
personnel, is adapting the premise of American leadership and military preeminence 
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to a grand strategy vision that is both more dependent on allies and partners, and less 
willing to accept the costs of global primacy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The high-level policy documents on defense planning and military strategy, and the 
wider practical discourse on national security and defense in the Pentagon 
demonstrate that politically ideas of continued American leadership, hegemony, and 
global preeminence in military matters coexist, and are in fact developed jointly with 
visions of increased partnerships and cooperation on the one side, and greater 
restraint and a more limited geopolitical ambitions on the other side. Such flexibility 
and pragmatism in the design of grand strategy clearly frustrate ‘purists,’ such as the 
experts and pundits populating the various beltway think tanks, which oftentimes 
blend visions of strategy with firmly entrenched ideological predispositions on 
security and defense.  
 
Yet, the U.S. military, which defines grand strategy predominantly as an creative 
exercise, seems much more willing to accept such compromises in the complex 
interplay of ways means and ends that mark the long-term pursuit of the national 
interest. This seems largely based on a culture of political neutrality, and a pragmatic 
appreciation for what is perceived as changing geopolitical realities. Beyond the field 
of professional military education, this pragmatism is also reflected and confirmed 
for the administration’s civilian and military leadership in national security in such 
diverse texts as the Defense Strategic Guidance, the reports by the National 
Intelligence Council, or the Mr. Y. article. But the pragmatism of policy planning 
seems increasingly in conflict with the established mantra of American leadership.  
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With the end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the onset of sequestration, it 
seems that a focus on restraint has taken on ever-greater discursive significance over 
the course of Obama’s presidency. While this does not signal that the United States 
is willing to relinquish its global military leadership role, or that there is a reframing 
of geopolitical identity in official discourse, it has clearly shifted the argumentative 
focus of security and defense planning away from the ‘Long War’ on Terror towards 
a concern with security and sustainability.  
 
This at the same times documents a growing rift between the hegemonic imagination 
of the United States and its role in the world, marked by notions of leadership, 
exceptionalism, indispensability and unparalleled military power, and political 
practices that downsize and reprioritize America’s armed forces. The ‘pivot to Asia’ 
and sequestration, although discursively linked to a continued vision of ‘American 
leadership,’ in fact speak for a United States that has to adapt the makeup of its 
national security to an age of austerity and unprecedented limitations of U.S. actions 
that is likely to last into the foreseeable future.  
 
Yet, the political rhetoric of defense reviews and military strategies, the formal 
expertise of IR scholarship and think tank policy research, and the popular 
entertainment of Hollywood blockbusters and national politics bestsellers continue to 
constitute a worldview, where American power and leadership are the essential 
pillars of world order, globalization and Western values, and the absence of both the 
cause for global instability and heightened risk, from the continued Syrian civil war, 
to Chinese assertiveness in the Pacific, and Russian intrusions into Eastern Ukraine.  
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It seems doubtful if the inconsistencies and tensions in this geopolitical discourse of 
security, identity and power will be able to last indefinitely in the formulation of 
American grand strategy. If current trends continue, at some point the language of 
global leadership and existential threat in elite discourse will have to be adapted to a 
more limited role of the U.S. in world politics, and a growing popular sentiment that 
is tired of risking American lives for what seem to be intractable problems of world 
politics. While the United States will maintain forces and an accompanying defense 
budget that is still set out to maintain a global military preeminence, and underwrite 
U.S. hegemony, the definition of both seem to be in flux, and a grand strategy of 
American primacy seems neither to reflect the political ambition nor the economic 
reality of the United States.  
 
As such, neither the Air-Sea Battle concept with its limited practical implications and 
mixed messages concerning the perception and future threat projection of China, nor 
the ever growing focus on sustainability in the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense 
Reviews seem designed to reinvigorate U.S. military supremacy to levels of the 
previous George W. Bush administration. They seem rather designed to better 
administrate shrinking, or at best flat lining resources in the still vast defense 
establishment of the United States, and prepare the nation for an era where the ‘tide 
of war has receded,’ at least as far as large-scale U.S. military interventions on the 
ground are concerned.  
 
In the remaining, final chapter it will now be the task to investigate how President 
Obama, as ‘commander-in-chief’ has used his position as the country’s top 
representative in foreign and security policy to maintain, or reframe the geopolitical 
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identity of the United States in political discourse, how this has connected 
intertextually in expert circles, the media, and the wider public and how he has 
incorporated popular, formal and practical discourses of hegemony, engagement and 
restraint in his vision for the country’s grand strategy.  
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7. President Obama – Vision for Change? 
 
“Don’t do stupid shit.”1 – Barack H. Obama 
 
On a trip to Asia in April 2014, President Obama employed a uniquely American 
baseball analogy to contrast the popular reflection of his foreign policy in 
Washington with his own definition of the ‘Obama doctrine:’ 
You hit singles, you hit doubles; every once in a while we may be able to hit a 
home run. That may not always be sexy. That may not always attract a lot of 
attention, and it doesn’t make for good argument on Sunday morning shows. But 
we steadily advance the interests of the American people and our partnership 
with folks around the world.2 
 
This careful appreciation for the scope and limitations of American power and 
influence in the world by the President of the United States renewed once more a 
virulent debate about Obama’s grand strategy in the American media and expert 
circles of U.S. foreign policy.3 In fact, shortly after his Asia trip, and an even more 
off-hand description of his basic foreign policy premise had become prominent, 
Obama announced the final drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan until 2016. 
This would end America’s longest running war by the time the President would leave 
                                            
1
 Quoted in David Rotkopf, “Obama’s ‘Don’t Do Stupid Shit’ Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, June 4, 2014, 
accessed August 22, 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/04/obama_dont_do_stupid_shit_foreign_policy_bowe_bergdahl. 
This phrase was apparently used by President Obama in a conversation with accompanying journalists during his 
trip to Asia in April 2014 to describe his basic foreign policy premise of avoiding further military entanglements 
of the United States abroad. It gained a wide circulation after it featured prominently in several leading American 
media; cf., Mike Allen, “‘Don't do stupid sh--' (stuff),” Politico, June 1, 2014, accessed August 29, 2014, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/dont-do-stupid-shit-president-obama-white-house-107293.html; 
according to the LA Times: “Within the tight circle of foreign policy aides in the White House, the shorthand 
captured Obama’s resistance to a rigid catch-all doctrine, as well as his aversion to what he once called the ‘dumb 
war’ in Iraq;” cf., Christi Parsons and Kathleen Hennessy, “Obama will explain 'interventionist' foreign policy at 
West Point,” LA Times, May 25, 2014, accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-obama-
foreign-policy-20140525-story.html.  
2
 Landler, “Ending Asia Trip, Obama Defends His Foreign Policy;” this baseball image was hardly an 
enthusiastic confirmation of America’s vigorous leadership role. As one op-ed columnist for the New York Times 
wrote: “It doesn’t feel like leadership. It doesn’t feel like you’re in command of your world. […] What happened 
to crushing it and swinging for the fences? Where have you gone, Babe Ruth?” Maureen Dowd, “Is Barry 
whiffing?” New York Times, April 29, 2014, accessed June 2, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/opinion/dowd-is-barry-whiffing.html.  
3
 For some prominent examples of this debate in Obama’s second term, see Slaughter, “Does Obama have a 
grand strategy for his second term? If not, he could try one of these;” Ian Bremmer, “The Tragic Decline of 
American Foreign Policy;” Paul Bonicelli, “Five years is long enough to wait for an Obama grand strategy.”  
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office in 2017, yet it also provided his critics with further evidence that a policy of 
geopolitical retrenchment was at the heart of Obama’s grand strategy.4  
 
Partly to counter this prevalent popular criticism of his administration’s retreat from 
American leadership, the President presented a much anticipated declaration of the 
‘Obama doctrine’ on May 28, 2014 before the graduation class of the U.S. Military 
Academy at West Point, the same location where he had announced a substantial 
troop increase to Afghanistan five years earlier. Obama defined his speech as 
description of his ‘vision for how the United States of America and our military 
should lead in the years to come.’5 As announced by the White House, the President 
would now, after having wound up the legacy of the Bush wars, offer his own vision 
for American foreign policy and national security, and formulate a grand strategy to 
point the country into the future.6  
 
As this chapter will demonstrate, far from a new or original interpretation of 
America’s role in the world, Obama used his speech to reiterate a series of familiar 
themes that have dominated his formulation of grand strategy ever since he took 
office in 2009: the continued indispensability of American leadership in the world 
and the belief in American exceptionalism; a strong emphasis on cooperative 
                                            
4
 Cf., Editorial Board, “President Obama continues his retreat from Afghanistan,” Washington Post, May 28, 
2014, accessed June 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-continues-his-retreat-
from-afghanistan/2014/05/27/ae01686e-e5c2-11e3-8f90-73e071f3d637_story.html  
5
 Barack Obama, “Transcript of President Obama’s Commencement Address at West Point,” May 28, 2014, 
accessed June 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/us/politics/transcript-of-president-obamas-
commencement-address-at-west-point.html. 
6
 Cf., Peter Baker, “Rebutting Critics, Obama Seeks Higher Bar for Military Action,” New York Times, May 28, 
2014, accessed June 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/us/politics/rebutting-critics-obama-seeks-
higher-bar-for-military-
action.html?rref=politics&module=Ribbon&version=context&region=Header&action=click&contentCollection=
Politics&pgtype=article; John Cassidy, “A reluctant Realist at West Point,” New Yorker, May 29, 2014, accessed 
June 2, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2014/05/a-reluctant-realist-at-west-
point.html.  
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engagement, and increased burden sharing with allies and partners in support of an 
interdependent international order; the end of America’s decade of war, a more 
limited national security focus on counter-terrorism efforts; and finally a 
prioritization of America’s domestic renewal, and a greater concern with military 
restraint and the prudent use of U.S. power.7 As Obama explained at West Point: 
America must always lead on the world stage. If we don’t, no one else will. 
The military […] is, and always will be, the backbone of that leadership. But 
U.S. military action cannot be the only, or even primary, component of our 
leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not 
mean that every problem is a nail.8 
 
Far from a coherent vision for America’s way forward, the West Point speech 
revealed once more the inherent tension between the established hegemonic 
imagination of America’s irreplaceable leadership and its foundation in military 
preeminence, and countering discourses of ‘nation-building at home’, and ‘leading 
from behind.’ Unable, and most likely also unwilling to artificially dissolve this 
tension, Obama formulated a grand strategy that thus failed to deliver the convincing 
narrative for the geopolitical imagination of the nation that most experts and 
commentators demanded.9 Peter Bergen, national security analyst for CNN and 
director of the progressive New America Foundation think tank, summarized the 
Obama doctrine as follows: 
                                            
7
 In the 2010 National Security Strategy Obama had already broadly described this vision: “Going forward, there 
should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security—through our 
commitments to allies, partners, and institutions; our focus on defeating al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the globe; and our determination to deter aggression and prevent the 
proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons. As we do, we must recognize that no one nation—no 
matter how powerful—can meet global challenges alone. As we did after World War II, America must prepare 
for the future, while forging cooperative approaches among nations that can yield results. Our national security 
strategy is, therefore, focused on renewing American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our 
interests in the 21st century. We will do so by building upon the sources of our strength at home, while shaping 
an international order that can meet the challenges of our time.” Barack Obama, U.S. National Security Strategy 
(Washington DC: The White House, 2010), p. 1.  
8
 Obama, “Transcript of President Obama’s Commencement Address at West Point.” 
9
 As the New York Times commented: “The address did not match the hype, was largely uninspiring, lacked 
strategic sweep and is unlikely to quiet his detractors, on the right or the left.” Editorial Board, “President Obama 
Misses a Chance on Foreign Affairs,” New York Times, May 28, 2014, accessed June 2, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/opinion/president-obama-misses-a-chance-on-foreign-affairs.html?_r=0.   
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What Obama did in his West Point speech was to chart a course that balances 
two natural, and contradictory, American national security impulses -- 
isolationism and interventionism -- and points to a hybrid approach that 
avoids some of the pitfalls of either of these strategic approaches.10 
 
The presentation at West Point and the controversial reaction to it in formal and 
popular discourses, from CNN and the New York Times to Foreign Affairs and the 
National Interest, once again confirmed the intertextual connectivity, but also the 
hybridity and ideational complexity of the President’s geopolitical vision, which 
Obama himself has placed between ‘isolationism’ and ‘interventionism.’11As Obama 
himself has acknowledged, his grand strategy was not always ‘sexy.’ Nor, could it fit 
on a bumper sticker.12 Both conservatives and liberal proponents of the Washington 
consensus of hegemony have in turn reacted negatively to Obama’s vision for 
America. They have criticized a mood of national decline, an era of shrinkage, and a 
strategy of global retrenchment and restraint to have taken hold under the Obama 
White House: signs of weakness that they hold responsible for dangerously 
undermining the liberal world order that ‘America made.’13  
                                            
10
 Peter Bergen, “Obama says goodbye to American hubris,” CNN, May 28, 2014, accessed June 2, 2014,  
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/28/opinion/bergen-obama-doctrine-smart-power/.  
11
 See also the discussion of Obama’s speech in Jacob Heilbrunn, “Barack Obama Misfires at West Point,” The 
National Interest, May 29, 2014, accessed June 2, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/obamas-west-point-
speech-10552; Michael O’Hanlon, “The Obama Defense,” Foreign Affairs, May 28, 2014, accessed June 2, 2014, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141473/michael-ohanlon/the-obama-defense?nocache=1; Daniel W. 
Drezner, “Five things I think I think about U.S. foreign policy after Obama’s West Point speech,” The 
Washington Post, June 2, 2014, accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/06/02/five-things-i-think-i-think-about-american-
foreign-policy-after-obamas-west-point-speech/.  
12
 Cf., Jonathan Chait, “Liberalism's Bumper Sticker Problem,” The New Republic, April 28, 2011, accessed June 
3, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/jonathan-chait/87553/liberalisms-bumper-sticker-problem. In fact, 
Ben Rhodes, one of the President’s deputy national-security advisers, remarkably illustrated this tension between 
geopolitical complexity and the reductionist demands of grand strategy discourse, when he offered: “If you were 
to boil it all down to a bumper sticker, it’s ‘Wind down these two wars, reestablish American standing and 
leadership in the world, and focus on a broader set of priorities, from Asia and the global economy to a nuclear-
nonproliferation regime’.” Quoted in, Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist. How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s 
foreign policy,” The New Yorker May 2, 2011, accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/02/110502fa_fact_lizza?currentPage=all. 
13
 Robert Kagan recently reiterated his argument for the fundamental necessity of America’s hegemony and 
military preeminence in a lengthy tractate for the New Republic, a leading liberal journal on American politics, 
firmly embedded in the discourse of hegemonic engagement. Titled “Superpowers don’t get to retire,” Kagan’s 
again constructs his familiar historic genealogy that represents the current liberal world order exclusively as a 
result of American agency and willpower, to conclude that under Obama the United States would lack a similar 
sense of responsibility to underwrite global security and prosperity: “Many Americans and their political leaders 
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Fig. 18 President Obama at West Point  
 
The declaration of the ‘Obama doctrine‘ at West Point found a mixed echo among foreign policy 
experts and the media.14  
 
This was particularly the case for conservative critics and Obama’s opponents in the 
Republican Party, who have attacked Obama’s supposed lack of vigor in leading the 
world, and missing faith in American exceptionalism. Charles Krauthammer, for 
example, has expressed this conservative frustration and exasperation with Obama’s 
grand strategy: “As with the West Point speech itself, as with the president’s entire 
                                                                                                                           
in both parties, including President Obama, have either forgotten or rejected the assumptions that undergirded 
American foreign policy for the past seven decades. In particular, American foreign policy may be moving away 
from the sense of global responsibility that equated American interests with the interests of many others around 
the world and back toward the defense of narrower, more parochial national interests, cf., Kagan, “Superpowers 
don’t get to retire;” according to the New York Times some of Obama’s remarks during his West Point speech 
were a formulated as direct rebuttal to Kagan’s charge, see Baker, “Rebutting Critics, Obama Seeks Higher Bar 
for Military Action.”  
14
 Retrieved December 19, 2014, from http://i.ytimg.com/vi/PbHV1TERoIE/0.jpg. 
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foreign policy of retreat, one can only marvel at the smallness of it all.”15 According 
to AEI’s Thomas Donnelly, Obama took down the sign: ‘superpower lives here.’16 
Other, more progressive voices, and longtime critics of the Washington consensus in 
U.S. foreign and security policy, such as Oliver Stone or Andrew Bacevich in turn, 
have charged Obama not for a lack of leadership, but with continuing on the 
misguided path of American empire.17  
 
What these examples from politics, academia and popular culture illustrate is that the 
President of the United States is both the source and the focal point for much of the 
national debate on grand strategy, and the country’s future direction in world politics. 
The American President occupies a privileged position in shaping the national 
narrative and framing the discourse of the geopolitical identity of the country. 
Through his constitutional role as head of state and government, and commander-in-
chief of the Armed Forces, the President acts as the face and voice of the nation, and 
as chief architect of America’s foreign and security policy.18 Thus, the American 
President lies at the heart of political debate and policy-making in the United States, 
but he also represents the central hub in an intertextual network of grand strategy 
discourse, providing the focus for the policy advice and criticism of Washington 
think tanks, the reporting and commentary of the media, and the intellectual attention 
of academic researchers interested in the study of U.S. foreign and security policy.  
 
                                            
15
 Charles Krauthammer, “Krauthammer: Obama doctrine forged in retreat,” Boston Herald, June 1, 2014, 
accessed June 2, 2014, 
http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/opinion/op_ed/2014/05/krauthammer_obama_doctrine_forged_in_retreat.  
16
 Thomas Donnelly, interview by Georg Löfflmann, 29 May 2013. 
17
 Cf., Stone and Kuznick, pp. 549-615; Bacevich, Washington Rules, pp. 19-20. 
18
 For a detailed analysis of the different roles of the modern American President, see George C. Edwards III and 
William G. Howell, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009); Jim Twombly, The Progression of the American Presidency (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).  
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As Ó Tuathail and Agnew have remarked on the discursive role of the President: “He 
is the chief bricoleur of American political life, a combination of storyteller and 
tribal shaman.”19 Indeed, the American President is both a political institution and a 
highly symbolic figure, invested with the vestiges and icons of American power, 
from the Oval Office to Air Force One. This also makes the President a particular 
fixture of American popular culture, from satirical ridicule by the Simpsons and the 
Ramones to filmic adaptions of Presidential power and determined resolve, ranging 
from the West Wing (1999-2006) to 24 (2001-2010), and Independence Day 
(1996).20 Two Hollywood action films Olympus has Fallen (2013) and White House 
Down (2013) have shown the President, the embodiment of U.S. national security, 
under attack by terrorists in the White House documenting the continued relevance 
of terrorism to the threat perception in the United States, as well as the symbolic role 
the President plays in defending the nation in the popular imagination. 
 
This chapter will critically investigate the formulation of American grand strategy as 
a geopolitical vision of America’s role in the world as articulated by the President of 
the United States, and its intertextual linkage to the various popular, formal and 
practical discourses of national security and geopolitics established so far. This 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the way Obama’s vision is both reconfirmed 
and contested by his conduct of foreign and security policy, and the frequent tensions 
that mark the discourse of American grand strategy between the worldview of 
American hegemony and the visions of engagement and restraint.  
 
                                            
19
 Ó Tuathail and Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse,” p. 195. 
20
 See in this context also, Iwan E. Morgan, ed, Presidents in the Movies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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Here, the President is involved in a constant exchange with competing producers of 
geopolitical knowledge over the definition of the purpose of American power, 
ranging from Washington’s most influential think tanks to Hollywood blockbusters, 
from bestselling authors, policy experts, and media pundits, to political opponents, 
and even diverging voices within his own administration. Finally, the direction the 
President charts in guiding the nation’s role in world politics also constantly 
reverberates in opinion polls that add a further dimension of popular confirmation or 
contestation to Obama’s geopolitical vision that is being looked at here.    
 
This chapter will focus in particular on high-profile Presidential speeches, policy 
documents and official statements, such as the annual State of the Union addresses, 
and several other prominent speeches that have been used by Obama to frame his 
foreign and security policy since he entered the White House, from West Point to 
Cairo.21 As with the preceding chapter on practical grand strategy discourse, the 
critical investigation is primarily concerned with the dominant political 
representation of the geopolitical identity of the United States, marked by the 
hegemonic imagination of American leadership, and its linkage to national security 
policy.  
 
As will be demonstrated, Obama’s geopolitical vision and conduct of policy in 
national security is testament to the complexity of world politics at the beginning of 
the 21st century, and illustrates that established notions of grand strategy seem more 
and more outdated in a world where various economic, social and political dynamics, 
                                            
21
 In fact Obama, generally recognized as a gifted orator able to use inspiring rhetoric, often uses high-profile 
speeches as political instrument to deflect criticism of his policies, or to lay out his vision on particular issues, 
from drones to the Afghanistan War.  
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do not allow for permanently fixed identities and coherent but overly simplistic 
narratives, supposed to capture a nation’s imagination and give purpose to its power. 
While not quite post-American, Obama’s grand strategy is characterized by a 
multiplicity of discourses and the fluidity of meaning that is accepted rather than 
avoided when describing America’s role in a changing world.  
 
Leading through engagement in a post-American world 
 
President Obama made it clear from the beginning of his presidency that his vision 
for America’s role in the world was intended to depart significantly from that of his 
predecessor, which had been marked by a preference for unilateralism, a doctrine of 
preemptive warfare, and a simplistic, Manichean rhetoric of ‘you’re either with us or 
against us’ that seemed to demand fellowship and support, rather than invite mutual 
consultation and collaboration. Against this unapologetic display of American 
primacy by the George W. Bush administration, in particular during Bush’s first 
term, Obama contrasted a geopolitical vision of engagement and cooperation for the 
United States. In 2009, in his first State of the Union Address, Obama announced a 
shift of perspective that corresponded with his central campaign message of ‘hope’ 
and ‘change,’ and seemed to actualize it for the future course of U.S. foreign policy: 
In words and deeds, we are showing the world that a new era of engagement 
has begun. For we know that America cannot meet the threats of this century 
alone, but the world cannot meet them without America.22 
 
This emphasis was repeated in the 2010 State of the Union address: “That's the 
leadership that we are providing –- engagement that advances the common security 
                                            
22
 Barack Obama, “Remarks of President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery Address to Joint Session of 
Congress,” February 24, 2009, accessed June 5, 2014 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-
President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress. 
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and prosperity of all people.“23 A policy of engagement and Obama’s rhetoric of 
mutual respect were meant to restore the credibility and international legitimacy of 
the United States and its policies, which under Bush had reached a dramatic low 
point in many parts of the world.24 A central point in Obama’s speeches and 
statements was that the United States was strongest when it could lead through the 
power of its example, not alone the example of its power: “Recent events have 
shown us that what sets us apart must not just be our power -– it must also be the 
purpose behind it.” 25  
 
This key idea also entered the text of the National Security Strategy of 2010: “Our 
moral leadership is grounded principally in the power of our example—not through 
an effort to impose our system on other peoples.” 26  The idea that American 
leadership and moral authority in the world could be restored and renewed through a 
collaborative network of allies and partners seems to represent a long-standing 
political belief in Barack Obama. While still a U.S. Senator, he had formulated his 
vision for American politics, and a different set of domestic and foreign policies in 
                                            
23
 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, 27 January 2010, 
accessed June 5, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address. 
24
 Cf., Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American Foreign Policy, p. 16; according to a Pew Research poll of the 
Global Attitudes Project, released in July 2009: “The image of the United States has improved markedly in most 
parts of the world, reflecting global confidence in Barack Obama. In many countries opinions of the United States 
are now about as positive as they were at the beginning of the decade before George W. Bush took office;” 
“Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World,” Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, July 23, 
2009, accessed, May 22, 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/07/23/confidence-in-obama-lifts-us-image-
around-the-world/; in 2013 this image had changed somewhat, but was far from the dramatic fall in U.S. standing 
around the world experienced under Bush. As Pew has commented: “America’s improved image is coincident 
with Barack Obama assuming the presidency in 2009. Obama has largely received more positive ratings than his 
predecessor, George W. Bush. […] Even so, Obama’s ratings are lower now than when he first took office;” 
“America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s,” Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, July 18, 
2013, accessed May 22, 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remains-more-
positive-than-chinas/. Obama’s public announcement to close down the Guantanamo prison camp within a year 
after he took office was likewise undertaken to restore America’s moral standing, however to this day Obama has 
failed to deliver on this promise. In fact, as Matthew Waxman, senior fellow for law and foreign policy at the 
influential  Hoover Institution has argued: “While it decries Guantanamo as contrary to American values, the 
Obama administration has convinced courts of Guantanamo's legal validity.” Matthew C. Waxman, “Obama’s 
Guantanamo Legacy,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 12, 2013, accessed June 5, 2014, 
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-the-law/obamas-guantanamo-legacy/p30926.  
25
 Obama, “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address,” 2010.  
26
 Obama, National Security Strategy, p. 10.  
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his best-selling book The Audacity of Hope. Here, he had already documented a clear 
preference for multilateralism:   
Acting multilaterally means […] engaging in the hard diplomatic work of 
obtaining most of the world’s support for our actions, and making sure our 
actions serve to further recognize international norms.27 
 
The emphasis on engagement, cooperative multilateralism and the joint benefits of a 
liberal world order under U.S. stewardship have of course long been hallmarks of the 
way political elites in Washington describe the means and ends of American grand 
strategy, both to domestic and foreign audiences. 28  These themes have been 
reemphasized under the Obama administration, and represented a central strand of 
practical grand strategy discourse.29  
 
Running from the President and the White House to the Pentagon and the State 
Department, there was a deliberate effort to reframe U.S. foreign and security policy 
right after Obama took office. Aside from the President’s high profile statements and 
diplomatic offers to negotiate and restart relationships with countries such as Iran, 
North-Korea, Venezuela, Myanmar, or Russia, Secretary Clinton embraced a ‘smart 
power approach’ in U.S. foreign policy and launched a Diplomacy and Development 
and Review. Secretary Gates, referring to the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review, 
also announced the Pentagon’s new found focus on ‘building partner capacity.’30 As 
documented in chapter five, this policy initiative was accompanied by a significant 
effort by high-ranking Obama officials to reconfirm this apparent shift in grand 
                                            
27
 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope (New York,: Crown Publishers, 2006), p. 309. 
28
 Cf., in particular, Ruggie, “Past as Prologue”, pp. 108-109; see also Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders; Layne, Peace 
of Illusions.  
29
 Several authors who have written on U.S. foreign and security policy under Obama have identified 
‘engagement’ as its central theme, while also noting the limitations of this concept, see in this context, David 
Sanger, “Pursuing Ambitious Global Goals, but Strategy is More;” Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American 
Foreign Policy, p. 19; James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle inside the White House to redefine American 
Power (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), p. 251. 
30
 Cf., Clinton, “Leading Through Civilian Power;” Gates, “Helping Others to defend Themselves.”  
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strategy in the realm of formal discourse, with Foreign Affairs as a preferred outlet 
of choice, positioned at the direct intellectual cross-over between political practice 
and academic exchange in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. 31  
 
With Obama, engagement was clearly the new game in town. In his speeches and 
statements on multilateralism and a collaborative foreign policy, President Obama 
did primarily connect with an established liberal discourse of hegemonic engagement 
promoted by such diverse voices as Thomas Friedman’s and Michael Mandelbaum’s 
That Used to Be Us, Brook’s, Wolhforth’s, and Ikneberry’s scholarly articles in 
support of ‘deep engagement,’ or the grand strategy recommendations by Brookings 
and CNAS that all linked arguments for America’s continued military preeminence 
with calls for revitalizing the U.S. economy in order to sustain American leadership 
in support of a liberal world order of free trade, democratic freedom, and great power 
peace.  
 
However, where Obama’s geopolitical vision of cooperation went further than 
established notions of multilateral leadership was that he demonstrated a willingness 
early on to engage with states considered to be America’s adversaries without fixed 
preconditions, or political demands to the other side.32  Obama’s rhetoric and 
                                            
31
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, head of the U.S. State Department’s policy planning operation from 2009 until 2011, 
would again chose this elite publication, when in 2009 she envisioned the role of the United States as a globalized 
networking power, concluding that: “In the twenty-first century, the United States' exceptional capacity for 
connection, rather than splendid isolation or hegemonic domination, will renew its power and restore its global 
purpose.” Slaughter, “America’s Edge,” p. 113.  
32
 Mann, The Obamians, p. 194; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American Foreign Policy, p. 24. During the 
Democratic primaries Hillary Clinton, Obama’s main inner-party opponent would exploit this relatively open 
stand vis-à-vis countries considered America’s enemies to attack his inexperience in foreign policy, cf., 
Associated Press, “Clinton: Obama ‘naive’ on foreign policy,” NBC News, July 24, 2007, accessed June 10, 2014, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19933710/ns/politics-the_debates/t/clinton-obama-naive-foreign-
policy/#.U5bxLBYdsoE. During the presidential campaign, Senator McCain accused his Democratic opponent of 
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invitation to dialogue with members of Bush’s infamous ‘axis of evil’ further 
underlined the promise of policy change; a break with the usual ‘threat inflation’ and 
Washington way of doing things, just as Obama’s vote against the Iraq invasion set 
him apart from John McCain and Hillary Clinton, both establishment figures who 
had supported the decision to go to war. As the bestselling book author and New 
York Times journalist David Sanger has observed:  “Obama […] promised to restore 
traditional American ‘engagement’ by talking and listening to America’s most 
troubling partners and reluctant partners.”33  
 
After entering the White House, Obama documented this willingness for a new era of 
cooperative engagement on several occasions. One of the most visible examples was 
his presidential speech at the University of Cairo on June 4, 2009, which was 
designed as a reaching out of the United States to the Muslim world, titled ‘a new 
beginning:’34 
I have come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States 
and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual 
respect (…).35  
 
Here, Obama also invited discussions between the United States and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, ‘without preconditions on the basis of mutual respect.’36 However, 
on Iran the Obama administration actually continued to pursue a two-pronged 
strategy of diplomatic engagement and economic sanctions, meant to persuade the 
                                                                                                                           
supposed weakness, lack of leadership credibility and missing conviction in American primacy would reemerge 
in the 2012 campaign, when the Republican candidate Mitt Romney attacked President Obama for constantly 
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country from developing nuclear weapons.37 At the same time, Obama has frequently 
stated that the United States considered a nuclear armed Iran ‘unacceptable,’ and that 
military solutions would be ‘on the table’ in dealing with such a perceived threat to 
U.S. national security.38 The Iran example illustrates that cooperative engagement 
and diplomacy were not an exclusive grand strategy in itself, but merely one element 
in the way President Obama pursued national security and foreign policy. 39   
The charge against Obama’s naiveté in wanting to engage countries like Iran or 
Russia, and to not clearly label them as enemies or adversaries of the United States, 
formed part of a larger discourse in expert circles, popular media, and American 
politics that questioned the conduct of U.S. foreign and security policy under Obama, 
because it did not fully comply with the dominant mainstream consensus on U.S. 
hegemony. Both neoconservative and liberal internationalist critics have accused 
Obama’s grand strategy of ‘weakness.’ It was characterized as ‘fantasy’, or attacked 
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for leading to ‘America’s meltdown abroad.’40 Here, Obama appeared as both weak 
in the face of great power aggression, as with Russia and Ukraine, or China and the 
Senkakus/Diaoyus islands, and as passive and aloof from the concerns for human 
rights and humanitarian intervention, as for example with Syria.  
 
As Andrew Bacevich has remarked in Washington Rules, the Washington consensus 
on hegemony is defined by the enduring triad of a ‘global military presence,’ 
configured for ‘global power projection,’ in order to counter threats through a policy 
of ‘global interventionism.’41 ‘American leadership,’ usually an allegory for using 
America’s global military power, is thus seen as necessary to provide a solution to 
international problems from Eastern Europe to the Middle East and the South 
Pacific. Obama’s lack of leadership in turn, that is his alleged reluctance to use hard 
power, is supposed to have provoked the outbreak of geopolitical crises.  
 
However, this criticism of the Obama doctrine betrays a retrospective, intellectual 
simplicity in assuming an America-centric, militarized unipolarity, categorizing 
world politics along clearly defined lines of friendship or enmity with the United 
States that does not reflect the world of interdependence that Obama regularly 
referred to in his foreign policy speeches. As the President explained at West Point, 
while the ’United States is and remains the one indispensable nation,’ the world has 
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changed:42 “From Brazil to India, rising middle classes compete with us, and 
governments seek a greater say in global forums.”43 As Zakaria argued in 2008: “At a 
military-political level, America still dominates the world, but the larger structure of 
unipolarity -economic, financial, cultural- is weakening”.44  
 
Obama’s grand strategy vision, and in particular his emphasis on engagement are 
intellectually linked to the concept of a post-American world, in which the diffusion 
of power and the ‘rise of the rest’ are ending an era of American primacy, and where 
relative decline will mean that the United States is still the most influential, but no 
longer the sole dominant power in the international system.45 Here, more countries 
than ever before have a say in global governance, and require attention, respect and 
understanding. As President Obama has remarked during a G-20 summit in London, 
the world has changed:  
 If it’s just Roosevelt and Churchill sitting in a room with brandy, […] 
 that’s an easier negotiation. But that’s not the world we live in.46  
 
In fact, as documented in chapter seven, this assessment of a geopolitical rebalancing 
has already entered official policy documents, such as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review:  
 (…) the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must 
 increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability 
 and peace.47  
 
A ‘post-American’ scenario also features regularly in the NIC’s long-term grand 
strategy forecasts, where a ‘global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of 
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China, India, and others.’48 It also seems to have been a prime rationale behind the 
‘pivot to Asia’ the Obama administration launched in 2011/2012, which aimed to 
strategically reorient the United States to the Asia-Pacific as the future center of 
gravity in world politics. 
 
Obama was famously photographed on the campaign trail holding a copy of 
Zakaria’s popular book that firmly established the notion of a ‘post-American world’ 
in American geopolitical discourse.49 Yet, as the political scientist Robert Singh has 
pointed out, despite the sometimes more outspoken, sometimes more tacit 
acknowledgement of post-American dynamics and future scenarios of relative 
decline by parts of the Obama administration, there is a firmly established underlying 
assumption among Washington elites that “(…) other countries […] still anticipate, 
expect and demand American leadership of the international community.”50 
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Fig. 19 Barack Obama on the campaign trail in 2008 
 
Barack Obama holding a copy of Fareed Zakaria’s Post-American World while running for President 
in 2008.51 
 
As the thesis has demonstrated, this hegemonic imagination is regularly produced 
and reproduced in popular culture through various blockbuster movies and 
geopolitics bestsellers, from Act of Valor to George Friedman’s The Next Decade. 
From the Avengers (2012), to Battleship (2012), Battle: Los Angeles (2011), and 
Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen (2009), every alien invasion film produced by 
Hollywood features American leadership in form of its outstanding military power or 
unique superheroes as the only possible option for the planet to prevail against an 
existential threat. In popular bestsellers Friedman and Mandelbaum sum up a 
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hegemonic worldview that declares the global political, economic, and social reality 
almost exclusively as a product of American actions: 
It is the American example that deserves the most credit for the global spread 
of democratic politics and free-market economies. In this sense, too, the 
world of today is the world we invented.52  
 
This fundamental conviction in the necessity of U.S. hegemony animates IR 
scholarship, visible in the regular demands for the forwarded presence of American 
Armed Forces, and the necessary command of the global commons by the United 
States in Foreign Affairs, again stressing the exclusivity and singularity of the United 
States. As Brooks and Wohlforth for example conclude: 
In an anarchic world of self-interested states-that is to say, in the real world-
the chances that those states will cooperate are best when a hegemon takes 
the lead.53  
 
The same argument anchors the policy advise of neoconservative and centrist think 
tanks, from AEI to Brookings that stress American ‘military preeminence’ as 
necessary foundation of global security. A recent policy paper by AEI and the 
Heritage Foundation for example again described America’s Cold War and post-
Cold War national security strategy as successful vision of global hegemony, 
designed for:  
(…) defense of the American homeland, protection of the common areas of 
the world through which Americans traded and travelled, and preservation of 
political equilibriums in parts of the world vital to American security and 
prosperity, and particularly in Europe and Asia.54 
 
Finally, the amalgam of military preeminence, American leadership, and a world 
order of democratic freedom and free-market capitalism remains a staple feature in 
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policy documents and official statements from the Pentagon’s Defense Strategic 
Guidance to President Obama’s own State of the Union Addresses.  
 
These examples highlight the political significance of intertextuality in the discourse 
of American grand strategy, where presidential rhetoric, expert opinion and popular 
sentiment regularly intersect in supporting and maintaining an American worldview 
of exceptionalist singularity and global superiority. However, as Zakaria’s Post-
American World demonstrates, there is also a prevailing counter-influence in 
American grand strategy discourse under Obama that likewise impacts Presidential 
policy and rhetoric. The notion of a post-American world, and policies that seem to 
fall in line with such sentiments, like Obama’s efforts for enhanced engagement with 
allies, partners and adversaries, counteract the dominant construct of hegemonic 
identity, upsetting the conventional wisdom about American leadership. As Zakaria 
has argued, writing in the Washington Post about this tension between established 
notions of past American primacy, and the uncertainty about America’s future in 
world politics: 
Washington’s elites — politicians and intellectuals — miss the old days as 
well. They wish for the world in which the United States was utterly 
dominant over its friends, its foes were to be shunned entirely and the 
challenges were stark, moral and vital.55 
 
What the statements by President Obama, Zakaria and others indicate is the widely 
shared and deeply rooted imagination of geopolitical identity that represents 
American leadership not only as the result of superior economic and military power, 
and the attractiveness of American values, but also as the clear demand of other 
nations, which supposedly see the United States as the single, decisive factor in 
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world politics, from tackling climate change to concluding the Middle East peace 
process, and the safeguarding of regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. This betrays a 
certain hegemonic narcissism where Americans perceive the rest of the world almost 
exclusively through the prism of their own vaunted leadership role. Not only is our 
world ‘made in America,’ it is also the only positive world imaginable: 
(…) no country is prepared to step in to replace the United States as the 
world’s government (…). Nor will our economically pressed allies in Europe 
and Asia shoulder the costs of these global services. […] a weaker America 
would leave the world a nastier, poorer, more dangerous place.56 
 
There certainly exists an outspoken demand for a leading role of the United States, 
for example by foreign officials in countries that seek American security guarantees, 
such as Japan and Poland vis-à-vis China and Russia, or by groups that ask for 
American military intervention on behalf of their own political goals, like rebel 
forces fighting in Libya and Syria. Oftentimes however, it seems that the demands 
and needs for U.S. leadership by others are simply postulated as self-evident reality 
by key producers of American grand strategy discourse. Not unlike the argument for 
the U.S. control of the global commons, the idea that something besides American 
leadership could provide a feasible solution to global challenges simply does not 
enter the dominant discourse on U.S. foreign policy and national security.  
 
The debate on American grand strategy largely exists within a self-contained and 
self-replicated political reality of reiterated clichés, normative convictions and 
historic genealogies. This interlinkage of conventional wisdom, research expertise 
and political reasoning stretches from the sacrosanct mantra of ‘leadership’ to the 
frequent labeling of any alternative to all-out hegemony as dangerous and 
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irresponsible ‘isolationism.’57 Here, foreign opinions and initiatives can at best 
augment U.S. hegemony, but never replace it, or claim equal status. Obama’s 
nuanced vision of leadership however, is more caveated, more appreciative of the 
complexity of international relations, and less simplistic in its characterization of 
American power and what it can achieve on the world stage. This alone sets him 
apart from large parts of the political establishment in Washington, not just the 
conservative proponents of unmitigated American primacy found in Republican 
circles, but also the representatives of the liberal vision of hegemonic engagement in 
the Democratic party. In the words of one high-ranking official who served under 
both Presidents Obama and Clinton: 
You can divide up this town into people who believe that the world revolves 
around the United States, that other countries wake up in the morning 
thinking about the United States, and other people who don’t think that. […] 
Hillary Clinton thinks of the United States as the world’s indispensable 
nation, as the world’s leader. She’s still rooted in the Clinton administration 
of the 1990s. And fundamentally, Barack Obama doesn’t think that way.58  
 
From the unsuccessful attempts of the United States to negotiate a climate agreement 
in Copenhagen, to the refusal of Germany to follow U.S. demands for larger fiscal 
stimulus packages for the Euro-Zone, or China’s reluctance to accommodate 
America by rising the exchange mechanism for its currency: the regular professions 
by American elites how foreign countries instinctively turn to the United States for 
guidance clearly only reflect part of the reality of America’s influence in world 
politics. As remarked by U.S. government officials, when Obama came to office he 
and his administration did not face a ‘rising India and China,’ these countries had 
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already risen.59 In the words of Singh, when Obama entered the White House “(…) 
many nations and peoples were simply not looking to Washington any longer.”60 In 
fact, the Gallup Global Leadership Track,61 described as ‘the largest global public 
opinion study of views about U.S. leadership’ concluded in 2013: 
The image of U.S. leadership worldwide was weaker at the end of  Obama’s 
fourth year in office than at any point during his first administration […]. 
This shift suggests that Obama and new Secretary of State John Kerry may 
not find global audiences as receptive to advancing the U.S. agenda as they 
have in the past. In fact, they may even find audiences increasingly critical — 
even in key partner countries.62 
 
In the interdependent world President Obama has described, American leadership 
seems to be less, not more important than before, and the perception of American 
power and influence by others is not static, as implied in U.S. grand strategy 
discourse, but constantly changing, in part due to developments entirely outside of 
American control, again suggesting less, not more global influence for the United 
States. Although the discourse of engagement Obama promotes is meant to serve as a 
bridge, this fundamental tension between the perception of an increasingly post-
American world and the continued profession of America’s irreplaceable leadership 
remains unresolved in the President’s articulation of American grand strategy. 
 
Nation-building at home, covert operations abroad  
 
Engagement under Obama was also meant to correct an over-reliance on military 
force, the fixation on national security threats, and a pervasive polarization of foreign 
policy and national security issues that had dominated under Bush and that continues 
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to inform the Washington consensus on hegemony. As deputy national security 
adviser Ben Rhodes, one of Obama’s speechwriters and closest foreign policy 
advisors described this shift in the strategic vision of the Obama administration 
against established opinion:  
What's notable in some of the debate is how much U.S. engagement abroad is 
viewed through the prism of whether or not we're taking military action, 
almost up to the point that if you're not using the military you're not dealing 
with issues. […] We're seeking to reorient that to show that you can use 
diplomacy to try to resolve conflicts like we're doing in the Middle East.63  
 
Together with his emphasis on engagement, President Obama reformulated the use 
of American military power for the pursuit of U.S. national security in significant 
ways, and by doing so partially redefined the meaning of America’s global military 
preeminence in grand strategy discourse.  
 
When Obama entered the White House he inherited two ongoing wars. The one in 
Iraq, Obama had always opposed and characterized as the ‘dumb war.’ 64  On 
February 27, 2009 the President fulfilled one of his central campaign promises when 
he announced that all U.S. forces would leave Iraq by the end of 2011. Afghanistan, 
however, Obama had always referred to as a ‘war of necessity’ that had been under-
resourced by the George Bush administration, because of the distraction of Iraq.65 
Obama intended to change this. Shortly after his inauguration on January 20, 2009, 
he authorized a troop increase in Afghanistan of 17,000 soldiers on February 17, in 
response to an urgent request by the local commander of U.S. forces, General 
McKiernan, and while an initial sixty-day review of the war by launched the White 
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House was still underway. 66  As the New York Times observed, the war in 
Afghanistan would from now on carry ‘Obama’s stamp.’67  
 
At the end of an initial sixty-day review President Obama agreed to dispatch another 
4,000 soldiers to Afghanistan to implement a COIN strategy, and to ‘disrupt, 
dismantle and defeat’ al-Qaeda.68 This review had also included Flournoy, who 
together with the Center of a New American Security co-founded by her, had been a 
staunch supporter of counter-insurgency operations from the outset. As James Mann 
has reported: “(…) Flournoy returned again and again to core COIN concepts.”69 As 
with the preparation of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the implementation of 
a strategy of counter-insurgency for Afghanistan by the Obama White House was 
also the result of an institutionalized exchange in the intertextual production of 
geopolitical knowledge. This interlinkage between the policy advise of senior 
researchers in beltways think tanks and the policymaking of defense officials and 
security experts happened both intellectually and personally via Washington’s 
‘rotating door’.  
 
As a result of a more comprehensive three-month Afghanistan review Obama then 
agreed to send an additional 30,000 troops in November 2009, bringing the total 
American troop strength there to just under 100,000 personnel.70 President Obama 
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finally announced the troop deployment to Afghanistan at a speech at the U.S. 
military academy of West Point on December 1, 2009. However, with the decision to 
‘surge’ in Afghanistan, Obama at the same time changed gear and set new priorities 
for the war, including a fixed date for the withdrawal of the American presence there. 
He declared: 
We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in lives and 
resources. […] And having just experienced the worst economic crisis since 
the Great Depression, the American people are understandably focused on 
rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home.71 
 
Instead of final ‘victory’ through an open-ended counter-insurgency operation, an 
exit strategy moved into the center of attention in Washington that would allow the 
United States to start withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan by July 2011. After 
the end of 2014 U.S. troops would no longer be in the country in a combat role, apart 
from a residual presence meant for counter-terrorism operations to keep a check on 
the remnants of the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and Pakistan.72 As Sanger has 
commented, Obama switched to a strategy of ‘good enough’ in Afghanistan.73 This 
was a shift in priorities that would allow the United States to finally focus on ‘nation 
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building at home.’74 Obama would continue to emphasize his focus on ending 
America’s wars, not to start new ones, and to weigh the commitment to American 
national security against the domestic demands of reforming healthcare, education, 
and the fiscal stability of the country. In his 2012 State of the Union Address Obama 
opened, not as usual with the state of the American economy, but with the impending 
end of America’s decade of war: 
For the first time in two decades, Osama bin Laden is not a threat to this 
country. Most of al-Qaeda’s top lieutenants have been defeated. The 
Taliban’s momentum has been broken, and some troops in Afghanistan have 
begun to come home.75  
 
In 2013, during his second inaugural address Obama stated:  
We, the people, still believe that enduring security and lasting peace do not 
require perpetual war.76  
 
Finally, during the 2014 State of the Union address the President declared:  
We must fight the battles that need to be fought, not those that terrorists 
prefer from us – large-scale deployments that drain our strength and may 
ultimately feed extremism.77 
This reluctance to ‘entangle’ the United States militarily was also visible when 
Obama announced a new offensive against Islamist fighters of the Islamic State 
organization in Iraq and Syria on 10 September 2014.78 While Obama declared a 
prolonged campaign to ‘destroy’ IS, including the formation of an international 
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coalition, and announced U.S. air strikes in Syria, he vehemently and repeatedly 
ruled out to send U.S. ground troops back into Iraq.79  
 
Obama’s emphasis on military restraint, and the need to rebuild American strength at 
home are intertextually linked to the arguments for offshore balancing that the 
libertarian Cato Institute and realist IR scholars regularly bring forward, from 
Stephen Walt, to Christopher Layne, and John Mearsheimer. As Walt for example 
wrote on offshore balancing: 
That strategy -- which would eschew nation-building and large onshore 
ground and air deployments -- would both increase our freedom of action and 
dampen anti-Americanism in a number of key areas.80  
 
According to Cato’s Christopher Preble: “We should reduce our military power in 
order to be more secure.”81 This again demonstrates that the grand strategy discourse 
under Obama can not simply be reduced to liberal ideas of cooperative engagement 
and multilateral leadership. Obama’s geopolitical vision incorporated significant 
elements of realpolitik thinking and a ‘realist’ concern for conserving America’s 
financial, economic and military strength, plus a repeatedly demonstrated will to use 
military force unilaterally, when deemed necessary.  
 
Besides ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama also initiated a profound 
rhetorical shift away from the dominant focus on the singularity of American 
leadership and the supremacy of U.S. military power that the Global War on Terror 
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(GWOT) represented. This was still the lens through which President Bush had 
perceived America’s role in the world, a country shaped by what he called the 
‘defining ideological struggle of the 21st century’.82 Whereas Bush envisioned the 
United States to be committed in an open-ended confrontation against extremists 
who ‘despise freedom’ and ‘despise America’, Obama instead invoked the picture of  
‘turning the page after a decade of war.’83 During a speech on May 23, 2013 at the 
National Defense University, home to the National War College, and one of the 
nation’s prime locations for the senior education of grand strategy, Obama declared a 
change in American counter-terrorism strategy that was widely perceived as an 
unofficial end to the war on terror.84 As Obama explained in his speech, ‘every war 
must come to an end:’ 
Neither I, nor any President can promise the total defeat of terror. […] Today, 
the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defat. […] 
Targeted actions against terrorists, effective partnerships, diplomatic 
engagement and assistance – through such a comprehensive strategy we can 
significantly reduce the chances of large-scale attacks on the homeland and 
mitigate threats to Americans overseas.85 
 
The president redefined Bush’s global war into a strategy to manage an existing but 
not existential threat to the United States.86 The NDU speech also implied that the 
United States would continue to rely on one particular instrument in America’s 
                                            
82
 George W. Bush, “President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address,” January 28, 2008, accessed October 5 
2013, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080128-13.html,  
83
 Ewen MacAskill, “Barack Obama ends the war in Iraq. 'Now it's time to turn the page',” Guardian, September 
1, 2010, accessed May 22, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/01/obama-formally-ends-iraq-war. 
84
 Cf., Peter Baker, “Pivoting From a War Footing, Obama Acts to Curtail Drones,” The New York Times, May 
23, 2013, accessed May 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/pivoting-from-a-war-footing-
obama-acts-to-curtail-drones.html?_r=0; Patricia Zengerle and Matt Spetalnick, “Obama wants to end 'war on 
terror' but Congress balks,” Reuters, May 24, 2013, accessed may 23, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/24/us-usa-obama-speech-idU.S.BRE94M04Y20130524;  
85
 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” May 23, 2013, accessed May 
23, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.  
86
 As part of this realignment of counterterrorism policy, Obama also renewed his promise to close down the 
Guantanamo Bay prison camp, pointed to the release of a Presidential Policy Guidance on the use of force against 
terrorists, including drone strikes, and formulated his goal to ‘refine, and ultimately repeal,’ the Authorization to 
Use Military Force (AUMF) mandate that was passed by Congress after 9/11 and allowed the U.S. President to 
use all ‘necessary and appropriate force’ against those he deemed responsible for planning, authorizing, 
committing or aiding in the September 11th attacks, cf., ibid. 
 334 
counter-terrorism arsenal: drones. One of the signatory policies of Obama’s 
administration has been the marked increase in drone strikes against suspected 
terrorist targets in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other places, such as Yemen.87  
 
The attacks with bombs and missiles on suspected terrorist targets, launched from 
remote-controlled, unmanned aerial vehicles, were credited by United States officials 
for having seriously ‘disrupted and degraded’ al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. In the 
words of Obama: “Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb 
makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield”.88 Dennis Blair, the former 
the former director of national intelligence, summed up this policy as follows: 
It is the politically advantageous thing to do — low cost, no U.S. casualties, 
gives the appearance of toughness. It plays well domestically, and it is 
unpopular only in other countries. Any damage it does to the national interest 
only shows up over the long term.89 
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In combination with Obama’s use of Special Forces, as highlighted by the successful 
raid on Osama bin Laden by U.S. Navy SEALs on May 2, 2011, the suspected use of 
cyber technologies against Iran’s nuclear program, such as the ‘stuxnet’ computer 
virus, or the comprehensive surveillance activities by the NSA, revealed by the 
agency’s former contractor Edward Snowden, the use of American power by 
President Obama has reformulated American grand strategy and the exercise of 
hegemony in surprising ways.90  
 
This has also found a particular echo in American popular culture, from the Pentagon 
supported and Navy produced Act of Valor, to the immensely successful Call of Duty 
videogame franchise, which regularly features the use of drones and U.S. special 
operations soldiers in global counter-terrorism campaigns. A prominent example is 
also Katherine Bigelow’s Zero Dark Thirty (2013) on the CIA’s ten-year hunt for 
Osama bin Laden.91  
 
Where President Obama’s vision of engagement attempts to balance a tacit 
appreciation for what has been dubbed the ‘post-American world’ with the continued 
emphasis on American leadership, a similar tension in grand strategy discourse exists 
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in the President’s repeated insistencies that the ‘tide of war’ is turning and the 
increased covert use of American power abroad. The result has been that while the 
age of large-scale American counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is 
ending, the United States continues to wage a war from the shadows against 
suspected terrorists and their networks, increasingly making use of remote-controlled 
drone strikes, cyber technologies, and special operations forces.  
 
These covert tools of American primacy have demonstrated a continued reliance on 
unilateralism, and the global projection of military power in the pursuit of U.S. 
national security, but with almost no risk of American casualties, and far fewer 
financial resources required. While this has been reflected in popular culture and 
prominent policy statements, critics correctly argued that the covert use of American 
military power and secret intelligence measures have never been fully integrated into 
a comprehensive definition of the Obama doctrine. As New York Times reporters Joe 
Becker and Scott Shane have remarked: 
His [President Obama’s] actions have often remained inscrutable, obscured 
by awkward secrecy rules, polarized political commentary and the president’s 
own deep reserve.92 
 
SEAL team six, stuxnet, and the NSA represent a ‘black hole’ in American grand 
strategy discourse.93 What has occasionally been described as the ‘light footprint’ of 
the ‘Obama doctrine’ by officials in the administration in fact appears as the dark 
side of Obama’s policy of military restraint that only rarely enters the spotlight of 
presidential rhetoric, or publicly available government documents.94 Yet, taken in 
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context with the critical discourse analysis developed so far, the use of these covert 
instruments of American power did fall in line with Obama’s verdict that U.S. 
national security should be pursued more cost-effective, with less direct military 
involvement on the ground, and less burden on the American taxpayer. The use of 
special operations is part of a grand strategy vision of President Obama that balances 
but cannot fully resolve the tensions between American leadership abroad, and 
‘nation building at home.’ While envisioning greater military restraint, Obama as 
commander-in-chief directs a massive national security apparatus in pursuit of an 
aggressive counter-terrorism policy across the globe. This tension in the execution of 
American power under Obama, between hegemony and restraint, would find its most 
accurate expression to date in the phrase ‘leading from behind.’  
 
Leading from behind: Hegemony between military restraint and the global 
retrenchment of American power  
 
The end of America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan notwithstanding, global 
leadership and military preeminence remain the centerpiece in the geopolitical 
imagination of key officials in the Obama Administration. In the words of former 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates:  
The United States is the strongest and greatest nation on earth (…). The 
power and global reach of its military have been an indispensable contributor 
to world peace and must remain so.95  
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This is a sentiment that was voiced in a similar fashion by successors Panetta and 
Hagel, and Secretaries of State Clinton, and John Kerry.96 It remains the fundamental 
tenet of an American worldview dominant in Washington: a lens of geopolitical 
indispensability and national exceptionalism through which America’s global role is 
perceived. As President Obama declared in 2012 at the annual Veterans of Foreign 
Wars convention:  
We’re leading from Europe to the Asia Pacific, with alliances that have never 
been stronger.  We’re leading the fight against nuclear dangers. […] We’re 
leading on behalf of freedom -- standing with people in the Middle East and 
North Africa [….]; protecting the Libyan people as they rid the world of 
Muammar Qaddafi.97 
 
The global financial crisis and the debate about American decline have not 
fundamentally discredited the idea of American leadership, or displaced it as a 
powerful idea about America’s role in the world. In a 2011 Pew research poll for 
example, nine out of ten Americans, across party lines, stated that the United States 
either stands above all other countries in the world (38%) or is one of the greatest 
along with some others (53%).98  At the same time, however, the geopolitical 
ambition and scope of the American leadership role are being scaled back under 
President Obama, adding a further dimension of tension and inconsistency in grand 
strategy discourse. Aside from the end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 
abandonment of COIN as a military strategy of choice, this was most visible in 
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Obama’s ‘leading from behind’ approach in the Libya crisis, and his response to the 
use of chemical weapons in Syria.  
 
According to media reports it was due to substantial pressure from some of the key 
members within his own administration, that President Obama finally gave his 
approval for American military support of the Libyan rebels fighting Gaddafi.99 In 
arguing for America’s involvement in Libya, the President once again invoked the 
geopolitical identity of American leadership:  
To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and — more profoundly 
— our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances 
would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn 
a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is 
different.100 
 
While its superior military assets were providing the opening round of strikes against 
the Gaddafi regime, and the support of the United States was decisive in securing a 
vote sanctioning the intervention by the UN Security Council, the United States soon 
withdrew from the frontlines. Within NATO, France and the United Kingdom took 
the lead in operating militarily against the Gaddafi regime.101 This new, more 
cooperative, and at the same time more limited and restrained approach would later 
become famous as ‘leading from behind.’ The term is attributed to an unknown 
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member of the Obama administration, and it found a wide media echo, in particular 
after it featured prominently in an article published in the New Yorker.102  
 
The public reaction to ‘leading from behind’ was so strong because the term seemed 
to encapsulate a new geopolitical vision, a new way the United States exercised its 
power, and understood its hegemonic position in world politics under President 
Obama. As Ryan Lizza put it: (…) at the heart of the idea of leading from behind is 
the empowerment of other actors to do your bidding (…).”103 At the same time, as 
the advisor who coined the phrase admitted, this approach counteracted the 
dominant, popular imagination of America’s world role: “It’s so at odds with the 
John Wayne expectation for what America is in the world.”104 Under Obama, the 
global sheriff was looking for deputies. 
 
In fact, as demonstrated in chapter seven, in his cover letter to the 2012 Defense 
Strategic Guidance, Obama referred to the Libya campaign, and the ‘growing 
capabilities of allies and partners’ to illustrate his vision of ‘burden-sharing.’105 To 
Republicans, ‘leading from behind’ represented further proof that Obama’s vision 
consisted of diminishing U.S. power in the world, and accepting American 
decline.106 Although Obama never used the term ‘leading from behind’ himself, it 
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seemed to fit with the understanding of America’s changed role in a more 
interdependent world that he laid out in successive statements and speeches.  
 
Whereas George W. Bush had formulated a vision of American primacy with an 
expansive agenda for global transformation through military force in the Global War 
on Terror, Obama’s ‘leading from behind’ seemed like a remarkable reformulation of 
the established hegemony of the United States that incorporated the uniqueness of 
American power and American values into a cooperative context of ‘limited 
engagement.’ Yet, leading from behind would ultimately not provide a lasting 
formula to bridge the tensions and inconsistencies in American grand strategy 
discourse. The initial success of the Libya campaign notwithstanding, there seems to 
exist a general weariness in the United States about the country’s global 
commitments, disillusionment with military interventions and their political 
outcomes, and a heightened awareness for the complexity of world politics in the 21st 
century.  
 
As one newspaper article headline put it: “Team America no longer wants to be the 
World’s Police.”107 The title itself is a pop-cultural reference to the filmic parody of 
the United States as a militarist, over-the-top, jingoist superpower in the 2004 
comedy film Team America: World Police. While the popular representation of 
America’s heroism and military power still regularly provide the context for 
successful Hollywood blockbusters, from the Battleship (2012) to Captain America: 
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The Winter Soldier (2014), the era of excess and hubris Team America parodied 
seem no longer to capture American’s imagination of national security.   
 
There is a growing popular sentiment in the United States that questions the 
country’s extensive foreign commitments, and that demands greater focus on 
domestic concerns. A much reported Pew research poll for example found that 52% 
of Americans said the U.S. should ‘mind its own business internationally and let 
other countries get along the best they can on their own’ — the first time since 1964 
that more than half the public held that view.108 Within the dominant discourse of 
hegemonic engagement, this result and similar polls like it, were promptly 
denounced as sign for a dangerously increasing mood of ‘isolationism’ among the 
American people.109  
 
As Stephen Walt has written in reaction to just such an ‘isolationist’ headline in the 
New York Times: “Hawks like to portray opponents of military intervention as 
‘isolationist’ because they know it is a discredited political label.”110 Here in fact 
emerges a further intertextual link in grand strategy discourse, between realists such 
as Walt, proponents of libertine conservatism, such as the Cato Institute, and 
President Obama that all seek to disentangle a policy of non-interventionism and 
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military restraint from the stigma of isolationism employed by neoconservative 
primacists and liberal hegemonists, which continue to uphold the bi-partisan 
consensus of American global leadership. As Cato’s Benjamin Friedman and 
Christopher Preble have commented:  
 (…) the public is neither isolationist nor misguided when it comes to 
 foreign policy. Americans do not want to withdraw from the world; they 
 just prefer not to try to run it with their military.111  
 
Obama made his case for greater restraint at West Point as follows: 
Since World War II, some of our most costly mistakes came not from our 
restraint but from our willingness to rush into military adventures without 
thinking through the consequences, without building international support 
and legitimacy for our action, without leveling with the American people 
about the sacrifices required. 112 
 
Even more striking when it comes to the established mainstream consensus of U.S. 
foreign policy were poll results about the popular sentiments of U.S. citizens toward 
American leadership in the world, the sacrosanct mantra of the grand strategy 
discourse in Washington that Obama too was unwilling to breach. As Pew reported:  
Americans believe U.S. influence in the world is declining. About half (53%) 
said the U.S. role as a world leader is less important and powerful than 10 
years ago while only 17% said it was more important. Seven-in-ten said the 
U.S. is less respected by other countries than in the past. About an equal 
number favored a shared leadership role in the world with far fewer saying 
the U.S. should be the single world power.113  
 
Despite the majority of popular, formal and practical discourses that overwhelmingly 
stress the exceptionalism and indispensability of American leadership, and the 
paramount importance of U.S. military preeminence for peace, prosperity, and 
freedom, the American people seemed quite willing to accept a more restrained and 
less hegemonic role of their country in world politics. As an article in Time magazine 
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concluded: “Simply put, Obama has given the people the foreign policy they want—
one in which America “mind[s] its own business.”114 The President himself did 
acknowledge this national mood of retrenchment and restraint, when he directly 
quoted from a veteran’s letter addressed to him, during his nationally televised 
address on Syria: “This nation is sick and tired of war.”115 But while in his Syria 
speech Obama reemphasized his focus to end America’s wars, not to start new ones, 
and to focus on rebuilding the nation at home, he did invoke the image of American 
exceptionalism as a special responsibility for the United States to act abroad when its 
unique values where violated, as with the gas attacks attributed to the Assad regime 
in Syria.  
 
On the other hand, Obama went to great lengths to distinguish a possible military 
intervention in Syria from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, from the beginning 
ruling out the possibilities of ground invasion, regime change, or even a prolonged 
air campaign like in Kosovo, or Libya. This caveated, limited and cautious link 
between exceptionalism, American leadership, and U.S. policy that Obama 
demonstrated in his speech was then further strained by the fact that the President 
postponed seeking an authorization for military strikes from Congress, a vote he was 
likely to have lost, and instead opted for a diplomatic solution in accordance with 
Russia. President Obama closed his remarks on Syria with the following: 
America is not the world’s policeman. Terrible things happen across the 
globe, and it is beyond our means to right every wrong. But when, with 
modest effort and risk, we can stop children from being gassed to death, […], 
I believe we should act. That’s what makes America different. That’s what 
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makes us exceptional. With humility, but with resolve, let us never lose sight 
of that essential truth.116 
 
The image of American exceptionalism in Obama’s speech implied a special 
responsibility of the United States to commit its outstanding military assets when its 
‘unique’ values were violated, however a policy that would demonstrate this failed to 
materialize. While President Obama worked towards redefining American grand 
strategy toward restraint, engagement and multilateral cooperation, the country’s 
geopolitical identity remains firmly linked to an image of American leadership and 
military preeminence, and the use of force in defense of American values and 
national interests.  
 
On Libya, Obama could reconcile this tension, encapsulated in the phrase ‘leading 
from behind.’117 On Syria however, the President could not provide an image of 
determined leadership. The implied consequences for crossing the ‘red lines’ Obama 
set up in his speech did not result in military actions by the United States, and ‘red 
lines’ has become a symbol for the perceived weakness of the United States under 
Obama among conservative critics, foreign policy experts and the media.118 Even 
though a majority of Americans favored a diplomatic solution in Syria, the dominant 
impression is that Obama and the United States had been diplomatically 
outmaneuvered by Russia. 119  A CBS/New York Times poll, released on 25 
September 2013, revealed that just 37 percent approved of President Obama’s 
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handling of the Syrian crisis. His general approval ratings on foreign policy also 
dropped significantly over the course of the Syria episode.120  
 
The controversy over Syria indicated a fundamental tension prevailing in American 
grand strategy discourse on all levels, between a geopolitical vision of engagement 
and restraint, and a hegemonic imagination that still locates the country as the 
world’s leader and expects its political rhetoric and actions to reflect this identity. 
This split also seems present within the American population, which according to 
polls favors diplomatic engagement, and is weary of further military entanglements 
abroad, but is also critical of the perceived lack of American leadership. ‘Leading 
from behind’ seems to quite accurately describe the mood of a majority of 
Americans when it comes to their country’s preferred role in the world, but the 
implication of a diminished status of the United States is resented at the same time. 
 
The New York Times has observed that for ‘critics ranging from Senator McCain to 
human rights activists,’ U.S. actions over Syria have ‘come to symbolize the erosion 
of America’s leadership role in the world during the Obama presidency.’121 Robert 
Kagan, writing in the Washington Post has remarked that, while according to polls 
Americans in general favor a focus on ‘nation building at home’ and ‘leading from 
behind,’ the geopolitical image of exceptionalism, leadership and indispensability 
has also been a source of national pride and self-confirmation: “To follow a leader to 
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triumph inspires loyalty, gratitude and affection. Following a leader in retreat 
inspires no such emotions.”122 ‘Leading from behind’ has not been able to dissolve 
this conundrum of having to inspire the geopolitical imagination of the nation 
through policies aimed at limiting costs and risks.  
 
However, within the context of the established elite and popular discourses on U.S. 
foreign policy and national security President Obama was more willing than most to 
challenge conventional wisdom. He regularly stressed the contingency of American 
leadership on the country’s economic recovery and fiscal sustainability, and he 
emphasized the value of diplomatic engagement, instead of a singular focus on 
military action in matters of national security. During a press conference Obama 
reacted strongly to criticism of his foreign policy, in particular the reticence the 
United States displayed to get involved militarily over Syria and Ukraine: 
Typically, criticism of our foreign policy has been directed at the failure to 
use military force. And the question I think I would have is, why is it that 
everybody is so eager to use military force after we’ve just gone through a 
decade of war at enormous costs to our troops and to our budget?123 
 
Obama has not reframed the geopolitical identity of the United States to replace the 
imagination of American exceptionalism and indispensability. Given its cultural 
embeddedness, discursive authority and political importance such a move seems 
neither politically feasible, nor would it have accurately reflected Obama’s grand 
strategy that sought to reformulate, but not relinquish American leadership in the 
world.  
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Indeed, ‘American leadership,’ military preeminence and the use of force by the 
United States seem to have become almost synonymous in the mainstream discourse 
that represents the bi-partisan consensus on U.S. foreign and security policy. For 
Brooks, Ikenberry and Wolfforth, the United States has pursued a single successful 
grand strategy since the end of World War II:  
Its military bases cover the map, its ships patrol transit routes across the 
globe, and tens of thousands of its troops stand guard in allied countries such 
as Germany, Japan and South Korea.124 
 
According to Robert Kagan: 
If there has been less aggression, less ethnic cleansing, less  territorial 
conquest over the past 70 years, it is because the United States and its allies 
have both punished and deterred aggression (…).125  
 
The Brookings Institute has stated that U.S. military power is a ‘stabilizing element 
in the current global environment.’126 From the editorial and commentary pages of 
the New York Times, to the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal to the 
decidedly liberal New Republic, or the staunchly neoconservative Weekly Standard 
and Fox News, Obama is attacked for his lack of leadership and unwillingness to 
confront the provocations of aggressive great powers.127 As Zakaria has observed:  
 Obama is battling a knee-jerk sentiment in Washington in which the 
 only kind of international leadership that means anything is the use of 
 military force.128  
 
Here, engagement and diplomacy are often associated with the historic stigma of 
‘appeasement,’ and nuance with a lack of moral fiber and conviction in America’s 
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unique destiny. In the words of Andrew Bacevich: “In the American Exceptionalist 
catechism, isolationism comes in a close second to appeasement in the ranking of 
heinous sins.”129  
 
However, Obama’s careful shift in perspective about the possibilities of America’s 
role in the world, and the more limited meaning of military force, seem also to 
correspond with a certain generational change in popular attitudes toward American 
exceptionalism. A 2011 Pew poll found that only 32% of the current Millennials 
generation in the U.S. thought their country was ‘the greatest in the world’ — 
compared to 72% of those between the ages of 76-83.130  
 
The geopolitical vision of restrained leadership and global engagement that President 
Obama has formulated reflects the post-American future rather than the hegemonic 
past of America’s role in world politics. But most influential scholars, pundits and 
policy makers remain embedded in the Washington consensus of hegemony, mired 
in a unipolar worldview. They seem unable to move beyond the narrative of America 
as triumphant victor of World War 2 and the Cold War, and global defender of 
freedom and democracy. The American people on the other hand seem increasingly 
willing, and able to accept the post-American future in world politics that Obama’s 
geopolitical vision has pointed to. This might prove to be the lasting change of 
America’s role in the world that Obama’s grand strategy has achieved. 
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Conclusion 
 
A critical analysis of Obama’s articulation of grand strategy suggests that this 
President acted not so much a transformative, but as a transitional figure. Obama has 
hinted at new realities for the dominant role and position of the United States in 
world politics, marked by fewer resources, more limited ambitions, and a more 
careful and restricted use of American power. The various presidential speeches and 
statements in this context are intertextually linked to U.S. government estimates, 
such as the NIC report series and the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Reviews, the 
findings from IR scholarship, think tank research in policy analysis, and various 
popular media reflections. Representations and the practices of U.S. national security 
and foreign policy under Obama have documented a complex process of geopolitical 
adaptation and realignment, motivated both by the perception of an ever increasing 
dynamic of multipolarity, and the ambition to restore the domestic base of America’s 
economic strength, in order to preserve American leadership into the near future.  
 
Here, President Obama simultaneously connected with all three basic discourses of 
American grand strategy, analytically identified in the thesis as hegemony, 
engagement and restraint. Yet, this multidimensional character in the formulation of 
national security and foreign policy failed to convince large segments of the foreign 
policy establishment, which predominantly expected the un-caveated confirmation of 
American leadership. As the Washington Post has commented: 
‘Ending wars.’ ‘Nation-building at home.’ The ‘pivot to Asia.’ These are 
popular and attractive slogans, and they make a lot of sense in the abstract. 
But they don’t necessarily bring peace to a dangerous world (…).131 
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Obama’s simultaneous confirmation and contestation of such diverse discursive 
strands as multilateral hegemony, liberal, internationalism, realist offshore balancing, 
military primacy, and American exceptionalism made it impossible to assign the 
President’s geopolitical vision a clear and distinctive label that would correspond to 
the narrative cohesiveness and clarity of purpose geopolitical strategists, foreign 
policy experts and media pundits expect of grand strategy.  
 
Just as the Washington establishment’s definition of American leadership remains 
anchored in a U.S.-centric genealogy of the current international order, and the 
historic narrative of American victory in World War 2 and the Cold War, the 
dominant discourse of American grand strategy is unable to move beyond the 
fixation with containment and the intellectual allure of George Kennan’s ‘Long 
Telegram.’ Accordingly, the dominant voices of the Washington consensus demand 
clarity of vision and confirmation of leadership, not the pragmatic management of 
relative decline, or the tacit reorientation towards a more complex, and 
interdependent world of multiple centers of global power and influence.  
 
Obama’s grand strategy managed to disappoint the expectations of neoconservative 
primacists, humanitarian interventionists, realist offshore-balancers and radical 
critics of American empire in equal measure. The President himself appeared at least 
in parts to be critical of the established grand strategy discourse, when he and some 
of his closest advisors contrasted Obama’s careful, analytical style against the 
polarization of issues and the instinctual recourse to military action that accompany 
the habitual calls for ‘American leadership’ in Washington.  
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While, like his predecessors before him, Obama regularly confirmed and 
reconstituted a vision of America’s global leadership, military preeminence and U.S. 
power as foundation for liberal values and international order, he at the same time 
strongly promoted the idea of burden sharing, and stressed the need for collaborative 
action in an ever more interconnected and interdependent world. However, the limits 
of Obama’s engagement did not only manifest themselves in the unwillingness of 
several potential partners to renegotiate their relationships with the United States, 
and become ‘responsible stakeholders’ in a U.S.-led international order, but also in 
the inability to fully reconcile the notion of a post-American world and the 
implication of relative American decline with the hegemonic identity of the United 
States as the ‘indispensable nation.’  
 
A similar tension exists between Obama’s profession that America’s decade of war is 
ending, and the insistence on military restraint, and an increase in covert operations, 
drone strikes and secret intelligence tools in counter-terrorism policy that violate 
international law and infringe on the national sovereignty of enemies, allies and 
partners alike. Here, Obama arguably represented not a break with the Bush 
administration but an escalation of its policies. The need to square hegemonic 
geopolitical ambitions and the perception of diminished resources, power and 
influence, and thus practices that run counter to the established notion of American 
leadership marked the discourse of grand strategy throughout the Obama presidency. 
This perpetual tension would be partially captured in the phrase ‘leading from 
behind’ that rose to prominence over the Libya intervention.  
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Obama has not acted as a President, who is already operating in a post-American 
world, but he has formulated a grand strategy that points the way into a future where 
American leadership will be less distinctive, more contingent on outside support, and 
ultimately less in control of the shaping of outside events and processes, from the 
Middle East to the Pacific and Eastern Europe. To a foreign policy establishment that 
constantly professes that this world and its established order are a product of 
American leadership, this careful reframing of American grand strategy discourse 
has come as a disconcerting iconoclasm. Yet, Obama has been in tune with an 
American public that is increasingly weary of the country’s foreign commitments, 
although Americans seem to welcome the substance of a more restrained U.S. 
foreign policy more than the cautious style it is delivered with.  
 
Obama uses the image of American exceptionalism and hegemony to advance 
policies actually designed to lessen the burden of American leadership, and to divert 
resources, both economic and intellectual, for domestic priorities, thus inverting the 
conventional linkage of exceptionalist rhetoric and hegemonic practices expressed 
through foreign interventionism and the use of force. Yet, as the Syria episode 
illustrated, the identity of America as a leader in world politics and policies that 
counteract this identity cannot be bridged indefinitely within the existing paradigm 
of geopolitical identity. This conflict between the hegemonic imagination of 
American leadership and the practice of cooperative engagement and military 
restraint under Obama, raises the question about the limits of reframing American 
grand strategy and the potential future breaking point of the existing discourse. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
Speaking at the 2014 commencement ceremony at West Point, President Obama 
declared:  
(…) by most measures, America has rarely been stronger relative to the rest 
of the world. Those who argue otherwise -- who suggest that America is in 
decline, or has seen its global leadership slip away -- are either misreading 
history or engaged in partisan politics.1 
 
This dogged confirmation of American leadership was also meant as a rebuttal of 
Robert Kagan, who had accused Obama in the New Republic, to ‘preside over an 
inward turn by the United States that threatened the global order and broke with 
more than 70 years of American presidents and precedence,’ as the New York Times 
described it.2 Ironically, only two years earlier Obama had embraced Kagan’s 
argument for U.S. hegemony in his 2012 State of the Union Address, where he 
announced that the United States would remain the ‘indispensable nation’ of world 
affairs.  
 
The contradiction of opinions about the status of America’s role in the world 
between the politician Obama and the academic Kagan, publicized in the country’s 
leading media, highlighted once again the ongoing controversy in the national debate 
over grand strategy. The episode also demonstrated how reflections of grand strategy 
are frequently cross-referenced and mutually reconfirmed, and contested between 
scholarly analysis, Presidential rhetoric, and popular media, bringing into focus 
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several points the thesis presented here has examined in relation to the meaning, 
operation and impact of American grand strategy under the Obama presidency.  
 
First, grand strategy functions as an intertextual and cross-discursive process of 
construction of geopolitical identity, which establishes a dominant worldview, 
constituted and reconstituted between the realms of popular culture, academic 
expertise, and political reasoning. Secondly, the idea of American leadership, 
exceptionalism and indispensability is paramount to the dominant discourse of grand 
strategy, anchoring the geopolitical imagination about the role of the United States in 
a deep-seated and widespread concept of hegemonic identity. Finally, the vision of 
American grand strategy pursued by President Obama, reflecting a redefinition, but 
not replacement of hegemony, is contested from within the foreign policy 
establishment, revealing a fracturing of the national consensus about the purpose of 
American power, the use of force, and the nature of American leadership in the 
world.  
 
In addressing the formulation of American grand strategy under the Obama 
administration, and its interlinkage with national security policy through an 
intertextual analysis of popular, formal and practical discourses, the thesis has 
provided a critical reconceptualization of grand strategy that successfully 
incorporated geopolitical identity as an analytical dimension in the context of 
power/knowledge. Looking at texts from popular books to films, speeches, policy 
documents, and research articles, the thesis could demonstrate how representations of 
leadership, exceptionalism, and military supremacy are fundamental in constituting a 
worldview of American hegemony that far exceeds a strict material understanding of 
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grand strategy, and the use of power for security. Exploring the intertextual links 
between identity and policy then revealed that the American grand strategy the 
Obama administration defined was in fact multidimensional, reflected in competing, 
and conflicting discourses of hegemony, engagement, and restraint that reconfirmed, 
but also reformulated this geopolitical vision of American leadership.  
  
Regarding the existing literature on the subject, this approach constituted a 
theoretical and epistemological innovation, offering a critical research perspective on 
a traditionally positivist understood concept, mainly associated with realism. At the 
same time, the thesis advanced methodologically from the conventional sphere of 
discourse analysis in critical geopolitics. Moving beyond a mainly representational 
understanding of discourse, it included material factors, such as sales figures and 
impact factors, in its intertextual analysis, operationalized in an interpretive 
framework of power/knowledge. Finally, the investigation of American grand 
strategy entailed both an analysis of the discursive performance of such terms as 
‘indispensable nation’ and ‘American exceptionalism,’ and an examination of the 
practical procedures interlinked with these discursive tropes, from filmmaking to the 
trajectory of the American defense budget and military intervention, that constitute 
them as political, social and cultural reality.  
 
From the conclusions provided by the thesis, grand strategy then should primarily be 
understood as expression of a dominant worldview, culturally embedded, 
intertextually constructed, and reconstituted across discursive domains. It is based on 
normative assumptions, beliefs, historic narratives, and convictions, which are pre-
imposed on the discourse of strategy and security, not gained through a positivist 
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process of empirical analysis. While conventionally understood as a process of 
calculation of the future, and the anticipation of outcomes, grand strategy works ex 
post, rather than ex ante. It is a projection of the past into the future: a product of 
conventional wisdom, and establishment thinking, supported by historic genealogies 
that stress continuity over change, simplicity over complexity, and coherence over 
ambiguity.  
 
From Battleship, and Robert Kagan’s bestselling The World America Made and 
President Obama’s 2014 speech at West Point, to the majority of grand strategy 
articles published in Foreign Affairs and the policy papers on national security of 
Washington’s leading think tanks: American leadership in the world is discursively 
imposed as the only viable option in the international system that can guarantee 
global freedom, prosperity and peace: The only world imaginable is the world 
America made.  
 
The dominant American grand strategy discourse thus de-politicizes issues of 
national security policy and geopolitics by establishing an exclusive reality of 
American leadership, exceptionalism and military supremacy as beyond legitimate 
debate. The de-legitimization of libertarian and realist concepts of restraint as 
forwarded by the Cato Institute, or the IR scholar Stephen Walt as ‘isolationism,’ by 
proponents of the bi-partisan consensus of U.S. hegemony is a perfect example for 
this genealogical construction of the grand strategy discourse. Neoconservatives and 
liberals from AEI and Charles Krauthammer, to Brookings and President Obama 
declare a geopolitical vision of territorial self-defense and greatly limited military 
expenditures to stand outside acceptable opinion by linking it to the dominant 
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narrative of the catastrophic results of ‘appeasement’ and ‘isolationism’ in World 
War 2.  
 
The idealization of George F. Kennan and containment as a ‘golden age’ of 
American grand strategy on the other hand exemplary reveals a highly selective and 
biased reading of history that reproduces a basic narrative of American 
exceptionalism and the country’s role as victorious defender of freedom. This 
narrative largely ignores the constant threat of mutual nuclear annihilation, the 
immense human costs of the superpower proxy wars from Vietnam to Afghanistan, 
and the questionable role the United States has played in the past to counter a 
perceived threat of Soviet expansionism. Calls for the return of grand strategy expose 
a peculiar nostalgia for a supposedly simpler, less complex geopolitical environment, 
in which America’s enemy was clear, and its sense of national purpose guaranteed.  
 
Critically reconceptualizing grand strategy as a discourse of geopolitical identity in 
the context of power/knowledge has allowed the thesis to question the use of such 
de-politicizing tactics. Grand strategy thus appears not simply as an empirical 
description and scientific analysis of external reality, but as a political worldview 
that divides world politics into legitimate and illegitimate concepts of identity, power 
and order. Grand strategy in short is never neutral, but highly politicized. The 
majority of American grand strategy thinking is retrospective, conservative, and 
reluctant to accept changing geopolitical realties, greater complexity and less 
certainty in the international system. Both, a non-interventionist, offshore balancing 
United States that practices restraint, and a ‘post-American world’ of multiple 
centers of global power and influence in which the country exist as only one of many 
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hubs, directly clash with the established narrative of American leadership, and the 
dominant identity construct of global superpower status. Maybe worst of all, the 
grand strategy visions of engagement and restraint offer more complexity and 
uncertainty for the future, not less.  
 
In the dominant grand strategy discourse promoted by the Washington consensus, the 
‘big picture’ is supposed to be clear, coherent and focused. Realties that seem to 
question long-held beliefs, assumptions and convictions of geopolitical identity are 
being rejected, when they question the hegemonic premise of ‘American leadership.’ 
The ongoing political debate about Congressional sequestration and cuts to the 
Pentagon budget for example continues to be as virulent as it is, because it touches 
on this entrenched hegemonic identity of the United States as unchallenged, global 
superpower, and the political-military practice necessary to sustain this status. A 
singularity of thinking impedes the ability for political change and ideational 
transformation. In highlighting the nexus of geopolitical identity and national 
security policy, the research presented here has thus achieved to go beyond a 
utilitarian understanding of grand strategy as rationalist reduction of complexity.  
 
A critical perspective can highlight the multiple tensions, fractures and 
inconsistencies entailed within the formulation of grand strategy that the 
conventional literature misses. This appreciation for, and acceptance of complexity, 
nuance and multidimensionality does not devalue the concept of grand strategy, or 
diminish the insight of critical approaches to international relations, but strengthens 
the interpretive value of both. If we want to better understand how a country acts in 
the world and the motivation it follows in its actions, we should look at how a nation 
 360 
defines its role in the world, the beliefs, assumptions and narratives that this is based 
on, and the implications this has for the construction of knowledge, expressed in the 
formulation of policies, the authority of scholarly expertise, and the definition of 
conventional wisdom. To gain insight into these debates about a nation’s future, its 
aspirations, and limitations via the lens of its dominant geopolitical imagination, this 
is the value of grand strategy.  
 
Limitations of research  
 
One of the problems with this cross-discursive, intertextual approach of analysis is 
that it sacrifices depth for breadth. An investigative approach that considers 
discursive sites as varied as popular culture, academic expertise, and policy making 
naturally cannot provide the same amount of detailed analysis into one particular 
issue as for example an exclusive monograph on the geopolitical imagination of the 
national security cinema. However, rather than a weakness, such a method that 
highlights the mutual interconnectedness of fields of analysis normally observed 
separately responds positively too often heard calls for interdisciplinary openness 
and network-oriented thinking in the social sciences. Here, the thesis also offers 
possibilities for future research connections with related fields such as history, 
cultural studies, or linguistics.  
 
A further limitation arises from the fact that the main research interest of the thesis 
lies in how American grand strategy operates within an elite framework of political, 
academic and popular discursive domains. This largely excludes marginalized, or 
fringe voices, discourses of resistance, or outsider definitions of America’s 
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geopolitical identity that might come, for example from groups such as Occupy Wall 
Street. Such subjugated knowledges are undoubtedly insightful for mapping out the 
many alternatives to the establishment view of what America should be in the 
world.3 Yet, as the thesis demonstrated, it is within the foreign policy establishment 
that we encounter a considerable bandwidth of conflicting opinion about America’s 
future strategic course. This is all the more relevant because this conflict occurred at 
the very center of what constitutes the elite network responsible for the formulation 
of U.S. foreign and national security policy, and that claims to speak for ‘America.’  
 
Advantages of research design 
 
Incorporating insights from critical geopolitics in the study of national security 
allows a more inclusive discussion of what grand strategy actually means, the 
implication it has, and what this reveals about the role of convictions, perceptions 
and assumptions in world politics and their materialization in security discourses and 
practices. A rethinking of American geopolitical identity away from its fixation with 
leadership, exceptionalism and hegemony could for example divert substantial 
financial resources from defense toward domestic spending programs, from 
education to healthcare.  
 
A United States that perceives its role as a more equal and interdependent member of 
the international system however, would also have to result in a mutual 
reformulation of several key relationships between the United States and its friends 
and allies. This would mean that the United States ceases to perceive its partners in 
                                            
3
 Cf., Milliken, p. 243. 
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Europe and Asia primarily as infantilized, and occasionally derided auxiliaries to 
American hegemony, unfit to be trusted with managing the ‘commons,’ or providing 
international security and global governance.  
 
On the other hand, several countries would need to decrease their existing 
dependence on the United States in international security matters, from intelligence 
to military assets. At the moment it is still the default position, particularly in Europe 
to hope for the United States to act as the world’s policeman, and to criticize it 
afterwards. A grand strategy vision of engagement as cooperative partnership would 
thus have to be reciprocated by countries willing to share joint responsibilities for 
combating terrorism, or deter regional aggression, based on shared threat 
assessments and common interests.  
 
A critical analysis of grand strategy, national security and geopolitics encourages us 
to not reduce world politics to abstract, reductionist conceptualizations of what 
reality should be, exclusively understood in terms of materiality, empiricism, and 
positivism, but rather to investigate the multiple implications of human imagination 
and interaction in the construction of social reality, which forms and reforms in 
various domains, and in different constellations of power and knowledge. A critical 
grand strategy perspective should encourage us for example to question the often-
postulated equation of unipolar stability, military supremacy and global security as 
self-evident truth. Given the negative record of past military interventions in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the usefulness, effectiveness and validity of military 
power in achieving lasting political stability seems very much in doubt. Conclusions 
about the use of military power and national security should at the very least be 
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probed extensively for each individual case, not reduced to knee-jerk reactions about 
Western credibility and American leadership, be it in Syria or Ukraine.  
 
On the other side, a dogmatic position of restraint as often presented by realists 
should also be questioned. Simply ignoring severe human rights violations and 
genocidal practices might be consistent with a coherent grand strategy of ‘offshore 
balancing,’ but it would be ethically and morally reprehensible. In a globalized 
world, grand strategy should be about understanding complexity and reacting 
flexibly to changing environments, not to remain fixated on artificial notions of 
coherence and consistency. 
 
American grand strategy as discourse of geopolitical identity: The worldview of 
American hegemony 
 
Grand strategy is a prism of interpretation that reveals dominant perceptions of the 
national self in a world political context, and it filters policies as either confirming or 
contesting such a dominant construct of geopolitical identity. It sets the national 
framework for the conduct of foreign and security policy and demarcates the limits 
of debate and acceptable opinion. As such it represents a nexus of power/knowledge 
in the Foucauldian sense in that what is considered an acceptable grand strategy for 
the United States is bound up with hierarchies of legitimacy and influence that 
advance certain conceptualizations of geopolitical knowledge and historic narratives 
over others.  
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For the United States, the dominant, legitimized mainstream discourse of grand 
strategy is a discourse of hegemony, which describes both the dominant 
representation of the geopolitical identity of the country as leading political, military, 
economic and cultural power in the world, in popular films, books, articles, policy 
papers, strategy documents, and Presidential speeches, and the practice of securing 
this position as the global number one, and ‘steward of the international system.’  
 
From Hollywood blockbusters to popular bestsellers, political debates and 
conventional scholarly analysis, Americans continue to be socialized in, and 
informed by a mainstream discourse that reproduces the geopolitical reality of a 
dominant United States, reflecting a narrative of historic continuity marked by 
America’s victories in World War 2 and the Cold War. However, rather than 
determining policy outcomes, ‘American leadership’ seems primarily vital for 
confirming the self-image of the United States in the American geopolitical 
imagination.  
 
In an era marked by increasing geopolitical uncertainty, as documented in the 
popular, formal, and practical discourses that frequently represent changes to the 
status quo predominantly as threat and risk scenarios, form the Arab Spring to the 
rise of China, and Russian revisionism, an American grand strategy is expected to 
provide national self-confirmation. The discourse of hegemony then serves an 
identity building and identity stabilizing function, meant to assure the continued 
premier status of the United States in the international system. In the words of 
President Obama: 
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(…) the United States is and remains the one indispensable nation. That has 
been true for the century passed and it will be true for the century to come.4  
 
This comes at a time where the global financial crisis and the outcome of the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have seriously undermined the premise of a ‘unipolar moment’, 
and the American claim to world leadership seems more tenuous than maybe at any 
point since the end of the Cold War. Yet, discounting a few outliers within the 
engagement and restraint discourses, global leadership, American exceptionalism, 
and indispensability remain the prism through which most influential discursive 
producers in the United States perceive, and in turn reconstruct America’s role in 
world politics. When it comes to grand strategy, it is thus a question of how and 
through which means the United States should lead in the world, not if.5      
 
Issues of representation and political practice are not separate, but intrinsically linked 
and mutually reinforcing each other in the discourse of grand strategy of hegemony. 
This linkage manifests itself in multiple ways that go beyond strict national security 
and defense policy: The provision of military goods and services by the Pentagon to 
film productions that confirm the image of US military supremacy. A researcher of 
the CSIS think tank anonymously drafting a speech by Secretary of Defense Chuck 
Hagel, confirming America’s status as a ‘Pacific power.’ The hiring of leading 
members of the Center for a New American Century think tank by the Obama White 
House into senior positions for foreign policy and defense. Secretary Gates 
presenting the Pentagon’s new ‘partner-building’ initiative in the pages of Foreign 
Affairs. The political endorsement of Hillary Clinton, widely considered a ‘liberal 
                                            
4
 Obama, “Transcript of President Obama’s Commencement Address at West Point,” May 28, 2014. 
5
 As President Obama explained at West Point: “The question we face, the question each of you will face, is not 
whether America will lead, but how we will lead -- not just to secure our peace and prosperity, but also extend 
peace and prosperity around the globe.” Ibid. 
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hawk’ by Robert Kagan, a staunch, neoconservative hegemonist in the New York 
Times.6  
 
These are only some of the examples how the geopolitical vision of American 
leadership is being maintained and reinforced in Washington DC. As such, the 
production of the grand strategy discourse of hegemony also represents a self-
reinforcing cycle of conventional wisdom, elite status and professional expertise that 
rewards the perpetuation of the status quo, rather than outside-the-box thinking, or 
progressive ideas. In fact, the geopolitical imagination of global leadership, 
maintained and reproduced by the elite class of the US national security and foreign 
policy establishment, is responsible for an entire political economy of hegemony, 
manifest in multiple think tank research projects, multi-billion US-dollar weapons 
programs, university study programs, and a prolific publishing enterprise that runs 
under the ‘grand strategy’ label.  
 
The discourse of grand strategy then achieves its political significance not as a 
stringent blueprint for political and military action, but primarily as attempt to 
reconfirm the hegemonic identity of the United States of America in a time where 
this identity seems to come more and more under pressure. This hegemonic role and 
position has undoubtedly provided a national sense of destiny, and certainty of 
purpose for the world’s ‘only remaining superpower.’ The realization that the time of 
the United States as the world’s indispensable nation might come to an end in a post-
American world, a possibility the popular, formal and practical grand strategy 
                                            
6
 Kagan commented on Clinton: "I feel comfortable with her on foreign policy;" quoted in Horowitz. 
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discourses so far have at best hinted at, is therefore a potential shock to the national 
imagination that could shatter America’s hegemonic narcissism.  
 
Competing visions, conflicting discourses: Hybridity, intertextuality and the 
‘breaking point’ of the grand strategy discourse  
 
Under the Obama presidency there is no single, dominant American grand strategy 
that actually functions as the coherent narrative and supreme guideline to the national 
interest that foreign policy experts, media pundits and strategists themselves 
postulate. There is no longer a national consensus on America’s role in the world. 
Liberal hawks and neoconservative primacists defend an increasingly tenuous status 
quo of unipolarity, hegemony and military supremacy against calls for change by 
libertarian conservatives, progressives, and realists, which all demand a strategic 
course correction and greater restraint in the conduct of American foreign and 
security policy, and in particular the use of force.  
 
President Obama does not side with either side completely, but adopts elements from 
all these competing discourses in his articulation of grand strategy. Obama’s grand 
strategy actually represents a multitude of conflicting discourses that point the 
country in different directions, between unipolar leadership and military supremacy, 
cooperative partnerships and post-American dynamics, and geopolitical retrenchment 
and military restraint. The much-highlighted ‘pivot to Asia’ of the Obama 
administration for example appears less as a coherent and consistent set of 
strategically oriented policies, and more as testament to a discourse of geopolitical 
uncertainty where the United States simultaneously seeks to contain China as a rival, 
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and engage it as a partner in the Asia-Pacific region. A duality of the geopolitical 
imagination accurately captured as ‘congagement’ by the Cato Institute.  
 
The competing discourses of grand strategy, simultaneously employed by the 
President as expressed in his frequent use of such key formulations as ‘indispensable 
nation,’ ‘leading from behind, and ‘nation-building at home,’ reveal a complexity of 
contemporary international relations, which is not easily subsumed under one central 
narrative, unitary threat perception, and single-minded prioritization of national 
resources that grand strategy is supposed to deliver. However, this does not mean 
that grand strategy does not exist, or play a role in the Obama White House, as critics 
argue. Neither does it mean that grand strategy does not serve a function within the 
context of national security policy. Hegemony, engagement and restraint provide the 
ideational framework under which the foreign and security policy of the Obama 
administration operates, and through which it is confirmed and contested from the 
outside.  
 
This multitude of competing and conflicting geopolitical visions in Obama’s 
speeches and policies did not lead to the coherence and consistency, grand strategists 
expect, leading to the frequent charge that President Obama lacks a grand strategy to 
begin with. But this multidimensional grand strategy discourse accurately reflects the 
President’s political priorities in addressing the country’s foreign and security policy, 
the domestic commitments it is weighed against, and the changing geopolitical 
environment. A development that US government institutions like the Pentagon and 
the NIC expect to increasingly move toward a global multipolarity of power and 
influence.  
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However, only by moving beyond the idea of grand strategy as stringent input-output 
equation of material resources calculated against an identified enemy, and by 
applying a discursive framework of investigation and understanding does the grand 
strategy of the Obama administration become recognizable as such. It is not the lack 
of grand strategy then that marks the conduct of national security and foreign policy 
under the Obama administration, but the increased adversity and complexity in 
defining America’s role in the world. 
 
Obama’s grand strategy seems to match the national mood, and is supported by a 
majority of the American people, according to the latest opinion polls that have 
indicated that a majority of Americans want the United States to ‘mind its own 
business.’ This in turn points to a further fracturing of the dominant grand strategy 
consensus between elites and the American public. It seems that in addition to 
libertarian conservatives, realists, and progressives a majority of the American 
people is questioning the wisdom of hegemony and primacy. Even popular films 
such as Captain America: The Winter Soldier, White House Down, or Avatar seem to 
contain critical reflections of American leadership and military supremacy, 
demonstrating how Hollywood, normally a bastion of the production and re-
production of conventional wisdom, can occasionally challenge the premise of 
American hegemony.  
 
Given that the mantra of American leadership is such an essential element of the 
established American grand strategy discourse, a key representation of identity 
Obama himself has not challenged, this conflict between elite opinion and popular 
sentiment points to further friction in the grand strategy discourse in the future, 
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should the United States continue to match a rhetoric of hegemonic indispensability 
with political practices that seek to contain American power and limit the use of 
force.      
 
The worldview of American grand strategy then, understood as geopolitical vision of 
American leadership in the world underwritten by a posture and policy of global 
military primacy, which up to the presidency of George W. Bush represented a 
dominant consensus for more than seven decades, is fracturing at the very center of 
mainstream discourse. This challenge to hegemony is not limited to the usual 
criticism from left, progressive circles, but pits the foreign policy establishment 
against itself, where the President himself, influential think tanks, popular authors 
and respected scholars are bringing forward alternative formulations for a US role in 
the world.  
 
In President Obama the discourse of hegemony is quasi challenged from within, 
when the commander-in-chief of America’s Armed Forces declares that ‘because we 
have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.’ The new focus on 
restraint and engagement however ill fits with the established representation of 
American leadership as central trope of geopolitical identity construction. This raises 
the question about the future breaking point of the discourse, and how long this 
tension will be sustainable, between the country's hegemonic self-perception of 
indispensable global leadership, and its national security policies oriented toward 
greater shared responsibility and the pragmatic management of retrenchment in a 
multipolar world.  
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Here, Obama so far neither fundamentally changed course, nor did he provide a 
radical redefinition of America’s role in the world. It was neither an embrace of 
isolationism, nor an acceptance of American decline, but a pragmatic response to 
maintain American leadership in an anticipated, but not yet fully realized post-
American world. This balancing act between assuring the American people of 
America’s continued importance as the world’s only superpower, and a policy that 
seeks to strategically redistribute the responsibilities of global leadership, and that 
sometimes chooses to not exercise leadership at all, is marked by a fundamental 
inconsistency in the discourse.  
 
While Obama is a transitional President that has modulated, but not completely 
redefined the dominant vision of hegemony, future Presidents might be forced to 
reformulate American grand strategy more radically, and to provide a lasting, new 
definition of America’s role in the world that bings in line representations and 
resources, rhetoric and practice. This would likely involve providing a long-term 
vision, which redefines the country’s geopolitical identity to better match a world in 
which the United States might still be the most important factor in an interdependent, 
and interconnected world, but where it is no longer the sole, indispensable nation.    
 
 Beyond American grand strategy: A critical research perspective for the study of 
identity and security in world politics 
 
The density and variety of data collection, the cross-discursive observation of 
knowledge production, and the attention to intertextuality in both discursive 
representations and practices the thesis has employed points to avenues of IR 
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research beyond an individual study of US foreign and security policy. A research 
design that seeks to operationalize the examination of identity and the political 
practices that confirm, or contest dominant ideational concepts accepts that 
knowledge is not built in isolation, and that worldviews are expressed in words and 
actions. Such an incorporation of materiality however, should not be undertaken for 
the sake of positivist reduction and simplification, but rather in an attempt to open 
the study of security for the possibilities of complexity, multidimensionality, nuance, 
and change that eschews both the simplicity of a power based cause and effect logic, 
and the reduction of political processes to the textual writing of identity.  
 
Future analysis could for example be operationalized in more detailed research 
designs, with a greater scope of content analysis, wider use of original empirical data 
collection, and greater focus on policy impact. A possible angle of enquiry could also 
lie in devising comparative research designs that examine the geopolitical and 
national security discourses of more than one country, to anticipate likely friction in 
foreign and security policy due to diverging conceptualizations of two nations’ 
respective understandings of their role in the world.  
 
Another significant aspect that requires further research is the question of coherence 
and congruence between identity and policy, and the implications of a divergence 
between constructs of geopolitical identity and national security policy. Here, rather 
than dismissing the concept of grand strategy for its retrospective and reductionist 
bias altogether, the thesis has offered a research perspective that would utilize the 
concept as interpretive device for the durability of ideational concepts of identity and 
historic narratives in a world political context. The cracks that have appeared in the 
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Washington consensus over the course of the Obama presidency suggest that a 
dominant discourse of identity cannot be endlessly juxtaposed against contrary 
political practices. When and how a reframing of geopolitical identity would have to 
occur in order to realign discourse, policy and practice would be a valuable research 
question for further study.  
 
The world does not operate according to the ideas and ideals of strategists. The 
global complexity of international interactions, -politically, economically, militarily, 
and culturally-, frustrates their political preferences for intellectual simplicity and 
clarity of vision. The failure to grasp an increasingly post-American world through a 
coherent and consistent American grand strategy also reveals a crisis of Western 
political thinking and confidence in the progress of liberal modernity. A theme 
explored by the Indian author and essayist Pankaj Mishra, who wrote that 
considering the multiple crises and conflicts affecting the Middle East, Europe, and 
Asia: 
(…) the most commonplace response seems to be despair over American 
‘weakness’ and accusations about what Barack Obama, as president of the 
‘sole superpower,’ should have done or ought to do.7 
 
Beyond lamenting a lack of ‘American leadership,’ most thinkers of grand strategy 
seem unable to respond to a changing world, which has been shaped by centuries of 
European and American dominance, both materially and intellectually, but appears 
now more and more influenced by events and processes outside the West’s control. 
The thesis has demonstrated that a criticality rooted in an empirically rich, 
intertextually dense exploration can offer more substantiated and sophisticated 
claims about the mutual correlation of power and knowledge, inviting us to question 
                                            
7
 Pankaj Mishra, “The west is not a model for the rest,” Zeit, September 13, 2014, accessed September 17, 2014, 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-09/geopolitics-west-democracy-freedom.  
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long-held premises, normative assumptions and established narratives in a world that 
is in flux. However, such a dense reading is likely to lead to more complex 
understandings of International Relations. Judging from this study of American 
grand strategy however, it is the multitude of knowledge, the multidimensionality of 
power, and the fluidity of discourse, not artificial coherence and consistency, which 
produce the reality of geopolitics.   
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9. List of Abbreviations  
ASB Air-Sea Battle 
BCA Budget Control Act 
CAP Center for American Progress 
CFR Council on Foreign Relations 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CNAS Center of a New American Security 
COIN Counter-Insurgency 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
CSBA Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments  
CSIS  Center for Strategic and International Studies  
CT Counter-terrorism 
DNI  Director of National Intelligence  
DoD U.S. Department of Defense 
DSG Defense Strategic Guidance 
IC Intelligence Community 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDU National Defense University 
NIC  National Intelligence Council  
NSA National Security Agency 
NWC National War College  
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
OCS Officer Candidate School 
PME Professional Military Education 
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs 
ROTS Reserve Officer Training Course 
SEAL  Sea Air and Land Team of the U.S. Navy 
UN United Nations 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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10. Appendix – List of Interviews 
 
Interview with Christopher Preble, 21 May 2013, Washington DC. 
 
Interview with Andrew Bacevich, 22 May 2013, Boston, MA. 
 
Interview with Thomas Donnelly, 29 May 2013, Washington DC. 
 
Interview with Michael O’Hanlon, 1 June 2013, Washington DC. 
 
Interview with Mark Mykleby, 7 June 2013, Beaufort SC. 
 
Interview with Greg Schultz, 12 June 2013, Washington DC. 
 
Interview with Shawn Brimley, 15 June 2013, Washington DC. 
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